Search results for 'Truth Functionality' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Rani Lill Anjum, Conditionals and Truth Functionality.score: 240.0
    The material interpretation of conditionals is commonly recognized as involving some paradoxical results. I here argue that the truth functional approach to natural language is the reason for the inadequacy of this material interpretation, since the truth or falsity of some pair of statements ‘p’ and ‘q’ cannot per se be decisive for the truth or falsity of a conditional relation ‘if p then q’. This inadequacy also affects the ability of the overall formal system to establish (...)
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  2. Daniel J. Hill & Stephen K. McLeod (2010). On Truth-Functionality. Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (4):628-632.score: 240.0
    Benjamin Schnieder has argued that several traditional definitions of truth-functionality fail to capture a central intuition informal characterizations of the notion often capture. The intuition is that the truth-value of a sentence that employs a truth-functional operator depends upon the truth-values of the sentences upon which the operator operates. Schnieder proposes an alternative definition of truth-functionality that is designed to accommodate this intuition. We argue that one traditional definition of ‘truth-functionality’ is (...)
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  3. Pablo Cobreros & Luca Tranchini (2014). Supervaluationism: Truth, Value and Degree Functionality. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):136-144.score: 210.0
    This article deals with supervaluationism and the failure of truth-functionality. It draws some distinctions that may contribute to a better understanding of this semantic framework.
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  4. Leo K. C. Cheung (2004). Showing, Analysis and the Truth-Functionality of Logical Necessity in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Synthese 139 (1):81 - 105.score: 180.0
    This paper aims to explain how the Tractatus attempts to unify logic by deriving the truth-functionality of logical necessity from the thesis that a proposition shows its sense. I first interpret the Tractarian notion of showing as the displaying of what is intrinsic to an expression (or a symbol). Then I argue that, according to the Tractatus, the thesis that a proposition shows its sense implies the determinacy of sense, the possibility of the complete elimination of non-primitive symbols, (...)
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  5. Benjamin Schnieder (2008). Truth-Functionality. Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (1):64-72.score: 180.0
    It is shown that the standard definitions of truth-functionality, though useful for their purposes, ignore some aspects of the usual informal characterisations of truth-functionality. An alternative definition is given that results in a stronger notion which pays attention to those aspects.
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  6. Charles Sayward (2007). Quine and His Critics on Truth-Functionality and Extensionality. Logic and Logical Philosophy 16 (1):45-63.score: 164.0
    Quine argues that if sentences that are set theoretically equivalent are interchangeable salva veritate, then all transparent operators are truth-functional. Criticisms of this argument fail to take into account the conditional character of the conclusion. Quine also argues that, for any person P with minimal logical acuity, if ‘belief’ has a sense in which it is a transparent operator, then, in that sense of the word, P believes everything if P believes anything. The suggestion is made that he intends (...)
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  7. João Marcos (2009). What is a Non-Truth-Functional Logic? Studia Logica 92 (2):215 - 240.score: 160.0
    What is the fundamental insight behind truth-functionality ? When is a logic interpretable by way of a truth-functional semantics? To address such questions in a satisfactory way, a formal definition of truth-functionality from the point of view of abstract logics is clearly called for. As a matter of fact, such a definition has been available at least since the 70s, though to this day it still remains not very widely well-known. A clear distinction can be (...)
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  8. Robert C. Cummins & Dale Gottlieb (1972). On an Argument for Truth-Functionality. American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (3):265 - 269.score: 150.0
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  9. Richard Sharvy (1970). Truth-Functionality and Referential Opacity. Philosophical Studies 21 (1-2):5 - 9.score: 150.0
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  10. A. J. Dale (1978). Reference, Truth-Functionality and Causal Sentences. Analysis 38 (2):99 - 106.score: 150.0
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  11. Melvin Fitting (1977). Review: Hugues Leblanc, Semantic Deviations; Hughes Leblanc, George Weaver, Truth-Functionality and the Ramified Theory of Types. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 42 (2):313-313.score: 150.0
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  12. Hugues Leblanc (1972). Wittgenstein and the Truth-Functionality Thesis. American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (3):271 - 274.score: 150.0
  13. Joao Marcos (2006). Generalizing Truth-Functionality. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (3):511-511.score: 150.0
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  14. Christian G. Fermüller & Christoph Roschger (2014). From Games to Truth Functions: A Generalization of Giles's Game. Studia Logica 102 (2):389-410.score: 144.0
    Motivated by aspects of reasoning in theories of physics, Robin Giles defined a characterization of infinite valued Łukasiewicz logic in terms of a game that combines Lorenzen-style dialogue rules for logical connectives with a scheme for betting on results of dispersive experiments for evaluating atomic propositions. We analyze this game and provide conditions on payoff functions that allow us to extract many-valued truth functions from dialogue rules of a quite general form. Besides finite and infinite valued Łukasiewicz logics, also (...)
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  15. Ariadna Chernavska (1981). The Impossibility of a Bivalent Truth-Functional Semantics for the Non-Boolean Propositional Structures of Quantum Mechanics. Philosophia 10 (1-2):1-18.score: 100.0
    The general fact of the impossibility of a bivalent, truth-functional semantics for the propositional structures determined by quantum mechanics should be more subtly demarcated according to whether the structures are taken to be orthomodular latticesP L or partial-Boolean algebrasP A; according to whether the semantic mappings are required to be truth-functional or truth-functional ; and according to whether two-or-higher dimensional Hilbert spaceP structures or three-or-higher dimensional Hilbert spaceP structures are being considered. If the quantumP structures are taken (...)
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  16. C. Caleiro, W. A. Carnielli, M. E. Coniglio, A. Sernadas & C. Sernadas (2003). Fibring Non-Truth-Functional Logics: Completeness Preservation. [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12 (2):183-211.score: 96.0
    Fibring has been shown to be useful for combining logics endowed withtruth-functional semantics. However, the techniques used so far are unableto cope with fibring of logics endowed with non-truth-functional semanticsas, for example, paraconsistent logics. The first main contribution of thepaper is the development of a suitable abstract notion of logic, that mayalso encompass systems with non-truth-functional connectives, and wherefibring can still be dealt with. Furthermore, it is shown that thisextended notion of fibring preserves completeness under certain reasonableconditions. This (...)
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  17. Rani Lill Anjum (2008). Three Dogmas of 'If'. In A. Leirfall & T. Sandmel (eds.), Enhet i Mangfold. Unipub.score: 90.0
    In this paper I argue that a truth functional account of conditional statements ‘if A then B’ not only is inadequate, but that it eliminates the very conditionality expressed by ‘if’. Focusing only on the truth-values of the statements ‘A’ and ‘B’ and different combinations of these, one is bound to miss out on the conditional relation expressed between them. But this is not a flaw only of truth functionality and the material conditional. All approaches that (...)
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  18. Rani Lill Anjum (2007). The Logic of `If' — or How to Philosophically Eliminate Conditional Relations. Sorites - A Digital Journal of Analytic Philosophy 19:51-57.score: 90.0
    In this paper I present some of Robert N. McLaughlin's critique of a truth functional approach to conditionals as it appears in his book On the Logic of Ordinary Conditionals. Based on his criticism I argue that the basic principles of logic together amount to epistemological and metaphysical implications that can only be accepted from a logical atomist perspective. Attempts to account for conditional relations within this philosophical framework will necessarily fail. I thus argue that it is not (...) functionality as such that is the problem, but the philosophical foundation of modern logic. (shrink)
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  19. Carlos Caleiro, Walter Carnielli, Marcelo Coniglio & João Marcos (2005). Two's Company: The Humbug of Many Logical Values. In J. Y. Beziau (ed.), Logica Universalis. Birkhäuser Verlag.score: 90.0
    The Polish logician Roman Suszko has extensively pleaded in the 1970s for a restatement of the notion of many-valuedness. According to him, as he would often repeat, “there are but two logical values, true and false.” As a matter of fact, a result by W´ojcicki-Lindenbaum shows that any tarskian logic has a many-valued semantics, and results by Suszko-da Costa-Scott show that any many-valued semantics can be reduced to a two-valued one. So, why should one even consider using logics with more (...)
     
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  20. F. Parlamento (2014). Truth-Value Semantics and Functional Extensions for Classical Logic of Partial Terms Based on Equality. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 55 (3):383-395.score: 80.0
    We develop a bottom-up approach to truth-value semantics for classical logic of partial terms based on equality and apply it to prove the conservativity of the addition of partial description and selection functions, independently of any strictness assumption.
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  21. Rani Lill Anjum (2012). What's Wrong with Logic? Argumentos 4 (8).score: 74.0
    The truth functional account of conditional statements ‘if A then B’ is not only inadequate; it eliminates the very conditionality expressed by ‘if’. Focusing only on the truth-values of the statements ‘A’ and ‘B’ and different combinations of these, one is bound to miss out on the conditional relation expressed between them. All approaches that treat conditionals as functions of their antecedents and consequents will end up in some sort of logical atomism where causal matters simply are reduced (...)
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  22. Carlos Caleiro, Ricardo Gonçalves & Manuel Martins (2009). Behavioral Algebraization of Logics. Studia Logica 91 (1):63 - 111.score: 74.0
    We introduce and study a new approach to the theory of abstract algebraic logic (AAL) that explores the use of many-sorted behavioral logic in the role traditionally played by unsorted equational logic. Our aim is to extend the range of applicability of AAL toward providing a meaningful algebraic counterpart also to logics with a many-sorted language, and possibly including non-truth-functional connectives. The proposed behavioral approach covers logics which are not algebraizable according to the standard approach, while also bringing a (...)
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  23. Joao Marcos (2008). Possible-Translations Semantics for Some Weak Classically-Based Paraconsistent Logics. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 18 (1):7-28.score: 74.0
    In many real-life applications of logic it is useful to interpret a particular sentence as true together with its negation. If we are talking about classical logic, this situation would force all other sentences to be equally interpreted as true. Paraconsistent logics are exactly those logics that escape this explosive effect of the presence of inconsistencies and allow for sensible reasoning still to take effect. To provide reasonably intuitive semantics for paraconsistent logics has traditionally proven to be a challenge. Possible-translations (...)
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  24. Jean-Yves Beziau, Non Truth-Functional Many-Valuedness.score: 72.0
    Many-valued logics are standardly defined by logical matrices. They are truth-functional. In this paper non truth-functional many-valued semantics are presented, in a philosophical and mathematical perspective.
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  25. Adam Morton (1969). Extensional and Non-Truth-Functional Contexts. Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):159-164.score: 72.0
    I discuss Frege's argument - later called the slingshot - that if a construction is extensional and preserves logical equivalence then it is truth-functional. I consider some simple apparent counterexamples and conclude that they are not sentence-embedding in the required way.
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  26. David Sherry (1999). Note on the Scope of Truth-Functional Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (3):327-328.score: 72.0
    A plausible and popular rule governing the scope of truth-functional logic is shown to be indequate. The argument appeals to the existence of truth-functional paraphrases which are logically independent of their natural language counterparts. A more adequate rule is proposed.
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  27. Peter Päppinghaus & Martin Wirsing (1983). Nondeterministic Three-Valued Logic: Isotonic and Guarded Truth-Functions. Studia Logica 42 (1):1 - 22.score: 72.0
    Nondeterministic programs occurring in recently developed programming languages define nondeterminate partial functions. Formulas (Boolean expressions) of such nondeterministic languages are interpreted by a nonempty subset of {T (true), F (false), U (undefined)}. As a semantic basis for the propositional part of a corresponding nondeterministic three-valued logic we study the notion of a truth-function over {T, F, U} which is computable by a nondeterministic evaluation procedure. The main result is that these truth-functions are precisely the functions satisfying four basic (...)
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  28. Andrew Ushenko (1942). Dr. Quine's Theory of Truth-Functions. Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):64-67.score: 72.0
    This comment piece examines the distinction between negation of a statement and denial of its truth (assertion of its falsity), in the context of an early examination of Quine's related views. Where P is "Jones is ill," the author maintains, in contrast to Quine, that the negation of P is "Jones is ill" is false.
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  29. Ned Block (1988). Functional Role and Truth Conditions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:157-181.score: 70.0
  30. Cory D. Wright (2005). On the Functionalization of Pluralist Approaches to Truth. Synthese 145 (1):1-28.score: 62.0
    Traditional inflationary approaches that specify the nature of truth are attractive in certain ways; yet, while many of these theories successfully explain why propositions in certain domains of discourse are true, they fail to adequately specify the nature of truth because they run up against counterexamples when attempting to generalize across all domains. One popular consequence is skepticism about the efficaciousness of inflationary approaches altogether. Yet, by recognizing that the failure to explain the truth of disparate propositions (...)
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  31. Mahrad Almotahari (2014). The Identity of a Material Thing and its Matter. Philosophical Quarterly 64 (256):387-406.score: 62.0
    I have both a smaller and a larger aim. The smaller aim is polemical. Kit Fine believes that a material thing—a Romanesque statue, for example, or an open door—can be distinguished from its constituent matter—a piece of alloy, say, or a hunk of plastic—without recourse to modal or temporal considerations. The statue is Romanesque; the piece of alloy is not Romanesque. The door is open; the hunk of plastic is not open. I argue that these considerations, when combined with a (...)
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  32. Dirk Greimann (2004). Frege's Puzzle About the Cognitive Function of Truth. Inquiry 47 (5):425 – 442.score: 60.0
    The aim of this paper is to give a detailed reconstruction of Frege's solution to his puzzle about the cognitive function of truth, which is this: On the one hand, the concept of truth seems to play an essential role in acquiring knowledge because the transition from the mere hypothetical assumption that p to the acknowledgement of its truth is a crucial step in acquiring the knowledge that p, while, on the other hand, this concept seems to (...)
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  33. Adam Rieger (2013). Conditionals Are Material: The Positive Arguments. Synthese 190 (15):3161-3174.score: 60.0
    A number of papers have argued in favour of the material account of indicative conditionals, but typically they either concentrate on defending the account from the charge that it has counterintuitive consequences, or else focus on some particular positive argument in favour of the theory. In this paper, I survey the various positive arguments that can be given, presenting simple versions where possible and showing the connections between them. I conclude with some methodological considerations.
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  34. Irving H. Anellis (2011). Peirce's Truth-Functional Analysis and the Origin of the Truth Table. History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (1):87 - 97.score: 60.0
    We explore the technical details and historical evolution of Charles Peirce's articulation of a truth table in 1893, against the background of his investigation into the truth-functional analysis of propositions involving implication. In 1997, John Shosky discovered, on the verso of a page of the typed transcript of Bertrand Russell's 1912 lecture on ?The Philosophy of Logical Atomism? truth table matrices. The matrix for negation is Russell's, alongside of which is the matrix for material implication in the (...)
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  35. Michael Beaney (2007). Frege's Use of Function-Argument Analysis and His Introduction of Truth-Values as Objects. Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):93-123.score: 60.0
    One of Frege's most characteristic ideas is his conception of truth-values as objects. On his account (from 1891 onwards), concepts are functions that map objects onto one of the two truth-values, the True and the False. These two truth-values are also seen as objects, an implication of Frege's sharp distinction between objects and functions. Crucial to this account is his use of function-argument analysis, and in this paper I explore the relationship between this use and his introduction (...)
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  36. Michael Scanlan (1995). Wittgenstein, Truth-Functions, and Generality. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:175-193.score: 60.0
    Although it is eommon to attribute to Wittgenstein in the Tractatus a treatment of general propositions as equivalent to eonjunctions and disjunctions of instance propositions, the evidence for this is not perfeetly clear. This article considers Wittgenstein’s comments in 5.521, which can be read as rejecting such a treatment. It argues that properly situating the Tractatus historically allows for a revised reading of 5.521 and other parts of the Tractatus relevant to Wittgenstein’s theory of generality. The result is that 5.521 (...)
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  37. Sergi Oms (2010). Truth-Functional and Penumbral Intuitions. Theoria 25 (2):137-147.score: 60.0
    Two of the main intuitions that underlie the phenomenon of vagueness are the truth-functional and the penumbral intuitions. After presenting and contrasting them, I will put forward Tappenden's gappy approach to vagueness (which takes into account the truth-functional intuition). I will contrast Tappenden'sview with another of the theories of vagueness that see it as a semantic phenomenon: Supervaluationism (which takes into account the penumbral intuition). Then I will analyze some objections to Tappenden's approach and some objections to Supervaluationism. (...)
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  38. Jerome Frazee (1988). A New Symbolic Representation of the Basic Truth-Functions of the Propositional Calculus. History and Philosophy of Logic 9 (1):87-91.score: 60.0
    As with mathematics, logic is easier to do if its symbols and their rules are better. In a graphic way, the logic symbols introduced in thís paper show their truth-table values, their composite truth-functions, and how to say them as either ?or? or ?if ? then? propositions. Simple rules make the converse, add or remove negations, and resolve propositions.
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  39. Stephen Pollard (2005). The Expressive Unary Truth Functions of N -Valued Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 46 (1):93-105.score: 60.0
    The expressive truth functions of two-valued logic have all been identified. This paper begins the task of identifying the expressive truth functions of n-valued logic by characterizing the unary ones. These functions have distinctive algebraic, semantic, and closure-theoretic properties.
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  40. David H. Sanford (1970). What is a Truth Functional Component? Logique Et Analyse 52:4483-486.score: 60.0
    Although the truth value (falsity) of "Henry knows that (dogs live in trees and beavers chew wood)" remains unchanged no matter what sentence is substituted in it for "beavers chew wood", we want not to regard the second as a truth functional component (tfc) of the first. Many definitions of "tfc" (e.g., Quine's) fail to insure satisfaction of the following principle: if p is a component of r which is in turn a component of q, then p is (...)
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  41. Keith Stenning & Michiel Lambalgen (2004). A Little Logic Goes a Long Way: Basing Experiment on Semantic Theory in the Cognitive Science of Conditional Reasoning. Cognitive Science 28 (4):481-529.score: 60.0
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  42. Huw Price (1988/1989). Facts and the Function of Truth. Basil Blackwell.score: 58.0
  43. Stephen Pollard (2002). The Expressive Truth Conditions of Two-Valued Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (4):221-230.score: 56.0
    In a finitary closure space, irreducible sets behave like two-valued models, with membership playing the role of satisfaction. If f is a function on such a space and the membership of in an irreducible set is determined by the presence or absence of the inputs in that set, then f is a kind of truth function. The existence of some of these truth functions is enough to guarantee that every irreducible set is maximally consistent. The closure space is (...)
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  44. R. J. Nelson (1997). Proxy Functions, Truth and Reference. Synthese 111 (1):73-96.score: 54.0
    Quines ontological relativity is related to Tarskis theory of truth in two ways: Quine repudiates term-by-term-correspondence, as does Tarskis rule of truth; and Quines proxy argument in support of relativity finds exact formulation in Tarskis truth definition.Unfortunately, relativity is threatened by the fact that the proxy argument doesnt comply with the rule of truth (Tarskis celebrated condition (T)). Despite Quines express allegiance to (T), use of proxy schemes does not generate all of the true sentences condition (...)
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  45. Jean Fichot (2003). Truth, Proofs and Functions. Synthese 137 (1-2):43 - 58.score: 54.0
    There are two different ways to introduce the notion of truthin constructive mathematics. The first one is to use a Tarskian definition of truth in aconstructive (meta)language. According to some authors, (Kreisel, van Dalen, Troelstra ... ),this definition is entirely similar to the Tarskian definition of classical truth (thesis A).The second one, due essentially to Heyting and Kolmogorov, and known as theBrouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov interpretation, is to explain informally what it means fora mathematical proposition to be constructively proved. According to (...)
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  46. Harry Deutsch (2010). Diagonalization and Truth Functional Operators. Analysis 70 (2):215-217.score: 50.0
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  47. R. B. Angell (1986). Truth-Functional Conditionals and Modern Vs. Traditional Syllogistic. Mind 95 (378):210-223.score: 50.0
  48. S. Shapiro (2010). Truth, Function and Paradox. Analysis 71 (1):38-44.score: 50.0
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  49. William H. Hanson (1991). Indicative Conditionals Are Truth-Functional. Mind 100 (1):53-72.score: 50.0
  50. Scott Soames (1983). Generality, Truth Functions, and Expressive Capacity in the Tractatus. Philosophical Review 92 (4):573-589.score: 50.0
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