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  1. Tom Froese (2014). Bio-Machine Hybrid Technology: A Theoretical Assessment and Some Suggestions for Improved Future Design. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Technology 27 (4):539-560.
    In sociology, there has been a controversy about whether there is any essential difference between a human being and a tool, or if the tool–user relationship can be defined by co-actor symmetry. This issue becomes more complex when we consider examples of AI and robots, and even more so following progress in the development of various bio-machine hybrid technologies, such as robots that include organic parts, human brain implants, and adaptive prosthetics. It is argued that a concept of autonomous agency (...)
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  2. Tom Froese (2013). Interactively Guided Introspection is Getting Science Closer to an Effective Consciousness Meter. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):672-676.
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  3. Tom Froese, Hiroyuki Iizuka & Takashi Ikegami (2013). From Synthetic Modeling of Social Interaction to Dynamic Theories of Brain–Body–Environment–Body–Brain Systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):420 - 421.
    Synthetic approaches to social interaction support the development of a second-person neuroscience. Agent-based models and psychological experiments can be related in a mutually informing manner. Models have the advantage of making the nonlinear brainenvironmentbrain system as a whole accessible to analysis by dynamical systems theory. We highlight some general principles of how social interaction can partially constitute an individual's behavior.
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  4. Tom Froese & Takashi Ikegami (2013). The Brain is Not an Isolated “Black Box,” nor is its Goal to Become One. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):213-214.
    In important ways, Clark's (HPM) approach parallels the research agenda we have been pursuing. Nevertheless, we remain unconvinced that the HPM offers the best clue yet to the shape of a unified science of mind and action. The apparent convergence of research interests is offset by a profound divergence of theoretical starting points and ideal goals.
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  5. Tom Froese & Thomas Fuchs (2012). The Extended Body: A Case Study in the Neurophenomenology of Social Interaction. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):205-235.
    There is a growing realization in cognitive science that a theory of embodied intersubjectivity is needed to better account for social cognition. We highlight some challenges that must be addressed by attempts to interpret ‘simulation theory’ in terms of embodiment, and argue for an alternative approach that integrates phenomenology and dynamical systems theory in a mutually informing manner. Instead of ‘simulation’ we put forward the concept of the ‘extended body’, an enactive and phenomenological notion that emphasizes the socially mediated nature (...)
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  6. Tom Froese & Shaun Gallagher (2012). Getting Interaction Theory (IT) Together: Integrating Developmental, Phenomenological, Enactive, and Dynamical Approaches to Social Interaction. Interaction Studies 13 (3):436-468.
    We argue that progress in our scientific understanding of the `social mind' is hampered by a number of unfounded assumptions. We single out the widely shared assumption that social behavior depends solely on the capacities of an individual agent. In contrast, both developmental and phenomenological studies suggest that the personal-level capacity for detached `social cognition' (conceived as a process of theorizing about and/or simulating another mind) is a secondary achievement that is dependent on more immediate processes of embodied social interaction. (...)
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  7. Tom Froese (2011). Tchnąć nowe życie w kognitywistykę. Avant 2 (1).
    [Przekład] W artykule tym opowiadam się za zunifikowaną kognitywistyką, przyjmując dla swej argumentacji niecodzienny punkt wyjścia: stanowisko określane czasem jako „teza o kontinuum życia-umysłu”. Zamiast więc traktować jako pewnik powszechnie akceptowane założenia początkowe, a następnie proponować odpowiedzi na pewne dobrze określone pytania, muszę najpierw dowieść, że koncepcja kontinuum życia-umysłu może w ogóle stanowić właściwy punkt startowy. Zacznę zatem od oceny pojęciowych narzędzi, odpowiednich do budowania teorii umysłu na tej podstawie. Czerpiąc spostrzeżenia z wielu różnych dziedzin – szczególnie z połączenia egzystencjalistycznej (...)
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  8. Tom Froese & Ezequiel A. Di Paolo (2011). The Enactive Approach: Theoretical Sketches From Cell to Society. Pragmatics and Cognition 19 (1):1-36.
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  9. Tom Froese & Di Paolo (2011). The Enactive Approach: Theoretical Sketches From Cell to Society. Pragmatics and Cognition 19 (1):1-36.
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  10. Steve Torrance & Tom Froese (2011). An Inter-Enactive Approach to Agency: Participatory Sense-Making, Dynamics, and Sociality. Humana. Mente 15:21-53.
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  11. Tom Froese & Shaun Gallagher (2010). Phenomenology and Artificial Life: Toward a Technological Supplementation of Phenomenological Methodology. Husserl Studies 26 (2):83-106.
    The invention of the computer has revolutionized science. With respect to finding the essential structures of life, for example, it has enabled scientists not only to investigate empirical examples, but also to create and study novel hypothetical variations by means of simulation: ‘life as it could be’. We argue that this kind of research in the field of artificial life, namely the specification, implementation and evaluation of artificial systems, is akin to Husserl’s method of free imaginative variation as applied to (...)
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  12. Hanne De Jaegher & Tom Froese (2009). On the Role of Social Interaction in Individual Agency. Adaptive Behavior 17 (5):444-460.
    Is an individual agent constitutive of or constituted by its social interactions? This question is typically not asked in the cognitive sciences, so strong is the consensus that only individual agents have constitutive efficacy. In this article we challenge this methodological solipsism and argue that interindividual relations and social context do not simply arise from the behavior of individual agents, but themselves enable and shape the individual agents on which they depend. For this, we define the notion of autonomy as (...)
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  13. Tom Froese (2009). Hume and the Enactive Approach to Mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):95-133.
    An important part of David Hume’s work is his attempt to put the natural sciences on a firmer foundation by introducing the scientific method into the study of human nature. This investigation resulted in a novel understanding of the mind, which in turn informed Hume’s critical evaluation of the scope and limits of the scientific method as such. However, while these latter reflections continue to influence today’s philosophy of science, his theory of mind is nowadays mainly of interest in terms (...)
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  14. Tom Froese & Ezequiel A. Di Paolo (2009). Sociality and the Life–Mind Continuity Thesis. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):439-463.
    The life–mind continuity thesis holds that mind is prefigured in life and that mind belongs to life. The biggest challenge faced by proponents of this thesis is to show how an explanatory framework that accounts for basic biological processes can be systematically extended to incorporate the highest reaches of human cognition. We suggest that this apparent ‘cognitive gap’ between minimal and human forms of life appears insurmountable largely because of the methodological individualism that is prevalent in cognitive science. Accordingly, a (...)
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