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Profile: Ulrike Heuer (University of Leeds)
  1. Ulrike Heuer (2015). Intentions, Permissibility and the Reasons for Which We Act. In George Pavlakos & Veronica Rodriguez Blanco (eds.), Practical Normativity. Essays on Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press. 11-30.
  2. Ulrike Heuer (2014). XIII—Intentions and the Reasons for Which We Act. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):291-315.
    Many of the things we do in the course of a day we don't do intentionally: blushing, sneezing, breathing, blinking, smiling—to name but a few. But we also do act intentionally, and often when we do we act for reasons. Whether we always act for reasons when we act intentionally is controversial. But at least the converse is generally accepted: when we act for reasons we always act intentionally. Necessarily, it seems. In this paper, I argue that acting intentionally is (...)
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  3. Ulrike Heuer (2012). Guided by Reasons: Raz on the Normative-Explanatory Nexus. Jurisprudence 2 (2):353-365.
    Comment on Joseph Raz, From Normativity to Responsibility (OUP 2011).
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  4. Ulrike Heuer (2012). Promising-Part 1. Philosophy Compass 7 (12):832-841.
    The explanation of promising is fraught with problems. In particular the problem that promises can be valid even when nothing good comes of keeping the promise , and the bootstrapping problem with explaining how the mere intention to put oneself under an obligation can create such an obligation have been recognized since Hume’s famous discussion of the topic. There are two influential accounts of promising, and promissory obligation, which attempt to solve the problems: The expectation account and the practice account. (...)
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  5. Ulrike Heuer (2012). Promising - Part 2. Philosophy Compass 7 (12):842-851.
    The explanation of promising is fraught with problems. In particular the problem that promises can be valid even when nothing good comes of keeping the promise , and the bootstrapping problem with explaining how the mere intention to put oneself under an obligation can create such an obligation have been recognized since Hume’s famous discussion of the topic. In part 1, I showed that two main views of promising which attempt to solve these problems fall short of explaining the promissory (...)
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  6. Ulrike Heuer (2012). Thick Concepts and Internal Reasons. In Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams. Oxford University Press, Usa. 219.
  7. Ulrike Heuer (2012). The Reasons That Can't Be Followed. Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 8:1-14.
     
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  8. Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.) (2012). Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams. Oxford University Press, USA.
    Luck, Value, and Commitment comprises eleven new essays which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929-2003).
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  9. Andrei Marmor, Ulrike Heuer, Rebecca Prebble & Nandi Theunissen (2012). Agency and Luck. In Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams. Oxford University Press, Usa.
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  10. George Pavlakos, Douglas Lavin, Niko Kolodny & Ulrike Heuer (2012). Discussion: Three Comments on Joseph Raz's Conception of Normativity. Jurisprudence 2 (2):329-378.
    This section is a discussion of Joseph Raz's Conception of Normativity introduced by Georgios Pavlakos.
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  11. Ulrike Heuer (2011). The Paradox of Deontology, Revisited. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press.
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  12. Ulrike Heuer (2010). Beyond Wrong Reasons: The Buck-Passing Account of Value. In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan.
  13. Ulrike Heuer (2010). Reasons and Impossibility. Philosophical Studies 147 (2):235 - 246.
    In this paper, I argue that a person can have a reason to do what she cannot do. In a nutshell, the argument is that a person can have derivate reasons relating to an action that she has a non-derivative reason to perform. There are clear examples of derivative reasons that a person has in cases where she cannot do what she (non-derivatively) has reason to do. She couldn’t have those derivative reasons, unless she also had the non-derivative reason to (...)
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  14. Ulrike Heuer (2010). Wrongness and Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):137 - 152.
    Is the wrongness of an action a reason not to perform it? Of course it is, you may answer. That an action is wrong both explains and justifies not doing it. Yet, there are doubts. Thinking that wrongness is a reason is confused, so an argument by Jonathan Dancy. There can’t be such a reason if ‘ϕ-ing is wrong’ is verdictive, and an all things considered judgment about what (not) to do in a certain situation. Such judgments are based on (...)
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  15. Ulrike Heuer (2006). Explaining Reasons: Where Does the Buck Stop? Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (3):1-25.
    The buck-passing account of values offers an explanation of the close relation of values and reasons for action: of why it is that the question whether something that is of value provides reasons is not ”open.” Being of value simply is, its defenders claim, a property that something has in virtue of its having other reason-providing properties. The generic idea of buck-passing is that the property of being good or being of value does not provide reasons. It is other properties (...)
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  16. Ulrike Heuer (2004). Reasons for Actions and Desires. Philosophical Studies 121 (1):43–63.
    It is an assumption common to many theories of rationality that all practical reasons are based on a person's given desires. I shall call any approach to practical reasons which accepts this assumption a "Humean approach". In spite of many criticisms, the Humean approach has numerous followers who take it to be the natural and inevitable view of practical reason. I will develop an argument against the Humean view aiming to explain its appeal, as well as to expose its mistake. (...)
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  17. Ulrike Heuer (2004). Raz on Values and Reasons. In R. Jay Wallace, Philipp Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value. Oxford University Press.
  18. Ulrike Heuer (2001). Gründe Und Motive Über Humesche Theorien Praktischer Vernunft.
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  19. Ulrike Heuer (1999). Sind Wünsche Handlungsgründe? Analyse Und Kritik 21:1-24.
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