Search results for 'Truth functionality' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Rani Lill Anjum, Conditionals and Truth Functionality.score: 90.0
    The material interpretation of conditionals is commonly recognized as involving some paradoxical results. I here argue that the truth functional approach to natural language is the reason for the inadequacy of this material interpretation, since the truth or falsity of some pair of statements ‘p’ and ‘q’ cannot per se be decisive for the truth or falsity of a conditional relation ‘if p then q’. This inadequacy also affects the ability of the overall formal system to establish (...)
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  2. Daniel J. Hill & Stephen K. McLeod (2010). On Truth-Functionality. Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (4):628-632.score: 90.0
    Benjamin Schnieder has argued that several traditional definitions of truth-functionality fail to capture a central intuition informal characterizations of the notion often capture. The intuition is that the truth-value of a sentence that employs a truth-functional operator depends upon the truth-values of the sentences upon which the operator operates. Schnieder proposes an alternative definition of truth-functionality that is designed to accommodate this intuition. We argue that one traditional definition of ‘truth-functionality’ is (...)
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  3. João Marcos (2009). What is a Non-Truth-Functional Logic? Studia Logica 92 (2):215 - 240.score: 66.0
    What is the fundamental insight behind truth-functionality ? When is a logic interpretable by way of a truth-functional semantics? To address such questions in a satisfactory way, a formal definition of truth-functionality from the point of view of abstract logics is clearly called for. As a matter of fact, such a definition has been available at least since the 70s, though to this day it still remains not very widely well-known. A clear distinction can be (...)
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  4. Leo K. C. Cheung (2004). Showing, Analysis and the Truth-Functionality of Logical Necessity in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Synthese 139 (1):81 - 105.score: 60.0
    This paper aims to explain how the Tractatus attempts to unify logic by deriving the truth-functionality of logical necessity from the thesis that a proposition shows its sense. I first interpret the Tractarian notion of showing as the displaying of what is intrinsic to an expression (or a symbol). Then I argue that, according to the Tractatus, the thesis that a proposition shows its sense implies the determinacy of sense, the possibility of the complete elimination of non-primitive symbols, (...)
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  5. Benjamin Schnieder (2008). Truth-Functionality. Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (1):64-72.score: 60.0
    It is shown that the standard definitions of truth-functionality, though useful for their purposes, ignore some aspects of the usual informal characterisations of truth-functionality. An alternative definition is given that results in a stronger notion which pays attention to those aspects.
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  6. Christian G. Fermüller & Christoph Roschger (2014). From Games to Truth Functions: A Generalization of Giles's Game. Studia Logica 102 (2):389-410.score: 58.0
    Motivated by aspects of reasoning in theories of physics, Robin Giles defined a characterization of infinite valued Łukasiewicz logic in terms of a game that combines Lorenzen-style dialogue rules for logical connectives with a scheme for betting on results of dispersive experiments for evaluating atomic propositions. We analyze this game and provide conditions on payoff functions that allow us to extract many-valued truth functions from dialogue rules of a quite general form. Besides finite and infinite valued Łukasiewicz logics, also (...)
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  7. Charles Sayward (2007). Quine and His Critics on Truth-Functionality and Extensionality. Logic and Logical Philosophy 16 (1):45-63.score: 52.0
    Quine argues that if sentences that are set theoretically equivalent are interchangeable salva veritate, then all transparent operators are truth-functional. Criticisms of this argument fail to take into account the conditional character of the conclusion. Quine also argues that, for any person P with minimal logical acuity, if ‘belief’ has a sense in which it is a transparent operator, then, in that sense of the word, P believes everything if P believes anything. The suggestion is made that he intends (...)
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  8. Rani Lill Anjum (2008). Three Dogmas of 'If'. In A. Leirfall & T. Sandmel (eds.), Enhet i Mangfold. Unipub.score: 45.0
    In this paper I argue that a truth functional account of conditional statements ‘if A then B’ not only is inadequate, but that it eliminates the very conditionality expressed by ‘if’. Focusing only on the truth-values of the statements ‘A’ and ‘B’ and different combinations of these, one is bound to miss out on the conditional relation expressed between them. But this is not a flaw only of truth functionality and the material conditional. All approaches that (...)
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  9. Rani Lill Anjum (2007). The Logic of `If' — or How to Philosophically Eliminate Conditional Relations. Sorites - A Digital Journal of Analytic Philosophy 19:51-57.score: 45.0
    In this paper I present some of Robert N. McLaughlin's critique of a truth functional approach to conditionals as it appears in his book On the Logic of Ordinary Conditionals. Based on his criticism I argue that the basic principles of logic together amount to epistemological and metaphysical implications that can only be accepted from a logical atomist perspective. Attempts to account for conditional relations within this philosophical framework will necessarily fail. I thus argue that it is not (...) functionality as such that is the problem, but the philosophical foundation of modern logic. (shrink)
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  10. Robert C. Cummins & Dale Gottlieb (1972). On an Argument for Truth-Functionality. American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (3):265 - 269.score: 45.0
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  11. Richard Sharvy (1970). Truth-Functionality and Referential Opacity. Philosophical Studies 21 (1-2):5 - 9.score: 45.0
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  12. A. J. Dale (1978). Reference, Truth-Functionality and Causal Sentences. Analysis 38 (2):99 - 106.score: 45.0
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  13. Melvin Fitting (1977). Review: Hugues Leblanc, Semantic Deviations; Hughes Leblanc, George Weaver, Truth-Functionality and the Ramified Theory of Types. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 42 (2):313-313.score: 45.0
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  14. Carlos Caleiro, Walter Carnielli, Marcelo Coniglio & João Marcos (2005). Two's Company: The Humbug of Many Logical Values. In J. Y. Beziau (ed.), Logica Universalis. Birkhäuser Verlag.score: 45.0
    The Polish logician Roman Suszko has extensively pleaded in the 1970s for a restatement of the notion of many-valuedness. According to him, as he would often repeat, “there are but two logical values, true and false.” As a matter of fact, a result by W´ojcicki-Lindenbaum shows that any tarskian logic has a many-valued semantics, and results by Suszko-da Costa-Scott show that any many-valued semantics can be reduced to a two-valued one. So, why should one even consider using logics with more (...)
     
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  15. Hugues Leblanc (1972). Wittgenstein and the Truth-Functionality Thesis. American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (3):271 - 274.score: 45.0
  16. Joao Marcos (2006). Generalizing Truth-Functionality. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (3):511-511.score: 45.0
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  17. C. Caleiro, W. A. Carnielli, M. E. Coniglio, A. Sernadas & C. Sernadas (2003). Fibring Non-Truth-Functional Logics: Completeness Preservation. [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12 (2):183-211.score: 42.0
    Fibring has been shown to be useful for combining logics endowed withtruth-functional semantics. However, the techniques used so far are unableto cope with fibring of logics endowed with non-truth-functional semanticsas, for example, paraconsistent logics. The first main contribution of thepaper is the development of a suitable abstract notion of logic, that mayalso encompass systems with non-truth-functional connectives, and wherefibring can still be dealt with. Furthermore, it is shown that thisextended notion of fibring preserves completeness under certain reasonableconditions. This (...)
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  18. Rani Lill Anjum (2012). What's Wrong with Logic? Argumentos 4 (8).score: 37.0
    The truth functional account of conditional statements ‘if A then B’ is not only inadequate; it eliminates the very conditionality expressed by ‘if’. Focusing only on the truth-values of the statements ‘A’ and ‘B’ and different combinations of these, one is bound to miss out on the conditional relation expressed between them. All approaches that treat conditionals as functions of their antecedents and consequents will end up in some sort of logical atomism where causal matters simply are reduced (...)
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  19. Carlos Caleiro, Ricardo Gonçalves & Manuel Martins (2009). Behavioral Algebraization of Logics. Studia Logica 91 (1):63 - 111.score: 37.0
    We introduce and study a new approach to the theory of abstract algebraic logic (AAL) that explores the use of many-sorted behavioral logic in the role traditionally played by unsorted equational logic. Our aim is to extend the range of applicability of AAL toward providing a meaningful algebraic counterpart also to logics with a many-sorted language, and possibly including non-truth-functional connectives. The proposed behavioral approach covers logics which are not algebraizable according to the standard approach, while also bringing a (...)
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  20. Joao Marcos (2008). Possible-Translations Semantics for Some Weak Classically-Based Paraconsistent Logics. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 18 (1):7-28.score: 37.0
    In many real-life applications of logic it is useful to interpret a particular sentence as true together with its negation. If we are talking about classical logic, this situation would force all other sentences to be equally interpreted as true. Paraconsistent logics are exactly those logics that escape this explosive effect of the presence of inconsistencies and allow for sensible reasoning still to take effect. To provide reasonably intuitive semantics for paraconsistent logics has traditionally proven to be a challenge. Possible-translations (...)
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  21. Ariadna Chernavska (1981). The Impossibility of a Bivalent Truth-Functional Semantics for the Non-Boolean Propositional Structures of Quantum Mechanics. Philosophia 10 (1-2):1-18.score: 36.0
    The general fact of the impossibility of a bivalent, truth-functional semantics for the propositional structures determined by quantum mechanics should be more subtly demarcated according to whether the structures are taken to be orthomodular latticesP L or partial-Boolean algebrasP A; according to whether the semantic mappings are required to be truth-functional or truth-functional ; and according to whether two-or-higher dimensional Hilbert spaceP structures or three-or-higher dimensional Hilbert spaceP structures are being considered. If the quantumP structures are taken (...)
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  22. Adam Rieger (2013). Conditionals Are Material: The Positive Arguments. Synthese 190 (15):3161-3174.score: 30.0
    A number of papers have argued in favour of the material account of indicative conditionals, but typically they either concentrate on defending the account from the charge that it has counterintuitive consequences, or else focus on some particular positive argument in favour of the theory. In this paper, I survey the various positive arguments that can be given, presenting simple versions where possible and showing the connections between them. I conclude with some methodological considerations.
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  23. Ned Block (1988). Functional Role and Truth Conditions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:157-181.score: 30.0
  24. Andrew Ushenko (1942). Dr. Quine's Theory of Truth-Functions. Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):64-67.score: 30.0
    This comment piece examines the distinction between negation of a statement and denial of its truth (assertion of its falsity), in the context of an early examination of Quine's related views. Where P is "Jones is ill," the author maintains, in contrast to Quine, that the negation of P is "Jones is ill" is false.
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  25. Keith Stenning & Michiel Lambalgen (2004). A Little Logic Goes a Long Way: Basing Experiment on Semantic Theory in the Cognitive Science of Conditional Reasoning. Cognitive Science 28 (4):481-529.score: 30.0
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  26. Stephen Pollard (2002). The Expressive Truth Conditions of Two-Valued Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (4):221-230.score: 30.0
    In a finitary closure space, irreducible sets behave like two-valued models, with membership playing the role of satisfaction. If f is a function on such a space and the membership of in an irreducible set is determined by the presence or absence of the inputs in that set, then f is a kind of truth function. The existence of some of these truth functions is enough to guarantee that every irreducible set is maximally consistent. The closure space is (...)
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  27. Jean-Yves Beziau, Non Truth-Functional Many-Valuedness.score: 28.0
    Many-valued logics are standardly defined by logical matrices. They are truth-functional. In this paper non truth-functional many-valued semantics are presented, in a philosophical and mathematical perspective.
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  28. David Sherry (1999). Note on the Scope of Truth-Functional Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (3):327-328.score: 28.0
    A plausible and popular rule governing the scope of truth-functional logic is shown to be indequate. The argument appeals to the existence of truth-functional paraphrases which are logically independent of their natural language counterparts. A more adequate rule is proposed.
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  29. Adam Morton (1969). Extensional and Non-Truth-Functional Contexts. Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):159-164.score: 28.0
    I discuss Frege's argument - later called the slingshot - that if a construction is extensional and preserves logical equivalence then it is truth-functional. I consider some simple apparent counterexamples and conclude that they are not sentence-embedding in the required way.
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  30. Peter Päppinghaus & Martin Wirsing (1983). Nondeterministic Three-Valued Logic: Isotonic and Guarded Truth-Functions. Studia Logica 42 (1):1 - 22.score: 28.0
    Nondeterministic programs occurring in recently developed programming languages define nondeterminate partial functions. Formulas (Boolean expressions) of such nondeterministic languages are interpreted by a nonempty subset of {T (true), F (false), U (undefined)}. As a semantic basis for the propositional part of a corresponding nondeterministic three-valued logic we study the notion of a truth-function over {T, F, U} which is computable by a nondeterministic evaluation procedure. The main result is that these truth-functions are precisely the functions satisfying four basic (...)
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  31. Cory D. Wright (2005). On the Functionalization of Pluralist Approaches to Truth. Synthese 145 (1):1-28.score: 27.0
    Traditional inflationary approaches that specify the nature of truth are attractive in certain ways; yet, while many of these theories successfully explain why propositions in certain domains of discourse are true, they fail to adequately specify the nature of truth because they run up against counterexamples when attempting to generalize across all domains. One popular consequence is skepticism about the efficaciousness of inflationary approaches altogether. Yet, by recognizing that the failure to explain the truth of disparate propositions (...)
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  32. Dirk Greimann (2004). Frege's Puzzle About the Cognitive Function of Truth. Inquiry 47 (5):425 – 442.score: 24.0
    The aim of this paper is to give a detailed reconstruction of Frege's solution to his puzzle about the cognitive function of truth, which is this: On the one hand, the concept of truth seems to play an essential role in acquiring knowledge because the transition from the mere hypothetical assumption that p to the acknowledgement of its truth is a crucial step in acquiring the knowledge that p, while, on the other hand, this concept seems to (...)
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  33. Michael Beaney (2007). Frege's Use of Function-Argument Analysis and His Introduction of Truth-Values as Objects. Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):93-123.score: 24.0
    One of Frege's most characteristic ideas is his conception of truth-values as objects. On his account (from 1891 onwards), concepts are functions that map objects onto one of the two truth-values, the True and the False. These two truth-values are also seen as objects, an implication of Frege's sharp distinction between objects and functions. Crucial to this account is his use of function-argument analysis, and in this paper I explore the relationship between this use and his introduction (...)
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  34. Huw Price (1988/1989). Facts and the Function of Truth. Basil Blackwell.score: 24.0
  35. Jean-Yves Béziau (2011). Truth as a Mathematical Object. Principia 14 (1):31-46.score: 23.0
    Neste artigo, discutimos em que sentido a verdade é considerada como um objeto matemático na lógica proposicional. Depois de esclarecer como este conceito é usado na lógica clássica, através das noções de tabela de verdade, de função de verdade, de bivaloração, examinamos algumas generalizações desse conceito nas lógicas não clássicas: semânticas matriciais multi-valoradas com três ou quatro valores, semântica bivalente não veritativa, semânticas dos mundos possiveis de Kripke. DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n1p31.
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  36. Dale Jacquette (2010). Circularity or Lacunae in Tarski's Truth-Schemata. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (3):315-326.score: 22.0
    Tarski avoids the liar paradox by relativizing truth and falsehood to particular languages and forbidding the predication to sentences in a language of truth or falsehood by any sentences belonging to the same language. The Tarski truth-schemata stratify an object-language and indefinitely ascending hierarchy of meta-languages in which the truth or falsehood of sentences in a language can only be asserted or denied in a higher-order meta-language. However, Tarski’s statement of the truth-schemata themselves involve general (...)
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  37. Edward Mackinnon (1982). The Truth of Scientific Claims. Philosophy of Science 49 (3):437-462.score: 22.0
    The idea that science aspires to and routinely achieves truths about the world has been challenged in recent writings. Rather than beginning with a theory of scientific development, or of scientific explanation, we begin with a consideration of truth claims in ordinary discourse, particularly with Davidson's truth-functional semantics. Next we consider the way in which some framework features of ordinary language discourse are extended to and modified in scientific discourse. Two areas are treated in more detail: quantum theory, (...)
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  38. Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2010). Truth, Pluralism, Monism, Correspondence. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 21.0
    When talking about truth, we ordinarily take ourselves to be talking about one-and-the-same thing. Alethic monists suggest that theorizing about truth ought to begin with this default or pre-reflective stance, and, subsequently, parlay it into a set of theoretical principles that are aptly summarized by the thesis that truth is one. Foremost among them is the invariance principle.
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  39. Friederike Moltmann (forthcoming). 'Truth Predicates' in Natural Language. In Dora Achourioti, Henri Galinon & José Martinez (eds.), Unifying Theories of Truth. Springer.score: 21.0
    This takes a closer look at the actual semantic behavior of apparent truth predicates in English and re-evaluates the way they could motivate particular philosophical views regarding the formal status of 'truth predicates' and their semantics. The paper distinguishes two types of 'truth predicates' and proposes semantic analyses that better reflect the linguistic facts. These analyses match particular independently motivated philosophical views.
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  40. John MacFarlane (2008). Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths. In Max K”Obel & Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. 81--102.score: 21.0
    From García-Carpintero and Kölbel, eds, Relative Truth.
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  41. Gila Sher & Cory D. Wright (2007). Truth as a Normative Modality of Cognitive Acts. In Geo Siegwart & Dirk Griemann (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. 5--280.score: 21.0
    Attention to the conversational role of alethic terms seems to dominate, and even sometimes exhaust, many contemporary analyses of the nature of truth. Yet, because truth plays a role in judgment and assertion regardless of whether alethic terms are expressly used, such analyses cannot be comprehensive or fully adequate. A more general analysis of the nature of truth is therefore required – one which continues to explain the significance of truth independently of the role alethic terms (...)
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  42. Susanne Bobzien (2003). Stoic Logic. In Brad Inwood (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Stoic Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.score: 21.0
    ABSTRACT: An introduction to Stoic logic. Stoic logic can in many respects be regarded as a fore-runner of modern propositional logic. I discuss: 1. the Stoic notion of sayables or meanings (lekta); the Stoic assertibles (axiomata) and their similarities and differences to modern propositions; the time-dependency of their truth; 2.-3. assertibles with demonstratives and quantified assertibles and their truth-conditions; truth-functionality of negations and conjunctions; non-truth-functionality of disjunctions and conditionals; language regimentation and ‘bracketing’ devices; Stoic (...)
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  43. Ernest Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (2003). Outline for a Truth-Conditional Semantics for Tense. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Tense, Time and Reference. MIT. 49-105.score: 21.0
    Our aim in the present paper is to investigate, from the standpoint of truth-theoretic semantics, English tense, temporal designators and quantifiers, and other expressions we use to relate ourselves and other things to the temporal order. Truth-theoretic semantics provides a particularly illuminating standpoint from which to discuss issues about the semantics of tense, and their relation to thoughts at, and about, times. Tense, and temporal modifiers, contribute systematically to conditions under which sentences we utter are true or false. (...)
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  44. Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). The Moral Truth. In Michael Glanzburg (ed.), Oxford Handbook to Truth. Oxford.score: 21.0
    Common-sense allows that talk about moral truths makes perfect sense. If you object to the United States’ Declaration of Independence’s assertion that it is a truth that ‘all men’ are ‘endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights’, you are more likely to object that these rights are not unalienable or that they are not endowed by the Creator, or even that its wording ignores the fact that women have rights too, than that this is not the sort of (...)
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  45. Isidora Stojanovic (2007). Talking About Taste: Disagreement, Implicit Arguments, and Relative Truth. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (6):691-706.score: 21.0
    In this paper, I take issue with an idea that has emerged from recent relativist proposals, and, in particular, from Lasersohn (Linguistics and Philosophy 28: 643–686, 2005), according to which the correct semantics for taste predicates must use contents that are functions of a judge parameter (in addition to a possible world parameter) rather than implicit arguments lexically associated with such predicates. I argue that the relativist account and the contextualist implicit argument-account are, from the viewpoint of semantics, not much (...)
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  46. Michael P. Lynch (2009). Truth as One and Many. Clarendon Press.score: 21.0
    What is truth? Michael Lynch defends a bold new answer to this question. Traditional theories of truth hold that truth has only a single uniform nature. All truths are true in the same way. More recent deflationary theories claim that truth has no nature at all; the concept of truth is of no real philosophical importance. In this concise and clearly written book, Lynch argues that we should reject both these extremes and hold that (...) is a functional property. To understand truth we must understand what it does, its function in our cognitive economy. Once we understand that, we'll see that this function can be performed in more than one way. And that in turn opens the door to an appealing pluralism: beliefs about the concrete physical world needn't be true in the same way as our thoughts about matters -- like morality -- where the human stain is deepest. (shrink)
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  47. George Englebretsen (2010). Making Sense of Truth-Makers. Topoi 29 (2):147-151.score: 21.0
    This essay argues that propositions are made true by facts. A proposition is the sense expressed by a statement (sentence token used to make a truth claim). Facts are positive or negative constitutive properties of the domain of discourse (usually the actual world). The presence of horses is a positive constitutive property of the world; the absence of unicorns is a negative one. This notion of constitutive properties accords well with the Hume-Kant claim that existence is not a property (...)
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  48. James R. Beebe, Prosentential Theory of Truth. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 21.0
    Prosentential theorists claim that sentences such as “That’s true” are prosentences that function analogously to their better known cousins–pronouns. For example, just as we might use the pronoun ‘he’ in place of ‘James’ to transform “James went to the supermarket” into “He went to the supermarket,” so we might use the prosentenceforming operator ‘is true’ to transform “Snow is white” into “‘Snow is white’ is true.” According to the prosentential theory of truth, whenever a referring expression (for example, a (...)
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  49. William James (1909/2002). The Meaning of Truth. Dover Publications.score: 21.0
    One of the most influential men of his time, philosopher, psychologist, educator, and author William James (1842-1910) helped lead the transition from a predominantly European-centered nineteenth-century philosophy to a new "pragmatic" American philosophy. Helping to pave the way was his seminal book Pragmatism (1907), in which he included a chapter on "Truth," an essay which provoked severe criticism. In response, he wrote the present work, an attempt to bring together all he had ever written on the theory of knowledge, (...)
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  50. Jeremy Barris (2009). The Crane's Walk: Plato, Pluralism, and the Inconstancy of Truth. Fordham University Press.score: 21.0
    In The Crane's Walk, Jeremy Barris seeks to show that we can conceive and live with a pluralism of standpoints with conflicting standards for truth--with the truth of each being entirely unaffected by the truth of the others. He argues that Plato's work expresses this kind of pluralism, and that this pluralism is important in its own right, whether or not we agree about what Plato's standpoint is.The longest tradition of Plato scholarship identifies crucial faults in Plato's (...)
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