Search results for 'Torstein Theodor Tollefsen' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  9
    Torstein Theodor Tollefsen (2012). Activity and Participation in Late Antique and Early Christian Thought. OUP Oxford.
    An investigation into two basic concepts of ancient pagan and early Christian thought, activity and participation, through detailed discussion of the writings of Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor, and Gregory Palamas.
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  2. Aidan Nichols (2009). The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor by Torstein Theodor Tollefsen. New Blackfriars 90 (1028):502-504.
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  3.  9
    Torstein Tollefsen (2008). The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor. OUP Oxford.
    Maximus the Confessor was an important Byzantine thinker, the 'father of Byzantine theology'. This study describes his metaphysical world-view. The discussion covers Maximus' doctrine of creation, the Logos and the logoi, the cosmic order, the activities or energies of God, and how created beings may participate in God.
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  4.  82
    Deborah Perron Tollefsen (2009). WIKIPEDIA and the Epistemology of Testimony. Episteme 6 (1):8-24.
    In “Group Testimony” (2007) I argued that the testimony of a group cannot be understood (or at least cannot always be understood) in a summative fashion; as the testimony of some or all of the group members. In some cases, it is the group itself that testifies. I also argued that one could extend standard reductionist accounts of the justification of testimonial belief to the case of testimonial belief formed on the basis of group testimony. In this paper, I explore (...)
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  5. Deborah Tollefsen (2015). Groups as Agents. Polity.
    In the social sciences and in everyday speech we often talk about groups as if they behaved in the same way as individuals, thinking and acting as a singular being. We say for example that "Google intends to develop an automated car", "the U.S. Government believes that Syria has used chemical weapons on its people", or that "the NRA wants to protect the rights of gun owners". We also often ascribe legal and moral responsibility to groups. But could groups literally (...)
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  6. Christopher O. Tollefsen (2014). Lying and Christian Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
    This book defends the controversial 'absolute view' of lying, which maintains that an assertion contrary to the speaker's mind is always wrong, regardless of the speaker's intentions. Whereas most people believe that a lie told for a good cause, such as protecting Jews from discovery by Nazis, is morally acceptable, Christopher Tollefsen argues that Christians should support the absolute view. He looks back to the writings of Augustine and Aquinas to illustrate that lying violates the basic human goods of (...)
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  7. Christopher O. Tollefsen (2016). Lying and Christian Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
    This book defends the controversial 'absolute view' of lying, which maintains that an assertion contrary to the speaker's mind is always wrong, regardless of the speaker's intentions. Whereas most people believe that a lie told for a good cause, such as protecting Jews from discovery by Nazis, is morally acceptable, Christopher Tollefsen argues that Christians should support the absolute view. He looks back to the writings of Augustine and Aquinas to illustrate that lying violates the basic human goods of (...)
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  8.  77
    Deborah Tollefsen & Rick Dale (2011). Naturalizing Joint Action: A Process-Based Approach. Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):385-407.
    Numerous philosophical theories of joint agency and its intentional structure have been developed in the past few decades. These theories have offered accounts of joint agency that appeal to higher-level states that are?shared? in some way. These accounts have enhanced our understanding of joint agency, yet there are a number of lower-level cognitive phenomena involved in joint action that philosophers rarely acknowledge. In particular, empirical research in cognitive science has revealed that when individuals engage in a joint activity such as (...)
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  9.  88
    Deborah Tollefsen (2005). Let’s Pretend!: Children and Joint Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1):75-97.
    According to many, joint intentional action must be understood in terms of joint intentions. Most accounts of joint intention appeal to a set of sophisticated individual intentional states. The author argues that standard accounts of joint intention exclude the possibility of joint action in young children because they presuppose that the participants have a robust theory of mind, something young children lack. But young children do engage in joint action. The author offers a revision of Michael Bratman’s analysis of joint (...)
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  10.  73
    Deborah Tollefsen (2002). Organizations as True Believers. Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (3):395–410.
  11.  41
    Deborah P. Tollefsen, Rick Dale & Alexandra Paxton (2013). Alignment, Transactive Memory, and Collective Cognitive Systems. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1):49-64.
    Research on linguistic interaction suggests that two or more individuals can sometimes form adaptive and cohesive systems. We describe an “alignment system” as a loosely interconnected set of cognitive processes that facilitate social interactions. As a dynamic, multi-component system, it is responsive to higher-level cognitive states such as shared beliefs and intentions (those involving collective intentionality) but can also give rise to such shared cognitive states via bottom-up processes. As an example of putative group cognition we turn to transactive memory (...)
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  12. Adorno, W. Theodor, H. Albert, R. Dahrendorf, J. Habermas, H. Pilot & K. Popper (1976). The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology. Heinemann Educational Books.
  13. Deborah Tollefsen (2007). Group Testimony. Social Epistemology 21 (3):299 – 311.
    The fact that much of our knowledge is gained through the testimony of others challenges a certain form of epistemic individualism. We are clearly not autonomous knowers. But the discussion surrounding testimony has maintained a commitment to what I have elsewhere called epistemic agent individualism. Both the reductionist and the anti-reductionist have focused their attention on the testimony of individuals. But groups, too, are sources of testimony - or so I shall argue. If groups can be testifiers, a natural question (...)
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  14. Deborah Tollefsen (2006). From Extended Mind to Collective Mind. Cognitive Systems Research 7 (2):140-150.
  15. Deborah Perron Tollefsen (2003). Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collective Responsibility. Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):218 – 234.
    The debate surrounding the issue of collective moral responsibility is often steeped in metaphysical issues of agency and personhood. I suggest that we can approach the metaphysical problems surrounding the issue of collective responsibility in a roundabout manner. My approach is reminiscent of that taken by P.F. Strawson in "Freedom and Resentment" (1968). Strawson argues that the participant reactive attitudes - attitudes like resentment, gratitude, forgiveness and so on - provide the justification for holding individuals morally responsible. I argue that (...)
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  16.  72
    Deborah Perron Tollefsen (2002). Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):25-50.
    In everyday discourse and in the context of social scientific research we often attribute intentional states to groups. Contemporary approaches to group intentionality have either dismissed these attributions as metaphorical or provided an analysis of our attributions in terms of the intentional states of individuals in the group.Insection1, the author argues that these approaches are problematic. In sections 2 and 3, the author defends the view that certain groups are literally intentional agents. In section 4, the author argues that there (...)
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  17.  40
    Deborah Perron Tollefsen (2006). Group Deliberation, Social Cohesion, and Scientific Teamwork: Is There Room for Dissent? Episteme 3 (1-2):37-51.
    Recent discussions of rational deliberation in science present us with two extremes: unbounded optimism and sober pessimism. Helen Longino (1990) sees rational deliberation as the foundation of scientific objectivity. Miriam Solomon (1991) thinks it is overrated. Indeed, she has recently argued (2006) that group deliberation is detrimental to empirical success because it often involves groupthink and the suppression of dissent. But we need not embrace either extreme. To determine the value of rational deliberation we need to look more closely at (...)
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  18.  60
    Deborah Tollefsen (2006). The Rationality of Collective Guilt. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):222–239.
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  19.  98
    Christopher Tollefsen (2010). Divine, Human, and Embryo Adoption. The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10 (1):75-85.
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  20. Deborah Tollefsen (2004). Collective Intentionality. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  21.  76
    Deborah Tollefsen (2004). Collective Epistemic Agency. Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (1):55-66.
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  22.  10
    Christopher Tollefsen (2013). Response to Robert Koons and Matthew O'Brien's “Objects of Intention. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):751 - 778.
    Robert Koons and Matthew O’Brien have leveled a number of objections against the New Natural Law account of human action and intention. In this paper, I discuss five areas in which I believe that the Koons-O’Brien criticism of the New Natural Law theory is mistaken, or in which their own view is problematic. I hope to show, inter alia, that the New Natural Law approach is not committed to a number of theses attributed to it by Koons and O’Brien; that (...)
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  23.  11
    Christopher Tollefsen (2007). Religious Reasons and Public Healthcare Deliberations. Christian Bioethics 13 (2):139-157.
    This paper critically explores the path of some of the controversies over public reason and religion through four distinct steps. The first part of this article considers the engagement of John Finnis and Robert P. George with John Rawls over the nature of public reason. The second part moves to the question of religion by looking at the engagement of Nicholas Wolterstorff with Rawls, Robert Audi, and others. Here the question turns specifically to religious reasons, and their permissible use by (...)
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  24.  30
    Christopher Tollefsen (2011). Mind the Gap: Charting the Distance Between Christian and Secular Bioethics. Christian Bioethics 17 (1):47-53.
    The gap between Christian and secular bioethics appears to be widening, and inevitably so. In this essay, I identify four areas in which the differences between Christian and secular bioethics are significant, and in light of which secular bioethics, by its inability to attend to key concerns of Christian thought, will inevitably continue to marginalize the latter. How Christian bioethicists should view this marginalization will be the subject of the final section of this paper.
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  25.  27
    Christopher Tollefsen (2001). Embryos, Individuals, and Persons: An Argument Against Embryo Creation and Research. Journal of Applied Philosophy 18 (1):65–78.
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  26.  56
    Sondra Bacharach & Deborah Tollefsen (2010). We Did It: From Mere Contributors to Coauthors. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 68 (1):23-32.
  27.  9
    Christopher Tollefsen (2000). What Would John Dewey Do? The Promises and Perils of Pragmatic Bioethics. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 25 (1):77 – 106.
    Recent work done at the intersection of classical American pragmatism and bioethics promises much: a clarified self-understanding for bioethics, a modus vivendi for progress, and liberation from misguided and misguiding theories and principles. The revival of pragmatism outside bioethics in the past twenty years, however, has been of a distinctly anti-realist orientation. Richard Rorty, for example, has urged that there is no objective truth or good for philosophy to be concerned with. I ask whether the work in Pragmatic Bioethics follows (...)
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  28. D. Tollefsen (2005). Let's Pretend! Joint Action and Young Children. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1):75-97.
  29.  49
    Christopher Tollefsen & Mark J. Cherry (2003). Pragmatism and Bioethics: Diagnosis or Cure? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 28 (5 & 6):533 – 544.
  30.  20
    C. Tollefsen (2010). Incarnate Reason and the Embryo: A Response to Dabrock. Christian Bioethics 16 (2):177-186.
    “Incarnate reason” names, in Peter Dabrock's essay, both the task of utilizing natural reason in ethical and political discourse, and an answer to the ontological question about human persons, “What are we?” In this essay, I investigate the significance of this construal for questions about the metaphysical, moral, and political status of the human embryo.
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  31.  66
    Olaf Tollefsen (1982). Realism, Conventionalism, and the History of Science. New Scholasticism 56 (3):292-305.
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  32.  12
    C. Tollefsen (2004). Abortion and the Human Animal. Christian Bioethics 10 (1):105-116.
    I discuss three topics. First, there is a philosophical connecting thread between several recent trends in the abortion discussion, namely, the issue of our animal nature, and physical embodiment. The philosophical name given to the position that you and I are essentially human animals is “animalism.” In Section II of this paper, I argue that animalism provides a unifying theme to recent discussions of abortion. In Section III, I discuss what we do not find among recent trends in the abortion (...)
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  33. D. Tollefsen (2007). Collective Epistemic Agency and the Need for Collective Epistemology. In Nikolaos Psarros & Katinka Schulte-Ostermann (eds.), Facets of Sociality. Ontos 309--329.
  34.  28
    Joseph M. Boyle Jr, Germain Grisez & Olaf Tollefsen (1972). Determinism, Freedom, and Self-Referential Arguments. Review of Metaphysics 26 (1):3-37.
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  35.  35
    Christopher Tollefsen (2006). Is a Purely First Person Account of Human Action Defensible? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (4):441 - 460.
    There are two perspectives available from which to understand an agent's intention in acting. The first is the perspective of the acting agent: what did she take to be her end, and the means necessary to achieve that end? The other is a third person perspective that is attentive to causal or conceptual relations: was some causal outcome of the agent's action sufficiently close, or so conceptually related, to what the agent did that it should be considered part of her (...)
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  36.  16
    C. Tollefsen (2008). Intending Damage to Basic Goods. Christian Bioethics 14 (3):272-282.
    Richard McCormick justified his move to proportionalism in part because of the perceived inadequacy of the Grisez-Finnis approach to morality to answer the following question: “What is to count for turning against a basic good, and why?” In this paper, I provide the beginnings of an account of what it means to intend damage to a good; I then show that the account is readily exportable to judgments regarding killing and lying defended by Grisez and others. I then indicate that (...)
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  37.  88
    Deborah Tollefsen (1999). Princess Elisabeth and the Problem of Mind-Body Interaction. Hypatia 14 (3):59-77.
    : This paper focuses on Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia's philosophical views as exhibited in her early correspondence with René Descartes. Elisabeth's criticisms of Descartes's interactionism as well as her solution to the problem of mind-body interaction are examined in detail. The aim here is to develop a richer picture of Elisabeth as a philosophical thinker and to dispel the myth that she is simply a Cartesian muse.
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  38.  9
    Christopher Tollefsen (2000). Direct and Indirect Action Revisited. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 74 (4):653-670.
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  39.  81
    Christopher Tollefsen (2006). Reasons for Action and Reasons for Belief. Social Epistemology 20 (1):55 – 65.
    As Alan Wood has recently pointed out, there is "a long and strong philosophical traditionthat parcels out cognitive tasks to human faculties in such a way that belief is assigned to the will".1 Such an approach lends itself to addressing the ethics of belief as an extension of practical ethics. It also lends itself to a treatment of reasons for belief that is an extension of its treatment of reasons for action, for our awareness of reasons for action provides the (...)
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  40.  27
    Christopher Tollefsen (2003). Experience Machines, Dreams, and What Matters. Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (2):153-164.
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  41.  19
    Christopher Tollefsen (2008). The Ever-Conscious View: A Critique. The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 8 (1):43-48.
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  42.  38
    Christopher Tollefsen (2012). Augustine, Aquinas, and the Absolute Norm Against Lying. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):111-134.
    Recent events concerning the guerilla journalism group Live Action created controversy over the morality of lying for a good cause. In that controversy, I defended the absolutist view about lying, the view that lying, understood as assertion contrary to one’s belief, is always wrong. In this essay, I step back from the specifics of the Live Action case to look more closely at what St. Augustine, and St. Thomas Aquinas, had to say in defense of the absolute view. Their approaches, (...)
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  43.  23
    Deborah Tollefsen (2011). Groups as Rational Sources. In Hans Bernhard Schmid, Daniel Sirtes & Marcel Weber (eds.), Collective Epistemology. Ontos 20--11.
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  44.  23
    Christopher Tollefsen (2002). Practical Reason and Ethics Above the Line. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1):67-87.
    In John McDowell's recent Woodbridge Lectures at Columbia University, he characterizes Wilfrid Sellars's master thought, in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, as drawing a line between two types of characterizations of states that occur in people's mental lives: Above the line are placings in the logical space of reasons, and below it are characterizations that do not do that (McDowell, 1998, p. 433). In this essay, I ask what would be required for ethics to be above the line. More (...)
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  45.  22
    Christopher O. Tollefsen (2000). McDowell’s Moral Realism and the Secondary Quality Analogy. Disputatio:1-13.
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  46.  12
    Christopher Tollefsen (2013). Does God Intend Death? Diametros 38:191-200.
    In this paper, I argue that God never intends a human being’s death. The core argument is essentially Thomistic. God wills only the good; and human life is always a good, and its privation always an evil. Thus, St. Thomas holds that “God does not will death as per se intended,” and he gives an account of the act of divine punishment that conforms to this claim. However, some further claims of St. Thomas are in tension with this position – (...)
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  47.  38
    Sondra Bacharach & Deborah Tollefsen (2011). We Did It Again: A Reply to Livingston. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 69 (2):225-230.
  48.  13
    Rick Dale, Deborah P. Tollefsen & Christopher T. Kello (2012). An Integrative Pluralistic Approach to Phenomenal Consciousness. In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins Pub. Co. 88--231.
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  49.  27
    C. Tollefsen (1999). Non-Ecumenical Ecumenism. Christian Bioethics 5 (3):238-245.
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  50.  13
    Deborah Tollefsen (2009). Symposia on Gender, Race and Philosophy. In David Papineau (ed.), Philosophy. Oxford University Press 5--1.
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