Search results for 'Tomas Persson' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  19
    Jordan Zlatev, Tomas Persson & Peter Gärdenfors (2005). Triadic Bodily Mimesis is the Difference. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):720-721.
    We find that the nature and origin of the proposed “dialogical cognitive representations” in the target article is not sufficiently clear. Our proposal is that (triadic) bodily mimesis and in particular mimetic schemas – prelinguistic representational, intersubjective structures, emerging through imitation but subsequently interiorized – can provide the necessary link between private sensory-motor experience and public language. In particular, we argue that shared intentionality requires triadic mimesis.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  4
    Mathias Osvath, Tomas Persson & Peter Gärdenfors (2012). Foresight, Function Representation, and Social Intelligence in the Great Apes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (4):234-235.
    We find problems with Vaesen's treatment of the primatological research, in particular his analysis of foresight, function representation, and social intelligence. We argue that his criticism of research on foresight in great apes is misguided. His claim that primates do not attach functions to particular objects is also problematic. Finally, his analysis of theory of mind neglects many distinctions.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  2
    J. Persson & P. Ylikoski (2007). Ibe and Ebi on Explanation Before Inference Johannes Persson. In Johannes Persson & Petri Ylikoski (eds.), Rethinking Explanation. Springer 252--137.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Charles S. Peirce & Vincent Tomas (1957). Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Edited with an Introd. By Vincent Tomas. Liberal Arts Press.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  17
    Ingmar Persson (2013). From Morality to the End of Reason: An Essay on Rights, Reasons and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
    Many philosophers think that if you're morally responsible for a state of affairs, you must be a cause of it. Ingmar Persson argues that this strand of common sense morality is asymmetrical, in that it features the act-omission doctrine, according to which there are stronger reasons against performing some harmful actions than in favour of performing any beneficial actions. He analyses the act-omission doctrine as consisting in a theory of negative rights, according to which there are rights not to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6.  30
    Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2012). Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement. Oxford University Press.
    Unfit for the Future argues that the future of our species depends on our urgently finding ways to bring about radical enhancement of the moral aspects of our own human nature. We have rewritten our own moral agenda by the drastic changes we have made to the conditions of life on earth. Advances in technology enable us to exercise an influence that extends all over the world and far into the future. But our moral psychology lags behind and leaves us (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  7.  60
    Erik Persson (2014). What’s in a Name? – Exploring the Definition of ‘Cultural Relict Plant’. In Anna Andréasson, Anna Jakobsson, Elisabeth Gräslund Berg, Jens Heimdahl, Inger Larsson & Erik Persson (eds.), Sources to the history of gardening. Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences 289-299.
    When working with garden archaeology and garden archaeobotany, the plant material is of great importance. It is important to be able to identify which plants have grown in a particular garden and which have not, which of the plants you find in the garden today that are newly introduced or have established themselves on their own, and which plants that may be remnants of earlier cultivation. During the past two years, my colleagues and I have been involved in a project (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  20
    Ingmar Persson (2005). The Retreat of Reason: A Dilemma in the Philosophy of Life. Oxford University Press.
    The Retreat of Reason brings back to philosophy the ambition of offering a broad vision of the human condition. One of the main original aims of philosophy was to give people guidance about how to live their lives. Ingmar Persson resumes this practical project, which has been largely neglected in contemporary philosophy, but his conclusions are very different from those of the ancient Greeks. They typically argued that a life led in accordance with reason, a (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  9.  21
    Anna-Sofia Maurin & Johannes Persson (2001). Realistic Metaphysics An Interview with D. H. Mellor. Theoria 67 (2):96-113.
    This article is the text of an interview with D. H. Mellor conducted in Cambridge on 30 May 2001 by Anna-Sofia Maurin and Johannes Persson for the philosophical journal Theoria.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  10. Ingmar Persson (2008). The Retreat of Reason: A Dilemma in the Philosophy of Life. Oxford University Press Uk.
    The Retreat of Reason brings back to philosophy the ambition of offering a broad vision of the human condition. One of the main original aims of philosophy was to give people guidance about how to live their lives. Ingmar Persson resumes this practical project, which has been largely neglected in contemporary philosophy, but his conclusions are very different from those of the ancient Greeks. They typically argued that a life led in accordance with reason, a rational life, would also (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2008). The Perils of Cognitive Enhancement and the Urgent Imperative to Enhance the Moral Character of Humanity. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (3):162-177.
    abstract As history shows, some human beings are capable of acting very immorally. 1 Technological advance and consequent exponential growth in cognitive power means that even rare evil individuals can act with catastrophic effect. The advance of science makes biological, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction easier and easier to fabricate and, thus, increases the probability that they will come into the hands of small terrorist groups and deranged individuals. Cognitive enhancement by means of drugs, implants and (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   28 citations  
  12. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2013). Getting Moral Enhancement Right: The Desirability of Moral Bioenhancement. Bioethics 27 (3):124-131.
    We respond to a number of objections raised by John Harris in this journal to our argument that we should pursue genetic and other biological means of morally enhancing human beings (moral bioenhancement). We claim that human beings now have at their disposal means of wiping out life on Earth and that traditional methods of moral education are probably insufficient to achieve the moral enhancement required to ensure that this will not happen. Hence, we argue, moral bioenhancement should be sought (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  13.  65
    Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2012). Moral Enhancement, Freedom and the God Machine. The Monist 95 (3):399-421.
  14.  59
    Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2010). Moral Transhumanism. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35 (6):656-669.
    In its basic sense, the term "human" is a term of biological classification: an individual is human just in case it is a member of the species Homo sapiens . Its opposite is "nonhuman": nonhuman animals being animals that belong to other species than H. sapiens . In another sense of human, its opposite is "inhuman," that is cruel and heartless (cf. "humane" and "inhumane"); being human in this sense is having morally good qualities. This paper argues that biomedical research (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  15. Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (2013). A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):611-639.
    Skeptical worries about moral responsibility seem to be widely appreciated and deeply felt. To address these worries—if nothing else to show that they are mistaken—theories of moral responsibility need to relate to whatever concept of responsibility underlies the worries. Unfortunately, the nature of that concept has proved hard to pin down. Not only do philosophers have conflicting intuitions; numerous recent empirical studies have suggested that both prosaic responsibility judgments and incompatibilist intuitions among the folk are influenced by a number of (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16. Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (2012). The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility. Noûs 46 (2):326-354.
    In this paper, we do three things. First, we put forth a novel hypothesis about judgments of moral responsibility according to which such judgments are a species of explanatory judgments. Second, we argue that this hypothesis explains both some general features of everyday thinking about responsibility and the appeal of skeptical arguments against moral responsibility. Finally, we argue that, if correct, the hypothesis provides a defense against these skeptical arguments.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  17.  88
    Anders J. Persson & Sven Ove Hansson (2003). Privacy at Work – Ethical Criteria. Journal of Business Ethics 42 (1):59 - 70.
    New technologies and practices, such as drug testing, genetic testing, and electronic surveillance infringe upon the privacy of workers on workplaces. We argue that employees have a prima facie right to privacy, but this right can be overridden by competing moral principles that follow, explicitly or implicitly, from the contract of employment. We propose a set of criteria for when intrusions into an employee''s privacy are justified. Three types of justification are specified, namely those that refer to the employer''s (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  18.  39
    Johannes Persson (2003). Review: Causalité Et Lois de la Nature. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (448):741-746.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  22
    Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2011). The Turn for Ultimate Harm: A Reply to Fenton. Journal of Medical Ethics 37 (7):441-444.
    Elizabeth Fenton has criticised an earlier article by the authors in which the claim was made that, by providing humankind with means of causing its destruction, the advance of science and technology has put it in a perilous condition that might take the development of genetic or biomedical techniques of moral enhancement to get out of. The development of these techniques would, however, require further scientific advances, thus forcing humanity deeper into the danger zone created by modern science. Fenton argues (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  20. Ingmar Persson (2008). Why Levelling Down Could Be Worse for Prioritarianism Than for Egalitarianism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):295-303.
    Derek Parfit has argued that, in contrast to prioritarianism, egalitarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection, i.e., the objection that it is absurd that a change which consists merely in the betteroff losing some of their well-being should be in one way for the better. In reply, this paper contends that there is a plausible form of egalitarianism which is equivalent to another form of prioritarianism than the Parfitian one, a relational rather than an absolute form of prioritarianism, and (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  21. Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (2009). Judgments of Moral Responsibility – a Unified Account. In [2009] Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 35th Annual Meeting (Bloomington, IN; June 12-14). 326-354.
    Recent work in experimental philosophy shows that folk intuitions about moral responsibility are sensitive to a surprising variety of factors. Whether people take agents to be responsible for their actions in deterministic scenarios depends on whether the deterministic laws are couched in neurological or psychological terms (Nahmias et. al. 2007), on whether actions are described abstractly or concretely, and on how serious moral transgression they seem to represent (Nichols & Knobe 2007). Finally, people are more inclined to hold an agent (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  22.  64
    Ingmar Persson (2001). Equality, Priority and Person-Affecting Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (1):23-39.
    Derek Parfit has argued that (Teleological) Egalitarianism is objectionable by breaking a person-affecting claim to the effect that an outcome cannot be better in any respect - such as that of equality - if it is better for nobody. So, he presents the Priorty View, i.e., the policy of giving priority to benefiting the worse-off, which avoids this objection. But it is here argued, first, that there is another person-affecting claim that this view violates. Secondly, Egalitarianism can be (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  23.  29
    Johannes Persson (2005). Tropes as Mechanisms. Foundations of Science 10 (4):371-393.
    This paper is an attempt to further our understanding of mechanisms conceived of as ontologically separable from laws. What opportunities are there for a mechanistic perspective to be independent of, or even more fundamental than, a law perspective? Advocates of the mechanistic view often play with the possibility of internal and external reliability, or with the paralleling possibilities of enforcing, counteracting, redirecting, etc., the mechanisms’ power to produce To further this discussion I adopt a trope ontology. It is independent of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  24.  27
    Johannes Persson (2010). Activity-Based Accounts of Mechanism and the Threat of Polygenic Effects. Erkenntnis 72 (1):135 - 149.
    Accounts of ontic explanation have often been devised so as to provide an understanding of mechanism and of causation. Ontic accounts differ quite radically in their ontologies, and one of the latest additions to this tradition proposed by Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver reintroduces the concept of activity. In this paper I ask whether this influential and activity-based account of mechanisms is viable as an ontic account. I focus on polygenic scenarios—scenarios in which the causal truths depend on (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  25.  18
    Johannes Persson & Petri Ylikoski (eds.) (2007). Rethinking Explanation. Springer.
    This book highlights some of the conceptual problems that still need to be solved and points out a number of fresh philosophical ideas to explore.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  26. Vincent Tomas (1951). Ethical Disagreements and the Emotive Theory of Values. Mind 60 (238):205-222.
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  35
    Gordana Dodig Crnkovic & Daniel Persson (2008). Sharing Moral Responsibility with Robots: A Pragmatic Approach. In Holst, Per Kreuger & Peter Funk (eds.), Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications Volume 173. IOS Press Books
    Roboethics is a recently developed field of applied ethics which deals with the ethical aspects of technologies such as robots, ambient intelligence, direct neural interfaces and invasive nano-devices and intelligent soft bots. In this article we look specifically at the issue of (moral) responsibility in artificial intelligent systems. We argue for a pragmatic approach, where responsibility is seen as a social regulatory mechanism. We claim that having a system which takes care of certain tasks intelligently, learning from experience and making (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  28. Johannes Persson (2011). Explanation in Metaphysics? Metaphysica 12 (2):165-181.
    Arguments from explanation, i.e. arguments in which the explanatory value of a hypothesis or premise is appealed to, are common in science, and explanatory considerations are becoming more popular in metaphysics. The paper begins by arguing that explanatory arguments in science—even when these are metaphysical explanations— may fail to be explanatory in metaphysics; there is a distinction to be drawn between metaphysical explanation and explanation in metaphysics. This makes it potentially problematic to deploy arguments from explanation in, for instance, metaphysics (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  32
    Ingmar Persson (1999). Our Identity and the Separability of Persons and Organisms. Dialogue 38 (03):519-.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  30.  9
    Karl Persson (2013). The Right Perspective on Responsibility for Ill Health. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (3):429-441.
    There is a growing trend in policy making of holding people responsible for their lifestyle-based diseases. This has sparked a heated debate on whether people are responsible for these illnesses, which has now come to an impasse. In this paper, I present a psychological model that explains why different views on people’s responsibility for their health exist and how we can reach a resolution of the disagreement. My conclusion is that policymakers should not perceive people as responsible while health care (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  31.  24
    Ingmar Persson (2012). Could It Be Permissible to Prevent the Existence of Morally Enhanced People? Journal of Medical Ethics 38 (11):692-693.
    This paper discusses Nicholas Agar's argument in Humanity's End, that it can be morally permissible for human beings to prevent the coming into existence of morally enhanced people because this can harm the interests of the unenhanced humans. It contends that Agar's argument fails because it overlooks the distinction between morally permissible and morally impermissible harm. It is only if the harm to them would be of the morally impermissible kind that humans are provided with a reason to prevent the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  32.  5
    Ingmar Persson (2013). Is Agar Biased Against 'Post-Persons'? Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (2):77-78.
    I shall discuss only one of Nicholas Agar's main claims,1 namely ‘that the bad consequences/of moral status enhancement/are, in moral terms, so bad that a moderate probability of their occurrence makes it wrong not to seek to prevent them’. His other main claim, which I grant, is that moral status enhancement to the effect of creating beings with a moral status higher than that of persons—post-persons—is possible. My chief objection to Agar's argument is that it is biased in favour of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  33.  29
    Johannes Persson (2012). Three Conceptions of Explaining How Possibly—and One Reductive Account. In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), Epsa Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer 275--286.
    Philosophers of science have often favoured reductive approaches to how-possibly explanation. This article identifies three alternative conceptions making how-possibly explanation an interesting phenomenon in its own right. The first variety approaches “how possibly X?” by showing that X is not epistemically impossible. This can sometimes be achieved by removing misunderstandings concerning the implications of one’s current belief system but involves characteristically a modification of this belief system so that acceptance of X does not result in contradiction. The second variety offers (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  34.  55
    Johannes Persson (2002). Cause, Effect, and Fake Causation. Synthese 131 (1):129 - 143.
    The possibility of apparently negative causation has been discussed in a number of recent works on causation, but the discussion has suffered from beingscattered. In this paper, the problem of apparently negative causation and its attemptedsolutions are examined in more detail. I discuss and discard three attempts that have beensuggested in the literature. My conclusion is negative: Negative causation shows that thetraditional cause & effect view is inadequate. A more unified causal perspective is needed.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  35.  20
    Ingmar Persson (2012). Prioritarianism and Welfare Reductions. Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 (3):289-301.
    Derek Parfit has argued that egalitarianism is exposed to a levelling down objection because it implies, implausibly, that a change, which consists only in the better-off sinking to the level of the worse-off, is in one respect better, though it is better for nobody. He claims that, in contrast, the prioritarian view that benefits to the worse-off have greater moral weight escapes this objection. This article contends, first, that prioritarianism is equally affected by the levelling down objection as is egalitarianism, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  36.  64
    Nils-Eric Sahlin, Annika Wallin & Johannes Persson (2010). Decision Science: From Ramsey to Dual Process Theories. Synthese 172 (1):129 - 143.
    The hypothesis that human reasoning and decision-making can be roughly modeled by Expected Utility Theory has been at the core of decision science. Accumulating evidence has led researchers to modify the hypothesis. One of the latest additions to the field is Dual Process theory, which attempts to explain variance between participants and tasks when it comes to deviations from Expected Utility Theory. It is argued that Dual Process theories at this point cannot replace previous theories, since they, among other things, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  37.  20
    Ingmar Persson (2008). A Consequentialist Distinction Between What We Ought to Do and Ought to Try. Utilitas 20 (3):348-355.
    G. E. Moore raised the question of whether consequentialists ought to maximize actual rather than expected value, and came down in favour of the former alternative. But rather recently Frank Jackson has presented an example which has been widely thought to clinch the case in favour of the alternative view. This article argues for a sort of compromise between these rival views, namely that while we ought to do what maximizes actual value, we ought to try to do what maximizes (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  38.  39
    Ingmar Persson (2004). Two Act-Omission Paradoxes. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2):147–162.
    There are two ways in which the act-omission doctrine, which implies that it may be permissible to let people die or be killed when it is wrong to kill them, gives rise to a paradox. First, it may be that when you let a victim be killed, you let yourself kill this victim. On the assumption that, if it would be wrong of you to act in a certain fashion, it would be wrong of you let yourself act in this (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  39.  15
    Johannes Persson (2006). Compartment Causation. Synthese 149 (3):535 - 550.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  40.  8
    Ingmar Persson (2003). Two Claims About Potential Human Beings. Bioethics 17 (5-6):503-517.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  41.  74
    Ingmar Persson (2011). Prioritarianism, Levelling Down and Welfare Diffusion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):307-311.
    I have earlier argued that, like egalitarianism, prioritarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection—which I do not find serious—but also that it faces related, more serious objections that egalitarianism avoids. In this paper I reply to Thomas Porter’s attempt to rebut this argument. I also trace the more serious objections to prioritarianism to the fact that it implies the desirability of welfare diffusion, i.e. that it is better all things considered if a quantity of welfare is distributed over as (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  15
    Johannes Persson (2009). Semmelweis's Methodology From the Modern Stand-Point: Intervention Studies and Causal Ontology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 40 (3):204-209.
    Semmelweis’s work predates the discovery of the power of randomization in medicine by almost a century. Although Semmelweis would not have consciously used a randomized controlled trial (RCT), some features of his material—the allocation of patients to the first and second clinics—did involve what was in fact a randomization, though this was not realised at the time. This article begins by explaining why Semmelweis’s methodology, nevertheless, did not amount to the use of a RCT. It then shows why it is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  43.  55
    Vincent Tomas (1958). Creativity in Art. Philosophical Review 67 (1):1-15.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  44.  44
    Ingmar Persson (1983). Hare on Universal Prescriptivism and Utilitarianism. Analysis 43 (1):43 - 49.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  45.  17
    Ingmar Persson (1997). Hume - Not a "Humean" About Motivation. History of Philosophy Quarterly 14 (2):189-206.
  46.  10
    Ingmar Persson (1995). Genetic Therapy, Identity and the Person-Regarding Reasons. Bioethics 9 (1):16–31.
    It has been argued that there can be no person‐regarding reasons for practising genetic therapy, since it affects identity and causes to exist an individual who would not otherwise have existed. And there can be no such reasons for causing somebody to exist because existing cannot be better for an individual than never existing. In the present paper, both of these claims are denied. It is contended, first, that in practically all significant cases genetic therapy will not affect the identity (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  47.  25
    Anders J. Persson (2006). The Contract of Employment - Ethical Dimensions. Journal of Business Ethics 66 (4):407 - 415.
    In this paper, the nature of the contract of employment is explored from an ethical point of view. It is argued that certain normative arguments should be taken into account in order to justify such a contract. Furthermore, an argument is developed against the claim that (a) the individual’s freedom of decision and (b) the practice of institutional arrangements are sufficient to justify a contract of employment. The dimensional analysis offered shows that further conditions are needed: (a) must be elaborated (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  48.  21
    Ingmar Persson (1988). Rationality and Maximization of Satisfaction. Noûs 22 (4):537-554.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  49.  22
    Alexander Bird & Johannes Persson (2006). Introduction. Synthese 149 (3):445-450.
    This volume contains essays by five British philosophers and one Swedish philosopher working in metaphysics and in particular metaphysics as it relates to the philosophy of science. These philosophers are the core of a tight network of European philosophers of science and metaphysicians and their essays have evolved as a result of workshops in Lund, Edinburgh, and Athens.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  50.  56
    Vincent Tomas (1969). Kandinsky's Theory of Painting. British Journal of Aesthetics 9 (1):19-38.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000