Online research in philosophy

Expanding on a discussion by Hansson, this paper treats of Goodman's and Lewis' accounts of counterfactual conditionals, comparing the senses in which these theories may be accused of circularity. While I do maintain that in this respect Lewis has an edge over Goodman, the paper's aim is not so much to reach a firm conclusion as to disentangle some previously conflated aspects of the issue. It is also suggested that the importance of avoiding circularity may vary depending on the philosophical (...) purpose of one's analysis. (shrink)

It seems plausible, even truistic, that when an agent is faced with the choice of giving up one belief or another, the decision should be based on the relative strengths of these beliefs along some dimension of doxastic merit. This said, however, two non-trivial questions arise: (1) Which dimension? (2) How should the contraction outcome be affected by the distribution of beliefs along this dimension?