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  1. Tomasz Kakol (2013). Ingarden's Ontology of Time and Process and Presentism. Filozofia Nauki 21 (2):117 - +.
     
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  2. Tomasz Kąkol (2013). Is God His Essence? The Logical Structure of Aquinas' Proofs for This Claim. Philosophia 41 (3):649-660.
    In this article I consider whether Aquinas’ arguments for the claim that God is His essence are conclusive, and what was his purpose of upholding this thesis. I show his proofs from Summa Theologiae and Summa Contra Gentiles to be problematic and argue that the defense of Aquinas’ views on that matter suggested by certain remarks of P. T. Geach is flawed.
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  3. Tomasz Kąkol (2013). Ingardenowska ontologia czasu i procesu a prezentyzm. Filozofia Nauki 2.
    Presentism is described as the theory according to which there is an objective time flow and that there is neither past nor future. Roman Ingarden’s ontology of time does not seem to be presentist then, since it supposedly rejects the second component of that doctrine. In this article, I show that this view misconstrues the spirit of Ingarden’s account, and I defend a certain ontology of time (inspired by Ingarden’s works) against several objections (e.g. the ‘how fast does time flow’ (...)
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  4. Tomasz Kąkol (2012). W kwestii dowodów Spinozy na istnienie Boga i dowodu na jedyność Spinozjańskiej substancji. Filo-Sofija 12 (17):83-100.
    ON SPINOZA’S PROOFS OF (SPINOZIAN) GOD’S EXISTENCE AND THE PROOF OF THE UNIQUENESS OF THE SPINOZIAN SUBSTANCE In this paper I analyze Spinozian ontological arguments for God’s existence from Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata. I argue that the first proof suffers from circulus vitiosus, whereas the others have at least one non-obvious premise. I also consider P. Gut’s modification of the first proof, reported to me during the conference “The Philosophy of the 17th Century—Its Origins and Continuations” (Gdańsk, 16.06.2011). Meanwhile, I (...)
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  5. Tomasz Kakol (2010). Against Substantialism. Filozofia Nauki 18 (4):121.
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  6. Tomasz Kąkol (2010). Przeciw substancjalizmowi. Filozofia Nauki 4.
    In this paper I criticize substantialism by analyzing two well-known puzzles con-cerning identity and change - Tibbles the Cat puzzle and the fission paradox. All the approaches assuming substantialism I know lead to untenable consequences (e.g. bilocation) and I conclude that we should seriously take the possibility of processual or eventistic picture of our material life world.
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  7. Tomasz Kakol (2006). Analiza formalna wybranych dowodow NA jedynosc boga U swietego tomasza Z akwinu. Studia Philosophiae Christianae 42 (1):144-154.
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  8. Tomasz Kąkol (2006). Ingarden i zagadnienie tożsamości osobowej. Ruch Filozoficzny 1 (1).
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  9. Tomasz Kakol (2005). The Samep-Relation as a Response to Critics of Baker's Theory of Constitution. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (5/6):561 - 579.
    According to the so-called "standard account" regarding the problem of material constitution, a statue and a lump of clay that makes it up are not identical. The usual objection is that this view yields many objects in the same place at the same time. Lynne Rudder Baker's theory of constitution is a recent and sophisticated version of the standard account. She argues that the aforementioned objection can be answered by defining a relation of being the same P as (sameP). In (...)
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