Search results for 'Truth Conditions' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Michael McGlone (2012). Propositional Structure and Truth Conditions. Philosophical Studies 157 (2):211-225.score: 240.0
    This paper presents an account of the manner in which a proposition’s immediate structural features are related to its core truth-conditional features. The leading idea is that for a proposition to have a certain immediate structure is just for certain entities to play certain roles in the correct theory of the brute facts regarding that proposition’s truth conditions. The paper explains how this account addresses certain worries and questions recently raised by Jeffery King and Scott Soames.
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  2. Juan José Lara Peñaranda (2013). Ontology: Minimalism and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):683-696.score: 240.0
    In this paper, I develop a criticism to a method for metaontology, namely, the idea that a discourse’s or theory’s ontological commitments can be read off its sentences’ truth-conditions. Firstly, I will put forward this idea’s basis and, secondly, I will present the way Quine subscribed to it (not actually for hermeneutical or historic interest, but as a way of exposing the idea). However, I distinguish between two readings of Quine’s famous ontological criterion, and I center the focus (...)
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  3. Ari Maunu (2002). Frege's Gedanken Are Not Truth Conditions. Facta Philosophica 4 (2):231-238.score: 240.0
    Michael Dummett has advanced, very influentially, the view that Frege means truth conditions by his notion of thought (Gedanke). My aim in this paper is to argue that Dummett and others are mistaken in this claim. First, Frege's aversion of the correspondence theory of truth does not square well with Dummett's claim. Secondly, and more importantly, Grundgesetze I, §32, is the only place where Frege even appears to be talking about truth conditions in connection with (...)
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  4. Andrea Iacona (2013). Logical Form and Truth-Conditions. Theoria 28 (3):439-457.score: 240.0
    This paper outlines a truth-conditional view of logical form, that is, a view according to which logical form is essentially a matter of truth-conditions. Section 1 provides some preliminary clarifications. Section 2 shows that the main motivation for the view is the fact that fundamental logical relations such as entailment or contradiction can formally be explained only if truth-conditions are formally represented. Sections 3 and 4 articulate the view and dwell on its affinity with a (...)
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  5. Alex Silk (2013). Truth Conditions and the Meanings of Ethical Terms1. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8:195.score: 210.0
  6. Agustin Rayo (2008). On Specifying Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Review 117 (3):385 - 443.score: 192.0
    This essay is a study of ontological commitment, focused on the special case of arithmetical discourse. It tries to get clear about what would be involved in a defense of the claim that arithmetical assertions are ontologically innocent and about why ontological innocence matters. The essay proceeds by questioning traditional assumptions about the connection between the objects that are used to specify the truth-conditions of a sentence, on the one hand, and the objects whose existence is required in (...)
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  7. Stephen Pollard (2002). The Expressive Truth Conditions of Two-Valued Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (4):221-230.score: 186.0
    In a finitary closure space, irreducible sets behave like two-valued models, with membership playing the role of satisfaction. If f is a function on such a space and the membership of in an irreducible set is determined by the presence or absence of the inputs in that set, then f is a kind of truth function. The existence of some of these truth functions is enough to guarantee that every irreducible set is maximally consistent. The closure space is (...)
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  8. Michelle Beer (2010). Tense and Truth Conditions. Philosophia 38 (2):265-269.score: 180.0
    The B-theory of time holds that McTaggart’s A-series of past, present, and future is reducible to the B-series of events running from earlier to later. According to the date-theory—originally put forth by J.J.C. Smart and later endorsed by by D.H. Mellor—the truth conditions of tensed or Asentence-tokens can be given in terms of tenseless or B-sentences and, therefore, A-sentence-tokens do not ascribe any A-determinations of pastness, presentness, or futurity. However, as Nathan Oaklander has argued, the date-theory does not (...)
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  9. Claire Horisk, Dorit Bar-On & William G. Lycan (2000). Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1 - 28.score: 180.0
    Over the last three decades, truth-condition theories have earned a central place in the study of linguistic meaning. But their honored position faces a threat from recent deflationism or minimalism about truth. It is thought that the appeal to truth-conditions in a theory of meaning is incompatible with deflationism about truth, and so the growing popularity of deflationism threatens truth-condition theories of meaning.
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  10. Anthony S. Gillies (2009). On Truth-Conditions for If (but Not Quite Only If ). Philosophical Review 118 (3):325-349.score: 180.0
    What we want to be true about ordinary indicative conditionals seems to be more than we can possibly get: there just seems to be no good way to assign truth-conditions to ordinary indicative conditionals. Some take this argument as reason to make our wantings more modest. Others take it to show that indicative conditionals don't have truth-conditions in the first place. But we have overlooked two possibilities for assigning truth-conditions to indicatives. What's more, those (...)
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  11. Scott Forschler (2009). Truth and Acceptance Conditions for Moral Statements Can Be Identical: Further Support for Subjective Consequentialism. Utilitas 21 (3):337-346.score: 180.0
    Two meanings of "subjective consequentialism" are distinguished: conscious deliberation with the aim of producing maximally-good consequences, versus acting in ways that, given one's evidence set and reasoning capabilities, is subjectively most likely to maximize expected consequences. The latter is opposed to "objective consequentialism," which demands that we act in ways that actually produce the best total consequences. Peter Railton's arguments for a version of objective consequentialism confuse the two subjective forms, and are only effective against the first. After reviewing the (...)
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  12. Ian Rumfitt (1995). Truth Conditions and Communication. Mind 104 (416):827-862.score: 180.0
    The paper addresses itself to the "Homeric struggle" in the theory of meaning between those (e.g., Grice) who try to analyze declarative meaning in terms of an intention to induce a belief and those (e.g., Davidson) for who declarative meaning consists in truth conditions. (The point of departure is Strawson's celebrated discussion of this issue, in his Inaugural Lecture.) I argue that neither style of analysis is satisfactory, and develop a "hybrid" that may be-although what I take from (...)
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  13. Stephan Torre (2009). Truth-Conditions, Truth-Bearers and the New B-Theory of Time. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):325-344.score: 180.0
    In this paper I consider two strategies for providing tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences: the token-reflexive theory and the date theory. Both theories have faced a number of objections by prominent A-theorists such as Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. Traditionally, these two theories have been viewed as rival methods for providing truth-conditions for tensed sentences. I argue that the debate over whether the token-reflexive theory or the date theory is true has arisen from a failure (...)
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  14. Daniel Stoljar (1993). Emotivism and Truth Conditions. Philosophical Studies 70 (1):81 - 101.score: 180.0
    By distinguishing between pragmatic and semantic aspects of emotivism, and by distinguishing between inflationary and deflationary conceptions of truth conditions, this paper defends emotivism against a series of objections. First, it is not the case (as Blackburn has argued) that emotivism must explain the appearance that moral sentences have truth conditions. Second, it is not the case (as Boghossian has argued) that emotivism presupposes that non-moral sentences have inflationary truth conditions. Finally, it is not (...)
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  15. Lionel Shapiro (2008). Naïve Truth-Conditions and Meaning. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):265–277.score: 180.0
    Critics of attempts to explain meaning in terms of truth-conditions have tended to charge their opponents with misconceptions regarding truth. I shall argue that the 'naïve' version of the truth-conditional theory which best accounts for its resilience fails for a different and more basic reason, namely, circularity arising from the contingency of meaning. One reason why this problem has been overlooked is a tendency (noted by Dummett in a different connection) to assimilate the naïve truth-conditional (...)
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  16. Richard Heck (2002). Meaning and Truth-Conditions: A Reply to Kemp. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):82–87.score: 180.0
    In his 'Meaning and Truth-Conditions', Gary Kemp offers a reconstruction of Frege's infamous 'regress argument' which purports to rely only upon the premises that the meaning of a sentence is its truth-condition and that each sentence expresses a unique proposition. If cogent, the argument would show that only someone who accepts a form of semantic holism can use the notion of truth to explain that of meaning. I respond that Kemp relies heavily upon what he himself (...)
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  17. Heather Dyke (2002). Tokens, Dates and Tenseless Truth Conditions. Synthese 131 (3):329 - 351.score: 180.0
    There are two extant versions of the new tenseless theory of time: the date versionand the token-reflexive version. I ask whether they are equivalent, and if not, whichof them is to be preferred. I argue that they are not equivalent, that the date version isunsatisfactory, and that the token-reflexive version is correct. I defend the token-reflexive version against a string of objections from Quentin Smith. My defence involves a discussion of the ontological and semantic significance of truth conditions, (...)
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  18. Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore (2005). Radical and Moderate Pragmatics: Does Meaning Determine Truth Conditions? In Zoltán Gendler Szabó (ed.), Semantics versus Pragmatics. Oxford University Press.score: 180.0
    But the sort of context sensitivity exhibited in such sentences does not compromise the claim that meaning determines truth conditions, since recourse to context here is directed and restricted by conventional meaning alone. Anyone who understands sentence (2) knows that its utterances are true just in case whatever object is demonstrated in the context of utterance is nice; and he also knows that any utterance of (2) says of, or expresses about, whichever object is demonstrated that it’s nice. (...)
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  19. L. A. Paul (1997). Truth Conditions of Tensed Sentence Types. Synthese 111 (1):53-72.score: 180.0
    Quentin Smith has argued that the new tenseless theory of time is faced with insurmountable problems and should be abandoned in favour of the tensed theory of time. Smith;s main argument attacks the fundamental premise of the tenseless theory: that tenseless truth conditions for tokens of tensed sentences adequately capture the meaning of tensed sentences. His position is that tenseless truth conditions cannot explain the logical relations between tensed sentences, thus the tensed theory must be accepted. (...)
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  20. Jason M. Byron, On Specifying Truth-Conditions.score: 180.0
    I develop a technique for specifying truth-conditions. (This is part of a series of four closely related papers. The other three are ‘An Account of Possibility’, ‘Ontological Commitment’ and ‘An Actualist’s Guide to Quantifying-In’.).
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  21. Gary Kemp (2002). Reply to Heck on Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):233-236.score: 180.0
    Richard Heck has contested my argument that the equation of the meaning of a sentence with its truth-condition implies deflationism, on the ground that the argument does not go through if truth-conditions are understood, in Davidson's style, to be stated by T-sentences. My reply is that Davidsonian theories of meaning do not equate the meaning of a sentence with its truth-condition, and thus that Heck's point does not actually obstruct my argument.
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  22. Alex Barber (2003). Truth Conditions and Their Recognition. In , Epistemology of Language. Oxford University Press.score: 180.0
    This paper offers and defends a particular version of the view that it is the intentions with which it is performed that determine the truth conditions of an utterance. A competing version, implied by Grice's work on meaning, is rejected as inadequate. This latter is incompatible with the phenomenon of anti-lying: performing a true utterance with the intention that one's audience believe it to be false. In place of the quasi-Gricean version, the paper maintains that an utterance is (...)
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  23. Reinhard Muskens (2001). Talking About Trees and Truth-Conditions. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 10 (4):417-455.score: 180.0
    We present Logical Description Grammar (LDG), a model ofgrammar and the syntax-semantics interface based on descriptions inelementary logic. A description may simultaneously describe the syntacticstructure and the semantics of a natural language expression, i.e., thedescribing logic talks about the trees and about the truth-conditionsof the language described. Logical Description Grammars offer a naturalway of dealing with underspecification in natural language syntax andsemantics. If a logical description (up to isomorphism) has exactly onetree plus truth-conditions as a model, it (...)
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  24. Douglas Odegard (1993). Truth-Conditions and Contradiction. American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (4):363 - 372.score: 180.0
    Applying truth-conditions to sentences about the world seems to generate paradoxes unless their application is restricted. We can avoid such restrictions by refusing to apply logical laws to sentences the truth-values of which cannot possibly be established by applying truth-conditions. Such a refusal is reasonable, since the point of logic is to help us make justified truth claims. And the basis for the refusal allows us to avoid a surprisingly wide range of contradictions, without (...)
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  25. Amanda C. Brandone, Susan A. Gelman & Jenna Hedglen (2014). Children's Developing Intuitions About the Truth Conditions and Implications of Novel Generics Versus Quantified Statements. Cognitive Science 38 (8).score: 180.0
    Generic statements express generalizations about categories and present a unique semantic profile that is distinct from quantified statements. This paper reports two studies examining the development of children's intuitions about the semantics of generics and how they differ from statements quantified by all, most, and some. Results reveal that, like adults, preschoolers recognize that generics have flexible truth conditions and are capable of representing a wide range of prevalence levels; and interpret novel generics as having near-universal prevalence implications. (...)
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  26. Corinne Iten (2005). Linguistic Meaning, Truth Conditions and Relevance: The Case of Concessives. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 180.0
    Many linguists and philosophers of language explain linguistic meaning in terms of truth conditions. This book focuses on the meanings of expressions that escape such truth-conditional treatment, in particular the concessives: but , even if , and although . Corinne Iten proposes semantic analyses of these expressions based on the cognitive framework of relevance theory. A thoroughly cognitive approach to linguistic meaning is presented in which linguistic forms are seen as mapping onto mental entities, rather than individuals (...)
     
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  27. Brian Loar (1982). Conceptual Role and Truth Conditions. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (July):272-83.score: 178.0
  28. Ned Block (1988). Functional Role and Truth Conditions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:157-181.score: 178.0
  29. Nate Charlow (forthcoming). Decision Theory: Yes! Truth Conditions: No! In Nate Charlow Matthew Chrisman (ed.), Deontic Modals. Oxford University Press.score: 176.0
    This essay makes the case for, in the phrase of Angelika Kratzer, packing the fruits of the study of rational decision-making into our semantics for deontic modals—specifically, for parametrizing the truth-condition of a deontic modal to things like decision problems and decision theories (and ultimately also things like moral and epistemological views). Then it knocks it down. While the fundamental relation of the semantic theory must relate deontic modals to things like decision problems and theories, this semantic relation cannot (...)
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  30. Angus Ross (1989). Why Content Must Be a Matter of Truth Conditions. Philosophical Quarterly 39 (156):257-275.score: 174.0
    It is argued that if, with Dummett, we see assertion as an act governed by conditions of correctness which makes a claim to the effect that these conditions are met, then the conditions of correctness that determine its content must have the impersonal character of a requirement of truth, rather than the speaker-relative character of a requirement of justification or assertibility. For otherwise it would be impossible for different speakers to use the same words to make (...)
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  31. Gerald Vision (2010). Intensional Specifications of Truth-Conditions: 'Because', 'in Virtue Of', and 'Made True By…'. Topoi 29 (2):109-123.score: 168.0
    Although a number of truth theorists have claimed that a deflationary theory of ‘is true’ needs nothing more than the uniform implication of instances of the theorem ‘the proposition that p is true if and only if p ’, reflection shows that this is inadequate. If deflationists can’t support the instances when replacing the biconditional with ‘because’, then their view is in peril. Deflationists sometimes acknowledge this by addressing, occasionally attempting to deflate, ‘because’ and ‘in virtue of’ formulas and (...)
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  32. Dorit Bar-On, Claire Horisk & William G. Lycan (2000). Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1-28.score: 164.0
    Some deflationists about truth maintain that such deflationism undercuts truth-condition theories of meaning. We offer a deductive argument designed to show that meaning must at least include truth-condition. Deflationist replies are considered and rebutted. We conclude that either deflationism is false or it is not, after all, incompatible with truth-condition theories of meaning.
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  33. WR Stirton (1997). Anti-Realism, Truth-Conditions and Verificationism. Mind 106 (424):697-716.score: 164.0
    The article begins by distinguishing a number of theses which, in the past, have sometimes been lumped together under the heading of 'anti-realism'. One of the theses is that there is something wrong with truth-conditional theories of meaning (what a truth-conditional theory of meaning is a matter discussed at some length), another is what I take to be the central thesis of anti-realism, that all truths are knowable. Several writers on the subject, such as Wright and Prawitz, have (...)
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  34. Anna Papafragou, Epistemic Modality and Truth Conditions.score: 164.0
    Within the linguistics literature it is often claimed that epistemic modality, unlike other kinds of modality, does not contribute to truth-conditional content. In this paper I challenge this view. I reanalyze a variety of arguments which have been used in support of the non-truth-conditional view and show that they can be handled on an alternative analysis of epistemic modality. # 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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  35. Daniel Cohnitz & Jaan Kangilaski (2013). Understanding a Sentence Does Not Entail Knowing its TruthConditions: Why the Epistemological Determination Argument Fails. Dialectica 67 (2):223-242.score: 164.0
    The determination argument is supposed to show that a sentence's meaning is at least a truth-condition. This argument is supposed to rest on innocent premises that even a deflationist about truth can accept. The argument comes in two versions: one is metaphysical and the other is epistemological. In this paper we will focus on the epistemological version. We will argue that the apparently innocent first premise of that version of the argument is not as innocent as it seems. (...)
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  36. Scott Soames (1998). Facts, Truth Conditions, and the Skeptical Solution to the Rule-Following Paradox. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):313-48.score: 162.0
  37. Richard Heck (2007). Meaning and Truth-Conditions. In D. Greimann & G. Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. 349--76.score: 156.0
    Defends the view that understanding can be identified with knowledge of T-sentences against the classical criticisms of Foster and Soames.
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  38. William F. Harms (2010). Determining Truth Conditions in Signaling Games. Philosophical Studies 147 (1):23 - 35.score: 156.0
    Evolving signaling systems can be said to induce partitions on the space of world states as they approach equilibrium. Formalizing this claim provides a general framework for understanding what it means for language to “cut nature at its seams”. In order to avoid taking our current best science as providing the adaptive target for all evolving systems, the state space of the world must be characterized exclusively in terms of the coincidence of stimuli and payoffs that drives the evolution of (...)
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  39. Robert C. Cummins (1979). Intention, Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Studies 35 (4):345 - 360.score: 156.0
    In this paper, I sketch a revision of jonathan bennett's "meaning-Nominalist strategy" for explaining the conventional meanings of utterance-Types. Bennett's strategy does not explain sentence-Meaning by appeal to sub-Sentential meanings, And hence cannot hope to yield a theory that assigns a meaning to every sentence. I revise the strategy to make it applicable to predication and identification. The meaning-Convention for a term can then be used to fix its satisfaction conditions. Adapting a familiar trick of tarski's, We can then (...)
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  40. Gary Kemp (2014). II—Hyperintensional Truth Conditions. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):57-68.score: 156.0
    A response to certain parts of Rumfitt : I defend Davidson's project in semantics, suggest that Rumfitt's use of sentential quantification renders his definition of truth needlessly elaborate, and pose a question for Rumfitt's handling of the strengthened Liar.
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  41. D. Baron, C. Horisk & W. G. Lycan (2005). Postscript to '€˜Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions'. In J. C. Beall & B. Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationary Truth. Open Court.score: 156.0
     
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  42. John McDowell (1976). Truth-Conditions, Bivalence, and Verification. In G. Evans & J. McDowell (eds.), Truth and Meaning. Clarendon Press.score: 156.0
  43. Kenneth G. Ferguson (1987). Truth Conditions for "Might" Counterfactuals. Review of Metaphysics 40 (3):483 - 494.score: 152.0
    According to david lewis, When the conditional excluded middle is accepted for would-Asserting counterfactuals, It becomes difficult or impossible to define their might-Asserting counterparts. But I provide a definition of "might" counterfactuals that does agree with cem: a "might" counterfactual is true iff its consequent is true at some antecedent-World within a set whose membership is determined by appeal to various categories of possibility.
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  44. Kathrin Glüer (2012). Theories of Meaning and Truth Conditions. In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Continuum International Pub..score: 150.0
    Or, in Donald Davidson’s much quoted words: “What is it for words to mean what they do?” (Davidson 1984, xiii). Davidson himself suggested approaching this matter by asking two different questions: What form should a formal semantics take? And: What is it that makes a semantic theory correct for a particular language, i.e. what determines meaning? The second question concerns the place of semantic facts in a wider metaphysical space: How do these facts relate to non-semantic facts? Can they be (...)
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  45. Douglas Edwards (2009). Truth-Conditions and the Nature of Truth: Re-Solving Mixed Conjunctions. Analysis 69 (4):684-688.score: 150.0
  46. Michael Hand (1992). Meaning, Truth-Conditions, and Substitutional Quantification. Philosophical Studies 68 (2):195 - 216.score: 150.0
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  47. W. L. Craig (1999). On Truth Conditions of Tensed Sentence Types. Synthese 120 (2):265-270.score: 150.0
  48. Dorothy Edgington (1986). Do Conditionals Have Truth-Conditions. Cr'itica 18 (52):3-30.score: 150.0
  49. James Dreier (2004). Lockean and Logical Truth Conditions. Analysis 64 (1):84–91.score: 150.0
    1. In ‘A problem for expressivism’ Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit argue ‘that expressivists do not have a persuasive story to tell about how ethical sentences can express attitudes without reporting them and, in particular, without being true or false’ (1998: 240). Briefly: expressivists say that ethical sentences serve to express non-cognitive attitudes, but that these sentences do not report non-cognitive attitudes. The view that ethical sentences do report non-cognitive attitudes is not Expressivism (and not non-cognitivism), but rather a version (...)
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  50. Gary Kemp (1998). Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):483-493.score: 150.0
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