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Profile: Tomas Bogardus (Pepperdine University)
  1. Tomas Bogardus (unknown). Two Wrong Turns for Type-Identity Physicalism. Philosophical Studies 87:61 - 85.
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  2. Tomas Bogardus (2013). Disagreeing with the (Religious) Skeptic. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):5-17.
    Some philosophers believe that, when epistemic peers disagree, each has an obligation to accord the other’s assessment equal weight as her own. Other philosophers worry that this Equal-Weight View is vulnerable to straightforward counterexamples, and that it requires an unacceptable degree of spinelessness with respect to our most treasured philosophical, political, and religious beliefs. I think that both of these allegations are false. To show this, I carefully state the Equal-Weight View, motivate it, describe apparent counterexamples to it, and then (...)
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  3. Tomas Bogardus (2013). Erratum To: Disagreeing with the (Religious) Skeptic. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):19-19.
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  4. Tomas Bogardus (2013). Erratum To: Undefeated Dualism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 165 (2):467-467.
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  5. Tomas Bogardus (2013). Knowledge Under Threat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):289-313.
    Many contemporary epistemologists hold that a subject S’s true belief that p counts as knowledge only if S’s belief that p is also, in some important sense, safe. I describe accounts of this safety condition from John Hawthorne, Duncan Pritchard, and Ernest Sosa. There have been three counterexamples to safety proposed in the recent literature, from Comesaña, Neta and Rohrbaugh, and Kelp. I explain why all three proposals fail: each moves fallaciously from the fact that S was at epistemic risk (...)
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  6. Tomas Bogardus (2013). The Problem of Contingency for Religious Belief. Faith and Philosophy 30 (4):371-392.
  7. Tomas Bogardus (2013). Undefeated Dualism. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):445-466.
    In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many philosophers as true, including many non-dualists. This ‘striking’ generates prima facie justification: in the absence of defeaters, we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be, i.e. we ought to be dualists. In this paper, I examine several proposed undercutting defeaters for our dualist intuitions. I argue that each proposal fails, since each rests on a false assumption, or requires empirical evidence that it lacks, or overgenerates defeaters. By the (...)
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  8. Tomas Bogardus & Chad Marxen (2013). Yes, Safety is in Danger. Philosophia (2):1-14.
    In an essay recently published in this journal (“Is Safety in Danger?”), Fernando Broncano-Berrocal defends the safety condition on knowledge from a counterexample proposed by Tomas Bogardus (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2012). In this paper, we will define the safety condition, briefly explain the proposed counterexample, and outline Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the safety condition. We will then raise four objections to Broncano-Berrocal’s defense, four implausible implications of his central claim. In the end, we conclude that Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the safety (...)
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  9. Tomas Bogardus (2011). What Certainty Teaches. Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):227 - 243.
    Most philosophers, including all materialists I know of, believe that I am a complex thing?a thing with parts?and that my mental life is (or is a result of) the interaction of these parts. These philosophers often believe that I am a body or a brain, and my mental life is (or is a product of) brain activity. In this paper, I develop and defend a novel argument against this view. The argument turns on certainty, that highest epistemic status that a (...)
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  10. Tomas Bogardus (2009). A Vindication of the Equal-Weight View. Episteme 6 (3):324-335.
    Some philosophers believe that when epistemic peers disagree, each has an obligation to accord the other's assessment the same weight as her own. I first make the antecedent of this Equal-Weight View more precise, and then I motivate the View by describing cases in which it gives the intuitively correct verdict. Next I introduce some apparent counterexamples – cases of apparent peer disagreement in which, intuitively, one should not give equal weight to the other party's assessment. To defuse these apparent (...)
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  11. Tomas Bogardus (2008). Should We Be Alarmed by Medical Research? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 33 (5):524-532.
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