This paper presents the model of ‘bounded revision’ that is based on two-dimensional revision functions taking as arguments pairs consisting of an input sentence and a reference sentence. The key idea is that the input sentence is accepted as far as (and just a little further than) the reference sentence is ‘cotenable’ with it. Bounded revision satisfies the AGM axioms as well as the Same Beliefs Condition (SBC) saying that the set of beliefs accepted after the revision does not (...) depend on the reference sentence (although the posterior belief state does depend on it). Bounded revision satisfies the Darwiche–Pearl (DP) axioms for iterated belief change. If the reference sentence is fixed to be a tautology or a contradiction, two well-known one-dimensional revision operations result. Bounded revision thus naturally fills the space between conservative revision (also known as natural revision) and moderate revision (also known as lexicographic revision). I compare this approach to the two-dimensional model of ‘revision by comparison’ investigated by Fermé and Rott (Artif Intell 157:5–47, 2004 ) that satisfies neither the SBC nor the DP axioms. I conclude that two-dimensional revision operations add substantially to the expressive power of qualitative approaches that do not make use of numbers as measures of degrees of belief. (shrink)

In rebellion against low‐dimensional (e.g., two‐factor) theories in psychology, the authors make the case for high‐dimensional theories. This change in perspective requires a shift towards a focus on computation and quantitative reasoning.

The modern doctor-patient relationship displays a patient-centred, mutual-participation characteristic rather than the former active-passive or guidance-cooperation models in terms of medical decision making. Respecting the wishes of patients, amounting to more than mere concern for their welfare, has become the feature central to certain modern bioethics theories. A group of ethical principles such as respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice has been proposed by bioethicists and widely adopted by many medical societies as an ethical guide to how doctors, in (...) their daily practice, should treat their patients. However, seeing patients as persons who are rational, self-conscious beings capable of valuing their own lives, and who are consequently entitled to the liberty and rights to choose for themselves, is in general the backbone of Western bioethical principles.Since Confucian philosophy has long been a representative of the East-Asia cultural tradition and Confucian bioethics has recently been developed as a theory of applied ethics, examining Confucius's idea of “persons” may shed some light on the current bioethical debates. Confucius's concept of persons, which is best interpreted via his theories of “chun-tze”, encapsulating a two-dimensional approach, , provides a more comprehensive model regarding what a person is and how he/she should be treated. This two-dimensional approach sees a person not only as a rational, autonomous agent but also as a relational, altruistic identity whose self actualisation involves incessant participating in and promoting of the welfare of his fellow persons. Hence this may balance the current bioethical trend whereby “respect for autonomy” often triumphs. (shrink)

A focus group study using four groups of food shoppers provides insights into consumers’ knowledge, beliefs, and behaviors regarding organic foods. Two focus groups consisted of shoppers who regularly bought organic foods and two focus groups of shoppers who predominantly purchased conventional foods. Participants in one of the conventional groups were all Caucasian; in the other they were all African-American. While familiarity with organic foods was much lower in the African-American group, its members were more receptive and positive towards organic (...) foods. Likewise, the African-American shoppers were more accepting of price premiums for organics foods. In comparing the two organic shopper groups with the two conventional shopper groups, it was found that the former were generally more knowledgeable about organic foods. They were also more likely to follow a special diet than conventional Caucasian shoppers. However, the behavior of organic shoppers varied widely. The research supports examining social justice and access as motivations for changing policies to support organic agriculture. (shrink)

Backpacker travel has become an imperative trend in modern tourism. Previous research, however, has not discussed in-depth the intentions and motivations of accommodation selection, in particular, the religious organization e.g. church, mosque, synagogue, and temple affiliated pilgrim hostel. To fill the gap of previous studies, this study provides a new research direction involving the pilgrim hostel playing an essential role as more than mere pilgrim accommodation; pilgrim hostels in Taiwan have surprisingly included a certain percentage of backpacker tourists. A survey (...) addressed the primary identity and service content perceptions of lodgers. Two historical temple-affiliated pilgrim hostels generated 287 valid responses; 112 backpackers, composing 39 % of the sample units, participated in person. Study findings indicated many significant differences between pilgrims and backpackers regarding self-recognised identity on journeys and perceptions of pilgrim hostel service content (for example, religious identification, reason for lodging, total travel expense, number of nights stayed, customer satisfaction, and service value). Implications of these findings provide suggestions and practical applications for the tourism stakeholder and for future research. (shrink)

This chapter gives an introduction to the problem of rational belief change and its formal modeling in qualitative logical theories. It first presents an outline of the approach based on rationality postulates and of the most important constructive approaches within the classical AGM model of belief revision. Then it gives the basic ideas of extensions of the classical model to iterated belief revision, to multiple revision and to two-dimensional belief change, to belief (...) merging and to belief updates, as well as to default reasoning. (shrink)

Two models are developed for updating opinions in social networks under situations where certain beliefs might be considered to be competing. These two models represent different attitudes of people towards the perceived conflict between beliefs. In both models agents have a degree of tolerance, which represents the extent to which the agent takes into account the differing beliefs of other agents, and a degree of conflict, which represents the extent to which two beliefs are considered to be competing. Computer simulations (...) are used to determine how the opinion dynamics are affected by the inclusion of conflict. Results show that conflict can enhance the formation of consensus within the network in certain circumstances according to one of the models. (shrink)

Two models are developed for updating opinions in social networks under situations where certain beliefs might be considered to be competing. These two models represent different attitudes of people towards the perceived conflict between beliefs. In both models agents have a degree of tolerance, which represents the extent to which the agent takes into account the differing beliefs of other agents, and a degree of conflict, which represents the extent to which two beliefs are considered to be competing. Computer simulations (...) are used to determine how the opinion dynamics are affected by the inclusion of conflict. Results show that conflict can enhance the formation of consensus within the network in certain circumstances according to one of the models. (shrink)

Theory change is a central concern in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. In this paper, we investigate the relationships between two ongoing research programs providing formal treatments of theory change: the (post-Popperian) approach to verisimilitude and the AGM theory of belief change. We show that appropriately construed accounts emerging from those two lines of epistemological research do yield convergences relative to a specified kind of theories, here labeled “conjunctive”. In this domain, a set of plausible (...) conditions are identified which demonstrably capture the verisimilitudinarian effectiveness of AGM belief change, i.e., its effectiveness in tracking truth approximation. We conclude by indicating some further developments and open issues arising from our results. (shrink)

The aim of science is the explanation of complicated systems by reducing it to simple subsystems. According to a millennia-old imagination this will be attained by dividing matter into smaller and smaller pieces of it. The popular superstition that smallness implies simplicity seems to be ineradicable. However, since the beginning of quantum theory it would be possible to realize that the circumstances in nature are exactly the other way round. The idea “smaller becomes simpler” is useful only down to the (...) atoms of chemistry. Planck’s formula shows that smaller extensions are related to larger energies. That more and more energy should result in simpler and simpler structures, this does not only sound absurd, it is absurd. A reduction to really simple structures leads one to smallest energies and, thus, to utmost extended quantum systems. The simplest quantum structure, referred to as quantum bit, has a two-dimensional state space, and it establishes a cosmological structure. Taking many of such quantum bits allows also for the construction of localized particles. The non-localized fraction of quantum bits can appear as “dark matter”. (shrink)

In virtue of what are we responsible for our beliefs? I argue that doxastic responsibility has a crucial social component: part of being responsible for our beliefs is being responsible to others. I suggest that this responsibility is a form of answerability with two distinct dimensions: an individual and an interpersonal dimension. While most views hold that the individual dimension is grounded in some form of control that we can exercise over our beliefs, I contend that we are answerable for (...) our beliefs as long as they reflect our evaluative commitments and dispositions, or are products of our reasoning, where this does not amount to a form of control. I next argue that answerability has a second, largely neglected dimension: the interpersonal dimension, which is grounded in what I call our relations of doxastic dependence. As social creatures, we depend on one another in our capacity as believers. We depend on one another as believers not only in epistemic ways, but also in practical ways, because our beliefs inform and motivate our actions, and allow us to participate in shared practical goals. Depending on one another in these ways is an unavoidable part of cooperating in the shared project of pursuing epistemic and practical success, and it makes us vulnerable to both epistemic and moral harm. It is because of this, I argue, that answerability has interpersonal normative force upon us: we are subject to legitimate expectations associated with participating in relations of doxastic dependence. (shrink)

This paper is about two requirements on wish reports whose interaction motivates a novel semantics for these ascriptions. The first requirement concerns the ambiguities that arise when determiner phrases, such as definite descriptions, interact with ‘wish’. More specifically, several theorists have recently argued that attitude ascriptions featuring counterfactual attitude verbs license interpretations on which the determiner phrase is interpreted relative to the subject’s beliefs. The second requirement involves the fact that desire reports in general require decision-theoretic notions for their analysis. (...) The current study is motivated by the fact that no existing account captures both of these aspects of wishing. I develop a semantics for wish reports that makes available belief-relative readings but also allows decision-theoretic notions to play a role in shaping the truth conditions of these ascriptions. The general idea is that we can analyze wishing in terms of a two-dimensional notion of expected utility. (shrink)

Philosophical views about the logical structure of time are typically divided between proponents of A and B theories, based on McTaggart's A and B series. Drawing on Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutic phenomenology, I develop and defend McTaggart's thesis that the C series and the A series working together give a consistent description of temporal experience, provided that the two series are treated as distinct dimensions internal to time. In the proposed two-dimensional model, the C series expresses a nesting order of (...) the constitutive states of a world, whereas ontological continuity and change are properties of the A series. This, I argue, allows for limited backward causation. (shrink)

In virtue of what are we responsible for our beliefs? I argue that doxastic responsibility has a crucial social component: part of being responsible for our beliefs is being responsible to others. I suggest that this responsibility is a form of answerability with two distinct dimensions: an individual and an interpersonal dimension. While most views hold that the individual dimension is grounded in some form of control that we can exercise over our beliefs, I contend that we are answerable for (...) our beliefs as long as they reflect our evaluative commitments and dispositions, or are products of our reasoning, where this does not amount to a form of control. I next argue that answerability has a second, largely neglected dimension: the interpersonal dimension, which is grounded in what I call our relations of doxastic dependence. As social creatures, we depend on one another in our capacity as believers. We depend on one another as believers not only in epistemic ways, but also in practical ways, because our beliefs inform and motivate our actions, and allow us to participate in shared practical goals. Depending on one another in these ways is an unavoidable part of cooperating in the shared project of pursuing epistemic and practical success, and it makes us vulnerable to both epistemic and moral harm. It is because of this, I argue, that answerability has interpersonal normative force upon us: we are subject to legitimate expectations associated with participating in relations of doxastic dependence. (shrink)

Prioritized bases, i.e., weakly ordered sets of sentences, have been used for specifying an agent’s ‘basic’ or ‘explicit’ beliefs, or alternatively for compactly encoding an agent’s belief state without the claim that the elements of a base are in any sense basic. This paper focuses on the second interpretation and shows how a shifting of priorities in prioritized bases can be used for a simple, constructive and intuitive way of representing a large variety of methods for the change (...) of belief states—methods that have usually been characterized semantically by a system-of-spheres modeling. Among the methods represented are ‘radical’, ‘conservative’ and ‘moderate’ revision, ‘revision by comparison’ in its raising and lowering variants, as well as various constructions for belief expansion and contraction. Importantly, none of these methods makes any use of numbers. (shrink)

Awareness logic is a type of belief logic in which an agent's beliefs are restricted to those sentences that the agent is aware of. Awareness logic is a successful way to circumvent the problem of omniscience so that actual belief is modelled in a reasonable way. In this paper, we suggest a new method modelling awareness and actual belief by using two-dimensional logics. We show that the two-dimensional logics are flexible tools. Different types of concepts (...) of awareness can be easily modelled by this method. (shrink)

We present the logic $${\mathsf {LCB}}$$ LCB which is expressed in a propositional language constantly enriched by new atomic expressions. Our formal framework is the propositional doxastic logic $${\mathsf {KD45}}$$ KD 45 with the belief operator $${\mathcal {B}}$$ B, extended by the $${\mathcal {C}}$$ C operator, to be read it changes that.... We describe the changing beliefs of an agent who uses progressively expanding language. The approach presented here allows us to weaken pragmatic objections to the so-called principle of (...) negative retrospection accepted in $${\mathsf {KD45}}$$ KD 45 and the problem of logical omniscience. In what follows, we present the expanding propositional language used in our formalism, interpreted using an epistemic version of Kripke semantics. Next, we give a syntactic characterization of logic $${\mathsf {LCB}}$$ LCB and prove the soundness and completeness of $${\mathsf {LCB}}$$ LCB in respect to our semantics. Finally, we compare the idea of expanding language with the notion of agent awareness and we relate our formalism to two epistemic temporal logics. (shrink)

We give a model for iterated belief change in multi-agent systems. The formal tool we use for this is a combination of modal and dynamic logic. Two core notions in our model are the expansion of the knowledge and beliefs of an agent, and the processing of new information. An expansion is defined as the change in the knowledge and beliefs of an agent when it decides to believe an incoming formula while holding on to its current (...) propositional beliefs. To prevent our agents from forming inconsistent beliefs they do not expand with every piece of information they receive. Instead, our agents remember their original beliefs and every piece of information they receive. After every receipt of information they decide which subset of the received information should be incorporated into their original beliefs. This procedure is called the processing of new information. We show that our model of belief update behaves in an intuitive way and that it is not sensitive to criticism on comparable models. (shrink)

Two systems of belief change based on paraconsistent logics are introduced in this article by means of AGM-like postulates. The first one, AGMp, is defined over any paraconsistent logic which extends classical logic such that the law of excluded middle holds w.r.t. the paraconsistent negation. The second one, AGMo , is specifically designed for paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs), which have a formal consistency operator that allows to recover all the classical inferences. Besides the (...) three usual operations over belief sets, namely expansion, contraction and revision (which is obtained from contraction by the Levi identity), the underlying paraconsistent logic allows us to define additional operations involving (non-explosive) contradictions. Thus, it is defined external revision (which is obtained from contraction by the reverse Levi identity), consolidation and semi-revision, all of them over belief sets. It is worth noting that the latter operations, introduced by S. Hansson, involve the temporary acceptance of contradictory beliefs, and so they were originally defined only for belief bases. Unlike to previous proposals in the literature, only defined for specific paraconsistent logics, the present approach can be applied to a general class of paraconsistent logics which are supraclassical, thus preserving the spirit of AGM. Moreover, representation theorems w.r.t. constructions based on selection functions are obtained for all the operations. (shrink)

We must change our beliefs, and change them in particular ways, in response to new information. But not all changes are created equal: some are rational changes, some not. The Problem of Epistemic Change is the problem of specifying the rational constraints on how the epistemic state of an agent ought to change in the face of new information. This dissertation is about the philosophical and logical investigation of rational belief change. I start by (...) arguing that the familiar foundations---coherence distinction from static epistemology does not adequately carve up the logical space of theories of epistemic change. It is better to think of theories as being loosely ordered along a continuum from more to less foundational. The ordering, however, is "clumpy" in the sense that there are large regions in the ordering which remain unexplored. I then present and develop GDEC which is a new foundations model of belief revision that fills a gap in this ordering of theories of epistemic change. The key insight in GDEC is that belief that...is ambiguous between the attitudes of accept that...and expect that... GDEC respects the difference and how it matters for epistemic change. I show that GDEC is a genuine competitor to the AGM theory of belief revision in the sense that the two approaches are incompatible. The remainder of the dissertation is devoted to exploring the logical dynamics of GDEC and the models I develop here which extend it by applying them to a series of richer epistemic environments. I show how puzzles and paradoxes which confound other theories of belief revision are solved in a unified way by GDEC and its extensions. In particular, I give solutions to Moore's Paradox, Fuhrmann's Impossibility Theorem, the Reduction Problem of Epistemic Conditionals, and the Gardenfors Impossibility Theorem. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the notion of a minimal belief change that incorporates new information. I apply the fundamental decision-theoretic principle of Pareto-optimality to derive a notion of minimal belief change, for two different representations of belief: First, for beliefs represented by a theory – a deductively closed set of sentences or propositions – and second for beliefs represented by an axiomatic base for a theory. Three postulates exactly characterize Pareto-minimal revisions of theories, yielding a weaker (...) set of constraints than the standard AGM postulates. The Levi identity characterizes Pareto-minimal revisions of belief bases: a change of belief base is Pareto-minimal if and only if the change satisfies the Levi identity (for “maxichoice” contraction operators). Thus for belief bases, Pareto-minimality imposes constraints that the AGM postulates do not. The Ramsey test is a well-known way of establishing connections between belief revision postulates and axioms for conditionals (“if p, then q”). Pareto-minimal theory change corresponds exactly to three characteristic axioms of counterfactual systems: a theory revision operator that satisfies the Ramsey test validates these axioms if and only if the revision operator is Pareto-minimal. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the notion of a minimal belief change that incorporates new information. I apply the fundamental decisiontheoretic principle of Pareto-optimality to derive a notion of minimal belief change, for two different representations of belief: First, for beliefs represented by a theory –a deductively closed set of sentences or propositions–and second for beliefs represented by an axiomatic base for a theory. Three postulates exactly characterize Pareto-minimal revisions of theories, yielding a weaker set of constraints (...) than the standard AGM postulates. The Levi identity characterizes Pareto-minimal revisions of belief bases: a change of belief base is Pareto-minimal if and only if the change satisfies the Levi identity (for “maxichoice” contraction operators). Thus for belief bases, Pareto-minimality imposes constraints that the AGM postulates do not. Keywords: belief revision, decision theory.. (shrink)

ABSTRACT We introduce a two-dimensional temporal logic as a formalism which enables the description of both the history of a world and the evolution of an observer's views about the history. We apply such formalism to the description of certain problems that occur in historical database systems due to updates. The historical dimension describes the history of a world according to an observer's view at a certain moment in time. The transaction dimension describes the evolution of an observer's view; (...) changes can occur in the observer's view of the present and future as well as in his views of the past. The database is seens as an observer of the history of the world. Besides describing the history of the world, the database system can also execute temporal specifications in the form of temporal actions. The two-dimensional formalism is used to describe the effects of updates in the execution of temporal actions. The detection of some problematic effects and its implementation are discussed. (shrink)

Starting from the sixties of the past century theory change has become a main concern of philosophy of science. Two of the best known formal accounts of theory change are the post-Popperian theories of verisimilitude (PPV for short) and the AGM theory of belief change (AGM for short). In this paper, we will investigate the conceptual relations between PPV and AGM and, in particular, we will ask whether the AGM rules for theory change are effective (...) means for approaching the truth, i.e., for achieving the cognitive aim of science pointed out by PPV. First, the key ideas of PPV and AGM and their application to a particular kind of propositional theories - the so called "conjunctive propositions" - will be illustrated. Afterwards, we will prove that, as far as conjunctive propositions are concerned, AGM belief change is an effective tool for approaching the truth. (shrink)

D. Wulff developed a notion of post-critical beliefs as a proposal for the description of religion in the light of the progress of secularization and socio-cultural changes. According to his theory, we can situate potential attitudes toward religion in a two-dimensional space. The vertical dimension stands for Inclusion vs. Exclusion of Transcendence, and the horizontal one-for the way an individual interprets religious content: Literal vs. Symbolic. In this way, the two dimensions determine four quadrants, each reflecting a potential attitude (...) towards religion, operationalized by D. Hutsebaut in the Post-Critical Belief Scale as: Orthodoxy, External Critique, Relativism and Second Naiveté. The research presented in this paper is our attempt at fi n ding an answer to the question whether the religious attitudes determined by Wulff are related to self-consciousness types. We tested 159 adult individuals by means of the PCBS scale by D. Hutsebaut and the Self-consciousness scale by Z. Zaborowski and Z. Oleszkiewicz. The results of these tests are that the refl ective type of self-consciousness correlated positively with Orthodoxy and Second Naiveté and negatively with External Critique and Relativism. (shrink)

In this paper we study changes of beliefs in a ranking-theoretic setting using non-extremal implausibility thresholds for belief. We represent implausibilities as ranks and introduce natural rank changes subject to a minimal change criterion. We show that many of the traditional AGM postulates for revision and contraction are preserved, except for the postulate of Preservation which is invalid. The diagnosis for belief contraction is similar, but not exactly the same. We demonstrate that the one-shot versions of both (...) revision and contraction can be represented as revisions based on semiorders, but in two subtly different ways. We provide sets of postulates that are sound and complete in the sense that they allow us to prove representation theorems. We show that, and explain why, the classical duality between revision and contraction, as exhibited by the Levi and Harper identities, is partly broken by threshold-based belief changes. We also study the logic of iterated threshold-based revision and contraction. The traditional Darwiche-Pearl postulates for iterated revision continue to hold, as well as two additional postulates that characterize ranking-based revision as a restricted `improvement' operator. We investigate the dual notion of iterated threshold-based belief contraction and provide a new set of postulates for it, characterizing contraction as a restricted 'degrading' operator. (shrink)

Studies concerning the changing landscapes of religiosity and spirituality in the lives of young people in England and Wales draw attention to decline in traditional religiosity and to growth in alternative spiritualities. The present study examined whether such alternative spiritualities occupy the same personality space as traditional religiosity. A sample of 2,950 13- to 16-year-old pupils attending 11 secondary schools in England and Wales completed the Francis Scale of Attitude toward Christianity and an index of paranormal belief, alongside the (...) abbreviated-form Junior Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised. The data demonstrated that these two forms of belief were related in different ways to Eysenck's dimensional model of personality space. While attitude toward Christianity occupied the space defined by low psychoticism scores and high lie scale scores, paranormal belief was related to high psychoticism scores and was independent of lie scale scores. These findings support the view that alternative spiritualities may be associated with different personalities. (shrink)

In this article, a qualitative notion of subjective plausibility and its revision based on a preorder relation are implemented in higher-order logic. This notion of plausibility is used for modeling pragmatic aspects of communication on top of traditional two-dimensional semantic representations.

This paper investigates the question whether we could have reason to believe that time is two-dimensional. I connect discussion of this question to discussion of the question whether we could have reason to believe that there has been a global time freeze.

According to the Ramsey Test, conditionals reflect changes of beliefs: α > β is accepted in a belief state iff β is accepted in the minimal revision of it that is necessary to accommodate α. Since Gärdenfors’s seminal paper of 1986, a series of impossibility theorems (“triviality theorems”) has seemed to show that the Ramsey test is not a viable analysis of conditionals if it is combined with AGM-type belief revision models. I argue that it is possible to (...) endorse that Ramsey test for conditionals while staying true to the spirit of AGM. A main focus lies on AGM’s condition of Preservation according to which the original belief set should be fully retained after a revision by information that is consistent with it. I use concrete representations of belief states and (iterated) revisions of belief states as semantic models for (nested) conditionals. Among the four most natural qualitative models for iterated belief change, two are identified that indeed allow us to combine the Ramsey test with Preservation in the language containing only flat conditionals of the form α > β. It is shown, however, that Preservation for this simple language enforces a violation of Preservation for nested conditionals of the form α > (β > γ). In such languages, no two belief sets are ordered by strict subset inclusion. I argue that it has been wrong right from the start to expect that Preservation holds in languages containing nested conditionals. (shrink)

This study realizes belief/reliability change of a judge in a legal judgment by dynamic epistemic logic. A key feature of DEL is that possibilities in an agent’s belief can be represented by a Kripke model. This study addresses two difficulties in applying DEL to a legal case. First, since there are several methods for constructing a Kripke model, our question is how we can construct the model from a legal case. Second, since this study employs several dynamic (...) operators, our question is how we can decide which operators are to be applied for belief/reliability change of a judge. In order to solve these difficulties, we have implemented a computer system which provides two functions. First, the system can generate a Kripke model from a legal case. Second, the system provides an inconsistency solving algorithm which can automatically perform several operations in order to reduce the effort needed to decide which operators are to be applied. By our implementation, the above questions can be adequately solved. With our analysis method, six legal cases are analyzed to demonstrate our implementation. (shrink)

This work explores the conceptual and empirical issues of the concept of knowledge and its relation to the pattern of our belief change, from formal and experimental perspectives. Part I gives an analysis of knowledge (called Sustainability) that is formally represented and naturalistically plausible at the same time, which is claimed to be a synthesized view of knowledge, covering not only empirical knowledge, but also knowledge of future, practical knowledge, mathematical knowledge, knowledge of general facts. Part II tries (...) to formalize the natural pattern of belief change assumed in Sustainability in terms of a specific formal theory of belief change, after carefully examining the notions of belief, belief change, and Information, from which the cognitive function F in Chapter 3 is actually constructed, which is later implemented by a computer program and its behavior against random input is demonstrated. In Part III we proceed to examine the analysis empirically. In particular, we will investigate Sustainability from the developmental point of view. We first justify experimental approach in philosophy as a legitimate method of philosophical investigation, and then developmental approach in particular. The specific proposal of experiment here is what we call the Gettier Task, an analogue of the famous false-belief task in developmental psychology, which has been much discussed in philosophy of mind. Two versions of the Gettier Task were tested on children aged from 6 to 12, and we claim that the data obtained empirically supports our analysis of knowledge, or Sustainability. (shrink)

In standard decision theory, the probability function ought to be updated in light of evidence, but the utility function generally stays fixed. However, there is nothing in the formal theory that prevents one from instead updating the utility function, while keeping the probability function fixed. Moreover, there are good arguments for updating the utilities and not just the probabilities. Hence, the first puzzle is whether there is anything that justifies updating beliefs, but not desires, in light of evidence. The paper (...) argues that there is not, but that this raises a second puzzle. (shrink)

Four-dimensionalism and eternalism are theories on time, change, and persistence. Christian philosophers and theologians have adopted four-dimensional eternalism for various reasons. In this paper I shall attempt to argue that four-dimensional eternalism conflicts with Christian thought. Section I will lay out two varieties of four-dimensionalism—perdurantism and stage theory—along with the typically associated ontologies of time of eternalism and growing block. I shall contrast this with presentism and endurantism. Section II will look at some of the purported theological (...) benefits of adopting four-dimensionalism and eternalism. Section III will examine arguments against four-dimensional eternalism from the problem of evil. Section IV will argue that four-dimensional eternalism causes problems for Christian eschatology. (shrink)

Bayesian, Jeffrey and Field conditionals are compared and it is shown why the last two cannot be reduced to the first. Maximum relative entropy is used in two kinds of justification of the Field conditional and the dispensability of entropy principles in general is discussed.

If we suppose that reasonable belief is reasonable not because it has a foundation but because it is self-correcting, and that bodies of reasonable belief are self-correctable in virtue of their web-like internal structure, then it becomes natural to ask for explicit accounts both of self-correction itself, and of the web-like internal structure that makes self-correction possible: The theory of rational belief change. ;In this essay we study qualitative, logical theories of rational belief change, (...) in particular the AGM account, and its offshoot, the theory base account. Throughout, however, we use quantitative, probabilistic models as foils. ;We first undertake a systematic, critical study of the AGM account, focusing especially on its "possible worlds" formulation and on its theory of belief revision. According to the AGM account we can represent AGM revision by simple computations over total preorders of possibilities. We investigate iterated AGM revision from this perspective, and prove that symmetry considerations familiar from social choice theory essentially determine a particular ordering dynamics. These symmetry arguments put an upper bound on the sorts of responsiveness we can expect from the AGM model of rational belief change. The most widely criticized feature of the AGM account is its "recovery" condition on belief contraction. We show how to deflect all existing criticisms to recovery by paying close to attention to exactly which beliefs are given up in a particular case. The principal cost of this strategy is that the AGM account becomes harder to apply and to test. ;Theory base accounts add a layer of syntactically-encoded information to the AGM model. We show that this approach fails comprehensively: that it cannot successfully coordinate the syntactic layer of information with underlying contents or with necessary ordering information, and that it sanctions demonstrably irrational belief changes. Our diagnosis is, in part, that the theory base account conflates two distinct sorts of nonmonotonic belief change. ;Lastly, we summarize our current research into quantitative accounts of rational belief change, focusing on a model that generalizes irreducibly two-place probability, and that has the AGM account as a limiting case. (shrink)

For various domains in proportional reasoning cognitive development is characterized as a progression through a series of increasingly complex rules. A multiplicative relationship between two task features, such as weight and distance information of blocks placed at both sides of the fulcrum of a balance scale, appears difficult to discover. During development, children change their beliefs about the balance scale several times: from a focus on the weight dimension (Rule I) to occasionally considering the distance dimension (Rule II), guessing (...) (Rule III), and applying multiplication (Rule IV; Siegler, 1981). Because of the detailed empirical findings the balance scale task has become a benchmark task for computational models of proportional reasoning. In this article, we present a large empirical study (N = 420) of which the findings provide a challenge for computational models. The effect of feedback and the effect of individually adapted training items on rule transition were tested for children using Rule I or Rule II. Presenting adapted training items initiates belief revision for Rule I but not for Rule II. The experience of making mistakes (by providing feedback) induces a change for both Rule I and Rule II. However, a delayed posttest shows that these changes are preserved after 2 weeks only for children using Rule I. We conclude that the transition from Rule I to Rule II differs from the transition from Rule II to a more complex rule. Concerning these empirical findings, we will review performance of computational models and the implications for a future belief revision model. It is one Thing, to show a Man that he is in an Error, and another, to put him in possession of Truth. John Locke. (shrink)

The paper has two aims. The first is to propose a general framework for organizing some central questions about normative practical reasons in a way that separates importantly distinct issues that are often run together. Setting out this framework provides a snapshot of the leading types of view about practical reasons as well as a deeper understanding of what are widely regarded to be some of their most serious difficulties. The second is to use the proposed framework to uncover and (...) diagnose what I believe is a structural problem that plagues the debate about practical reasons. A common move in the debate involves a proponent of one type of view offering what she and others proposing that type consider to be a devastating criticism of an opposing type of view, only to find that her criticism is shrugged off by her opponents as easy to answer, misguided, or having little significance for their view. This isn’t due to conceptual blindness or mere slavish devotion to a theory but something fundamental about the argumentative structure of a debate over genuinely shared issues. Hence, the debate about practical reasons suffers from argumentative gridlock. The proposed framework helps us to see why this is so, and what we might do to move beyond it. (shrink)

The paper attacks the almost universally held view that belief revison theories, as they have been studied in the literature of the past two decades, are founded on a Principle of Minimal Change, or Principle of Informational Economy. The principle comes in two versions. According to the first, an agent should, when accepting new information, aim at a posterior belief set that minimizes the items on which it disagrees with the prior belief set. If there are (...) different ways to effect the belief change, then according to the second version, the agent should give up the beliefs that are least entrenched. Although widely endorsed and advertised by belief revision theorists, the paper argues that both versions of the principle are dogmas that are not in fact (and perhaps should not be) adhered to. Two simple mathematical observations substantiate this claim, and it is defended against four possible objections that involve contractions, reconstructions, dispositions, and truths. (shrink)

The paper attacks the widely held view that belief revision theories, as they have been studied in the past two decades, are founded on the Principle of Informational Economy. The principle comes in two versions. According to the first, an agent should, when accepting a new piece of information, aim at a minimal change of his previously held beliefs. If there are different ways to effect the belief change, then the agent should, according to he second (...) version, give up those beliefs that are least entrenched. Although widely proclaimed by belief revision theorists, I argue that both versions of the principle are dogmas that are not (and perhaps should not be) adhered to. I substantiate this claim with two simple mathematical observations, and I defend it against four possible objections that involve contractions, reconstructions, dispositions, and truths. (shrink)

Part 1. Human capability in light of God's power -- Divine power and the creation -- God's will and human destiny -- Part 2. Human capability to understand God -- Human knowledge -- Human knowledge of God -- Part 3. Human capability in relation to doctrinal ordination -- Criteria of Christian authorities -- Philosophical freedom and doctrinal minimalism : two test cases -- Conclusion.

Although companies recognize the importance of social responsibility and community engagement, conflicts between companies and communities have been noticeably increasing. To better understand the role of institutional environments in company–community conflicts, we analyze two mining conflicts—Minera Yanacocha's Minas Conga extension project in Peru and Minera Los Pelambres' El Mauro Tailings Dam in Chile. Our findings imply that, to prevent negative consequences and alleviate company–community conflicts, mining companies should address underlying structural causes and pursue informal approaches in order to obtain and (...) maintain their social license. We find that better formal institutional environments not only alleviate conflict intensity but also facilitate informal approaches through which companies and communities can cooperate to resolve conflicts. The best practice would be to start and continue dialogs between communities and companies, mediated by impartial governments, to understand the concerns of the counterparty and find means by which to address the causes. (shrink)

Belief polarization is said to occur when two people respond to the same evidence by updating their beliefs in opposite directions. This response is considered to be “irrational” because it involves contrary updating, a form of belief updating that appears to violate normatively optimal responding, as for example dictated by Bayes' theorem. In light of much evidence that people are capable of normatively optimal behavior, belief polarization presents a puzzling exception. We show that Bayesian networks, or Bayes (...) nets, can simulate rational belief updating. When fit to experimental data, Bayes nets can help identify the factors that contribute to polarization. We present a study into belief updating concerning the reality of climate change in response to information about the scientific consensus on anthropogenic global warming. The study used representative samples of Australian and U.S. participants. Among Australians, consensus information partially neutralized the influence of worldview, with free-market supporters showing a greater increase in acceptance of human-caused global warming relative to free-market opponents. In contrast, while consensus information overall had a positive effect on perceived consensus among U.S. participants, there was a reduction in perceived consensus and acceptance of human-caused global warming for strong supporters of unregulated free markets. Fitting a Bayes net model to the data indicated that under a Bayesian framework, free-market support is a significant driver of beliefs about climate change and trust in climate scientists. Further, active distrust of climate scientists among a small number of U.S. conservatives drives contrary updating in response to consensus information among this particular group. (shrink)

Motivated reasoning occurs when we reason differently about evidence that supports our prior beliefs than when it contradicts those beliefs. Adult participants (N = 377) from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) system completed written responses critically evaluating strengths and weaknesses in a vignette on the topic of anthropogenic climate change (ACC). The vignette had two fictional scientists present prototypical arguments for and against anthropogenic climate change that were constructed with equally flawed and conflicting reasoning. The current study tested and (...) found support for three main hypotheses: cognitive style, personality, and ideology would predict both motivated reasoning and endorsement of human caused climate change; those who accept human-caused climate change will be less likely to engage in biased reasoning and more likely to engage in objective reasoning about climate change than those who deny human activity as a cause of climate change. (144 words). (shrink)

Isaac Levi's new book is concerned with how one can justify changing one's beliefs. The discussion is deeply informed by the belief-doubt model advocated by C. S. Peirce and John Dewey, of which the book provides a substantial analysis. Professor Levi then addresses the conceptual framework of potential changes available to an inquirer. A structural approach to propositional attitudes is proposed, which rejects the conventional view that a propositional attitude involves a relation between an agent and either a linguistic (...) entity or some other intentional object such as a proposition or set of possible worlds. The last two chapters offer an account of change in states of full belief understood as changes in commitments rather than changes in performance; one chapter deals with adding new information to a belief state, the other with giving up information. The book builds upon topics discussed in some of Levi's earlier work. It will be of particular interest to discussion theorists, epistemologists, philosophers of science, computer scientists, and cognitive psychologists. (shrink)

This book compares Butler's and Wang's moral vision and conception of conscience. It seeks to advance our ongoing inquiry into the complex encounter between Christianity and Confucianism. The study shows that in both thinkers' treatises are profound consonances that could serve as framework for a constructive interaction between these two civilizations.

This book presents the concept of “complementary science” which contributes to scientific knowledge through historical and philosophical investigations. It emphasizes the fact that many simple items of knowledge that we take for granted were actually spectacular achievements obtained only after a great deal of innovative thinking, painstaking experiments, bold conjectures, and serious controversies. Each chapter in the book consists of two parts: a narrative part that states the philosophical puzzle and gives a problem-centred narrative on the historical attempts to solve (...) the puzzle; and the analysis part which provides in-depth analyses of certain scientific, historical, and philosophical aspects of the story. (shrink)