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  1. Todd Jones (2012). Do Customs Compete with Conditioning? Turf Battles and Division of Labor in Social Explanation. Synthese 184 (3):407-430.
    We often face a bewildering array of different explanations for the same social facts (e.g. biological, psychological, economic, and historical accounts). But we have few guidelines for whether and when we should think of different accounts as competing or compatible. In this paper, I offer some guidelines for understanding when custom or norm accounts do and don’t compete with other types of accounts. I describe two families of non-competing accounts: (1) explanations of different (but similarly described) facts, and (2) accounts (...)
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  2. Todd Jones (2010). What People Believe When They Say That People Believe: Folk Sociology and the Nature of Group Intentions. Lexington Books.
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  3. Todd Jones (2008). Explanations of Social Phenomena: Competing and Complementary Accounts. Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):621-650.
    Abstract: Situations that social scientists and others explain by using concepts like "custom" and "norm" often tend to be situations in which many other kinds of explanations (for example, biological, psychological, economic, historical) seem plausible as well. Do these other explanations compete with the custom or norm explanations, or do they complement them? We need to consider this question carefully and not just assume that various accounts are all permissible at different levels of analysis. In this article I describe two (...)
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  4. Todd Jones (2007). Numerous Ways to Be an Open-Minded Organization: A Reply to Lahroodi. Social Epistemology 21 (4):439 – 448.
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  5. Todd Jones (2007). What's Done Here—Explaining Behavior in Terms of Customs and Norms. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):363-393.
    Terms like “norm,” “custom,” “convention,” “tradition,” and “culture” are used throughout social science, and throughout everyday conversation ,to describe certain types of behaviors. Yet it is not very clear what people mean by them. In this paper, I try to make clearer what is meant by these terms and what makes the behavior they describe possible.
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  6. Todd Jones (2006). "We Always Have a Beer After the Meeting": How Norms, Customs, Conventions, and the Like Explain Behavior. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (3):251-275.
    There are a vast number of ways of explaining human behavior in the social sciences and in ordinary conversation. One family of accounts seeks to explain behavior using terms such as norms, customs, tradition, convention , and culture . Despite the ubiquity of these terms, it is not fully clear how these concepts really explain behavior, how they are related, how they differ, and what they contrast with. In this article, I hope to answer such questions. Key Words: norm • (...)
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  7. Todd Jones (2005). How Many New Yorkers Need to Like Bagels Before You Can Say "New Yorkers Like Bagels?" Understanding Collective Ascription. Philosophical Forum 36 (3):279–306.
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  8. Todd Jones (2004). Reduction and Anti-Reduction: Rights and Wrongs. Metaphilosophy 25 (5):614-647.
  9. Todd Jones (2004). Special Sciences: Still a Flawed Argument After All These Years. Cognitive Science 28 (3):409-432.
  10. Todd Jones (2004). Uncovering "Cultural Meaning": Problems and Solutions. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):247 - 268.
    In his highly influential "The Interpretation of Cultures," anthropologist Clifford Geertz argues that the study of culture ought to be "not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning." I argue that the two need not be opposed. The best way of making sense of the social scientific practice of looking at meaning is to see interpretivists as looking at typical mental reactions that people in a given culture have to certain acts and (...)
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  11. Todd Jones (2003). The Failure of the Best Arguments Against Social Reduction (and What That Failure Doesn't Mean). Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):547-581.
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  12. Todd Jones (2003). The Virtues of Non-Reduction, Even When Reduction is a Virtue. Philosophical Forum 34 (4):121-140.
  13. Todd Jones (2001). Unifying Scientific Theories. Margaret Morrison. Mind 110 (440):1097-1102.
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  14. Todd Jones (2001). What CBS Wants: How Groups Can Have (Difficult to Uncover) Beliefs. Philosophical Forum 32 (3):221-251.
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  15. Ron Wilburn, Todd Jones & David Beisecker (2001). Moscow Nights. The Philosophers' Magazine 15 (15):30-31.
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  16. Todd Jones (1999). Arbitrary Arbitrariness: Reply to Segal. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 29 (2):310-314.
  17. Todd Jones (1999). FIC Descriptions and Interpretive Social Science: Should Philosophers Roll Their Eyes? Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 29 (2):337–369.
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  18. Todd Jones (1998). Interpretive Social Science and the "Native's Point of View": A Closer Look. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 28 (1):32-68.
    In the past two decades, many anthropologists have been drawn to "interpre tive" perspectives which hold that the study of human culture would profit by using approaches developed in the humanities, rather than using approaches used in the natural sciences. The author discusses the source of the appeal of such perspectives but argues that interpretive approaches to social science tend to be fundamentally flawed, even by common everyday epistemological standards.
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  19. Todd Jones (1998). Unification, Deduction, and History: A Reply to Steel. Philosophy of Science 65 (4):672-681.
    Daniel Steel argues that a causal theory of explanation can account for Ferguson's anthropological theory of Yanomami warfare but that a unification theory of explanation cannot. I argue that a unification theory can explain such an account, in a manner similar to Hempel's view of explanation in history. I go on to argue that the unification theory allows for different explanations of specific and general social circumstances.
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  20. Todd Jones & D. Steel (1998). Unification, Deduction, and History. Author's Reply. Philosophy of Science 65 (4):672-687.
     
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  21. Todd Jones (1997). Thick Description, Fat Syntax, and Alternative Conceptual Systems. Pragmatics and Cognition 5 (1):131-162.
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  22. Todd Jones (1997). Unification, Reduction, and Non-Ideal Explanations. Synthese 112 (1):75-96.
    Kitcher's unification theory of explanation seems to suggest that only the most reductive accounts can legitimately be termed explanatory. This is not what we find in actual scientific practice. In this paper, I attempt to reconcile these ideas. I claim that Kitcher's theory picks out ideal explanations, but that our term explanation is used to cover other accounts that have a certain relationship with the ideal accounts. At times, versions and portions of ideal explanations can also be considered explanatory.
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  23. Todd Jones (1996). Methodological Individualism in Proper Perspective. Behavior and Philosophy 24 (2):119 - 128.
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  24. Todd Jones (1995). How the Unification Theory of Explanation Escapes Asymmetry Problems. Erkenntnis 43 (2):229 - 240.
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  25. Todd Jones (1995). Reductionism and the Unification Theory of Explanation. Philosophy of Science 62 (1):21-30.
    P. Kitcher's unification theory of explanation appears to endorse a reductionistic view of scientific explanation that is inconsistant with scientific practice. In this paper, I argue that this appearance is illusory. The existence of multiply realizable generalizations enable the unification theory to also count many high-level accounts as explanatory.
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  26. Todd Jones (1991). Staving Off Catastrophe: A Critical Notice of Jerry Fodor's Psychosemantics. Mind and Language 6 (1):58-82.