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Profile: Michael Tye (University of Texas at Austin)
  1. Michael Tye, Precis of Color, Content, and Consciousness.
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  2. Michael Tye, “Qualia,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Revised 31 July 2007).
    Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, (...)
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  3. Michael Tye, Précis Of: Consciousness, Color, & Content (MIT Press, 2000).
    In 1995, in my book, Ten Problems of Consciousness (Bradley Books, MIT Press), I proposed a version of the theory of phenomenal consciousness now known as representationalism. The present book, in part, consists of a further development of that theory along with replies to common objections. It is also concerned with two prominent challenges for any reductive theory of consciousness: the explanatory gap and the knowledge argument. In addition, it connects representationalism with two more general issues: the nature of (...)
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  4. Michael Tye, On Pain and Representational Content.
    I appreciate that such a view needs argument which is not appropriate here. However, I think that there are independent reasons to think that Tye’s theses are problematical. It is difficult to see how these theses are consistent both with what we know about pains, and other perceptual experiences, and with the package of claims that are central to Tye's treatment of pain, and more generally of perceptual experiences, whereby phenomenal character is explained in terms of representational content [as presented (...)
     
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  5. B. Cutter & M. Tye (forthcoming). Pains and Reasons: Why It is Rational to Kill the Messenger. Philosophical Quarterly.
    In this paper, we defend the representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness against a recent objection due to Hilla Jacobson, who charges representationalism with a failure to explain the role of pain in rationalizing certain forms of behavior. In rough outline, her objection is that the representationalist is unable to account for the rationality of certain acts, such as the act of taking pain killers, which are aimed at getting rid of the experience of pain rather than its intentional object. If (...)
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  6. M. Tye (forthcoming). Forthcoming (B)" Externalism and Memory,". Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume.
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  7. Michael Tye (forthcoming). Phenomenal Externalism, Lolita, and the Planet Xenon. In Terence E. Horgan & David Sosa (eds.), Collection on the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim. Mit Press.
     
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  8. Michael Tye (forthcoming). What is the Content of a Hallucinatory Experience? In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception have Content? Oxford University Press.
    Keith has just taken a hallucinogenic drug. A few minutes earlier, he was occupied with the beginning of H.H. Price's well-known book on perception. The combined effect of these activities is that Keith is now hallucinating a ripe tomato. This is not a de re hallucination. There is no particular tomato located elsewhere out of Keith's vision such that he is hallucinating that tomato as being before him. Keith is hallucinating a tomato without there being any particular tomato that he (...)
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  9. Michael Tye (2014). Does Conscious Seeing Have A Finer Grain Than Attention? Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):154-158.
    Ned Block says ‘yes’ (, ). His position is based on the phenomenon of identity-crowding. According to Block, in cases of identity-crowding, something is consciously seen even though one cannot attend to it. In taking this view, Block is opposing a position I have taken in recent work (Tye 2009a, 2009b, 2010). He is also contributing to a vigorous recent debate in the philosophy of mind over the relation, if any, between consciousness and attention. Who is right? Not surprisingly, I (...)
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  10. Michael Tye (2014). Speaks on Strong Property Representationalism. Philosophical Studies 170 (1):85-86.
    Strong property representationalism, as applied to visual experience, is the thesis that the phenomenal character of a visual experience is one and the same as the property complex or ‘sensible profile’ represented by that experience. Speaks discusses the following argument against this thesis:Let ‘RED’ stand for the phenomenal character of the experience of red.(1) Red = RED (strong property representationalism).(2) My pen has no representational properties, but is red.Hence,(3) My pen has a phenomenal character but no representational properties.Since (3) is (...)
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  11. Michael Tye (2014). Transparency, Qualia Realism and Representationalism. Philosophical Studies 170 (1):39-57.
    In this essay, I want to take another look at the phenomenon of transparency and its relevance to qualia realism and representationalism. I don’t suppose that what I have to say will cause those who disagree with me to change their minds, but I hope not only to clarify my position and that of others who are on my side of the debate but also to respond to various criticisms and objections that have arisen over the last 10–15 years or (...)
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  12. Mark Sainsbury & Michael Tye (2013). Seven Puzzles of Thought: And How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts. Oup Oxford.
    Sainsbury and Tye present a new theory, 'originalism', which provides natural, simple solutions to puzzles about thought that have troubled philosophers for centuries. They argue that concepts are to be individuated by their origin, rather than epistemically or semantically. Although thought is special, no special mystery attaches to its nature.
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  13. R. M. Sainsbury & Michael Tye (2012). Seven Puzzles of Thought: And How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts. OUP Oxford.
    How can one think about the same thing twice without knowing that it's the same thing? How can one think about nothing at all (for example Pegasus, the mythical flying horse)? Is thinking about oneself special? One could mistake one's car for someone else's, but it seems one could not mistake one's own headache for someone else's. Why not? -/- R. M. Sainsbury and Michael Tye provide an entirely new theory--called 'originalism'-- which provides simple and natural solutions to these puzzles (...)
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  14. Michael Tye (2012). Précis of Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):187-189.
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  15. Michael Tye (2012). Reply to Crane, Jackson and McLaughlin. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):215-232.
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  16. Michael Tye (2012). Cohen on Color Relationism. Analytic Philosophy 53 (3):297-305.
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  17. Michael Tye (2012). 13 Knowing What It Is Like. Philosophical Inquiry 36 (1):300.
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  18. Brian Cutter & Michael Tye (2011). Tracking Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):90-109.
  19. R. M. Sainsbury & Michael Tye (2011). An Originalist Theory of Concepts. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):101-124.
    We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...)
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  20. Michael Tye (2011). Knowing What It Is Like. In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press, Usa. 300.
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  21. Michael Tye & Briggs Wright (2011). Is There a Phenomenology of Thought? In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. 35.
  22. Michael Tye (2010). Attention, Seeing, and Change Blindness. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):410-437.
  23. Michael Tye (2010). Up Close with the Speckled Hen. Analysis 70 (2):283-286.
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  24. Michael Tye (2009). A New Look at the Speckled Hen. Analysis 69 (2):258 - 263.
    (forthcoming in Analysis) We owe the problem of the speckled hen to Gilbert Ryle. It was suggested to A.J. Ayer by Ryle in connection with Ayer’s account of seeing. Suppose that you are standing before a speckled hen with your eyes trained on it. You are in good light and nothing is obstructing your view. You see the hen in a single glance. The hen has 47 speckles on its facing side, let us say, and the hen ap­ pears speckled (...)
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  25. Michael Tye (2009). Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts. Mit Press.
    Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be -- What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal (...)
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  26. Michael Tye (2009). Interview for Mind and Consciousness: 5 Questions. In Patrick Grim (ed.), Mind and Consciousness: 5 Questions. Automatic Press.
    I went up to Oxford as an undergraduate to study physics. I chose Oxford over Cambridge at the urging of my school physics teacher who was an Oxford man. When I arrived, I found out that, as a physics student, I was expected to spend one day a week in the laboratory. This seemed to me extremely unappealing not only because it would interfere with my social life but also because the practical side of physics was, to my mind, deadly (...)
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  27. Michael Tye (2009). Representationalist Theories of Consciousness. In B. McLaughlin & A. Beckermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    This essay surveys representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness as well as the major arguments for them. It also takes up two major objections. The essay is divided into five sections. Section I offers some introductory remarks on phenomenal consciousness. Section II presents the classic view of phenomenal consciousness to which representationalists are opposed. Section III canvasses various versions of representationalism about consciousness. Section IV lays out the main arguments for the representationalist stance. The final section addresses the two objections.
     
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  28. Michael Tye (2009). The Admissible Contents of Visual Experience. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):541-562.
    My purpose is to take a close look at the nature of visual content. I discuss the view that visual experiences have only existential contents, the view that visual experiences have either singular or gappy contents, and the view that visual experiences have multiple contents. I also consider a proposal about visual content inspired by Kaplan's well known theory of indexicals. I draw out some consequences of my discussion for the thesis of intentionalism with respect to the phenomenal character of (...)
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  29. Michael Tye (2008). The Experience of Emotion: An Intentionalist Theory. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62:25--50.
    The experience of emotion is a fundamental part of human consciousness. Think, for example, of how different our conscious lives would be without such experiences as joy, anger, fear, disgust, pity, anxiety, and embarrassment. It is uncontroversial that these experiences typically have an intentional content. Anger, for example, is normally directed at someone or something. One may feel angry at one=s stock broker for provid- ing bad advice or angry with the cleaning lady for dropping the vase. But it is (...)
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  30. Michael Tye (2007). Intentionalism and the Argument From No Common Content. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):589–613.
    Disjunctivists (Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1990, Martin 2002, 2006) often motivate their approach to perceptual experience by appealing in part to the claim that in cases of veridical perception, the subject is directly in contact with the perceived object. When I perceive a table, for example, there is no table-like sense-impression that stands as an intermediary between the table and me. Nor am I related to the table as I am to a deer when I see its footprint in the snow. (...)
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  31. Michael Tye (2007). New Troubles for the Qualia Freak. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell Pub..
    The phenomenal character of an experience is what it is like subjectively to undergo the experience. Experiences vary in their phenomenal character, in what it is like to un- dergo them. Think, for example of the subjective differences between feeling a burning pain in a toe, experiencing an itch in an arm, smelling rotten eggs, tasting Marmite, having a visual experience of bright purple, running one’s fingers over rough sandpaper, feeling hungry, experiencing anger, feeling elated. Insofar as what it is (...)
     
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  32. Michael Tye (2007). Phenomenal Consciousness and Cognitive Accessibility. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):527-528.
    Block tries to show that the results of the Sperling experiment lend support to the view that phenomenology outstrips cognitive accessibility. I argue that Block fails to make a compelling case for this general claim on the basis of the Sperling data.
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  33. Michael Tye (2007). Philosophical Problems of Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 23--35.
  34. Michael Tye (2007). True Blue Redux. Analysis 67 (1):92-93.
    A chip looks true blue to John and greenish blue to Jane. On the face of it, at least one of the two perceivers has an inaccurate colour experience; for the chip cannot be both true blue and greenish blue. But John and Jane are “normal” perceivers, and there is no privileged class of normal perceivers (Block 1999). This is the puzzle of true blue (Tye.
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  35. Michael Tye (2007). The Problem of Common Sensibles. In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Status of Secondary Qualities. Kluwer. 287 - 303.
    In _On The Soul_ (425a-b), Aristotle drew a distinction between those qualities that are perceptible only via a single sense and those that are perceptible by more than one. The latter qualities he called.
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  36. Alex Byrne & Michael Tye (2006). Qualia Ain't in the Head. Noûs 40 (2):241-255.
    Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates (in the same or different metaphysically possible worlds) have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head.1 Intentionalism (or representationalism) comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects (in the same or different metaphysically (...)
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  37. M. Tye (2006). Another Look At Representationalism About Pain. In M. Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. The Mit Press. Bradford Books. 99-120.
     
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  38. Michael Tye (2006). Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Review 115 (2):139-168.
    At the very heart of the mind-body problem is the question of the nature of consciousness. It is consciousness, and in particular _phenomenal_ consciousness, that makes the mind-body relation so deeply perplexing. Many philosophers hold that no defi nition of phenomenal consciousness is possible: any such putative defi nition would automatically use the concept of phenomenal consciousness and thus render the defi nition circular. The usual view is that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is one that must be explained by (...)
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  39. Michael Tye (2006). Nonconceptual Content and Fineness of Grain. In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
     
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  40. Michael Tye (2006). Nonconceptual Content, Richness, and Fineness of Grain. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. 504–30.
     
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  41. Michael Tye (2006). The Puzzle of True Blue. Analysis 66 (291):173–178.
    Most men and nearly all women have non-defective colour vision, as measured by standard colour tests such as those of Ishihara and Farns- worth. But people vary, according to gender, race and age in their per- formance in matching experiments. For example, when subjects are shown a screen, one half of which is lit by a mixture of red and green lights and the other by yellow or orange light, and they are asked to ad- just the mixture of lights (...)
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  42. Michael Tye (2006). The Truth About True Blue. Analysis 66 (292):340–344.
    Cohen, Hardin, and McLaughlin (2006) complain that my solution to the puzzle of true blue (Tye 2006) depends upon my assuming that 'all variation in colour experience among standard perceivers in standard circumstances is at the level of fine-grained hues (4)'. That assumption, they say, is false: 'there is in fact variation in colour experience among.
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  43. Michael Tye (2006). The Thesis of Nonconceptual Content. European Review of Philosophy 6:7-30.
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  44. Michael Tye (2005). Another Look at Representationalism and Pain. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Mit Press.
     
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  45. Michael Tye (2005). In Defense of Representationalism: Reply to Commentaries. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press. 163-176.
     
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  46. Michael Tye (2005). On the Nonconceptual Content of Experience. Schriftenreihe-Wittgenstein Gesellschaft.
    I suppose that substantive philosophical theses are much like second marriages. The philo- sophical thesis I wish to discuss in this paper is the thesis that experiences have nonconceptual content. I shall not attempt to argue that _all_ experiences have nonconceptual content nor that the only contents experiences have are nonconceptual. Instead, I want to ? esh out the thesis of nonconceptual content for experience in more detail than has been offered hithertofore and to provide a variety of motivations for (...)
     
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  47. Michael Tye (2003). A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. 91-105.
    1) There is widespread agreement that consciousness must be a physical phenomenon, even if it is one that we do not yet understand and perhaps may never do so fully. There is also widespread agreement that the way to defend physicalism about consciousness against a variety of well known objections is by appeal to phenomenal concepts (Loar 1990, Lycan 1996, Papineau 1993, Sturgeon 1994, Tye 1995, 2000, Perry 2001) . There is, alas, no agreement on the nature of phenomenal concepts.
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  48. Michael Tye (2003). Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: New Problems for Representationalism? In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
     
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  49. Michael Tye (2003). Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity. MIT Press.
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