By considering the history of bioethics and international humanitarian law, Joseph J. Fins contends that bioethics as an academic and moral community should stand in solidarity with Ukraine as it defends freedom and civility.

This article analyses Ukraine’s language policies from 2002 to 2022 within a framework of liberalism, while avoiding making normative judgements or recommendations, updating the discussion raised in Kymlicka and Opalski’s Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? The analysis takes into consideration Ukraine’s present and historic position, including the challenge that postcolonial nation building can pose for achieving liberalism and linguistic justice. The paper focuses on three main areas of language policy: education, businesses and media, and assesses if they can (...) be described as liberal orthodox, pluralist or illiberal. The article begins by defining liberalism and illiberalism, discussing the context of Ukraine’s linguistic diversity and postcolonial context, before outlining the language situation until EuroMaidan. Then, the main issue of language policy in the areas of education, business and media is analysed, before considering whether Ukrainian language laws might be considered liberal or illiberal. Finally, potential future trajectories are outlined. (shrink)

War in Ukraine and the Russian annexation of Crimea are the events that changed the US policy towards Russia. The events in Ukraine forced the United States to take a closer look at Eastern and Central Europe. The United States’ policy during the Ukrainian crisis has been limited to sanctions and strong statements so far because in Ukraine there is an asymmetry of interests. Ukraine is much more important to Russia than to the United States. The (...) United States may be willing to support the democratic and western aspiration of Ukrainians but will not risk a major conflict with Russia over it. However the crisis in Ukraine is not only about Ukraine or Russia. It is also about US credibility around the world. Both friends and foes are watching closely the American reaction to the situation. That is why the United States has increased its military presence in those NATO countries that share borders with Russia. (shrink)

The usefulness of ‘realism’ in explaining Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine has become a keenly contested debate not only in International Relations but in wider public intellectual discourse since the onset of the war in February 2022. At the centre of this debate is the punditry of John J. Mearsheimer, a prominent offensive realist who is a Professor of International Relations at the University of Chicago. This article argues that although Mearsheimer is indeed a realist, his offensive realism is (...) but one of many different realist theories that can forward an explanation of the Ukraine War. Beyond the apparent hegemony of structural realism (the branch of realism to which Mearsheimer’s offensive realism belongs), it is argued that classical and neoclassical realist frameworks can provide more nuanced and, ultimately, convincing arguments as to why Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to invade Ukraine. This is because both classical and neoclassical realism can incorporate insights from non-realist studies—such as the concepts of civilization and ontological security—and combine them into an overarching power politics framework. Although neither classical nor neoclassical realism is flawless in their explanations, they demonstrate that realism does not just have to be about international power structures but can offer multivariate accounts of why a state, like Russia, decided to act, such as invading Ukraine. (shrink)

For most readers, myself included, the views and opinions on the Russian attack and consequent war in Ukraine are dependent on the main media houses, who present the situation in a certain language. In this article, Badiou’s understanding of democratic materialism (languages and bodies) will be explored within the context of the war, and how language is used to order bodies into categories of good and evil. In democratic materialism, there are only bodies and languages, but no truth. The (...) question that will be explored in these few pages is, is there a way beyond democratic materialism via truth towards a materialist dialectic? Contribution: The paper contributes to the current discussion on the war in Ukraine and tries to make sense of the geopolitical context of the war. It then seeks to engage with these discourses from a theological perspective. (shrink)

This article applies the concept of the boundary of order to examine the multi-faceted and complex relations between the EU and Ukraine. The focus is on geopolitical, institutional/legal and cultural boundaries in order to conceptualize the EU’s reluctant engagement with Ukraine. Yet, notwithstanding the EU’s refusal to offer Ukraine membership, it softened the legal boundary to placate Ukraine’s demand for inclusion. Furthermore, the cultural boundary has become blurred through references to Europe as a discursive benchmark of (...) ‘normality’ in Ukraine, and Ukraine’s Europeanness as evidenced in its support for so-called European values. Overall, it is argued that different boundaries are subject to conflicting dynamics and that Russia has, inadvertently, contributed to a diminution of the boundaries between the EU and Ukraine. (shrink)

The paper analyses Ukraine’s geopolitical position and argues that Ukraine is slowly gravitating towards West. The paper gives a small hint of approximation process of Ukraine within EU and NATO, and argues how this approximation process is opposed by Russia, who wants Ukraine back to its influence. Occupation off Crimea by Russia violated international order, opening way to unstructured international ties out traditional UN bodies. The Ukraine’s destiny is unclear, Dnieper River may divide country in (...) two, and the West faces biggest security and political threat after WWII. (shrink)

The article deals with the Maidan revolution in Ukraine in 2013/14 and how it was connected to the European idea. It analyzes the performative, revolutionary and theopolitical character of the event and raises the question of what meaning the experience of the Maidan can have for the renewal of European identity. In linking the idea of Europe with the struggle for freedom and dignity, the Maidan event unfolds a communitarian and meaningful political force that connects the Ukrainian nation, the (...) idea of Europe, and the desire for self-determi­nation, for which people stake their lives. The essay takes a look at the forms and functions of political liturgy as well as the meaning of martyrdom and its ritualized remembrance. The revolutionary appropriation of political sovereignty by the people and the theopolitical dimensions of the event are reflected upon, both in their political power and significance for a European identity and in the associated dangers of mythologizing and idealizing Europe. (shrink)

The conflict in Ukraine indicates some of the features of a potential post-liberal order and raises several potential ethical issues that may arise for international interventions as the world changes. What types of interventions, if any, are justifiable in response to situations such as the one in Ukraine? Can interventions be permissible given the potential undermining of universalist claims that are often used to support them? How should states prioritize between situations if there is an even greater number (...) of global challenges in a post-liberal order? Three new books—Solferino 21 by Hugo Slim, Decolonizing Human Rights by Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim, and Promoting Justice across Borders by Lucia Rafanelli—can help to navigate these questions. Drawing on their insights, this essay argues that reform interventions can be justified to defend the liberal international order, that intervention can be defended from a relativist basis, and that socioeconomic rights should be given greater priority. (shrink)

Exports are critical for the highly open Ukrainian economy which is characterized by the large trade deficit. Since independence the major consumers of the Ukrainian products have been the CIS and the EU. Conflict with Russia led to the significant decline of the volume of Ukraine’s export commodities. The export analysis, based on the data provided by the State Statistics Service of Ukraine for the period of 2010-2018 allowed to identify the problems and to come up with possible (...) solutions focusing primarily on the role of the Government of Ukraine in strengthening cooperation with the EU. Firstly, it is suggested to take the institutional steps aimed at expanding and deepening the integration towards the common economic space with the EU, especially the common customs space. Secondly, to explore the opportunities of exporting goods to the countries, with which the EU has signed regional trade agreements. The third step is related to the changing role of Ukraine in the global model of the transformation of the world economy and requires the combination of close cooperation with the EU, on the one hand, and the powerful economies, on the other, thereby contributing to the formation of non-confrontational relations between East and West. (shrink)

The paper analyzes the acceleration of the history we are witnessing in our time, which is evident in a series of events and crises that mark the world we live in, especially after the start of the war in Ukraine, which have not occurred in such significant intensity and frequency since the end of the Second World War. Considering these events and crises, the paper discusses the thesis of a historian Eric Hobsbawm that the “short” 20th century that had (...) lasted as “the age of extremes” since the First World War ended with the fall of “communism” and the Berlin Wall, after which we in fact entered the 21st century. Contrary to this thesis and to the well-known thesis on the “end of history”, our paper presents the view that we are still “politically” in the 20th century, because in our time there are similar tensions between the great powers that marked the 20th century and which in general mark the modern world since Westphalian peace in the 17th century. This general thesis is explained by the observation of the most basic lines of the dialectics of modern European and world history. The paper concludes that we are not only “politically” living in the “long” 20th century, but we are still “politically” living in the “longest” classical Westphalian age, which has been lasting for three and a half centuries in the same dialectical contradictions of world politics. Ultimately, the paper also discusses the task of philosophy in the times of the so-called “acceleration of history”, such as ours, and concludes that philosophy as a discipline in these times is obligated to offer, with theoretical creativity, a fresh philosophy of history, explaining in wider perspective a series of actual international occurrences. (shrink)

The article analyzes the cultural and civilizational consequences of a long experience of Ukrainians' perception of the biblical picture of the world and the corresponding principles of its development. The author's reasoning is based on the thesis that the very acquisition of the Bible as a sacred text created the space of a common language - the language of values and the language of symbols. The present "European world", even as a globalized phenomenon, has historically emerged as the embodiment of (...) an ideal, symbolic "biblical world". In turn, the over-millennial affiliation of Christianized Ukraine to the "biblical world" has become an extremely important symbolic marker and cultural and ideological factor of civilization. Adopting the principle of biblical historicism coupled with the idea of biblical history as a universal, universal Holy History of Salvation, our ancestors, along with other Christianized peoples, were given the chance to see themselves as full participants in world historical drama. The same universal principle led to the formation of a new model of interpersonal communication - communication, which united families and tribes in nations, and nations into international unity. We still know this unity as Europe - either staying in it or seeking to rebuild and strengthen its ties with it. And, despite the fact that this unity always seemed to be a political, cultural, civilizational unity, it was basically a spiritual and mental unity. The “biblical world”, as a center of norms and symbols, was embodied in the various social and cultural forms of the great Europe. The author outlines a panorama of common cultural ideas and values that have been learned by our ancestors over a thousand years ago, the source of which is the biblical worldview. In particular, the idea of indisputable and unceasing progress is analyzed — as the idea of historical progress in the development of each individual, each local society, as well as humanity as a whole. It is shown that the possibility of such progress is justified by the affirmation of the value of personal creative effort in the transformation of the world — an effort that involves creativity and initiative. The basis for the creative world transformation for the human development is the value of rational knowledge of the world. However, it has been shown that the ideas of progressism, personal creative activism, rationalism and pragmatism in the European mentality are substantially counterbalanced by several important values, which are also of biblical origin. In this context, the idea of personal and collective responsibility for what humans is being done in the world is emphasized. This value — as the maxim of socially significant behavior — in our culture is a powerful safeguard for personal or group selfishness and particularism.These values can be realized in a system of constantly updating communities. Community, communication is the basis of a a fulfilling personal and collective life, both religious and secular. On the concrete examples of the analysis of the reception of the European biblical experience by the figures of the Kiev theological tradition of the late XIX - early XX centuries, the author demonstrates the perception by the Kiev authors of this period of polyphonic unity of the European world, the normative and symbolic core of which was the Bible. The author reasonably argues that by comparing the foreign experience of mastering and applying the Bible with the domestic, "home" situation, Kiev theologian researchers objectively strengthened the idea of a universal "biblical world". The "biblical world" - as the unity of the spiritual-symbolic and ethno-geographical principles, is, to put it now, the "geopolitical phenomenon" - has been globalized and modernized. As a result, there were also challenges to Ukrainian culture and society. These challenges remain relevant every time we attempt modern Ukrainian state and national-cultural construction. The author's current conclusion is that even now our self-awareness as Europeans, as full members of the global community of nations, requires us to read the Bible as a source of meaning shared with the rest of the world, with the experience of other nations. (shrink)

In Matthew 24, Jesus prophesied to his disciples about ‘wars and rumours of wars’ and other eschatological birth-pangs to prepare them in advance on how they are to be responding to eschatological events as they would be unfolding in the interim of his ascension and his promised Parousia. What then does Jesus mean by enlisting ‘wars and rumours of wars’ in this eschatological era to be functioning as ‘the beginning of birth-pangs’ and how should Christians be responding to wars and (...) rumours of wars as eschatological birth-pangs? Employing the redaction exegetical method, this study focuses on interpreting Matthew 24:6−8 to explain what Jesus most probably meant as he enlisted ‘wars and rumours of wars’ as eschatological birth-pangs; and with special reference to the Russia–Ukraine war that broke out on 24 February 2022, recommends from the Olivet prophecy how Christians are to be righteously responding to ‘wars and rumours of wars’ as eschatological birth-pangs. Contribution: This study explored Matthew 24:6−8 to unveil what Jesus means by enlisting wars and rumours of wars as eschatological birth-pangs. With special reference to the Russian military invasion of Ukraine, theological highlights were recommended on how Christians are to be responding to war and war rumours as end-time birth-pains. (shrink)

The review is devoted to an analysis of Nazip Khamitov’s new book “War in Ukraine and the New Humanism: David versus Goliath. Metaanthropology of history of the 21st century”, which was published in Bulgaria.

Personification, one of major types of metaphors often employed to express an attitude, is also an argumentative tool, especially in media texts on politically contested events. The present investigation aims at disclosing the attitudinal stance in personifying Ukraine, Russia, the Western countries and Lithuania in a corpus of texts collected from Lithuanian media in 2015–2018. The study relies on the three-step Critical Metaphor Analysis (CMA, Charteris-Black 2004), involving three levels: linguistic, cognitive and rhetorical. More specifically, they include (1) identifying (...) personification cases, (2) interpreting personification through cognitive metaphorical scenarios (Musolff 2016), and (3) explaining ideological implications encoded in the scenarios. The findings indicate that in the scenario of COMMUNICATION, Ukraine is mostly presented positively: active defender and in need of support, with occasional scepticism whether it is capable to change. The West, Lithuania including, is presented as a supporter, whereas Russia is viewed as a negatively evaluated antagonist. (shrink)

Ukraine faces a threat of full-fledged default and deep financial and political crisis. The current deep recession is the country's second major economic crisis in ten years. Ukraine was severely affected by the global financial crisis in 2008, with its economy shrinking by 15% in 2009. The economy remained weak in the aftermath, as former government caused the business climate worsening. The lack of reforms limited growth of GDP to just 0.3% in 2012 and remained static in 2013. (...) By the end of 2013, Ukraine was already on the brink of collapse. The conflict in the eastern part of the country has further exacerbated the recession. Today the sources of economic growth in Ukraine have been exhausted, and the country is strongly increasing its debts trying to attract foreign investment. The government’s reform efforts have so far failed to significantly improve the country’s business climate. Ukraine is ranked 83rd out of 189 countries in the latest World Bank's ‘Doing Business’ 2016 index. This score is the second worst in Europe. Ukraine is still considered the most corrupt country in Europe as well. The persistent state of war has disrupted industrial production, which is mainly located in the eastern part. The article elucidates recent events in Ukraine as well as gives a brief historical overview. The influence of misleading governance of economic situation is revealed. The positive scenario, in which Ukraine overcomes default, is unlikely to happen unless the firm measures are to be taken. (shrink)

To some extent, the current Russian-Ukrainian may be described as a conflict between two visions of nation, respectively, ethnic and civic models. Putin believes that a language defines a nation. In his understanding, since many Ukrainians are Russian speakers, they are Russians. His perception of Ukraine is anachronistic. He has failed to notice Ukraine's radical transformation since it gained independence. The current Ukrainian identity has a strong civic component. Its core is represented by a new urban middle class (...) with a new set of values. Sustainability of this identity largely depends on longevity and results of the war. (shrink)

When we look at the past of Ukraine, the names of our people and country, language and faith serve as the kind of guideline in search of sources. The creation of self-titles is often associated with the process of awareness of the people of their separateness.

In the article by Alla Aristova "Ukraine: Beyond the Boundaries of Religious Freedom", the changes in the confessional landscape, and in the level and quality of religious freedom that have occurred in recent years in the annexed and occupied territories of Ukraine are analyzed. The features of the religious situation on the Crimean peninsula and the Eastern regions of Ukraine are generalized.

The changes taking place in the religious life of modern Ukraine are closely linked to the global transformation processes in the world of religions. The result of the latter is the so-called religious postmodernism, a striking manifestation of which is the new religions. Their appearance can be seen as a kind of challenge to tradition, as a creation of a new type of religiosity or even a new religious culture, as a spiritual search and expression of a postmodern person.

In 1991, Ukrainian independence opened an important theoretical channel for debating the status of its women. The people's collective memory of an ancient matriarchy generated a neo-matriarchal mythology which has been transformed into a delusional ideology that legitimizes female subordination, in the name of her alleged empowerment. Fieldwork in Ukraine – annual visits, including travel from one end of the country to another in official capacities, and many extended stays in Ukraine, as a scholar, researcher, educator and participant (...) in key events, provided opportunities for exchanging views with countless people from many walks of life throughout the country. Participation in a host of programs – television ‘specials’ on gender, seminars, retreats, workshops and conferences, designed to raise the consciousness of women and men alike – provided an array of opportunities to observe at first hand the way that today's women construct individual identity. Extensive research in the press (many runs of daily newspapers, including Den’, in Kyiv, and Vysoky Zamok in Lviv, and women's journals such as the widely read Zhinka, among others) added further insights. Television viewing, popular publications collected habitually during my numerous visits to Ukraine, copies of documents contributed by my Ukrainian friends and colleagues, outdoor advertising, posters and intimate gatherings at the homes of likeminded women, all played a part in the formation of my impressions of Ukrainian women's inferior status. In this paper I use my findings to explore the conflicting discourses on women's alleged empowerment, and the essentialist constraints on their self-realization, together with measures adopted to date on changing gender stereotypes and promoting equal rights and opportunities. (shrink)

This article seeks to historicize both the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the debate on realism occasioned by Russian aggression in Ukraine since 2014. Using the research of Gerard Toal on Russia’s construction of its security interests in the post-Soviet spaces that include Ukraine, the article argues that neorealist geopolitical explanations fail to do justice to the roles of contingency and culture in setting Russia’s so-called ‘red lines.’ It also identifies an agency problem in realism: (...) realists not only fail to do justice to the agency of small states like Ukraine in this conflict but elide the moral and practical agency of decisionmakers like Russian President Vladmir Putin. The article also suggests that the current realism debate is the tip of an iceberg: realism has long had a problem specifying the relation of its theory to its practice. The article concludes by discussing the long shadow of 19th century imperial history over contemporary discussions of spheres of influence and great power status. (shrink)

The article analyzes the political motives of Ukrainian resistance to Russian invasion and aggression. First of all, it emphasizes the falsification of history by Russian propaganda, its use of history as a political instrument, the destruction of the traumatic memory of the recent imperial past and the glorification of the “glorious centuries-old” imperial history in modern Russia. This determines the difference in the structure of the historical memory of Russians and other former peoples of the empire, and the recent memory (...) of the tragic imperial past is the leading factor in the choice of the Ukrainian and Moldovan peoples for their political destiny. The article also shows that this choice, as well as the desire for truth, freedom and rights, determines these peoples’ slow but sure progress toward democracy. These choices and aspirations are at the same time a determining factor in the ability of the Ukrainian people to resist Russian armed aggression. Instead, the so-called “civilizational” links between the former peoples of the empire, with which Russia tries to justify its aggression, are actually a cover for its desire for political dominance. The article also outlines the importance of Ukrainian resistance for European democracies, calling for their unconditional support. The war in Ukraine is a challenge for them, because no matter what problems democracies around the world are facing today, they will remain actors of their own history only if they provide support to all those who resist the destruction of the minimum of rights and freedoms that define democracy. Using Kant’s work «Perpetual Peace» as an example, the article also shows that the cessation of war for the sake of cessation of war, which is often called for today, will not contribute to the establishment of peace. It will leave grounds for the renewal of war, which the aggressor, if he will not change its political essence, will always be able to use it again. (shrink)

This article is devoted to the roots of the developments that have taken place in Ukraine since Autumn 2013 and up to the Russian invasion. It stresses the historical differences between Ukraine and Russia, presents the international milieu of Ukrainian independence in the years 1991–2013, and ends with a description of the nature of the Maidan revolution and the pan-European challenge created by the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The main thesis is that the struggle for Ukraine (...) ends the post-Cold War epoch marked with an illusion of eternal peace in Europe and with the groundless hope for Russian imperialism to expire. (shrink)

A series of conflicts that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union culminated in the war in Ukraine waged by Russia in 2014. The international community was taken by surprise, and its reactions to the Russian aggression were often confused and inadequate. Even more confused and inadequate were the responses from global Christianity. Russian propaganda often renders the aggression against Ukraine as a quasi-religious conflict: a “holy war” against the “godless” or “heterodox” West. It would be natural, therefore, (...) for the Christian churches worldwide to loudly condemn both propaganda and aggression. However, in most cases, their response was silence. Such reactions came from most local Orthodox churches, the Roman Catholic church, and international ecumenical organizations such as the World Council of Churches. An exception was the reaction from the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which decided to grant autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. The article argues that the Tomos for autocephaly was, among other reasons, a reaction to the war in Ukraine. The responses of other local Orthodox churches to the Tomos also indicate their attitude to the war in Ukraine. These reactions have demonstrated a profound crisis in inter-Orthodox solidarity and social ethics. (shrink)

From the annals and historical chronicles it is known that the inhabitants of Ukraine first became acquainted with Islamic culture in the times of Kievan Rus. Diplomats, travelers and traders from the Middle and Middle East and Bulgaria were often visited by Kyiv, which at that time was the capital of the great power. They left historical chronicles, which tell about the lives and customs of Kievan Rus. It was at this time that the first Muslims appeared in Kiev.

In this article, I consider the permissibility of forming defensive alliances, which is a neglected topic in the contemporary literature on the ethics of war and peace. Drawing on the jus ad bellum criterion of proportionality in just war theory, I argue that if permissible defensive force requires that its expected harms must be counterbalanced by its expected goods, then, permissible defensive alliance formation seems to also require that its expected harms must be counterbalanced by its expected goods, as the (...) latter can result in much the same consequences as the former. Moreover, due to the incommensurability of values in play when making proportionality judgments, I argue for a value pluralist understanding of the criterion. On this view, defensive alliance formation is proportionate if the expected gains in certain values (goods) intuitively justify the expected losses in others (harms) when compared to the alternative expected value trade-offs of not allying. To explore the implications of my theoretical claims I consider them in relation to John Mearsheimer’s influential account of the causes of the Russo-Ukrainian War. On this account, the West’s strategy to assimilate Ukraine and Ukraine’s pursuit of NATO membership post-annexation of Crimea were disproportionate because the expected harms were unjustified when compared to the alternative expected goods and harms of forgoing Ukrainian membership of NATO. This does not imply that Russia’s aggression is just, but it does imply that the West and Ukraine are partially responsible for the war and that they acted impermissibly in attempting to expand/join NATO. (shrink)

On 5th June 2022 Wales played Ukraine for a place in the FIFA World Cup finals, which are due to be held in Qatar in November and December 2022.I suspect that all right-mined people wanted Ukraine...

Preview: /Scott Shapiro interviewed by Eli Kramer / EK: Thanks for talking with me today. Your book, The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World is not only kind of groundbreaking in the way it changes how we think about the role of international law in the history and philosophy of culture, and some of our progressive success of not having disastrous violence shape us each generation, but it has only become more relevant since the war (...) in Ukraine was launched. As a starting point for our conversation, can you summarize the main premise of the work? SS: It’s a story about the modern international order. Despite its imperfections, it needs to be defended now more than ever. The central argument of the book is that the origins of the modern international order can be traced to a specific date in history. Namely August 27th, 1928, when the great leaders of the world gathered in Paris to outlaw war. The treaty that was signed on that day is sometimes called the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Peace Pact, or the Paris Peace Pact. Its actual formal designation was “The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War,” basically saying it all was an attempt to outlaw war. Now, of course most people have never heard of it. It’s amazing that basically all the countries in the world decide to outlaw war, which in itself is initially a strange thing to do, but then nobody knows about it. (shrink)

War crimes are being committed in Ukraine today, but who should be held responsible? By looking at the literature on responsibility and violence by Philippa Foot and John Harris, this article argues that there are grounds for holding Vladimir Putin responsible for war crimes in Ukraine, even if he did not give the command for these crimes and other atrocities to be carried out.

In the past two decades, Ukraine has significantly deepened its relations with NATO. Following Russia’s seizure of Crimea and instigation of conflict in the eastern Ukrainian region of Donbas in 2014, Ukraine’s interest in NATO entry has particularly intensified. According to public opinion polls in Ukraine, membership in the Alliance is critical to the country’s security. On the other hand, Russia presents the further expansion of NATO to the east as the main threat to its national security. (...) The current developments on the ground and the ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia will affect NATO’s attitude towards Ukraine’s membership prospects in the Alliance. The potential for further escalation of the war in Ukraine is significant, although it is more likely that the war will flare up and target Ukrainian forces and the civilian population, but the likelihood of the involvement of the Western Allies in the conflict is also more certain. Ukrainian authorities will have to limit their expectations for NATO membership and focus only on maximum cooperation with the Alliance. (shrink)

In the history of the Slavic East, the word "philosopher" first appeared in the first great Oriental-Slavic work, known as "Chronicle." Nestor "or" The Tale of the Bereaved Years ". Ukrainian monk Nestor wrote this essay at the beginning of the XII century. on the basis of those older chronicles, which were written before him by Kiev chroniclers of Rus. In the Chronicle of Nestor "the philosophers" are called saints Cyril and Methodius.

The article O.Horkusha, L.Fylypovych «Interfaith dialogue in contemporary Ukraine: expediency and efficiency of its implementation in the conditions of War» discusses the state of interfaith communication in Ukraine, available dialogue platforms, which were created spontaneously for a long time, and now they grow up to a certain network. There are 5 types of interfaith dialogs, their effectiveness is analyzed, based on the purpose of the dialogue, topics, language, methodological approaches, criteria for the rules of conduct and subjects invited (...) to the dialogue. The recommendations on the success of the interfaith dialogue in Ukraine in the conditions of war are given. (shrink)

The article by Oksana Horkusha “Interconfessional dialogue in modern Ukraine: impulses, conditions, purpose, subjects, levels of understanding” analyzes the motives, conditions, goals, subjects and levels of understanding of the interconfessional dialogue in contemporary Ukraine. Interconfessional dialogue cannot have a purpose in itself. Different confessions reach agreement only in the process of such dialogue, which are carried out by mutually viable actors who have a common goal, are in the same cultural-historical context, a definite problem, for the solution of (...) which is used by adequate dialogue platforms, methods and instruments. (shrink)