1. Mathias Osvath & Tomas Persson (2013). Great Apes Can Defer Exchange: A Replication with Different Results Suggesting Future Oriented Behavior. Frontiers in Psychology 4.
    The topic of cognitive foresight in non-human animals has received considerable attention in the last decade. The main questions concern whether the animals can prepare for upcoming situations which are, to various degrees, contextually or sensorially detached from the situation in which the preparations are made. Studies on great apes have focused on tool-related tasks, e.g. the ability to select a tool which is functional only in the future. Dufour and Sterck (2008), however, investigated whether chimpanzees were also able to (...)
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  2. Mathias Osvath, Tomas Persson & Peter Gärdenfors (2012). Foresight, Function Representation, and Social Intelligence in the Great Apes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (4):234-235.
    We find problems with Vaesen's treatment of the primatological research, in particular his analysis of foresight, function representation, and social intelligence. We argue that his criticism of research on foresight in great apes is misguided. His claim that primates do not attach functions to particular objects is also problematic. Finally, his analysis of theory of mind neglects many distinctions.
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  3. Jordan Zlatev, Tomas Persson & Peter Gärdenfors (2005). Triadic Bodily Mimesis is the Difference. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):720-721.
    We find that the nature and origin of the proposed “dialogical cognitive representations” in the target article is not sufficiently clear. Our proposal is that (triadic) bodily mimesis and in particular mimetic schemas – prelinguistic representational, intersubjective structures, emerging through imitation but subsequently interiorized – can provide the necessary link between private sensory-motor experience and public language. In particular, we argue that shared intentionality requires triadic mimesis.
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