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  1. Ullin T. Place (forthcoming). Concept Acquisition and Ostensive Learning: A Response to Professor Stemmer. Behaviorism.
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  2. Ullin T. Place (ed.) (2003). Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place. Oxford University Press.
    This is the one and only book by the pioneer of the identity theory of mind. The collection focuses on Place's philosophy of mind and his contributions to neighboring issues in metaphysics and epistemology. It includes an autobiographical essay as well as a recent paper on the function and neural location of consciousness.
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  3. Ullin T. Place (2000). Consciousness and the Zombie Within: A Functional Analysis of the Blindsight Evidence. In Yves Rossetti & Antti Revonsuo (eds.), Beyond Dissociation: Interaction Between Dissociated Implicit and Explicit Processing. John Benjamins.
     
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  4. Ullin T. Place (2000). The Causal Potency of Qualia: Its Nature and its Source. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 1 (2):183-192.
    There is an argument (Medlin, 1967; Place, 1988) whichshows conclusively that if qualia are causallyimpotent we could have no possible grounds forbelieving that they exist. But if, as this argumentshows, qualia are causally potent with respect to thedescriptions we give of them, it is tolerably certainthat they are causally potent in other morebiologically significant respects. The empiricalevidence, from studies of the effect of lesions of thestriate cortex (Humphrey, 1974; Weiskrantz, 1986;Cowey and Stoerig, 1995) shows that what is missing (...)
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  5. Ullin T. Place (2000). The Two Factor Theory of the Mind-Brain Relation. Brain and Mind 1 (1):29-43.
    The analysis of mental concepts suggests that the distinctionbetween the mental and the nonmental is not ontologically fundamental,and that, whereas mental processes are one and the same things as thebrain processes with which they are correlated, dispositional mentalstates depend causally on and are, thus, ''''distinct existences'''' fromthe states of the brain microstructure with which ''they'' are correlated.It is argued that this difference in the relation between an entity andits composition/underlying structure applies across the board. allstuffs and processes are the same (...)
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  6. Ullin T. Place (1999). Connectionism and the Problem of Consciousness. Acta Analytica 22 (22):197-226.
     
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  7. Ullin T. Place (1999). Intentionality and the Physical: A Reply to Mumford. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (195):225-30.
    Martin and Pfeifer claim ‘that the most typical characterizations of intentionality’ proposed by philosophers are satisfied by physical dispositions. If that is correct, we must conclude either, as they do and as Mumford (this volume) does, that the philosophers are wrong and intentionality is something else or, as I do, that intentionality is what the philosophers say it is, in which case it is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional; the intentionality of a disposition consists in (...)
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  8. Ullin T. Place (1999). Token-Versus Type-Identity Physicalism. Anthropology and Philosophy 3:21-31.
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  9. Ullin T. Place (1999). Vagueness as a Mark of Dispositional Intentionality. Acta Analytica 14 (23):91-109.
  10. Ullin T. Place (1997). De Re Modality Without Possible Worlds. Acta Analytica 12 (19):129-143.
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  11. Ullin T. Place (1997). Linguistic Behaviorism and the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Behavior and Philosophy 25 (2):83 - 94.
    Linguistic Behaviorism (Place, 1996) is an attempt to reclaim for the behaviorist perspective two disciplines, linguistics and linguistic philosophy, most of whose practitioners have been persuaded by Chomsky's (1959) Review of B. F. Skinner's (1957) "Verbal Behavior" that behaviorism has nothing useful to contribute to the study of language. It takes as axiomatic (a) that the functional unit of language is the sentence, and (b) that sentences are seldom repeated word-for-word, but are constructed anew on each occasion of utterance out (...)
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  12. Ullin T. Place (1996). A Conceptualist Ontology. In Tim Crane (ed.), Dispositions: A Debate. New York: Routledge. 49--67.
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  13. Ullin T. Place (1996). Dispositions as Intentional States. In Tim Crane (ed.), Dispositions: A Debate. New York: Routledge.
     
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  14. Ullin T. Place (1996). Folk Psychology From the Standpoint of Conceptual Analysis. In W. O'Donahue & Richard F. Kitchener (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications.
  15. Ullin T. Place (1996). Intentionality as the Mark of the Dispositional. Dialectica 50 (2):91-120.
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  16. Ullin T. Place (1996). Linguistic Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Empirical Science. In William T. O'Donohue & Richard F. Kitchener (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications. 126--140.
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  17. Ullin T. Place (1996). Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or Both. In Tim Crane (ed.), Dispositions: A Debate. New York: Routledge. 105--125.
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  18. Ullin T. Place (1995). Symbolic Processes and Stimulus Equivalence. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (3-1):13 - 30.
    A symbol is defined as a species of sign. The concept of a sign coincides with Skinner's (1938) concept of a discriminative stimulus. Symbols differ from other signs in five respects: (1) They are stimuli which the organism can both respond to and produce, either as a self-directed stimulus (as in thinking) or as a stimulus for another individual with a predictably similar response from the recipient in each case. (2) they act as discriminative stimuli for the same kind of (...)
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  19. Ullin T. Place (1993). A Radical Behaviorist Methodology for the Empirical Investigation of Private Events. Behavior and Philosophy 20 (21):25-35.
    Skinner has repeatedly asserted that he does not deny either the existence of private events or the possibility of studying them scientifically. But he has never explained how his position in this respect differs from that of the mentalist or provided a practical methodology for the investigation of private events within a radical behaviorist perspective. With respect to the first of these deficiencies, I argue that observation statements describing a public state of affairs in the common public environment of two (...)
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  20. Ullin T. Place (1992). Eliminative Connectionism: Its Implications for a Return to an Empiricist/Behaviorist Linguistics. Behavior and Philosophy 20 (1):21-35.
    For the past three decades linguistic theory has been based on the assumption that sentences are interpreted and constructed by the brain by means of computational processes analogous to those of a serial-digital computer. The recent interest in devices based on the neural network or parallel distributed processor (PDP) principle raises the possibility ("eliminative connectionism") that such devices may ultimately replace the S-D computer as the model for the interpretation and generation of language by the brain. An analysis of the (...)
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  21. Ullin T. Place (1992). Two Concepts of Consciousness: The Biological/Private and the Linguistic/Social. Acta Analytica 7 (8):53-72.
     
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  22. Ullin T. Place (1992). The Role of the Ethnomethodological Experiment in the Empirical Investigation of Social Norms and its Application to Conceptual Analysis. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 22 (4):461-474.
    It is argued that conceptual analysis as practiced by the philosophers of ordinary language, is an empirical procedure that relies on a version of Garfinkel's ethnomethodological experiment. The ethnomethodological experiment is presented as a procedure in which the existence and nature of a social norm is demonstrated by flouting the putative convention and observing what reaction that produces in the social group within which the convention is assumed to operate. Examples are given of the use of ethnomethodological experiments, both in (...)
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  23. Ullin T. Place (1989). Low Claim Assertions. In John Heil (ed.), Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin. Kluwer. 121--135.
     
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  24. Ullin T. Place (1989). Toward a Connectionist Version of the Causal Theory of Reference. Acta Analytica 4 (5):71-97.
  25. Ullin T. Place (1989). Thirty Five Years On--Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process? In The Mind of Donald Davidson. Netherlands: Rodopi. 19-31.
    The writer's 1956 contention that "the thesis that consciousness is a process in the brain is ... a reasonable scientific hypothesis" is contrasted with Davidson's a priori argument in 'Mental events' for the identity of propositional attitude tokens with some unspecified and imspecifiable brain state tokens. Davidson's argument is rejected primarily on the grounds that he has failed to establish his claim that there are and can be no psycho-physical bridge laws. The case forthe empirical nature of the issue between (...)
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  26. Ullin T. Place (1989). The Mind of Donald Davidson. Netherlands: Rodopi.
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  27. Ullin T. Place (1988). Skinner's Distinction Between Rule-Governed and Contingency-Shaped Behaviour. Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):225 – 234.
    The distinction that Skinner draws in his 'An operant analysis of problem solving' (1966, 1969, 1984) between 'rule-governed' and 'contingency-shaped' behaviour is arguably the most important single contribution to the theory of behaviour that he has made in a long and uniquely distinguished career. The concept of a 'rule' as a 'contingency-specifying' verbal formula which exercises 'stimulus control' over other aspects of the behaviour of a linguistically competent human being presents a formidable challenge to contemporary cognitive psychology in that the (...)
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  28. Ullin T. Place (1988). Thirty Years on -- Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (June):208-19.
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  29. Ullin T. Place (1987). Causal Laws, Dispositional Properties and Causal Explanations. Synthesis Philosophica 2 (3):149-160.
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  30. Ullin T. Place (1985). Semicovert Behavior and the Concept of Pain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):70-71.
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  31. Ullin T. Place (1984). Logic, Reference, and Mentalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):565.
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  32. Ullin T. Place (1979). Physicalism By K. V. Wilkes London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978, 142 Pp., £4.75. [REVIEW] Philosophy 54 (209):423-.
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  33. Ullin T. Place (1973). The Mental and the Physical—a Reply to Dr Meynell. Heythrop Journal 14 (4):417–424.
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  34. Ullin T. Place (1972). Sensations and Processes: A Reply to Munsat. Mind 81 (January):106-112.
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  35. Ullin T. Place (1971). Understanding the Language of Sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):158-166.
  36. Ullin T. Place (1966). Consciousness and Perception, Part II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101:101-124.
     
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  37. Ullin T. Place (1960). Materialism as a Scientific Hypothesis. Philosophical Review 69 (January):101-4.
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  38. Ullin T. Place (1956). Is Consciousness a Brain Process? British Journal of Psychology 47 (1):44-50.
     
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  39. Ullin T. Place (1956). Is Consciousness a Brain Process. British Journal of Psychology 47 (1):44-50.
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