Search results for 'Tomas Persson' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jordan Zlatev, Tomas Persson & Peter Gärdenfors (2005). Triadic Bodily Mimesis is the Difference. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):720-721.score: 240.0
    We find that the nature and origin of the proposed “dialogical cognitive representations” in the target article is not sufficiently clear. Our proposal is that (triadic) bodily mimesis and in particular mimetic schemas – prelinguistic representational, intersubjective structures, emerging through imitation but subsequently interiorized – can provide the necessary link between private sensory-motor experience and public language. In particular, we argue that shared intentionality requires triadic mimesis.
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  2. Mathias Osvath, Tomas Persson & Peter Gärdenfors (2012). Foresight, Function Representation, and Social Intelligence in the Great Apes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (4):234-235.score: 240.0
    We find problems with Vaesen's treatment of the primatological research, in particular his analysis of foresight, function representation, and social intelligence. We argue that his criticism of research on foresight in great apes is misguided. His claim that primates do not attach functions to particular objects is also problematic. Finally, his analysis of theory of mind neglects many distinctions.
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  3. [deleted]Mathias Osvath & Tomas Persson (2013). Great Apes Can Defer Exchange: A Replication with Different Results Suggesting Future Oriented Behavior. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 240.0
    The topic of cognitive foresight in non-human animals has received considerable attention in the last decade. The main questions concern whether the animals can prepare for upcoming situations which are, to various degrees, contextually or sensorially detached from the situation in which the preparations are made. Studies on great apes have focused on tool-related tasks, e.g. the ability to select a tool which is functional only in the future. Dufour and Sterck (2008), however, investigated whether chimpanzees were also able to (...)
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  4. J. Persson & P. Ylikoski (2007). Ibe and Ebi on Explanation Before Inference Johannes Persson. In Johannes Persson & Petri Ylikoski (eds.), Rethinking Explanation. Springer. 252--137.score: 180.0
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  5. Ingmar Persson (2013). From Morality to the End of Reason: An Essay on Rights, Reasons and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.score: 120.0
    Many philosophers think that if you're morally responsible for a state of affairs, you must be a cause of it. Ingmar Persson argues that this strand of common sense morality is asymmetrical, in that it features the act-omission doctrine, according to which there are stronger reasons against performing some harmful actions than in favour of performing any beneficial actions. He analyses the act-omission doctrine as consisting in a theory of negative rights, according to which there are rights not to (...)
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  6. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2012). Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement. Oxford University Press.score: 60.0
    Unfit for the Future argues that the future of our species depends on our urgently finding ways to bring about radical enhancement of the moral aspects of our own human nature. We have rewritten our own moral agenda by the drastic changes we have made to the conditions of life on earth. Advances in technology enable us to exercise an influence that extends all over the world and far into the future. But our moral psychology lags behind and leaves us (...)
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  7. Anna-Sofia Maurin & Johannes Persson (2001). Realistic Metaphysics An Interview with D. H. Mellor. Theoria 67 (2):96-113.score: 60.0
    This article is the text of an interview with D. H. Mellor conducted in Cambridge on 30 May 2001 by Anna-Sofia Maurin and Johannes Persson for the philosophical journal Theoria.
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  8. Ingmar Persson (2005). The Retreat of Reason: A Dilemma in the Philosophy of Life. Oxford University Press.score: 60.0
    The Retreat of Reason brings back to philosophy the ambition of offering a broad vision of the human condition. One of the main original aims of philosophy was to give people guidance about how to live their lives. Ingmar Persson resumes this practical project, which has been largely neglected in contemporary philosophy, but his conclusions are very different from those of the ancient Greeks. They typically argued that a life led in accordance with reason, a rational life, would (...)
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  9. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2008). The Perils of Cognitive Enhancement and the Urgent Imperative to Enhance the Moral Character of Humanity. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (3):162-177.score: 30.0
    abstract As history shows, some human beings are capable of acting very immorally. 1 Technological advance and consequent exponential growth in cognitive power means that even rare evil individuals can act with catastrophic effect. The advance of science makes biological, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction easier and easier to fabricate and, thus, increases the probability that they will come into the hands of small terrorist groups and deranged individuals. Cognitive enhancement by means of drugs, implants and biological (including (...)
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  10. Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (2009). Judgments of Moral Responsibility – a Unified Account. In [2009] Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 35th Annual Meeting (Bloomington, IN; June 12-14). 326-354.score: 30.0
    Recent work in experimental philosophy shows that folk intuitions about moral responsibility are sensitive to a surprising variety of factors. Whether people take agents to be responsible for their actions in deterministic scenarios depends on whether the deterministic laws are couched in neurological or psychological terms (Nahmias et. al. 2007), on whether actions are described abstractly or concretely, and on how serious moral transgression they seem to represent (Nichols & Knobe 2007). Finally, people are more inclined to hold an agent (...)
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  11. Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (2013). A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):611-639.score: 30.0
    Skeptical worries about moral responsibility seem to be widely appreciated and deeply felt. To address these worries—if nothing else to show that they are mistaken—theories of moral responsibility need to relate to whatever concept of responsibility underlies the worries. Unfortunately, the nature of that concept has proved hard to pin down. Not only do philosophers have conflicting intuitions; numerous recent empirical studies have suggested that both prosaic responsibility judgments and incompatibilist intuitions among the folk are influenced by a number of (...)
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  12. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2013). Getting Moral Enhancement Right: The Desirability of Moral Bioenhancement. Bioethics 27 (3):124-131.score: 30.0
    We respond to a number of objections raised by John Harris in this journal to our argument that we should pursue genetic and other biological means of morally enhancing human beings (moral bioenhancement). We claim that human beings now have at their disposal means of wiping out life on Earth and that traditional methods of moral education are probably insufficient to achieve the moral enhancement required to ensure that this will not happen. Hence, we argue, moral bioenhancement should be sought (...)
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  13. Ingmar Persson (2008). Why Levelling Down Could Be Worse for Prioritarianism Than for Egalitarianism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):295 - 303.score: 30.0
    Derek Parfit has argued that, in contrast to prioritarianism, egalitarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection, i.e., the objection that it is absurd that a change which consists merely in the betteroff losing some of their well-being should be in one way for the better. In reply, this paper contends that (1) there is a plausible form of egalitarianism which is equivalent to another form of prioritarianism than the Parfitian one, a relational rather than an absolute form of prioritarianism, (...)
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  14. Johannes Persson (2011). Explanation in Metaphysics? Metaphysica 12 (2):165-181.score: 30.0
    Arguments from explanation, i.e. arguments in which the explanatory value of a hypothesis or premise is appealed to, are common in science, and explanatory considerations are becoming more popular in metaphysics. The paper begins by arguing that explanatory arguments in science—even when these are metaphysical explanations— may fail to be explanatory in metaphysics; there is a distinction to be drawn between metaphysical explanation and explanation in metaphysics. This makes it potentially problematic to deploy arguments from explanation in, for instance, metaphysics (...)
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  15. Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (2012). The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility. Noûs 46 (2):326-354.score: 30.0
    In this paper, we do three things. First, we put forth a novel hypothesis about judgments of moral responsibility according to which such judgments are a species of explanatory judgments. Second, we argue that this hypothesis explains both some general features of everyday thinking about responsibility and the appeal of skeptical arguments against moral responsibility. Finally, we argue that, if correct, the hypothesis provides a defense against these skeptical arguments.
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  16. Anders J. Persson & Sven Ove Hansson (2003). Privacy at Work – Ethical Criteria. Journal of Business Ethics 42 (1):59 - 70.score: 30.0
    New technologies and practices, such as drug testing, genetic testing, and electronic surveillance infringe upon the privacy of workers on workplaces. We argue that employees have a prima facie right to privacy, but this right can be overridden by competing moral principles that follow, explicitly or implicitly, from the contract of employment. We propose a set of criteria for when intrusions into an employee''s privacy are justified. Three types of justification are specified, namely those that refer to the employer''s interests, (...)
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  17. Ingmar Persson (2011). Prioritarianism, Levelling Down and Welfare Diffusion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):307-311.score: 30.0
    I have earlier argued that, like egalitarianism, prioritarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection—which I do not find serious—but also that it faces related, more serious objections that egalitarianism avoids. In this paper I reply to Thomas Porter’s attempt to rebut this argument. I also trace the more serious objections to prioritarianism to the fact that it implies the desirability of welfare diffusion, i.e. that it is better all things considered if a quantity of welfare is distributed over as (...)
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  18. Ingmar Persson (2001). Equality, Priority and Person-Affecting Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (1):23-39.score: 30.0
    Derek Parfit has argued that (Teleological) Egalitarianism is objectionable by breaking a person-affecting claim to the effect that an outcome cannot be better in any respect - such as that of equality - if it is better for nobody. So, he presents the Priorty View, i.e., the policy of giving priority to benefiting the worse-off, which avoids this objection. But it is here argued, first, that there is another person-affecting claim that this view violates. Secondly, Egalitarianism can be construed as (...)
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  19. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2012). Moral Enhancement, Freedom and the God Machine. The Monist 95 (3):399-421.score: 30.0
  20. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2010). Moral Transhumanism. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35 (6):656-669.score: 30.0
    In its basic sense, the term "human" is a term of biological classification: an individual is human just in case it is a member of the species Homo sapiens . Its opposite is "nonhuman": nonhuman animals being animals that belong to other species than H. sapiens . In another sense of human, its opposite is "inhuman," that is cruel and heartless (cf. "humane" and "inhumane"); being human in this sense is having morally good qualities. This paper argues that biomedical research (...)
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  21. Nils-Eric Sahlin, Annika Wallin & Johannes Persson (2010). Decision Science: From Ramsey to Dual Process Theories. Synthese 172 (1):129 - 143.score: 30.0
    The hypothesis that human reasoning and decision-making can be roughly modeled by Expected Utility Theory has been at the core of decision science. Accumulating evidence has led researchers to modify the hypothesis. One of the latest additions to the field is Dual Process theory, which attempts to explain variance between participants and tasks when it comes to deviations from Expected Utility Theory. It is argued that Dual Process theories at this point cannot replace previous theories, since they, among other things, (...)
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  22. Vincent Tomas (1958). Creativity in Art. Philosophical Review 67 (1):1-15.score: 30.0
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  23. Ingmar Persson (2006). Consciousness as Existence as a Form of Neutral Monism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):128-146.score: 30.0
    I shall here raise and attempt to answer -- given the constraints of space, rather dogmatically -- some fundamental questions as regards the fertile and far-reaching doctrine Ted Honderich has in the past called Consciousness as Existence.
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  24. Johannes Persson (2002). Cause, Effect, and Fake Causation. Synthese 131 (1):129 - 143.score: 30.0
    The possibility of apparently negative causation has been discussed in a number of recent works on causation, but the discussion has suffered from beingscattered. In this paper, the problem of apparently negative causation and its attemptedsolutions are examined in more detail. I discuss and discard three attempts that have beensuggested in the literature. My conclusion is negative: Negative causation shows that thetraditional cause & effect view is inadequate. A more unified causal perspective is needed.
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  25. Ingmar Persson (2004). Self-Doubt: Why We Are Not Identical to Things of Any Kind. Ratio 17 (4):390-408.score: 30.0
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  26. Ingmar Persson (2007). The Act—Omission Doctrine and Negative Rights. Journal of Value Inquiry 41 (1):15-29.score: 30.0
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  27. Ingmar Persson (1985). Phenomenal Realism. Erkenntnis 23 (May):59-78.score: 30.0
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  28. Ingmar Persson (2002). Human Death – a View From the Beginning of Life. Bioethics 16 (1):20–32.score: 30.0
    This paper presents a simple argument against definitions of the death of a human being in terms of death, or the cessation of functioning, of its brain: a human being is alive, and is capable of dying, before it acquires a brain. Although a more accurate definition is sketched, it is stressed that it should not be taken for granted that it is ethically urgent to work out such a definition. What morally matters more than the death of a human (...)
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  29. Ingmar Persson (1992). The Indeterminacy and Insignificance of Personal Identity. Inquiry 35 (2):271 – 283.score: 30.0
  30. Ingmar Persson (2004). Two Act-Omission Paradoxes. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2):147–162.score: 30.0
    There are two ways in which the act-omission doctrine, which implies that it may be permissible to let people die or be killed when it is wrong to kill them, gives rise to a paradox. First, it may be that when you let a victim be killed, you let yourself kill this victim. On the assumption that, if it would be wrong of you to act in a certain fashion, it would be wrong of you let yourself act in this (...)
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  31. Ingmar Persson (1999). Awareness of One's Body as Subject and Object. Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):70-76.score: 30.0
    This paper rejects Hume's famous claim that we never perceive our selves, by arguing that, under conditions specified, our perception of our bodies is perception of our selves. It takes as its point of departure Quassim Cassam's defence of a position to a similar effect but puts a different interpretation on the distinction between perceiving the body as an object, having spatial attributes, and perceiving it as a self or subject of experiences.
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  32. Ingmar Persson (2009). The Origination of a Human Being: A Reply to Oderberg. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (4):371-378.score: 30.0
    Recently David S. Oderberg has tried to refute three arguments that have been advanced in favour of the view that a human being does not begin to exist at fertilization. These arguments turn on the absence of differentiation between the embryoblast and trophoblast, the possibility of monozygotic twinning, and the totipotency of the cells during the first days after fertilization. It is here contended that Oderberg fails to rebut these arguments, though it is conceded that the first two arguments are (...)
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  33. Gordana Dodig Crnkovic & Daniel Persson (2008). Sharing Moral Responsibility with Robots: A Pragmatic Approach. In Holst, Per Kreuger & Peter Funk (eds.), Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications Volume 173. IOS Press Books.score: 30.0
    Roboethics is a recently developed field of applied ethics which deals with the ethical aspects of technologies such as robots, ambient intelligence, direct neural interfaces and invasive nano-devices and intelligent soft bots. In this article we look specifically at the issue of (moral) responsibility in artificial intelligent systems. We argue for a pragmatic approach, where responsibility is seen as a social regulatory mechanism. We claim that having a system which takes care of certain tasks intelligently, learning from experience and making (...)
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  34. Johannes Persson (2012). Mechanistic Explanation in Social Contexts: Elster and the Problem of Local Scientific Growth. Social Epistemology 26 (1):105-114.score: 30.0
    Jon Elster worries about the explanatory power of the social sciences. His main concern is that they have so few well-established laws. Elster develops an interesting substitute: a special kind of mechanism designed to fill the explanatory gap between laws and mere description. However, his mechanisms suffer from a characteristic problem that I will explore in this article. As our causal knowledge of a specific problem grows we might come to know too much to make use of an Elsterian mechanism (...)
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  35. Ingmar Persson (1999). Our Identity and the Separability of Persons and Organisms. Dialogue 38 (03):519-.score: 30.0
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  36. Ingmar Persson (1995). Critical Notice of Michael Smith: The Moral Problem. Theoria 61 (2):143-158.score: 30.0
  37. Ingmar Persson (2012). Could It Be Permissible to Prevent the Existence of Morally Enhanced People? Journal of Medical Ethics 38 (11):692-693.score: 30.0
    This paper discusses Nicholas Agar's argument in Humanity's End, that it can be morally permissible for human beings to prevent the coming into existence of morally enhanced people because this can harm the interests of the unenhanced humans. It contends that Agar's argument fails because it overlooks the distinction between morally permissible and morally impermissible harm. It is only if the harm to them would be of the morally impermissible kind that humans are provided with a reason to prevent the (...)
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  38. Ingmar Persson (1985). The Primacy of Perception: Towards a Neutral Monism. C.W.K. Gleerup.score: 30.0
  39. Ingmar Persson (2008). A Consequentialist Distinction Between What We Ought to Do and Ought to Try. Utilitas 20 (3):348-355.score: 30.0
    G. E. Moore raised the question of whether consequentialists ought to maximize actual rather than expected value, and came down in favour of the former alternative. But rather recently Frank Jackson has presented an example which has been widely thought to clinch the case in favour of the alternative view. This article argues for a sort of compromise between these rival views, namely that while we ought to do what maximizes actual value, we ought to try to do what maximizes (...)
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  40. Ingmar Persson (1995). Peter Singer on Why Persons Are Irreplaceable. Utilitas 7 (01):55-.score: 30.0
    In the preface to the second edition of his deservedly popular Practical Ethics , Peter Singer notes that one of the ‘two significant changes” of his ‘underlying ethical views” consists in dropping the tentative suggestion that ‘one might try to combine both the “total” and the “prior existence” versions of utilitarianism, applying the former to sentient beings who are not self-conscious and the latter to those who are” . On the total view our aim is ‘to increase the total amount (...)
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  41. Johannes Persson (2005). Tropes as Mechanisms. Foundations of Science 10 (4):371-393.score: 30.0
    This paper is an attempt to further our understanding of mechanisms conceived of as ontologically separable from laws. What opportunities are there for a mechanistic perspective to be independent of, or even more fundamental than, a law perspective? Advocates of the mechanistic view often play with the possibility of internal and external reliability, or with the paralleling possibilities of enforcing, counteracting, redirecting, etc., the mechanisms’ power to produce To further this discussion I adopt a trope ontology. It is independent of (...)
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  42. Ingmar Persson (2012). Prioritarianism and Welfare Reductions. Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 (3):289-301.score: 30.0
    Derek Parfit has argued that egalitarianism is exposed to a levelling down objection because it implies, implausibly, that a change, which consists only in the better-off sinking to the level of the worse-off, is in one respect better, though it is better for nobody. He claims that, in contrast, the prioritarian view that benefits to the worse-off have greater moral weight escapes this objection. This article contends, first, that prioritarianism is equally affected by the levelling down objection as is egalitarianism, (...)
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  43. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2011). The Turn for Ultimate Harm: A Reply to Fenton. Journal of Medical Ethics 37 (7):441-444.score: 30.0
    Elizabeth Fenton has criticised an earlier article by the authors in which the claim was made that, by providing humankind with means of causing its destruction, the advance of science and technology has put it in a perilous condition that might take the development of genetic or biomedical techniques of moral enhancement to get out of. The development of these techniques would, however, require further scientific advances, thus forcing humanity deeper into the danger zone created by modern science. Fenton argues (...)
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  44. Ingmar Persson (1994). The Groundlessness of Natural Rights. Utilitas 6 (01):9-.score: 30.0
    Today talk of rights is very much in vogue both in philosophical and popular ethics; so much so that it is common to find even philosophers unabashedly going straight to discussing what rights we have without touching on what their foundation might be. This is so in spite of there being a time-honoured tradition of scepticism about rights, conceived as ‘natural’ ones, going back at least to Jeremy Bentham. The present paper is intended as a contribution to this sceptical tradition (...)
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  45. Ingmar Persson (1988). Rationality and Maximization of Satisfaction. Noûs 22 (4):537-554.score: 30.0
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  46. Ingmar Persson (2003). The Badness of Unjust Inequality. Theoria 69 (1-2):109-124.score: 30.0
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  47. Anders J. Persson (2006). The Contract of Employment - Ethical Dimensions. Journal of Business Ethics 66 (4):407 - 415.score: 30.0
    In this paper, the nature of the contract of employment is explored from an ethical point of view. It is argued that certain normative arguments should be taken into account in order to justify such a contract. Furthermore, an argument is developed against the claim that (a) the individual’s freedom of decision and (b) the practice of institutional arrangements are sufficient to justify a contract of employment. The dimensional analysis offered shows that further conditions are needed: (a) must be elaborated (...)
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  48. Ingmar Persson (1996). Feldman's Justicized Act Utilitarianism. Ratio 9 (1):39-46.score: 30.0
  49. Johannes Persson & Petri Ylikoski (eds.) (2007). Rethinking Explanation. Springer.score: 30.0
    This book highlights some of the conceptual problems that still need to be solved and points out a number of fresh philosophical ideas to explore.
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  50. Ingmar Persson (1997). Ambiguities in Feldman's Desert-Adjusted Values. Utilitas 9 (03):319-.score: 30.0
    Fred Feldman has argued that consequentialists can answer the well-known by replacing the utilitarian axiology with one that makes the value of receiving pleasures and pains depend on how deserved it is. It is shown that this proposal is open to three interpretations: (1) the Fit-idea, which operates with the degree of fit between what recipients get and what they deserve; (2) the Merit-idea, which operates with the magnitude of the recipients' desert or merit; and (3) the Fit-Merit idea which (...)
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