Search results for 'Truth Condition' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. William G. Lycan (2010). Direct Arguments for the Truth-Condition Theory of Meaning. Topoi 29 (2):99-108.score: 148.0
    The truth-condition theory of meaning is, naturally, thought of an as explanatory theory whose explananda are the meaning facts. But there are at least two deductive arguments that purport to establish the truth of the theory irrespective of its explanatory virtues. This paper examines those arguments and concludes that they succeed.
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  2. Allan Hazlett (2012). Factive Presupposition and the Truth Condition on Knowledge. Acta Analytica 27 (4):461-478.score: 120.0
    In “The Myth of Factive Verbs” (Hazlett 2010), I had four closely related goals. The first (pp. 497-99, p. 522) was to criticize appeals to ordinary language in epistemology. The second (p. 499) was to criticize the argument that truth is a necessary condition on knowledge because “knows” is factive. The third (pp. 507-19) – which was the intended means of achieving the first two – was to defend a semantics for “knows” on which <S knows p> can (...)
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  3. William Lycan, On a Defense of the Truth-Condition Theory of Meaning.score: 120.0
    1.Competition between philosophical theories of linguistic meaning is sometimes specious. For example, suppose Ned believes that an utterance’s meaning is its truth-condition, while Ted insists that the utterance’s meaning is constituted by the speaker’s communicative intentions à la Grice.Here one wants to distinguish explananda:What Ned is after is really the utterance’s (“timeless”) sentence-meaning; Ted is focusing on speaker-meaning, which is not the same, and the two theories are perfectly compatible, indeed mutually complementary, accounts of distinct phenomena.
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  4. Michael Hannon (2013). 'Knows' Entails Truth. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:349-366.score: 108.0
    It is almost universally presumed that knowledge is factive: in order to know that p it must be the case that p is true. This idea is often justified by appealing to knowledge ascriptions and related linguistic phenomena; i.e., an utterance of the form ‘S knows that p, but not-p’ sounds contradictory. In a recent article, Allan Hazlett argues that our ordinary concept of knowledge is not factive. From this it seems to follow that epistemologists cannot appeal to ordinary language (...)
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  5. Brian Loar (1982). Conceptual Role and Truth Conditions. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (July):272-83.score: 102.0
  6. Ned Block (1988). Functional Role and Truth Conditions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:157-181.score: 102.0
  7. Nicholas Hammond (1994). Playing with Truth: Language and the Human Condition in Pascal's Pensées. Oxford University Press.score: 96.0
    Playing with Truth is the first comprehensive work on Pascal to be devoted to his use in the Pens'ees of key terms depicting its central subject--the human condition. Generally acknowledged as one of the greatest masterpieces of seventeenth-century France, the Pens'ees is an unfinished work which has both inspired and perplexed readers in succeeding centuries. In this study Nicholas Hammond explores such fundamental notions as language and order, proceeding with a detailed analysis of the words inconstance, ennui, inqui'etude, (...)
     
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  8. Alex Silk (2013). Truth Conditions and the Meanings of Ethical Terms1. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8:195.score: 94.0
  9. Simon Blackburn (1986). How Can We Tell Whether a Commitment has a Truth Condition. In Charles Travis (ed.), Meaning and Interpretation. B. Blackwell. 201--232.score: 90.0
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  10. Robert K. Shope (2002). The Truth Condition. In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 26.score: 90.0
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  11. John Campbell (1998). Sense and Consciousness. In New Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Atlanta: Rodopi. 195-211.score: 90.0
    On a classical conception, knowing the sense of a proposition is knowing its truth-condition, rather than simply knowing how to verify the proposition, or how to find its implications (whether deductive implications or implications for action). But knowing the truth-condition of a proposition is not unrelated to your use of particular methods for verifying the proposition, or finding its implications. Rather, your knowledge of the truth-condition of the proposition has to justify the use of (...)
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  12. Gp Baker & P. M. S. Hacker (1983). The Concept of a Truth-Condition. Conceptus. Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie Salzburg 17 (40-41):11-18.score: 90.0
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  13. G. Hellman (1985). Determination and Logical Truth. Journal of Philosophy 82 (November):607-16.score: 84.0
    Some remarks on determination, physicalism, model theory, and logical truth.//An attempt to defend physicalism against objections that its bases are indeterminate.
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  14. Fred Dretske (1979). Chisholm on Perceptual Knowledge. Grazer Philosophische Studien 8:253-269.score: 84.0
    Two general approaches to the analysis of knowledge are distinguished: a liberal view that takes the truth of what is known as a condition independent of the justificatory condition, and a conservative view that regards the truth of what is known as implied by the level of justification required for knowledge. Chisholm is classified as a liberal on perceptual knowledge, and his analysis is criticized from a conservative standpoint.
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  15. David Papineau (1990). Truth and Teleology. In D. Knowles (ed.), Explanation and its Limits. Cambridge University Press. 21-43.score: 78.0
  16. Roger Wertheimer (1968). Conditions. Journal of Philosophy 65 (12):355-364.score: 78.0
    Critique of prevailing textbook conception of sufficient conditions and necessary conditions as a truth functional relation of material implication (p->q)/(~q->~p). Explanation of common sense conception of condition as correlative of consequence, involving dependence. Utility of this conception exhibited in resolving puzzles regarding ontology, truth, and fatalism.
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  17. Steve Fuller (2000). The Truth About Science in the Postmodern Condition. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:105-120.score: 78.0
    Everyone agrees that the Enlightenment hasn’t succeeded—in that the critical rationality associated with modern natural science has not been extended to society at large (and may even have retreated from science itself). Should we be relieved or disappointed that the Enlightenment has failed? I am disappointed but not discouraged by what is called the postmodern condition. But to move forward, we cannot simply deny the presence of the condition, as if it were the collective hallucination of weak minds. (...)
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  18. Dana K. Nelkin (2004). Irrelevant Alternatives and Frankfurt Counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 121 (1):1-25.score: 74.0
    In rejecting the Principle of AlternatePossibilities (PAP), Harry Frankfurt makes useof a special sort of counterfactual of thefollowing form: ``he wouldn''t have doneotherwise even if he could have''''. Recently,other philosophers (e.g., Susan Hurley (1999,2003) and Michael Zimmerman (2002)) haveappealed to a special class of counterfactualsof this same general form in defending thecompatibility of determinism andresponsibility. In particular, they claim thatit can be true of agents that even if they aredetermined, and so cannot do otherwise, theywouldn''t have done otherwise even if (...)
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  19. Mark Pinder (forthcoming). The Cognitivist Account of Meaning and the Liar Paradox. Philosophical Studies:1-22.score: 74.0
    A number of theorists hold that literal, linguistic meaning is determined by the cognitive mechanism that underpins semantic competence. Borg and Larson and Segal defend a version of the view on which semantic competence is underpinned by the cognition of a truth-conditional semantic theory—a semantic theory which is true. Let us call this view the “cognitivist account of meaning”. In this paper, I discuss a surprisingly serious difficulty that the cognitivist account of meaning faces in light of the liar (...)
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  20. Ernest Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (2003). Outline for a Truth-Conditional Semantics for Tense. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Tense, Time and Reference. MIT. 49-105.score: 72.0
    Our aim in the present paper is to investigate, from the standpoint of truth-theoretic semantics, English tense, temporal designators and quantifiers, and other expressions we use to relate ourselves and other things to the temporal order. Truth-theoretic semantics provides a particularly illuminating standpoint from which to discuss issues about the semantics of tense, and their relation to thoughts at, and about, times. Tense, and temporal modifiers, contribute systematically to conditions under which sentences we utter are true or false. (...)
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  21. Michael McGlone (2012). Propositional Structure and Truth Conditions. Philosophical Studies 157 (2):211-225.score: 72.0
    This paper presents an account of the manner in which a proposition’s immediate structural features are related to its core truth-conditional features. The leading idea is that for a proposition to have a certain immediate structure is just for certain entities to play certain roles in the correct theory of the brute facts regarding that proposition’s truth conditions. The paper explains how this account addresses certain worries and questions recently raised by Jeffery King and Scott Soames.
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  22. Claire Horisk, Dorit Bar-On & William G. Lycan (2000). Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1 - 28.score: 72.0
    Over the last three decades, truth-condition theories have earned a central place in the study of linguistic meaning. But their honored position faces a threat from recent deflationism or minimalism about truth. It is thought that the appeal to truth-conditions in a theory of meaning is incompatible with deflationism about truth, and so the growing popularity of deflationism threatens truth-condition theories of meaning.
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  23. Dorit Bar-On, Claire Horisk & William G. Lycan (2000). Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1-28.score: 72.0
    Some deflationists about truth maintain that such deflationism undercuts truth-condition theories of meaning. We offer a deductive argument designed to show that meaning must at least include truth-condition. Deflationist replies are considered and rebutted. We conclude that either deflationism is false or it is not, after all, incompatible with truth-condition theories of meaning.
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  24. Richard Heck (2002). Meaning and Truth-Conditions: A Reply to Kemp. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):82–87.score: 72.0
    In his 'Meaning and Truth-Conditions', Gary Kemp offers a reconstruction of Frege's infamous 'regress argument' which purports to rely only upon the premises that the meaning of a sentence is its truth-condition and that each sentence expresses a unique proposition. If cogent, the argument would show that only someone who accepts a form of semantic holism can use the notion of truth to explain that of meaning. I respond that Kemp relies heavily upon what he himself (...)
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  25. Ari Maunu (2002). Frege's Gedanken Are Not Truth Conditions. Facta Philosophica 4 (2):231-238.score: 72.0
    Michael Dummett has advanced, very influentially, the view that Frege means truth conditions by his notion of thought (Gedanke). My aim in this paper is to argue that Dummett and others are mistaken in this claim. First, Frege's aversion of the correspondence theory of truth does not square well with Dummett's claim. Secondly, and more importantly, Grundgesetze I, §32, is the only place where Frege even appears to be talking about truth conditions in connection with his notion (...)
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  26. Juan José Lara Peñaranda (2013). Ontology: Minimalism and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):683-696.score: 72.0
    In this paper, I develop a criticism to a method for metaontology, namely, the idea that a discourse’s or theory’s ontological commitments can be read off its sentences’ truth-conditions. Firstly, I will put forward this idea’s basis and, secondly, I will present the way Quine subscribed to it (not actually for hermeneutical or historic interest, but as a way of exposing the idea). However, I distinguish between two readings of Quine’s famous ontological criterion, and I center the focus on (...)
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  27. Mark Textor (2001). Does the Truth-Conditional Theory of Sense Work for Indexicals? Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (2):119-137.score: 72.0
    The truth-conditional theory of sense holds that a theory of truth for a natural language can serve as a theory of sense: if knowledge of a theory of truth for a language L is sufficient for understanding utterance of L-sentences, the T-sentences of the theory 'show' the sense of the uttered object-language sentences. In this paper I aim to show that indexicals create a serious problem for this prima facie attractive theoretical option. The so-called 'instantiation problem' is (...)
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  28. Gary Kemp (2002). Reply to Heck on Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):233-236.score: 72.0
    Richard Heck has contested my argument that the equation of the meaning of a sentence with its truth-condition implies deflationism, on the ground that the argument does not go through if truth-conditions are understood, in Davidson's style, to be stated by T-sentences. My reply is that Davidsonian theories of meaning do not equate the meaning of a sentence with its truth-condition, and thus that Heck's point does not actually obstruct my argument.
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  29. Andrea Iacona (2013). Logical Form and Truth-Conditions. Theoria 28 (3):439-457.score: 72.0
    This paper outlines a truth-conditional view of logical form, that is, a view according to which logical form is essentially a matter of truth-conditions. Section 1 provides some preliminary clarifications. Section 2 shows that the main motivation for the view is the fact that fundamental logical relations such as entailment or contradiction can formally be explained only if truth-conditions are formally represented. Sections 3 and 4 articulate the view and dwell on its affinity with a conception of (...)
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  30. Daniel Cohnitz & Jaan Kangilaski (2013). Understanding a Sentence Does Not Entail Knowing its Truth‐Conditions: Why the Epistemological Determination Argument Fails. Dialectica 67 (2):223-242.score: 72.0
    The determination argument is supposed to show that a sentence's meaning is at least a truth-condition. This argument is supposed to rest on innocent premises that even a deflationist about truth can accept. The argument comes in two versions: one is metaphysical and the other is epistemological. In this paper we will focus on the epistemological version. We will argue that the apparently innocent first premise of that version of the argument is not as innocent as it (...)
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  31. Kevin Schilbrack (2002). Robert C. Neville (Ed.), The Human Condition: A Volume in the Comparative Religious Ideas Project ; Ultimate Realities: A Volume in the Comparative Religious Ideas Project ; Religious Truth: A Volume in the Comparative Religious Ideas Project. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 52 (3):191-193.score: 72.0
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  32. Luca Tranchini (2010). Truth: An Anti-Realist Adequacy Condition. In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophy of Language and Linguistics. Ontos Verlag. 347.score: 72.0
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  33. Joseph W. Koterski (1984). Freedom as a Condition for Truth. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 58:93-103.score: 72.0
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  34. Kate Schick (2009). 'To Lend a Voice to Suffering is a Condition for All Truth': Adorno and International Political Thought. Journal of International Political Theory 5 (2):138-160.score: 72.0
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  35. Amit Kr Sew (1997). PF Strawson a Common-Sense Logician at This Stage Makes a Distinction Between the Notion of 'Entailment'and the Notion of 'Presupposition'. L This Distinction Follows From Two Kinds of Logical Absurdities. Strawson Explains These Logical Absudities in This Way: There Are Two Statements, Say 5 Snd S'. Now If S'is the Necessary Condition for the Truth Simply of S and If One Asserts 'S'. [REVIEW] Indian Philosophical Quarterly 24 (2).score: 72.0
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  36. Ls Carrier (1977). Having A'mixed Truth-Table'like (2) is Still Only a Neces-Sary Condition for Being an Epistemic Concept, Since KAp Shares This Same Truth-Table with the Concept of Logical Ne. Logique Et Analyse 77:167.score: 72.0
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  37. Colin Leslie Dean (2005). Juxtaposing 2 Contradictory Views of Freud: The Apotheosis of Logic ; the Undermining of the Epistemological Validity of Logic: Freud Rejects Aristotelian Logic as the Criteria to Assess the 'Truths' of Psychoanalysis and Thus Becomes a Precursor to Quantum Mechanics and Mathematics Like Wise Abandonment of Aristotelian Logis as an Epistemic Condition of 'Truth' in Certain Situations. Gamahucher Press.score: 72.0
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  38. Stanley Hauerwas (1998). The Truth About God: The Decalogue as Condition for Truthful Speech. Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 40 (1):17-39.score: 72.0
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  39. Joseph W. Koterski (unknown). Freedom as a Condition for Truth: Jaspers on the Significance of Temporality in Science. :93-103.score: 72.0
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  40. Christopher Norris (2008). Meaning, Truth, and Causal Explanation : The 'Humean Condition' Revisited. In Ruth Groff (ed.), Revitalizing Causality: Realism About Causality in Philosophy and Social Science. Routledge.score: 72.0
     
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  41. Stephen Theron (1991). A Necessary Condition for the Truth of Moral and Other Judgments. The Thomist 55 (2):293-300.score: 72.0
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  42. L. Westra (1988). The Origin of the Work of Art: Truth in Existence and the Scholastic Tradition in Poetics of the Elements in the Human Condition. Part 2: The Airy Elements in Poetic Imagination. Analecta Husserliana 23:379-391.score: 72.0
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  43. Paul Saka (2007). The Argument From Ignorance Against Truth-Conditional Semantics. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):157 - 169.score: 68.0
    According to orthodox semantics, to know the meaning of a sentence is to know its truth-conditions. Against this view I observe that we typically do not know the truth-conditions of the sentences we understand. We do not know the truth-conditions, for instance, of empty definite descriptions, non-declaratives, subjunctive conditionals, causal ascriptions, belief ascriptions, probability statements, figurative language, category mistakes, normative judgments, or vague statements. Appealing to tacit knowledge does not help, for the problem goes beyond our inability (...)
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  44. Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). Hard Cases for Combining Expressivism and Deflationist Truth: Conditionals and Epistemic Modals. In Steven Gross & Michael Williams (eds.), (unknown). Oxford.score: 66.0
    In this paper I will be concerned with the question as to whether expressivist theories of meaning can coherently be combined with deflationist theories of truth. After outlining what I take expressivism to be and what I take deflationism about truth to be, I’ll explain why I don’t take the general version of this question to be very hard, and why the answer is ‘yes’. Having settled that, I’ll move on to what I take to be a more (...)
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  45. Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Josep Macia (eds.) (2006). Two-Dimensional Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.score: 60.0
    Two-dimensional semantics is a framework that helps us better understand some of the most fundamental issues in philosophy: those having to do with the relationship between the meaning of words, the way the world is, and our knowledge of the meaning of words. This selection of new essays by some of the world's leading authorities in this field sheds fresh light both on foundational issues regarding two-dimensional semantics and on its specific applications. Contributors: Richard Breheny, Alex Byrne, David Chalmers, Martin (...)
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  46. Savas L. Tsohatzidis (2013). Self-Reference and the Divorce Between Meaning and Truth. Logic and Logical Philosophy 22 (4):445-452.score: 60.0
    This paper argues that a certain type of self-referential sentence falsifies the widespread assumption that a declarative sentence's meaning is identical to its truth condition. It then argues that this problem cannot be assimilated to certain other problems that the assumption in question is independently known to face.
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  47. Rani Lill Anjum, Conditionals and Truth Functionality.score: 60.0
    The material interpretation of conditionals is commonly recognized as involving some paradoxical results. I here argue that the truth functional approach to natural language is the reason for the inadequacy of this material interpretation, since the truth or falsity of some pair of statements ‘p’ and ‘q’ cannot per se be decisive for the truth or falsity of a conditional relation ‘if p then q’. This inadequacy also affects the ability of the overall formal system to establish (...)
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  48. Barry M. Loewer (1982). The Role of 'Conceptual Role Semantics'. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (July):305-15.score: 60.0
  49. Stephen R. Schiffer (1986). Kripkenstein Meets the Remnants of Meaning. Philosophical Studies 49 (March):147-162.score: 60.0
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  50. Zoltán Gendler Szabó (2008). Structure and Conventions. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (3):399 - 408.score: 60.0
    Wayne Davis’s Meaning, Expression and Thought argues that linguistic meaning is conventional use to express ideas. An obvious problem with this proposal is that complex expressions that have never been used are nonetheless meaningful. In response to this concern, Davis associates conventions of use not only with linguistic expressions but also with the modes in which such expressions can combine into larger expressions. I argue that such constructive conventions are in conflict with the principle of compositionality (as it is usually (...)
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