52 found
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  1.  31
    Ulrike Hahn, Adam J. L. Harris & Adam Corner (2016). Public Reception of Climate Science: Coherence, Reliability, and Independence. Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (1):180-195.
    Possible measures to mitigate climate change require global collective actions whose impacts will be felt by many, if not all. Implementing such actions requires successful communication of the reasons for them, and hence the underlying climate science, to a degree that far exceeds typical scientific issues which do not require large-scale societal response. Empirical studies have identified factors, such as the perceived level of consensus in scientific opinion and the perceived reliability of scientists, that can limit people's trust in science (...)
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  2.  58
    Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn (2013). Normative Theories of Argumentation: Are Some Norms Better Than Others? Synthese 190 (16):3579-3610.
    Norms—that is, specifications of what we ought to do—play a critical role in the study of informal argumentation, as they do in studies of judgment, decision-making and reasoning more generally. Specifically, they guide a recurring theme: are people rational? Though rules and standards have been central to the study of reasoning, and behavior more generally, there has been little discussion within psychology about why (or indeed if) they should be considered normative despite the considerable philosophical literature that bears on this (...)
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  3.  14
    Ulrike Hahn, Adam J. L. Harris & Adam Corner (2009). Argument Content and Argument Source: An Exploration. Informal Logic 29 (4):337-367.
    Argumentation is pervasive in everyday life. Understanding what makes a strong argument is therefore of both theoretical and practical interest. One factor that seems intuitively important to the strength of an argument is the reliability of the source providing it. Whilst traditional approaches to argument evaluation are silent on this issue, the Bayesian approach to argumentation (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007) is able to capture important aspects of source reliability. In particular, the Bayesian approach predicts that argument content and source reliability (...)
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  4.  2
    Ulrike Hahn (2014). The Bayesian Boom: Good Thing or Bad? Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  5.  74
    Ulrike Hahn & Mike Oaksford (2006). A Bayesian Approach to Informal Argument Fallacies. Synthese 152 (2):207-236.
    We examine in detail three classic reasoning fallacies, that is, supposedly ``incorrect'' forms of argument. These are the so-called argumentam ad ignorantiam, the circular argument or petitio principii, and the slippery slope argument. In each case, the argument type is shown to match structurally arguments which are widely accepted. This suggests that it is not the form of the arguments as such that is problematic but rather something about the content of those examples with which they are typically justified. This (...)
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  6.  12
    Ulrike Hahn, Nick Chater & Lucy B. Richardson (2003). Similarity as Transformation. Cognition 87 (1):1-32.
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  7.  27
    Ulrike Hahn & Jos Hornikx (2016). A Normative Framework for Argument Quality: Argumentation Schemes with a Bayesian Foundation. Synthese 193 (6):1833-1873.
    In this paper, it is argued that the most fruitful approach to developing normative models of argument quality is one that combines the argumentation scheme approach with Bayesian argumentation. Three sample argumentation schemes from the literature are discussed: the argument from sign, the argument from expert opinion, and the appeal to popular opinion. Limitations of the scheme-based treatment of these argument forms are identified and it is shown how a Bayesian perspective may help to overcome these. At the same time, (...)
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  8.  24
    Andreas Jarvstad & Ulrike Hahn (2011). Source Reliability and the Conjunction Fallacy. Cognitive Science 35 (4):682-711.
  9.  27
    Ulrike Hahn & Nick Chater (1998). Similarity and Rules: Distinct? Exhaustive? Empirically Distinguishable? Cognition 65 (2-3):197-230.
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  10.  16
    Adam J. L. Harris, Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn (2013). James is Polite and Punctual (and Useless): A Bayesian Formalisation of Faint Praise. Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):414-429.
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  11.  3
    Ulrike Hahn & Mike Oaksford (2007). The Rationality of Informal Argumentation: A Bayesian Approach to Reasoning Fallacies. Psychological Review 114 (3):704-732.
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  12.  13
    Adam J. L. Harris, Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn (2009). Estimating the Probability of Negative Events. Cognition 110 (1):51-64.
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  13.  27
    Ulrike Hahn (2014). Experiential Limitation in Judgment and Decision. Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (2):229-244.
    The statistics of small samples are often quite different from those of large samples, and this needs to be taken into account in assessing the rationality of human behavior. Specifically, in evaluating human responses to environmental statistics, it is the effective environment that matters; that is, the environment actually experienced by the agent needs to be considered, not simply long-run frequencies. Significant deviations from long-run statistics may arise through experiential limitations of the agent that stem from resource constraints and/or information-processing (...)
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  14.  1
    Martin L. Jönsson, Ulrike Hahn & Erik J. Olsson (2015). The Kind of Group You Want to Belong To: Effects of Group Structure on Group Accuracy. Cognition 142:191-204.
    There has been much interest in group judgment and the so-called 'wisdom of crowds'. In many real world contexts, members of groups not only share a dependence on external sources of information, but they also communicate with one another, thus introducing correlations among their responses that can diminish collective accuracy. This has long been known, but it has-to date-not been examined to what extent different kinds of communication networks may give rise to systematically different effects on accuracy. We argue that (...)
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  15.  11
    Adam J. L. Harris, Ulrike Hahn, Jens K. Madsen & Anne S. Hsu (2016). The Appeal to Expert Opinion: Quantitative Support for a Bayesian Network Approach. Cognitive Science 40 (6):1496-1533.
    The appeal to expert opinion is an argument form that uses the verdict of an expert to support a position or hypothesis. A previous scheme-based treatment of the argument form is formalized within a Bayesian network that is able to capture the critical aspects of the argument form, including the central considerations of the expert's expertise and trustworthiness. We propose this as an appropriate normative framework for the argument form, enabling the development and testing of quantitative predictions as to how (...)
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  16.  35
    Ulrike Hahn & Mike Oaksford (2007). The Burden of Proof and Its Role in Argumentation. Argumentation 21 (1):39-61.
    The notion of “the burden of proof” plays an important role in real-world argumentation contexts, in particular in law. It has also been given a central role in normative accounts of argumentation, and has been used to explain a range of classic argumentation fallacies. We argue that in law the goal is to make practical decisions whereas in critical discussion the goal is frequently simply to increase or decrease degree of belief in a proposition. In the latter case, it is (...)
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  17.  12
    Ulrike Hahn (2009). Explaining More by Drawing on Less. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):90-91.
    One of the most striking features of is the detail with which behavior on logical reasoning tasks can now be predicted and explained. This detail is surprising, given the state of the field 10 to 15 years ago, and it has been brought about by a theoretical program that largely ignores consideration of cognitive processes, that is, any kind of internal behavior that generates overt responding. It seems that an increase in explanatory power can be achieved by restricting a psychological (...)
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  18.  8
    Ulrike Hahn (2011). Why Rational Norms Are Indispensable. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):257-258.
    Normative theories provide essential tools for understanding behaviour, not just for reasoning, judgement, and decision-making, but many other areas of cognition as well; and their utility extends to the development of process theories. Furthermore, the way these tools are used has nothing to do with the is-ought fallacy. There therefore seems no basis for the claim that research would be better off without them.
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  19.  17
    Ulrike Hahn, Adam J. L. Harris & Mike Oaksford (2013). Rational Argument, Rational Inference. Argument and Computation 4 (1):21 - 35.
    (2013). Rational argument, rational inference. Argument & Computation: Vol. 4, Formal Models of Reasoning in Cognitive Psychology, pp. 21-35. doi: 10.1080/19462166.2012.689327.
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  20.  3
    Andreas Jarvstad, Ulrike Hahn, Paul A. Warren & Simon K. Rushton (2014). Are Perceptuo-Motor Decisions Really More Optimal Than Cognitive Decisions? Cognition 130 (3):397-416.
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  21.  21
    Igor Volzhanin, Ulrike Hahn, Martin Jönsson & Erik J. Olsson, Individual Belief Revision Dynamics in a Group Context.
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  22.  19
    Peter J. Collins, Ulrike Hahn, Ylva von Gerber & Erik J. Olsson, The Bi-Directional Relationship Between Source Characteristics and Message Content.
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  23.  17
    Ulrike Hahn, Mercè Prat-Sala, Emmanuel M. Pothos & Duncan P. Brumby (2010). Exemplar Similarity and Rule Application. Cognition 114 (1):1-18.
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  24.  16
    Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn (2010). Message Framing, Normative Advocacy and Persuasive Success. Argumentation 24 (2):153-163.
    In a recent article in Argumentation, O’Keefe (Argumentation 21:151–163, 2007) observed that the well-known ‘framing effects’ in the social psychological literature on persuasion are akin to traditional fallacies of argumentation and reasoning and could be exploited for persuasive success in a way that conflicts with principles of responsible advocacy. Positively framed messages (“if you take aspirin, your heart will be more healthy”) differ in persuasive effect from negative frames (“if you do not take aspirin, your heart will be less healthy”), (...)
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  25.  8
    Ulrike Hahn & Todd M. Bailey (2005). What Makes Words Sound Similar? Cognition 97 (3):227-267.
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  26. Adam J. L. Harris & Ulrike Hahn (2011). Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events: A Cautionary Note. Psychological Review 118 (1):135-154.
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  27.  2
    Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn (2009). Evaluating Science Arguments: Evidence, Uncertainty, and Argument Strength. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 15 (3):199-212.
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  28.  11
    Ulrike Hahn & Mike Oaksford (2008). A Normative Theory of Argument Strength. Informal Logic 26 (1):1-24.
    In this article, we argue for the general importance of normative theories of argument strength. We also provide some evidence based on our recent work on the fallacies as to why Bayesian probability might, in fact, be able to supply such an account. In the remainder of the article we discuss the general characteristics that make a specifically Bayesian approach desirable, and critically evaluate putative flaws of Bayesian probability that have been raised in the argumentation literature.
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  29.  30
    Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn (2007). Evaluating the Meta-Slope: Is There a Slippery Slope Argument Against Slippery Slope Arguments? [REVIEW] Argumentation 21 (4):349-359.
    Slippery slope arguments (SSAs) have often been viewed as inherently weak arguments, to be classified together with traditional fallacies of reasoning and argumentation such as circular arguments and arguments from ignorance. Over the last two decades several philosophers have taken a kinder view, often providing historical examples of the kind of gradual change on which slippery slope arguments rely. Against this background, Enoch (2001, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 21(4), 629–647) presented a novel argument against SSA use that itself invokes (...)
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  30.  17
    Mike Oaksford & Ulrike Hahn (2006). Non-Monotonicity and Informal Reasoning: Comment on Ferguson (2003). Argumentation 20 (2):245-251.
    In this paper, it is argued that Ferguson’s (2003, Argumentation 17, 335–346) recent proposal to reconcile monotonic logic with defeasibility has three counterintuitive consequences. First, the conclusions that can be derived from his new rule of inference are vacuous, a point that as already made against default logics when there are conflicting defaults. Second, his proposal requires a procedural “hack” to the break the symmetry between the disjuncts of the tautological conclusions to which his proposal leads. Third, Ferguson’s proposal amounts (...)
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  31.  2
    Ulrich von Hecker, Ulrike Hahn & Jasmine Rollings (2016). Spatial Representation of Coherence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 145 (7):853-871.
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  32.  28
    Jos Hornikx & Ulrike Hahn (2012). Reasoning and Argumentation: Towards an Integrated Psychology of Argumentation. Thinking and Reasoning 18 (3):225 - 243.
    Although argumentation plays an essential role in our lives, there is no integrated area of research on the psychology of argumentation. Instead research on argumentation is conducted in a number of separate research communities that are spread across disciplines and have only limited interaction. With a view to bridging these different strands, we first distinguish between three meanings of the word ?argument?: argument as a reason, argument as a structured sequence of reasons and claims, and argument as a social exchange. (...)
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  33.  8
    Carl J. Hodgetts, Ulrike Hahn & Nick Chater (2009). Transformation and Alignment in Similarity. Cognition 113 (1):62-79.
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  34.  5
    Ulrike Hahn & Nick Chater (1998). Real-World Categories Don't Allow Uniform Feature Spaces – Not Just Across Categories but Within Categories Also. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):28-28.
    The Schyns et al. target article demonstrates that different classifications entail different representations, implying “flexible space learning.” We argue that flexibility is required even at the within-category level.
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  35.  39
    Emmanuel M. Pothos, Ulrike Hahn & Mercè Prat-Sala (2010). Contingent Necessity Versus Logical Necessity in Categorisation. Thinking and Reasoning 16 (1):45 – 65.
    Critical (necessary or sufficient) features in categorisation have a long history, but the empirical evidence makes their existence questionable. Nevertheless, there are some cases that suggest critical feature effects. The purpose of the present work is to offer some insight into why classification decisions might misleadingly appear as if they involve critical features. Utilising Tversky's (1977) contrast model of similarity, we suggest that when an object has a sparser representation, changing any of its features is more likely to lead to (...)
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  36.  17
    Ulrike Hahn (1999). The Dual-Route Account of German: Where It is Not a Schema Theory, It is Probably Wrong. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):1024-1025.
    Clahsen's experimental data from generalization, frequency, and priming fail to support and even conflict with those aspects of his dual-route account that distinguish it from schema theories.
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  37.  13
    Ulrike Hahn (2005). Is This What the Debate on Rules Was About? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1):25-26.
    The key weakness of the proposed distinction between rules and similarity is that it effectively converts what was previously seen as a consequence of rule or similarity-based processing, into a definition of rule and similarity themselves – evidence is elevated into a conceptual distinction. This conflicts with fundamental intuitions about processes and erodes the relevance of the debate across cognitive science.
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  38.  4
    Ulrike Hahn (2003). Similarity. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group
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  39.  17
    Nick Chater & Ulrike Hahn (1998). What is the Dynamical Hypothesis? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):633-634.
    Van Gelder's specification of the dynamical hypothesis does not improve on previous notions. All three key attributes of dynamical systems apply to Turing machines and are hence too general. However, when a more restricted definition of a dynamical system is adopted, it becomes clear that the dynamical hypothesis is too underspecified to constitute an interesting cognitive claim.
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  40.  4
    Ulrike Hahn, John M. Frost & Gregory Richard Maio (2005). What's in a Heuristic? Commentary on Sunstein, C. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):551-552.
    the term as used by sunstein seeks to bring together various traditions. however, there are significant differences between uses of the term in the cognitive and the social psychological research, and these differences are accompanied by very distinct evidential criteria. we suggest the term should refer to processes, which means that further evidence is required.
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  41.  5
    M. J. A. Ramscar & Ulrike Hahn, Wittgenstein and the Ontological Status of Analogy.
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  42.  13
    Ulrike Hahn, John-Mark Frost & Greg Maio (2005). What's in a Heuristic? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):551-552.
    The term “moral heuristic” as used by Sunstein seeks to bring together various traditions. However, there are significant differences between uses of the term “heuristic” in the cognitive and the social psychological research, and these differences are accompanied by very distinct evidential criteria. We suggest the term “moral heuristic” should refer to processes, which means that further evidence is required.
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  43.  3
    James Close, Ulrike Hahn, Carl J. Hodgetts & Emmanuel M. Pothos (2010). Rules and Similarity in Adult Concept Learning. In Denis Mareschal, Paul Quinn & Stephen E. G. Lea (eds.), The Making of Human Concepts. OUP Oxford
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  44.  7
    Ulrike Hahn (2002). Information, Information Transfer, and Information Processing. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (5):626-627.
    Shanker & King (S&K) fail to provide substantive reasons for a paradigm shift in the study of communication because nonstandard and equivocal use of terminology obscures and undercuts their arguments.
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  45.  5
    Ulrike Hahn & Nick Chater (1998). The Notion of Distal Similarity is Ill Defined. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):474-475.
    We argue that the notion of distal similarity on which Edelman's reconstruction of the process of perception and the nature of representation rests is ill defined. As a consequence, the mapping between world and description that is supposedly at stake is, in fact, a mapping between two different descriptions or “representations.”.
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  46. Ulrike Hahn, Frank Zenker & Roland Bluhm (forthcoming). Causal Argument. In Michael R. Waldmann (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning. Oxford University Press
    In this chapter, we outline the range of argument forms involving causation that can be found in everyday discourse. We also survey empirical work concerned with the generation and evaluation of such arguments. This survey makes clear that there is presently no unified body of research concerned with causal argument. We highlight the benefits of a unified treatment both for those interested in causal cognition and those interested in argumentation, and identify the key challenges that must be met for a (...)
     
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  47. Ulrike Hahn & Paul A. Warren (2010). Postscript: All Together Now: “Three Heads Are Better Than Four”. Psychological Review 117 (2):711-711.
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  48. Ulrike Hahn & Paul A. Warren (2009). Perceptions of Randomness: Why Three Heads Are Better Than Four. Psychological Review 116 (2):454-461.
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  49. Ulrike Hahn & Paul A. Warren (2009). "Perceptions of Randomness: Why Three Heads Are Better Than Four": Correction to Hahn and Warren. Psychological Review 116 (4):874-874.
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  50. Ulrike Hahn & Michael Ramscar (eds.) (2001). Similarity and Categorization. Oxford University Press Uk.
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