Search results for 'Truth Condition' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Allan Hazlett (2012). Factive Presupposition and the Truth Condition on Knowledge. Acta Analytica 27 (4):461-478.
    In “The Myth of Factive Verbs” (Hazlett 2010), I had four closely related goals. The first (pp. 497-99, p. 522) was to criticize appeals to ordinary language in epistemology. The second (p. 499) was to criticize the argument that truth is a necessary condition on knowledge because “knows” is factive. The third (pp. 507-19) – which was the intended means of achieving the first two – was to defend a semantics for “knows” on which <S knows p> can (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  2. William G. Lycan (2010). Direct Arguments for the Truth-Condition Theory of Meaning. Topoi 29 (2):99-108.
    The truth-condition theory of meaning is, naturally, thought of an as explanatory theory whose explananda are the meaning facts. But there are at least two deductive arguments that purport to establish the truth of the theory irrespective of its explanatory virtues. This paper examines those arguments and concludes that they succeed.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  3. William Lycan, On a Defense of the Truth-Condition Theory of Meaning.
    1.Competition between philosophical theories of linguistic meaning is sometimes specious. For example, suppose Ned believes that an utterance’s meaning is its truth-condition, while Ted insists that the utterance’s meaning is constituted by the speaker’s communicative intentions à la Grice.Here one wants to distinguish explananda:What Ned is after is really the utterance’s (“timeless”) sentence-meaning; Ted is focusing on speaker-meaning, which is not the same, and the two theories are perfectly compatible, indeed mutually complementary, accounts of distinct phenomena.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  3
    Paul Weingartner (1999). Tarski’s Truth Condition Revisited. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 6:193-201.
    The paper is divided into the following sections: In the first section a short historical survey is given which presents precursors of both Tarski’s truth-condition and Tarski’s truth definition . Secondly some purported objections against Tarski’s truth condition are stated and two important presuppositions of Tarski’s truth condition are analyzed. Thirdly TTC is enlarged in different ways as to incorporate the preconditions explicitly. Finally in the fourth section it will be shown how the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Simon Blackburn (1986). How Can We Tell Whether a Commitment has a Truth Condition. In Charles Travis (ed.), Meaning and Interpretation. B. Blackwell 201--232.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  6.  7
    Robert K. Shope (2002). The Truth Condition. In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press 26.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Gp Baker & P. M. S. Hacker (1983). The Concept of a Truth-Condition. Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 17 (40-41):11-18.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Nicholas Hammond (1994). Playing with Truth: Language and the Human Condition in Pascal's Pensées. Oxford University Press.
    Playing with Truth is the first comprehensive work on Pascal to be devoted to his use in the Pens'ees of key terms depicting its central subject--the human condition. Generally acknowledged as one of the greatest masterpieces of seventeenth-century France, the Pens'ees is an unfinished work which has both inspired and perplexed readers in succeeding centuries. In this study Nicholas Hammond explores such fundamental notions as language and order, proceeding with a detailed analysis of the words inconstance, ennui, inqui'etude, (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  9.  3
    James B. Freeman, The Truth About Truth as a Condition of Premise Adequacy.
    Is truth a condition of premise adequacy? We may distinguish objective and subjective argument correctness. Objective correctness means true premises rendering the conclusion true or probable. Subjective correctness means acceptable pr emises rendering the conclusion acceptable. Acceptability depends on evidence available and so is internalist. Objective and subjective correctness of the premises is ordinarily distinct. For connection adequacy, objective rightness and subjective righ tness coincide. We recognize entailment or rendering probably a priori. Logic is thus internalist. Logic needs (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Murat Baç (2005). The Myth Of Nonepistemic Truth As A Necessary Condition Of Knowledge. Philosophical Writings 30 (3).
    This paper aims to show that the putatively non-epistemic nature of propositional truth presents an interesting problem for those who reasonably believe that truth is normatively distinct from warrant or evidence and that such truth is an irreducible condition on propositional knowledge. After arguing that McDowell’s direct realist approach is rather inadequate to deal with the issue I am raising here, I introduce the notion of ‘epistemic gradient’ to show that even if one may plausibly maintain (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  15
    Steve Fuller (2000). The Truth About Science in the Postmodern Condition. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:105-120.
    Everyone agrees that the Enlightenment hasn’t succeeded—in that the critical rationality associated with modern natural science has not been extended to society at large (and may even have retreated from science itself). Should we be relieved or disappointed that the Enlightenment has failed? I am disappointed but not discouraged by what is called the postmodern condition. But to move forward, we cannot simply deny the presence of the condition, as if it were the collective hallucination of weak minds. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Michael Hannon (2013). 'Knows' Entails Truth. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:349-366.
    It is almost universally presumed that knowledge is factive: in order to know that p it must be the case that p is true. This idea is often justified by appealing to knowledge ascriptions and related linguistic phenomena; i.e., an utterance of the form ‘S knows that p, but not-p’ sounds contradictory. In a recent article, Allan Hazlett argues that our ordinary concept of knowledge is not factive. From this it seems to follow that epistemologists cannot appeal to ordinary language (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  8
    Nenad Popovic (2015). Why Truth is Not a Necessary Condition for Knowledge. Philosophical Forum 46 (4):397-401.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  11
    Kate Schick (2009). 'To Lend a Voice to Suffering is a Condition for All Truth': Adorno and International Political Thought. Journal of International Political Theory 5 (2):138-160.
    This paper explores the ways in which a fuller attention to suffering in the tradition of the early Frankfurt School might valuably inform international political thought. Recent poststructural writing argues that trauma is silenced to prevent it disrupting narratives of order and progress and instead advocates a continual ‘encircling’ of trauma that refuses incorporation into a broader historical narrative. This paper welcomes this challenge to mainstream international ethics: attention to particular suffering provides an important challenge to the abstraction, instrumentalism and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  15.  6
    Joseph W. Koterski (1984). Freedom as a Condition for Truth. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 58:93-103.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  5
    Amit Kr Sew (1997). ''PF Strawson a Common-Sense Logician at This Stage Makes a Distinction Between the Notion of 'Entailment 'and the Notion of 'Presupposition'. L This Distinction Follows From Two Kinds of Logical Absurdities. Strawson Explains These Logical Absudities in This Way: There Are Two Statements, Say 5 Snd S'. Now If S'is the Necessary Condition for the Truth Simply of S and If One Asserts 'S'. [REVIEW] Indian Philosophical Quarterly 24 (2).
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  4
    Luca Tranchini (2010). Truth: An Anti-Realist Adequacy Condition. In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophy of Language and Linguistics. Ontos Verlag 347.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  10
    Kevin Schilbrack (2002). Robert C. Neville (Ed.), The Human Condition: A Volume in the Comparative Religious Ideas Project ; Ultimate Realities: A Volume in the Comparative Religious Ideas Project ; Religious Truth: A Volume in the Comparative Religious Ideas Project. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 52 (3):191-193.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Ls Carrier (1977). Having A'mixed Truth-Table 'Like (2) is Still Only a Neces-Sary Condition for Being an Epistemic Concept, Since KAp Shares This Same Truth-Table with the Concept of Logical Ne'. Logique Et Analyse 77:167.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Colin Leslie Dean (2005). Juxtaposing 2 Contradictory Views of Freud: The Apotheosis of Logic ; the Undermining of the Epistemological Validity of Logic: Freud Rejects Aristotelian Logic as the Criteria to Assess the 'Truths' of Psychoanalysis and Thus Becomes a Precursor to Quantum Mechanics and Mathematics Like Wise Abandonment of Aristotelian Logis as an Epistemic Condition of 'Truth' in Certain Situations. Gamahucher Press.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Stanley Hauerwas (1998). The Truth About God: The Decalogue as Condition for Truthful Speech. Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 40 (1):17-39.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Joseph W. Koterski (1984). Freedom as a Condition for Truth: Jaspers on the Significance of Temporality in Science. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 58:93-103.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Christopher Norris (2008). Meaning, Truth, and Causal Explanation : The 'Humean Condition' Revisited. In Ruth Groff (ed.), Revitalizing Causality: Realism About Causality in Philosophy and Social Science. Routledge
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Stephen Theron (1991). A Necessary Condition for the Truth of Moral and Other Judgments. The Thomist 55 (2):293-300.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. L. Westra (1988). The Origin of the Work of Art: Truth in Existence and the Scholastic Tradition in Poetics of the Elements in the Human Condition. Part 2: The Airy Elements in Poetic Imagination. Analecta Husserliana 23:379-391.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  34
    G. Hellman (1985). Determination and Logical Truth. Journal of Philosophy 82 (November):607-16.
    Some remarks on determination, physicalism, model theory, and logical truth.//An attempt to defend physicalism against objections that its bases are indeterminate.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  27.  51
    John Corcoran (2014). Review of Macbeth, D. Diagrammatic Reasoning in Frege's Begriffsschrift. Synthese 186 (2012), No. 1, 289–314. Mathematical Reviews MR 2935338. MATHEMATICAL REVIEWS 2014:2935338.
    A Mathematical Review by John Corcoran, SUNY/Buffalo -/- Macbeth, Danielle Diagrammatic reasoning in Frege's Begriffsschrift. Synthese 186 (2012), no. 1, 289–314. ABSTRACT This review begins with two quotations from the paper: its abstract and the first paragraph of the conclusion. The point of the quotations is to make clear by the “give-them-enough-rope” strategy how murky, incompetent, and badly written the paper is. I know I am asking a lot, but I have to ask you to read the quoted passages—aloud if (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  97
    Brian Loar (1982). Conceptual Role and Truth Conditions. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (July):272-83.
  29.  52
    Ned Block (1988). Functional Role and Truth Conditions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:157-181.
  30.  35
    David Papineau (1990). Truth and Teleology. In D. Knowles (ed.), Explanation and its Limits. Cambridge University Press 21-43.
  31.  11
    John Campbell (1998). Sense and Consciousness. In Grazer Philosophische Studien. Atlanta: Rodopi 195-211.
    On a classical conception, knowing the sense of a proposition is knowing its truth-condition, rather than simply knowing how to verify the proposition, or how to find its implications (whether deductive implications or implications for action). But knowing the truth-condition of a proposition is not unrelated to your use of particular methods for verifying the proposition, or finding its implications. Rather, your knowledge of the truth-condition of the proposition has to justify the use of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  32.  23
    Max Kölbel (2002). Truth Without Objectivity. Routledge.
    The mainstream view in the philosophy of language holds that every meaningful sentence has a truth-condition. This view, however, runs into difficulties with non-objective sentences such as sentences on matters of taste or value: these do not appear to be either true or false, but are generally taken to be meaningful. How can this conflict be resolved? -/- Truth Without Objectivity examines various ways of resolving this fundamental problem, before developing and defending its own original (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   68 citations  
  33.  9
    Fred Dretske (1979). Chisholm on Perceptual Knowledge. Grazer Philosophische Studien 8:253-269.
    Two general approaches to the analysis of knowledge are distinguished: a liberal view that takes the truth of what is known as a condition independent of the justificatory condition, and a conservative view that regards the truth of what is known as implied by the level of justification required for knowledge. Chisholm is classified as a liberal on perceptual knowledge, and his analysis is criticized from a conservative standpoint.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Paul Horwich (2005). Truth. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Erkenntnis. Oxford University Press 261-272.
    What is truth. Paul Horwich advocates the controversial theory of minimalism, that is that the nature of truth is entirely captured in the trivial fact that each proposition specifies its own condition for being true, and that truth is therefore an entirely mundane and unpuzzling concept. The first edition of Truth, published in 1980, established itself as the best account of minimalism and as an excellent introduction to the debate for students. For this new edition, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   141 citations  
  35.  48
    Alex Silk (2013). Truth Conditions and the Meanings of Ethical Terms1. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8:195.
  36. Savas L. Tsohatzidis (2013). Self-Reference and the Divorce Between Meaning and Truth. Logic and Logical Philosophy 22 (4):445-452.
    This paper argues that a certain type of self-referential sentence falsifies the widespread assumption that a declarative sentence's meaning is identical to its truth condition. It then argues that this problem cannot be assimilated to certain other problems that the assumption in question is independently known to face.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Robert C. Cummins (2002). Truth and Meaning. In Joseph Keim-Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics. Seven Bridges Press 175-197.
    D O N A L D D AV I D S O N’S “ Meaning and Truth,” re vo l u t i o n i zed our conception of how truth and meaning are related (Davidson    ). In that famous art i c l e , Davidson put forw a rd the bold conjecture that meanings are satisfaction conditions, and that a Tarskian theory of truth for a language is a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  38.  73
    Roger Wertheimer (1968). Conditions. Journal of Philosophy 65 (12):355-364.
    Critique of prevailing textbook conception of sufficient conditions and necessary conditions as a truth functional relation of material implication (p->q)/(~q->~p). Explanation of common sense conception of condition as correlative of consequence, involving dependence. Utility of this conception exhibited in resolving puzzles regarding ontology, truth, and fatalism.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  39.  32
    Michel Henry (2003). I Am the Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity. Stanford University Press.
    A part of the “return to religion” now evident in European philosophy, this book represents the culmination of the career of a leading phenomenological thinker whose earlier works trace a trajectory from Marx through a genealogy of psychoanalysis that interprets Descartes’s “I think, I am” as “I feel myself thinking, I am.” In this book, Henry does not ask whether Christianity is “true” or “false.” Rather, what is in question here is what Christianity considers as truth, what kind of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  40.  81
    Qilin Li, Truth-Maker Theory and the Stopped Clock: Why Heathcote Fails to Solve the Gettier Problem.
    Adrian Heathcote has proposed a truth-making account of knowledge that combines traditional conditions of justified true belief with the truth-making condition, which would jointly provide us with the sufficient condition of knowledge, and this truth-maker account of knowledge in turn explains why a gettiered justified true belief fails to be regarded as a genuine instance of knowledge. In this paper, by the comparison of two different casual models that are illustrated by the thermometer and the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  50
    Torben Braüner (2002). Modal Logic, Truth, and the Master Modality. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (4):359-386.
    In the paper (Braüner, 2001) we gave a minimal condition for the existence of a homophonic theory of truth for a modal or tense logic. In the present paper we generalise this result to arbitrary modal logics and we also show that a modal logic permits the existence of a homophonic theory of truth if and only if it permits the definition of a socalled master modality. Moreover, we explore a connection between the master modality and hybrid (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  42.  38
    John Corcoran (forthcoming). Tarski’s Convention T: Condition Beta. SOUTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LOGIC 1 (1).
    Tarski’s Convention T—presenting his notion of adequate definition of truth (sic)—contains two conditions: alpha and beta. Alpha requires that all instances of a certain T Schema be provable. Beta requires in effect the provability of ‘every truth is a sentence’. Beta formally recognizes the fact, repeatedly emphasized by Tarski, that sentences (devoid of free variable occurrences)—as opposed to pre-sentences (having free occurrences of variables)—exhaust the range of significance of is true. In Tarski’s preferred usage, it is part of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  77
    William H. Smith (2007). Why Tugendhat's Critique of Heidegger's Concept of Truth Remains a Critical Problem. Inquiry 50 (2):156 – 179.
    With what right and with what meaning does Heidegger use the term 'truth' to characterize Dasein's disclosedness? This is the question at the focal point of Ernst Tugendhat's long-standing critique of Heidegger's understanding of truth, one to which he finds no answer in Heidegger's treatment of truth in §44 of Being and Time or his later work. To put the question differently: insofar as unconcealment or disclosedness is normally understood as the condition for the possibility of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  44.  57
    Dana K. Nelkin (2004). Irrelevant Alternatives and Frankfurt Counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 121 (1):1-25.
    In rejecting the Principle of AlternatePossibilities (PAP), Harry Frankfurt makes useof a special sort of counterfactual of thefollowing form: ``he wouldn''t have doneotherwise even if he could have''''. Recently,other philosophers (e.g., Susan Hurley (1999,2003) and Michael Zimmerman (2002)) haveappealed to a special class of counterfactualsof this same general form in defending thecompatibility of determinism andresponsibility. In particular, they claim thatit can be true of agents that even if they aredetermined, and so cannot do otherwise, theywouldn''t have done otherwise even if (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  45.  19
    Michael J. Shaffer (2015). Approximate Truth, Quasi-Factivity, and Evidence. Acta Analytica 30 (3):249-266.
    The main question addressed in this paper is whether some false sentences can constitute evidence for the truth of other propositions. In this paper it is argued that there are good reasons to suspect that at least some false propositions can constitute evidence for the truth of certain other contingent propositions. The paper also introduces a novel condition concerning propositions that constitute evidence that explains a ubiquitous evidential practice and it contains a defense of a particular (...) concerning the possession of evidence. The core position adopted here then is that false propositions that are approximately true reports of measurements can constitute evidence for the truth of other propositions. So, it will be argued that evidence is only quasi-factive in this very specific sense. (shrink)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  45
    Whitney Schwab (2013). Skepticism, Belief, and the Criterion of Truth. Apeiron 46 (3):327-344.
    In this paper I examine, and reject, one of the chief philosophical arguments that purports to show that Pyrrhonian Skepticism is incompatible with possessing any beliefs. That argument, first put forward by Jonathan Barnes and since accepted by many philosophers, focuses on the skeptic's resolute suspension of judgment concerning one philosophical issue, namely whether criteria of truth exist. In short, the argument holds that, because skeptics suspend judgment whether criteria of truth exist, they have no basis on which (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  28
    Mark Pinder (2015). The Cognitivist Account of Meaning and the Liar Paradox. Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1221-1242.
    A number of theorists hold that literal, linguistic meaning is determined by the cognitive mechanism that underpins semantic competence. Borg and Larson and Segal defend a version of the view on which semantic competence is underpinned by the cognition of a truth-conditional semantic theory—a semantic theory which is true. Let us call this view the “cognitivist account of meaning”. In this paper, I discuss a surprisingly serious difficulty that the cognitivist account of meaning faces in light of the liar (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  58
    Cesare Cozzo (2012). Gulliver, Truth and Virtue. Topoi 31 (1):59-66.
    What is the role of a notion of truth in our form of life? What is it to possess a notion of truth? How different would we be, if we did not possess a notion of truth? Gulliver’s description of three peoples encountered during his fifth travel will help me to answer. One might say that the basic anti-realist tenet is that we should explain the notion of truth by connecting it with our practice of assertion. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  57
    Margaret Urban Walker (2010). Truth Telling as Reparations. Metaphilosophy 41 (4):525-545.
    : International instruments now defend a "right to the truth " for victims of political repression and violence and include truth telling about human rights violations as a kind of reparation as well as a form of redress. While truth telling about violations is obviously a condition of redress or repair for violations, it may not be clear how truth telling itself is a kind of reparations. By showing that concerted truth telling can satisfy (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  2
    Cezary Cieśliński (2010). Deflationary Truth and Pathologies. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (3):325-337.
    By a classical result of Kotlarski, Krajewski and Lachlan, pathological satisfaction classes can be constructed for countable, recursively saturated models of Peano arithmetic. In this paper we consider the question of whether the pathology can be eliminated; we ask in effect what generalities involving the notion of truth can be obtained in a deflationary truth theory (a theory of truth which is conservative over its base). It is shown that the answer depends on the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000