Moving Pictures is a bold new theoretical account of the role of emotions and cognition in producing the aesthetic effects of film and television genres. It argues that film genres are mental structures which integrate sensations, emotions, and actions, activating the viewer's body and mind. Using recent developments in neuroscience and cognitive science, in combination with narrative theory and film theory, TorbenGrodal provides an alternative account to that offered by psychoanalysis explaining identification and the correlation of viewer (...) reaction with specific film genres. Concluding with an analysis of the emotional structures of comic fiction, metafiction, crime fiction, horror, and melodrama, the book is unique in describing a wide range of problems and issues within film studies, from a cognitive, neurophysiological, and ecological point of view. -/- Highly original, the work will interest scholars in a wide range of fields, from aesthetics to psychology in addition to researchers in the areas of film and television theory. (shrink)
I argue in this article (i) that Karl Olivecrona's legal philosophy, especially the critique of the view that law has binding force, the analysis of the concept and function of a legal rule, and the idea that law is a matter of organized force, is a significant contribution to twentieth century legal philosophy. I also argue (ii) that Olivecrona fails to substantiate some of his most important empirical claims, and (iii) that the distinction espoused by Olivecrona between the truth and (...) the correctness of legal statements is problematic but not needed in Olivecrona's legal philosophy. (shrink)
In the paper (Braüner, 2001) we gave a minimal condition for the existence of a homophonic theory of truth for a modal or tense logic. In the present paper we generalise this result to arbitrary modal logics and we also show that a modal logic permits the existence of a homophonic theory of truth if and only if it permits the definition of a so-called master modality. Moreover, we explore a connection between the master modality and hybrid logic: We show (...) that if attention is restricted to bidirectional frames, then the expressive power of the master modality is exactly what is needed to translate the bounded fragment of first-order logic into hybrid logic in a truth preserving way. We believe that this throws new light on Arthur Prior's fourth grade tense logic. (shrink)
Relativistic theories and arguments are fairly common in legal thinking. A case in point is Stanley Fish's theory of interpretation, which applies to statutes and constitutions as well as to novels and poems. Fish holds, inter alia, (i) that an interpretation of a statute, a poem, or some other text can be true or valid only in light of the interpretive strategies that define an interpretive community, and (ii) that no set of interpretive strategies (and therefore no interpretation) is truer (...) or more valid than any other. In this article, I discuss these claims critically and argue that the very idea of an interpretive community is more or less unintelligible, and that in any case Fish's theory is self-refuting. I begin with a few words about the methods and techniques of statutory interpretation(Section 2). I proceed by introducing Fish's theory of interpretation, giving special consideration to some difficulties in Fish's account of the concept of an interpretive community (Sections 3-4). I then introduce two types of relativism, cognitive and moral (Section 5), and argue that Fish's theory asserts cognitive relativism in the shape of conceptual relativism and relativism about truth (Section 6). Having done that, I consider Donald Davidson's well-known objection to alternative conceptual schemes (Section 7) as well as the popular charge that relativism about truth is self-refuting (Section 8). (shrink)
The Scandinavian Realist Karl Olivecrona did not pay much attention to questions of legal reasoning in his many works. He did, however, argue that courts necessarily create law when deciding a case. The reason, he explained, is that judges must evaluate issues of fact or law in order to decide a case, and that evaluations are not objective. Olivecrona's line of argument is problematic, however. The problem is that Olivecrona uses the term "evaluation" in a sense that is broad enough (...) to cover not only evaluations, including moral evaluations, but also considerations that are not evaluations at all, and therefore his claim that judges must evaluate issues of law or fact in order to decide whether a case is false. (shrink)
In this paper we give axiom systems for classical and intuitionistic hybrid logic. Our axiom systems can be extended with additional rules corresponding to conditions on the accessibility relation expressed by so-called geometric theories. In the classical case other axiomatisations than ours can be found in the literature but in the intuitionistic case no axiomatisations have been published. We consider plain intuitionistic hybrid logic as well as a hybridized version of the constructive and paraconsistent logic N4.
This is a companion paper to Braüner (2004b, Journal of Logic and Computation 14, 329–353) where a natural deduction system for propositional hybrid logic is given. In the present paper we generalize the system to the first-order case. Our natural deduction system for first-order hybrid logic can be extended with additional inference rules corresponding to conditions on the accessibility relations and the quantifier domains expressed by so-called geometric theories. We prove soundness and completeness and we prove a normalisation theorem. Moreover, (...) we give an axiom system first-order hybrid logic. (shrink)
This article aims to outline a perspective on democratic ideology centred on orientation and justification, which is discussed in relation to the right?left dyad and public reason. Ideology is approached in terms of the orientational structuring of identification processes, which is discussed in relation to the articulation between four pairs of orientational metaphors (up?down, in?out, front?back and right?left), which shape the political terrain and the terms of political justification. The latter is expressed in public reason based on political equality, pluralism (...) and contingency as opposed to hierarchy, monism and objectivism. A modern democratic ideology is based on right/left orientation to underpin the autonomy of the political symbolic order vis?à?vis cultural and religious orders, and on public reason as freestanding in relation to comprehensive reasons, which is a political justification of the priority of right/left in matters of common concerns. (shrink)
A hybrid logic is obtained by adding to an ordinary modal logic further expressive power in the form of a second sort of propositional symbols called nominals and by adding so-called satisfaction operators. In this paper we consider hybridized versions of S5 (“the logic of everywhere”) and the modal logic of inequality (“the logic of elsewhere”). We give natural deduction systems for the logics and we prove functional completeness results.
In this paper two different natural deduction systems forhybrid logic are compared and contrasted.One of the systems was originally given by the author of the presentpaper whereasthe other system under consideration is a modifiedversion of a natural deductionsystem given by Jerry Seligman.We give translations in both directions between the systems,and moreover, we devise a set of reduction rules forthe latter system bytranslation of already known reduction rules for the former system.
There is an error in the completeness proof for the {λ, =} part of FOIL-K. The error occurs in Section 4, in the text following the proof of Corollary 4.7, and concerns the definition of the interpretation I on relation symbols. Before this point in the paper, for each object variable v an equivalence class v has been defined, and for each intension variable f a function f has been defined. Then the following definition is given for a relation symbol (...) P : v1, v2, . . . , f1, f2, . . . ∈ I(P )(Γ) just in case there are w1, w2, . . . in d(Γ) with wi ∈ vi such that P (w1, w2, . . . , f1, f2, . . .) ∈ Γ. It was pointed out by Torben Brauner that we could have f1 and g1 being the same function, but also have P (w1, w2, . . . , f1, f2, . . .) ∈ Γ without having P (w1, w2, . . . , g1, f2, . . .) ∈ Γ. Our solution is to modify the definition of the model, rather artificially, so that if f and g are the same function, then f and g are syntactically the same intension variable. This is done as follows. First, arbitrarily choose some object variable w, and its corresponding equivalence class w. For each intension variable f we define a disambiguation world ˆ. (shrink)
This paper uses a two-dimensional version of a standard common consequence experiment to test the intransitivity explanation of Allais-paradox-type violations of expected utility theory. We compare the common consequence effect of two choice problems differing only with respect to whether alternatives are statistically correlated or independent. We framed the experiment so that intransitive preferences could explain violating behavior when alternatives are independent, but not when they are correlated. We found the same pattern of violation in the two cases. This is (...) evidence against intransitivity as an explanation of the Allais Paradox. The question whether violations of expected utility are mainly due to intransitivity or to violation of independence is important since it is exactly on this issue the main new decision theories differ. (shrink)
We generalize the concept of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for strategic form games to allow for ambiguity in the players' expectations. In contrast to other contributions, we model ambiguity by means of so-called lower probability measures or belief functions, which makes it possible to distinguish between a player's assessment of ambiguity and his attitude towards ambiguity. We also generalize the concept of trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate that for certain attitudes towards ambiguity it is possible to explain (...) cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma in a way that is in accordance with some recent experimental findings. (shrink)
Dr Thrane makes an original contribution to one of the central topics in syntax and semantics: the nature and mechanisms of reference in natural language. He makes a fundamental distinction between syntactic analyses that are internal to the structure of a language and analyses of the referential properties that connect a language with the 'outside world' - and therefore derive in some sense from common human capacities for perceptual discrimination. Dr Thrane argues that the failure to make this distinction and (...) to attend separately to both kinds of analysis has vitiated previous general accounts of linguistic structure. The book focuses particularly on pronouns and on the role of determiners, quantifiers and other components of the noun phrase. Most of the data come from the modern Germanic languages, especially English, but Dr Thrane considers also the structural peculiarities of 'classifier languages' like Vietnamese. The book will be important for students of English language as well as for general linguists. (shrink)
