One of the most ancient art forms, poetry, like other art forms, finds its roots embedded in activities that are not necessarily associated with art today, most notably religious rituals. Still, even while poetry is now commonly enjoyed for its own sake, many poems continue to be made for specific life events: weddings, funerals, presidential swearing-in ceremonies, anniversaries, and so on. Their connection to such events may call into question the art status of some poems; indeed, definitions of poetry (as (...) is the case with definitions of art in general) must provide an account that establishes the art status of poems while still acknowledging that some poems may be parasitic upon human activities and events that have no intrinsically artistic goals. Questions of this sort already presuppose a notion of art that divorces art works from those activities and events and establishes art-making as an endeavor in its own right, one that by definition is independent from any other goals and one that, were it to be mixed with other activities or goals, would have its art status threatened. However, just as a notion of art that denied art status to (say) the Vietnam Memorial in Washington, DC in virtue of its serving a function beyond the purely artistic would be seriously defective, so a definition of poetry that denied poetry status to W. H. Auden’s ‘Funeral Blues’ would be anemic at best. The intention to write a poem, therefore, is the intention to fit one’s work into a tradition, one in which, as happens to be the case, poems are written for various occasions. Likewise, the poetic tradition is one in which various formal means have been employed (alliteration, meter, rhyme schemes, etc.); a ‘transparent’ poetic intention (i.e. one in which the poet is aware of the character of her intention) would therefore involve responding to the formal dimension of the tradition in various ways (see Ribeiro 2007). (shrink)
Disagreement as we find it in both the history and the contemporary practice of philosophy is an inadequately understood phenomenon. In this paper I outline and motivate the problem of disagreement, arguing that "hard cases" of disagreement confront us with an unresolved, and seemingly unresolvable, challenge to the rationality of philosophical discourse, thereby raising the specter of a worrisome form of metaphilosophical skepticism. A variety of responses and attempted evasions are considered, though none are found to be particularly satisfying: Thus, (...) the specter remains unexorcised. (shrink)
Both macaque monkeys and humans have been shown to have what are called ‘mirror neurons’, a class of neurons that respond to goal-related motor-actions, both when these actions are performed by the subject and when they are performed by another individual observed by the subject. Gallese and Goldman (1998) contend that mirror neurons may be seen as ‘a part of, or a precursor to, a more general mind- reading ability’, and that of the two competing theories of mind-reading, mirror neurons (...) lend support to simulation theory. I here offer four reasons why I think mirror neurons do not provide support for simulation theory over its contender, theory theory. (shrink)
Though it seems rather surprising in retrospect, until about twenty-five years ago no philosopher in the Western tradition had explicitly formulated the question whether there could be an epistemic analogue to practical akrasia. Also surprisingly, despite the prima facie analogue with practical akrasia (the possibility of which is not much disputed), much of the recent work on this question has defended the rather bold view that epistemic akrasia is impossible. While the arguments purporting to show the impossibility of epistemic akrasia (...) have been criticized by some, I propose instead to make a head-on attack and defend the substantive view that epistemic akrasia is possible — indeed, actual. This leaves for another day the project of diagnosing exactly where the arguments for the impossibility of epistemic akrasia go wrong. Here, I content myself with trying to show that they must go wrong, since — as I will argue — epistemic akrasia is possible. (shrink)
In 'Of the Standard of Taste' Hume aspires to silence the 'extravagant' cavils of the anything-goes de gustibus sceptic by developing a programme of aesthetic education that would lead all properly-trained individuals to a set of agreed-upon aesthetic judgements. But I argue that if we read Hume's essay as an attempted direct theoretical refutation of de gustibus scepticism, Hume fails to achieve his aim. Moreover, although some recent commentators have read the essay as aiming at a less ambitious ‘sceptical solution’ (...) to the de gustibus challenge, I argue that this ‘sceptical solution’ reading also fails to save Hume's project. Thus the anything-goes de gustibus sceptic remains unvanquished. (shrink)
An argument against the rationality of desiring to go to heaven might be put in the form of a trilemma: (1) any state of being that both lasts eternally and preserves me as the person I am would be hellish and therefore would not be a state of being that I could have any reason to desire; (2) any state of being that lasts eternally and yet fails to preserve my personhood by turning me into a non-person would not be (...) a state of being that I (qua person that I am) could have any reason to desire; and (3) any state of being that lasts eternally and yet fails to preserve my personhood by turning me into some other person would not be a state of being that I (qua person that I am) could have any reason to desire. This paper offers defenses of each of the three horns of this trilemma and concludes that there is no rationally compelling reason for any human being to desire to go to heaven. (shrink)
The pragmatic theory of truth (PTT) seeks to illuminate the concept of truth by focusing on concepts like usefulness or adaptivity. However, contrary to common opinion, PTT does not merely face a narrow band of (perhaps) rather artificial counterexamples (as in a case of empirically unfounded but life-extending optimism in a cancer patient); instead, PTT is faced with a fast psychological research literature which suggests that inaccurate beliefs are both (1) pervasive in human beings and, nonetheless, (2) fully adaptive in (...) many cases. Call this the "pervasive adaptive illusions" (PAI) objection to PTT. According to PAI, the kind of connection drawn by PTT between the beliefs that we (intuitively or pretheoretically) regard as "true" and the beliefs we regard as useful is undercut by hard-nosed empirical work in psychology -- work that no empirically minded pragmatist can ignore. According to PAI, the connection drawn between truth and utility by PTT is subject to a simply overwhelming set of counterexamples (drawn from psychological research, and reviewed below). Thus, PTT is a theory any sensible theorist of truth must reject. (shrink)
In ' Unnatural Doubts' Michael Williams argues that Cartesian skepticism is not truly an "intuitive problem" (that is, one which we can state with little or no appeal to contentious theories) at all. According to Williams, the skeptic has rich theoretical commitments all his own, prominent among which is the epistemic priority thesis. I argue, however, that Williams's diagnostic critique of the epistemic priority thesis fails on his own conception of what is required for success. Furthermore, in a brief "Afterword" (...) I argue that the later Wittgenstein (to whom Williams sometimes appeals) would concur with my critique of Williams's antiskeptical efforts. (shrink)
Can a planetary anthropology cope with both the "provincial cosmopolitanism" of alternative anthropologies and the "metropolitan provincialism" of hegemonic schools? How might the resulting "world anthropologies" challenge the current panorama in which certain allegedly national anthropological traditions have more paradigmatic weight--and hence more power--than others? Critically examining the international dissemination of anthropology within and across national power fields, contributors address these questions and many others.
Baron Reed has developed a new argument for skepticism: (1) contemporary epistemologists are all committed to two theses, fallibilism and attributabilism; unfortunately, (2) these two theses about knowledge are incompatible; therefore, (3) knowledge as conceived by contemporary epistemologists is impossible. In this brief paper I suggest that Reed's argument appears to rest on an understanding of attributabilism that is so strong (call it maximal attributabilism) that it's doubtful that many contemporary epistemologists actually embrace it. Nor does Reed offer any direct (...) argument for the truth of maximal attributabilism. Therefore, we need not be persuaded by Reed's new argument for skepticism. (shrink)
While contemporary readers may find what appear to be appealing streaks of liberalism in Montaigne's 'Essays', I argue that a more careful analysis suggests that Montaigne's overall stance is quietistic and conservative. To help support this claim I offer a close reading of 'Essays' III.11 ("Of Cripples"), where Montaigne offers his famous critique of the witch trials of early modern Europe. Once Montaigne's objections to the witch trials are properly understood, we see that Montaigne did not seriously or consistently dispute (...) the church's authority in political matters, though certain undeveloped seeds of liberalism do leave an unresolved tension in his writings. (shrink)
Moral and financial scandals emerging in recent years around the world have created the momentum for reconsidering the role of virtuousness in organizational settings. This empirical study seeks to contribute toward maintaining this momentum. We answer to researchers’ suggestions that the exploratory study carried out by Cameron et al. (Am Behav Sci 47(6):766–790, 2004 ), which related organizational virtuousness (OV) and performance, must be pursued employing their measure of OV in other contexts and in relation to other outcomes (Wright (...) and Goodstein, J Manage 33(6):928–958, 2007 ). Two hundred and sixteen employees reported their perceptions of OV and their affective well-being (AWB) at work (one of the main indicators of employees’ happiness), their supervisors reporting their organizational citizenship behaviors (OCB). The main finding is that the perceptions of OV predict some OCB both directly and through the mediating role of AWB. The evidence suggests that OV is worthy of a higher status in the business and organizational psychology literatures. (shrink)
While Hume is famous for his development and defence of various arguments for radical scepticism, Hume was bothered by the tension between his ‘abstruse’ philosophical reflections and ordinary life: If he often felt intensely sceptical in his study, he nonetheless felt genuinely unable to take these sceptical views seriously when he returned to the concerns and activities of everyday life. Hume's published work shows a deep and ongoing preoccupation with this tension, and I believe it also shows that Hume's view (...) about the ‘durability’ of scepticism (that is, the extent to which sceptical insights can have an abiding impact on our cognitive lives) underwent an evolutionary development throughout the course of his publishing career. In this paper I propose to trace these textual developments in detail. In particular, I will argue that Hume's concern for intellectual stability is what drives the evolution, as he struggled to understand the ‘durable value’ in scepticism. (shrink)
How can we identify and estimate workers’ tacit knowledge? How can we design a personnel mix aimed at improving and speeding up its transfer and development? How is it possible to implement tacit knowledge sustainable projects in remote areas? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to distinguish between types of tacit knowledge, to establish what they allow for and to consider their sources. It is also essential to find a way of managing the tacit knowledge ‘stock’ and (...) distribution within the workforce. In short, a conceptual framework is needed to manage tacit knowledge. Based on previous works and 2 years of action research, this paper introduces such a framework and describes its partial application to support the pre-operational training and hiring in a large industrial plant in Brazil. Two contributions emerge from the research. First, the concept of ‘levels of similarity’ is introduced as a means to qualify the experience of workers and estimate the associated tacit knowledge. Second, the capability of carrying out three types of judgement properly and speedily is put forward as being a core ability of those who possess what has been called ‘collective tacit knowledge’ (Collins in Organ Stud 28(2):257–262, 2007). In practical terms, the results indicate the opportunity for companies to capitalize on the experience and tacit knowledge of their workers in a systematic way and with due recognition. Ultimately, positive impacts are expected in their absorptive capacity as well as in their management and human resources systems, accident prevention, productivity and the development of sustainable projects in remote areas. (shrink)
This paper reflects on quality assessment and performance evaluation in higher education, namely by analysing the insufficient link between those two aspects. We start by reviewing the current state of the art regarding different processes and mechanisms of quality assessment and performance evaluation and discuss some of the major issues regarding the implementation of some of them. In particular, we analyse the current limitations regarding data collected, available and publicised on the performance of HEIs and the problems those limitations bring (...) to a fair evaluation of higher education. Through this analysis we intend to contribute to a better understanding of the mechanisms of evaluation in higher education and the way these may lead to the promotion of better quality assessment practices and institutional management. (shrink)
This paper elaborates on the link between different types and degrees of experience that can be gone through within a form of life or collectivity—the so-called levels of immersion—and the development of distinct types of tacit knowledge and expertise. The framework is then probed empirically and theoretically. In the first case, its ‘predictions’ are compared with the accounts of novices who have gone through different ‘learning opportunities’ during a pre-operational training programme for running a huge nickel industrial plant in Brazil. (...) These are also analysed vis-à-vis the experience of an expert who has designed and experienced the outcomes of two pre-operational training sessions in the nickel industry before developing and managing the one discussed here. Theoretically, the framework is used to pinpoint exactly what interactional experts who have developed their expertise through linguistic socialisation alone are able to do as well as to analyse the case of technical connoisseurs. The results indicate that the proposed framework is useful. It supports the design and improvement of training programmes for the development of tacit knowledge while at the same time bringing about a refined analysis of claims concerning the abilities of types of experts and expertise. (shrink)
This paper develops a programmatic 'theory sketch' of a new theory of humour, pitched at roughly the same level of detail, and intended to have roughly the same level of inclusiveness, as the other available philosophical "theories" of humour. I will call the theory I propose the distance theory. After an appeal to some intuitive illustrations of the distance theory's attractions, I move on to offer an analysis of observational comedy using the distance theory. I conclude the paper with some (...) speculative remarks about the possible connections between the practice of observational comedy and the discipline of philosophy. (shrink)
Supposing you were convinced by certain radical skeptical arguments that many of your beliefs were not justifiably believed by you, what stance could/should you adopt with regard to those skeptically-problematized beliefs? This paper explores a range of possible reactions, aiming to be reasonably comprehensive in coverage though admittedly suggestive rather than decisive in its treatment of each individual reaction. In considering this variety of responses we begin to see suggestive intimations of the ways in which radical skepticism could represent a (...) threat to our notions of cognitive self-mastery. (shrink)
What should individuals do when their firmly held moral beliefs are prima facie inconsistent with their religious beliefs? In this article we outline several ways of posing such consistency challenges and offer a detailed taxonomy of the various responses available to someone facing a consistency challenge of this sort. Throughout the paper, our concerns are primarily pedagogical: how best to pose consistency challenges in the classroom, how to stimulate discussion of the various responses to them, and how to relate such (...) consistency challenges to larger issues, such as whether Scripture is, in general, a reliable guide to truth. (shrink)
In a recent paper (in Argumentation, 2006) Robert Talisse and Scott Aikin suggest that we ought to recognize two distinct forms of the straw man fallacy. In addition to misrepresenting the strength of an opponent’s specific argument (= the representation form), one can also misrepresent the strength of one’s opposition in general, or the overall state of a debate, by selecting a (relatively) weak opponent for critical consideration (= the selection form). Here I consider whether we as philosophy professors could (...) be seen as sometimes committing the selection form of the straw man through the performance of our regular teaching duties. (shrink)
In this paper I aim to address--and also to better understand--what is perhaps the most intuitive objection to Pyrrhonian skepticism, namely, that to completely suspend one's judgment is psychologically impossible. I propose to come to an understanding of Sextus's relation to this objection by trying to more clearly understand Sextus's claims about the "Skeptic". I hope to show that it is at least possible for us to understand Sextus and his claims about the "Skeptic" without being driven to either (1) (...) invoke restrictive interpretations of his claims or (2) adopt implausible hypotheses concerning his sincerity. (shrink)
Recent literature on skepticism has raised a nearly univocal voice in condemning skeptical argumentation on the grounds that such argumentation necessarily involves our adopting some nonordinary or unnatural perspective. Were this really so, then skeptical conclusions would not speak to us in the way in which skeptics think they do: We would be "insulated" from any such conclusions. I argue that skeptical argumentation need not rely on any nonordinary or unnatural standards. Rather, the skeptic's procedure is to offer a critique (...) from within. Having given my argument for this claim (which I call the 'continuity argument'), I consider and respond to two important objections. I conclude that the skeptic has a powerful meta-argument to be deployed in defending the legitimacy of his skeptical conclusions against the slings and arrows of (those I call) the half-true theorists. (shrink)
I welcome your comments, suggestions and complaints about the course you are taking at any time during the term. As with all course evaluations, your feedback is anonymous and will not affect your grade in the course.
In this paper I aim to do two things. First, I attempt to illustrate an interesting pattern of argument one can find in Hume's work. Next, I employ this Humean pattern of argument to show that IF there is a cogent and intuitive argument for any form of epistemological skepticism, which despite its cogency and intuitiveness has a (literally) unbelievable conclusion, THEN we lack a very important form of doxastic self-control, which I call rational self-control (RSC), over the beliefs problematized (...) by that skeptical argument. Thus, (1) the challenge posed by skepticism is even deeper and more radical than commonly supposed: If any form of skepticism proves unanswerable and yet unbelievable, then we demonstrably lack RSC in the domain problematized by that form of skepticism. Thus, (2) one's views on skepticism may entail definite views on (at least one form of) doxastic self-control. (shrink)
In this article we examine the true scope of the right Hobbes recognizes, even for the subjects of a State, to life. We hold that the right to live includes the subject's right not to accept to be deprived not only of life but also of limb; a right not to have to kill; a right not to accept to be imprisoned. The sovereign of course has a right to kill, mutilate and arrest but the conflict of his right and (...) the subject's is an original feature of Hobbes's political thought, not to be found for instance in Locke's. Also, since life is motion and desire is a continual progress from one object to another, the mere survival of the subject is not enough to make him content once peace has been achieved. The expression of the subject's discontent is illegal, but it may happen since we can understand the right to live as a right to an ever more ambitious desire. The ruler who wants to avoid discontent and its uncivil effects should in a certain measure pave the way for economic development, in order to permit the subjects to at least partially attain their desire. Obviously this is not a moral duty of the sovereign, but a prudential one, if he does not want to risk losing his office. (shrink)
In an earlier paper ("Skeptical Parasitism and the Continuity Argument," 'Metaphilosophy' 2004: 714-732) I suggested that the well-known "plane-spotters" story-first proposed by Thompson Clarke and later developed by Barry Stroud-distorts the very skeptical view it aims to elucidate. However, considerations of space prohibited me from fleshing out my criticisms of the Clarke/Stroud story in that paper. In this paper I aim to fill in this lacuna by showing how the Clarke/Stroud story distorts the skeptic's view. I conclude the paper by (...) briefly sketching the alternative position I endorse and explaining how it avoids the distortions encouraged by the Clarke/Stroud story. (shrink)
The cinematic technique of point-of-view shots is meant to give spectators a film character’s point-ofview. In ‘Imagining from the Inside’, Murray Smith claims that point-of-view shots allow viewers to ‘imagine seeing as the character does’ and this imagining in turn promotes imagining the character ‘from the inside’, thereby fostering empathy with the character. I argue, against Smith, that the cinematic technique of point-of-view shots does not prompt viewers to ‘imagine seeing as the character does’ for two reasons: first, such shots (...) do not give us a character’s perspective in any literal sense, but what I call a ‘symbolic perspective’; second, the very concept of ‘imagining seeing’ is problematic in that it places us on the same ontological level as that of fictional characters. I agree with Smith that point-of-view shots promote a qualitatively different emotional engagement in spectators and that they are powerful prompts to ‘imagining from the inside’, while I show that he conflates this Waltonian notion with Currie’s ‘personal imagining’ and with the idea of empathizing with a character. (shrink)
Despite their divergences, I argue that Sextus, Montaigne, and Hume are committed to several substantive points of commonality and that these commonalities justify us in speaking of them as belonging to a unitary Pyrrhonist tradition. In this tradition, Pyrrhonizing doubt serves to chart the boundary of that-which-resists-doubt, thereby simultaneously charting the shape of that complex of nature and custom which constitutes the bedrock of human life—the life that remains after doubt has done its worst.
Modern semiotics is a branch of logics that formally defines symbol-based communication. In recent years, the semiotic classification of signs has been invoked to support the notion that symbols are uniquely human. Here we show that alarm-calls such as those used by African vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops), logically satisfy the semiotic definition of symbol. We also show that the acquisition of vocal symbols in vervet monkeys can be successfully simulated by a computer program based on minimal semiotic and neurobiological constraints. (...) The simulations indicate that learning depends on the tutor-predator ratio, and that apprentice-generated auditory mistakes in vocal symbol interpretation have little effect on the learning rates of apprentices (up to 80% of mistakes are tolerated). In contrast, just 10% of apprentice-generated visual mistakes in predator identification will prevent any vocal symbol to be correctly associated with a predator call in a stable manner. Tutor unreliability was also deleterious to vocal symbol learning: a mere 5% of “lying” tutors were able to completely disrupt symbol learning, invariably leading to the acquisition of incorrect associations by apprentices. Our investigation corroborates the existence of vocal symbols in a non-human species, and indicates that symbolic competence emerges spontaneously from classical associative learning mechanisms when the conditioned stimuli are self-generated, arbitrary and socially efficacious. We propose that more exclusive properties of human language, such as syntax, may derive from the evolution of higher-order domains for neural association, more removed from both the sensory input and the motor output, able to support the gradual complexification of grammatical categories into syntax. (shrink)
There are a number of agricultural farming practices that are controversial. These may include using chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides, and planting genetically modified crops, as well as the decision to dehorn cattle rather than raise polled cattle breeds. We use data from a survey of Missouri crop and livestock producers to determine whether a farmer’s ethical framework affects his or her decision to engage in these practices. We find that a plurality of farmers prefer an agricultural policy that reflects (...) principles based on rights rather than principles of utilitarianism or justice. Furthermore, after controlling for personal and farm characteristics, we find a positive correlation between farmers preferring a rights-based policy and a farmer’s use of chemical farm inputs and polled rather than horned cattle. We also find that a combination of ethical framework and farm and farmer characteristics correlate with decisions to use farm chemicals, while only farm and farmer characteristics affect the decision to plant GM crops and only a farmer’s ethical framework affects the decision to use polled cattle. (shrink)
The regulation of the activity of multiple autonomous entities represented in a multi-agent system, in environments with no central design (and thus with no cooperative assumption), is gaining much attention in the research community. Approaches to this concern include the use of norms in so-called normative multi-agent systems and the development of electronic institution frameworks. In this paper we describe our approach towards the development of an electronic institution providing an enforceable normative environment. Within this environment, institutional services are provided (...) that assist agents in forming cooperative structures whose commitments are made explicit through contracts. Our normative framework borrows some concepts from contract law theory. Contracts are formalized using norms which are used by the institution while monitoring agents’ activities, thus making our normative environment dynamic. We regard the electronic institution as a means to facilitate both the creation and the enforcement of contracts between agents. A model of “institutional reality” is presented that allows for monitoring the fulfillment of norms. The paper also distinguishes our approach from other developments of the electronic institution concept. We address the application of our proposal in the B2B field, namely regarding the formation of Virtual Organizations. (shrink)
Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabela normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} O objetivo deste artigo consiste em apresentar a analogia que David Hume (1711 – 1776) estabelece entre a açáo moral e o movimento mecânico como indicativo claro de sua compreensáo acerca da relaçáo entre a razáo (direçáo) e as paixões (força) na conduta humana. Estendendo-se desde a epistemologia moral (...) de Hume até sua moral social, a noçáo que carrega a referida analogia serviria para endossar a tese de que o filósofo escocês almejava ser uma espécie de “Newton das ciências morais”. Isto significava pensar a filosofia moral dentro dos limites da natureza e permitir-lhe uma autonomia investigativa, especialmente em relaçáo à instância religiosa. O próprio projeto filosófico de Hume seria performático da imagem do movimento, enquanto formado por uma composiçáo indissociável entre o impulso do conteúdo de tendência sentimentalista, na esteira de Shaftesbury e Hutcheson, e o direcionamento metodológico do rigor empirista de origem baconiana-newtoniana. (shrink)
The idea that some aesthetic experiences and some aesthetic judgments are not open to all aesthetic subjects seems to be the kind of claim that only a cultural snob would make. Yet, on (loose) analogy with the notion of moral luck in ethics, the aesthetic experiences and judgments available to a given individual are frequently beyond her control. While in ethics the issue is one of moral assessment of one’s actions, in aesthetics it concerns the character and value of one’s (...) aesthetic experiences and judgments and, ultimately, the possibilities for aesthetic value in one’s life. If there is a phenomenon of aesthetic luck, then (1) all beauty is not open to us, and there is little we can do about it, and (2) our aesthetic subjectivity and notions of beauty are threatened. Attempts to overcome the vicissitudes of aesthetic luck land us in paradox or circularity. One may have to accept one’s aesthetic fate, and the restrictions it places on one’s potential for an aesthetically valuable life. [WC: 168]. (shrink)
This volume includes a collection of eighteen essays that provide a decisive input to the study of logic and argumentation theory by some of the finest specialists in these areas, covering the main schools of thought and contemporary trends at the beginning of the 21st century. In these essays, the authors clarify the status of what we currently call, ambiguously and problematically, “logic” and “argumentation theory”, and discuss the no less controversial issue of the relationship between these two concepts when (...) applied to the study of argumentation and its problems. At the same time, they take stock of the most recent developments of argumentation theory considered as an ongoing research subject. -/- It is the first time in the last few decades that a work this comprehensive and up-to-date on such matters has been published. This volume is an essential tool for all of those interested in the study of the relations between logic and argumentation, particularly at the university level. It provides not only an introduction to these subjects, but also the necessary framework for further specialised research development in the future. -/- . (shrink)
O artigo propõe problematizar ou inquirir sobre as relações lógicas [ e não apenas uma – como é normalmente defendido pelos comentadores imanentistas ] entre Deus ou substância e o universo dos modos em Spinoza (1632-1677), provando, ao seu fim, a hipótese de que podem [tais relações] ser devidamente demarcadas como de transcendência e de imanência em conciliação. Para tanto, o trabalho efetua o estudo do escólio da EIPXXIX [condição da prova] sob o apoio de outras passagens da Ethica (1677) (...) e de obras complementares de Spinoza. (shrink)
Habermas anuncia em sua obra Pensamento Pós-Metafísico o fim da metafísica enquanto pensamento totalizador e auto-referente que pretende um acesso privilegiado à verdade. A desvalorizaçáo deste modo de pensar culmina na passagem para o que ele denomina de pensamento pós-metafísico, fazendo-se necessário um redimensionamento do papel da filosofia, visto que um novo cenário de pensamento se instaura. O presente artigo pretende problematizar, à luz da filosofia de Heidegger, os pressupostos habermasianos que fundamentam a sua constataçáo do fim da metafísica. Neste (...) sentido, procura indicar que a constataçáo do império da técnica na contemporaneidade torna o anuncio da instauraçáo de um pensar pós-metafísico algo de difícil sustentaçáo. Palavras-chave: Habermas; Heidegger; Metafísica; Pensamento pós-metafísico; Técnica. (shrink)
Trata-se de uma investigação sobre a teoria dos primeiros princípios da razão prática na obra de Tomás de Aquino. No centro dessa teoria está o termo “sindérese”, cujo conteúdo foi elaborado nas discussões da filosofia e da teologia medievais, a partir de sua menção na Glosa de Jerônimo a Ezequiel. Tal termo designa um conceito que apresenta um caráter inovador dentro da teoria da ação moral em comparação com a ética aristotélica. Afinal, Tomás de Aquino o entende como (...) o hábito dos primeiros princípios da moral, equivalente ao hábito dos primeiros princípios teóricos de Aristóteles. Dessa forma, o interesse é compreender como o conceito de sindérese é recebido e desenvolvido na filosofia moral de Tomás de Aquino através da análise das três questões tradicionais: de sua natureza, de sua infalibilidade e de sua extinção. (shrink)
At the beginning of the Book 1 of the Physica, Aristotle sets the question on the matter and subject of natural science. This issue refers to the concept of the science, which he starts bringing up. Natural Science (philosophia naturalis) has, since then, been especially enquired into, above all in terms of the original Aristotle’s commentary. Averroes dedicates a concise and, at the same time comprehensive Proem on the subject. Thomas Aquinas, on the contrary, and in opposition to other cases, (...) omits a methodological proem, although the subject itself develops on the brim of the commentaries on the text of Book 1. The aim of this work is to analyze the approximation and differences between the Lesson 1 of the Commentaries to the Book 1 of the Aquinate (where the philosophia naturalis method is dealt with) and the exegesis of Averroes in his Proem and the Summa Prima, in order to establish the relationship between both. KEY WORDS – Aristotle. Thomas Aquinas. Averroes. Natural science. Physical methodology. (shrink)
A Reforma em território alemão possui duas figuras, por vezes próximas entre si, por vezes muito distantes: Lutero e Tomás Müntzer. À medida que foi se envolvendo na vida de seus fiéis, Müntzer foi tomando caminhos próprios, discordando de Lutero que este tomava a “Palavra, em sua realidade objetiva, como constitutiva da Igreja, e afirmando que os verdadeiros fiéis são os que possuem a experiência subjetiva do “Espírito”. Também contra Lutero, que defende a resistência à autoridade, mas em questões (...) seculares aceita a tirania, Müntzer, que vê a fé fortemente inserida no social, defende a revolução armada contra os príncipes. Müntzer não nega a graça, mas esta possui papel secundário em seu pensamento, enquanto, para Lutero, ela se coloca no centro de suas preocupações teológicas. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Reforma. Palavra. Graça. Experiência subjetiva. Resistência. Revolução. ABSTRACT The Reform in german territory has two figures, sometimes very close to each other, and sometimes very distant: Luther and Thomas Müntzer. As he got envolved in the lives of his followers, Müntzer began taking his own paths, disaccording of Luther that took the “Word” in its objective reality, as constitutive of the Church, and affirming that the true followers are the ones who own the subjective experience of the “Spirit”. Also against Luther, that stands for the resistance against authority, but in secular matters accepts tyranny, Müntzer, that sees tyranny deeply inserted in the social, stands for the armed revolution against the princes. Müntzer does not deny grace, but it has a secondary role in his thought, as, for Luther, it is placed in the center of his theological worries. KEY WORDS – Reform. Word. Grace. Subjective experience. Resistance. Revolution. (shrink)
Henrique Jales Ribeiro (Ed.): Rhetoric and Argumentation in the Beginning of the XXIst Century . Coimbra University Press, Coimbra, 2009, 312 pp Content Type Journal Article Pages 513-518 DOI 10.1007/s10503-010-9194-3 Authors C. Andone, Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Spuistraat 134, 1012 VB Amsterdam, The Netherlands Journal Argumentation Online ISSN 1572-8374 Print ISSN 0920-427X Journal Volume Volume 24 Journal Issue Volume 24, Number 4.
Os prólogos dos comentários de Tomás de Aquino às obras de Aristóteles são de suma importância, porque neles o autor apresenta o que se poderia denominar “o marco conceptual” do trabalho que está empreendendo. No caso do Comentário à Política, o conceito fundamental é o conceito de natureza. A afirmação de que existe uma “imitação da natureza” significa, para Tomás, muito mais do que representou para seus antecessores. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Tomás de Aquino. Comentário. Política. Natureza. Imitação. ABSTRACT (...) The prologs of Thomas Aquinas to the works of Aristotle are of main importance, because in these prologs the author presents what could be called “the conceptual mark” of the tasks he is undertaking. In the case of the Comments to the Politics, the fundamental concept is the concept of nature. The statement that there is an “imitation of nature” means, for Thomas, much more that it had represented for his antecessors. KEY WORDS – Thomas Aquinas. Comment. Politics. Nature. Imitatio. (shrink)
La psicologia contemporània sembla caracteritzar-se, des dels seus mateixos orígens, per la multiplicitat dels seus continguts, com també per la seva gairebé infinita fragmentació en corrents oposats. Això genera importants dificultats, no només a qui vol tenir-ne una primera aproximació, sinó també per als especialistes, que moltes vegades no arriben a una opinió suficientment clara sobre la naturalesa epistemològica de la psicologia, ni sobre la seva unitat disciplinar. Aquesta obra, sense descurar el problema global, se centra en un aspecte particular: (...) el que presenta la praxi de la psicologia, en particular la psicoteràpia i els seus fonaments teòrics. Es posa especial interès en una visió crítica de la psicoanàlisi, punt de referència inevitable (positiu o negatiu) per a la majoria dels corrents de psicoteràpia. Però aquest intent d'aclariment epistemològic i pràctic es porta a terme des d'un punt de vista original: a la llum del pensament de Sant Tomàs d?Aquino (1225-1274), conegut com un dels més grans teòlegs i filòsofs de l'Església Catòlica. Les qualitats de l?Aquinate com a epistemòleg són àmpliament conegudes. Menys coneguda és la seva faceta de psicòleg, que aquesta obra vol posar de manifest amb gran detall per evidenciar l'actualitat de les línies mestres de la psicologia de sant Tomàs, com també la possibilitat de practicar avui la psicologia sota la guia fonamental del Doctor Humanitatis.\n. (shrink)
Esta deslumbrante biografía de Santo Tomás de Aquino perfila la vida y la obra del filósofo y fraile dominico del siglo XIII, cuyo pensamiento, después de más de siete siglos, continua vigente. Eudaldo Forment, uno de los grandes especialistas en la figura de Santo Tomás, recrea sus años de formación, sus viajes, la evolución de su pensamiento filosófico, su carrera académica, los grandes hitos de su vida... El autor ha estudiado las fuentes primarias y las biografías posteriores, para (...) ofrecer un completo retrato del pensador y santo napolitano, situándolo en el contexto religioso, político y cultural de su época.. El riguroso trabajo de documentación le ha permitido clarificar tres grandes misterios de la vida de fray Tomás: el del cese repentino, sin motivo confesado, de sus actividades académicas y literarias, el 6 de diciembre de 1273; el de su última enfermedad; y el de la causa de su muerte. Trabajando siempre sobre los datos documentados, tanto los referidos a hechos naturales como a los que no lo son, el autor deja al lector que se forme su propio juicio sobre Santo Tomás. Una biografía novedosa y admirablemente documentada de un personaje esencial en la historia de Europa. (shrink)
O Comentário ao Liber De Causis pertence à última fase das obras de Santo Tomás. Foi escrito, com toda segurança, no primeiro semestre de 1272, em Paris, como testemunha uma cópia parisiense da obra. O De Causis trata das primeiras causas das coisas, que estão constituídas em três ordens, e da distinção e dependência das causas entre si. O texto de Santo Tomás segue passo a passo as proposições em que a obra se divide, que são trinta e (...) duas. Estas trinta de duas proposições são verdadeiros capítulos desenvolvidos a partir de uma tese central. Santo Tomás expõem-nas a modo de lições. (shrink)
The aim of this article is to show that the scholastic commentaries on the Predicables or Categorems (in Porphiry Eisagoge) constituted a style of treatises on the philosophy of language and philosophy of logic. In such studies, called afterwards “Material Logic”, is considered, for instance, the theme of the domain of logic and the possibility of its construction; furthermore, logic is relates to ontology through the problem of universals. Here is explored to logical being (ens rationis) which is the objectum (...) (subject) of this discipline, and is analized the structure of proposition and the nature of the main constitutives of inference. In the side of Philosophy of Language are located the study of the meaning of subjects and predicates (or predicables), that of the proposition formed by them, also a hierarchy of logical types (and semantical ones), and the principles of the ordained disposition of natural kinds and other classifications. They are things that now attract the interest of philosophers of logic and philosophers of languagewithin the analytic tradition. (shrink)
