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  1. Hannah Tierney, Chris Howard, Victor Kumar, Trevor Kvaran & Shaun Nichols (forthcoming). How Many of Us Are There? In Justin Sytsma (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind. Continuum Press.
  2. Trevor Kvaran & Alan G. Sanfey (2010). Toward an Integrated Neuroscience of Morality: The Contribution of Neuroeconomics to Moral Cognition. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):579-595.
    Interest in the neural processes underlying decision making has led to a flurry of recent research in the fields of both moral psychology and neuroeconomics. In this paper, we first review some important findings from both disciplines, and then argue that the two fields can mutually benefit each other. A more explicit recognition of the role of values and norms will likely lead to more accurate models of decision making for neuroeconomists, whereas the tasks, insights into neural mechanisms, and mathematical (...)
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  3. Thomas Nadelhoffer, Trevor Kvaran & Eddy Nahmias (2009). Temperament and Intuition: A Commentary on Feltz and Cokely. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):351-355.
    In this paper, we examine Adam Feltz and Edward Cokely’s recent claim that “the personality trait extraversion predicts people’s intuitions about the relationship of determinism to free will and moral responsibility”. We will first present some criticisms of their work before briefly examining the results of a recent study of our own. We argue that while Feltz and Cokely have their finger on the pulse of an interesting and important issue, they have not established a robust and stable connection between (...)
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  4. Eddy Nahmias, D. Justin Coates & Trevor Kvaran (2007). Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism: Experiments on Folk Intuitions. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):214–242.
    In this paper we discuss studies that show that most people do not find determinism to be incompatible with free will and moral responsibility if determinism is described in a way that does not suggest mechanistic reductionism. However, if determinism is described in a way that suggests reductionism, that leads people to interpret it as threatening to free will and responsibility. We discuss the implications of these results for the philosophical debates about free will, moral responsibility, and determinism.
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