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Profile: Tyler Doggett (University of Vermont)
  1. Tyler Doggett, Moving Cartesian Bodies.
    Argues that Descartes's commitment to mind-body causation leads to a commitment to body-body causation.
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  2. Tyler Doggett, What Would Taurek Do?
    A very short, exegetical paper about Taurek's "Should the Numbers Count?," arguing against the view that Taurek requires giving chances.
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  3. Shen-yi Liao & Tyler Doggett (forthcoming). The Imagination Box. Journal of Philosophy.
    Imaginative immersion refers to a phenomenon in which one loses oneself in make-believe. Susanna Schellenberg says that the best explanation of imaginative immersion involves a radical revision to cognitive architecture. Instead of there being an attitude of belief and a distinct attitude of imagination, there should only be one attitude that represents a continuum between belief and imagination. -/- We argue otherwise. Although imaginative immersion is a crucial data point for theorizing about the imagination, positing a continuum between belief and (...)
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  4. Tyler Doggett (2013). Saving the Few. Noûs 47 (2):302-315.
  5. Tyler Doggett (2012). Some Questions for Tamar Szabo Gendler. [REVIEW] Analysis 72 (4):764-774.
    Contribution to a symposium on Gendler's Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology.
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  6. Tyler Doggett & Andy Egan (2012). How We Feel About Terrible, Non-Existent Mafiosi. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2):277-306.
    We argue for an imaginative analog of desire from premises about imaginative engagement with fiction. There's a bit about the paradox of fiction, too.
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  7. Tyler Doggett (2011). Review of Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (6).
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  8. Tyler Doggett (2011). Review of Tamar Szabo Gendler's Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  9. Tyler Doggett (2011). Recent Work on the Ethics of Self-Defense. Philosophy Compass 6 (4):220-233.
  10. Tyler Doggett (2010). Why Leibniz Thinks Descartes Was Wrong and the Scholastics Were Right. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):1 - 18.
    Leibniz believes that if there are corporeal substances, they have substantial forms, believes there are substantial forms, and believes there is a close connection between the first two claims. Why does he believe there is this close connection? This paper answers that question and draws out its bearing on the realism/idealism debate.
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  11. Tyler Doggett & Daniel Stoljar (2010). Does Nagel's Footnote Eleven Solve the Mind-Body Problem? Philosophical Issues 20 (1):125-143.
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  12. Tyler Doggett (2009). What Is Wrong With Kamm's and Scanlon's Arguments Against Taurek. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (3).
    I distinguish several arguments Kamm and Scanlon make against Taurek's claim that it is permissible to save smaller groups of people rather than larger. I then argue that none succeeds. This is a companion to my "Saving the Few.".
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  13. Tyler Doggett & Andy Egan (2007). Wanting Things You Don't Want: The Case for an Imaginative Analogue of Desire. Philosophers' Imprint 7 (9):1-17.
    You’re imagining, in the course of a different game of make-believe, that you’re a bank robber. You don’t believe that you’re a bank robber. You are moved to point your finger, gun-wise, at the person pretending to be the bank teller and say, “Stick ‘em up! This is a robbery!”.
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