This report documents the program and the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 12441 "Foundations and Challenges of Change and Evolution in Ontologies", held from 28 October to 2 November 2012. The aim of the workshop was to bring together researchers working in the areas of logic-based ontologies, belief change, and database systems, along with researchers working in relevant areas in nonmonotonic reasoning, commonsense reasoning, and paraconsistent reasoning. The workshop provided a forum for discussions on the application of existing work in belief (...) change, nonmonotonic reasoning, commonsense reasoning, and databases to logic-based ontologies. Overall the intent was to provide an interdisciplinary (with respect to computer science and mathematics) workshop for addressing both theoretical and computational issues in managing change and evolution in formal ontologies. (shrink)
Description logics are a family of knowledge representation formalisms that are descended from semantic networks and frames via the system Kl-one. During the last decade, it has been shown that the important reasoning problems (like subsumption and satisfiability) in a great variety of description logics can be decided using tableau-like algorithms. This is not very surprising since description logics have turned out to be closely related to propositional modal logics and logics of programs (such as propositional dynamic logic), for which (...) tableau procedures have been quite successful.Nevertheless, due to different underlying institutions and applications, most description logics differ significantly from run-of-the-mill modal and program logics. Consequently, the research on tableau algorithms in description logics led to new techniques and results, which are, however, also of interest for modal logicians. In this article, we will focus on three features that play an important rôle in description logics (number restrictions, terminological axioms, and role constructors), and show how they can be taken into account by tableau algorithms. (shrink)
From the point of view of a dynamic morphology, form is not only the result of process(es) — it is process. This process may be analyzed in terms of two pairs of fundamental processes: growth and decay, differentiation and dedifferentiation. Each of these processes can be analyzed in terms of various modalities (parameters) and submodalities. This paper deals with those of growth (see Table 1). For the purpose of systematits and phylogenetic reconstruction the modalities and submodalities can be considered dynamic (...) characters that have states. Each state of such a dynamic character is a more detailed process, hence not static. For example, determinate growth represents a state of the dynamic character (or modality) of growth duration.The processes of Table 1 can be applied to the whole plant kingdom (although in certain cases only some processes of the whole set may be applicable). Thus, the diversity of plant form is seen as a diversity of process combinations. From this point of view, change in form implies change in the process combination(s). Questions that arise are, for example, the following: Which process combinations actually occur? Which of these are the most frequent? How and why have process combinations changed during ontogeny and phylogeny? (shrink)
Pathological morphogenesis on leaves of Fraxinus ornus (ash) and Solanum lycopersicum (tomato) under the influence of mites (Aceria fraxinivora and Eriophyes cladophthirus respectively) leads to a range of structures whose morphology and development cannot be reduced to the classical categories of plant morphology, but present a heterogeneous continuum which links fundamental structural categories. These findings support the pyramid model of plant construction.
In this paper, I argue that a person can have a reason to do what she cannot do. In a nutshell, the argument is that a person can have derivate reasons relating to an action that she has a non-derivative reason to perform. There are clear examples of derivative reasons that a person has in cases where she cannot do what she (non-derivatively) has reason to do. She couldn’t have those derivative reasons, unless she also had the non-derivative reason to (...) do what she cannot do. I discuss a number of objections to this view, in particular two: (1) The objection that if there were reasons to do what one cannot do, many of those would be ‘crazy reasons’, and (2) the worry that if there were such reasons, then agents would have reasons to engage in futile deliberations and tryings. I develop an explanation of ‘crazy reasons’ that shows that not all reasons to do the impossible are crazy and only those that are need to be filtered out, and, regarding the second objecting, I show that the reasons for trying as well as for taking the means to doing something—instrumental reasons in a broad sense—are different from the reasons for performing the action in the first place. They are affected by impossibility, and we can explain why that is so. The view I argue for is that a person may have a reason to do what she cannot do, but she does not have a reason to try to do so or to take means to realizing the impossible. (shrink)
Is the wrongness of an action a reason not to perform it? Of course it is, you may answer. That an action is wrong both explains and justifies not doing it. Yet, there are doubts. Thinking that wrongness is a reason is confused, so an argument by Jonathan Dancy. There can’t be such a reason if ‘ϕ-ing is wrong’ is verdictive, and an all things considered judgment about what (not) to do in a certain situation. Such judgments are based on (...) all the relevant reasons for and against ϕ-ing. If that ϕ-ing is wrong, while being an all things considered verdict, would itself be a reason, it would upset the balance of reasons: it would be a further reason which has not yet been considered in reaching the verdict. Hence, the judgment wasn’t ‘all things considered' after all. I show that the argument against wrongness being a reason is unsuccessful, because its main assumption is false. Is main assumption is that a consideration which necessarily does not affect the balance of reasons is not a reason. I also argue that there can be no deontic buck-passing account. (shrink)
It is an assumption common to many theories of rationality that all practical reasons are based on a person's given desires. I shall call any approach to practical reasons which accepts this assumption a "Humean approach". In spite of many criticisms, the Humean approach has numerous followers who take it to be the natural and inevitable view of practical reason. I will develop an argument against the Humean view aiming to explain its appeal, as well as to expose its mistake. (...) I focus on just one argument in favour of the Humean approach, which I believe can be constructed as the background idea of many Humean accounts: the argument from motivation. (shrink)
This paper contributes to the debate on whether we can have reason to do what we are unable to do. I take as my starting point two papers recently published in Philosophical Studies , by Bart Streumer and Ulrike Heuer, which defend the two dominant opposing positions on this issue. Briefly, whereas Streumer argues that we cannot have reason to do what we are unable to do, Heuer argues that we can have reason to do what we are unable (...) to do when we can get closer to success but cannot have reason to try to do what we are unable to do when we cannot get closer to success. In this paper, I reject both positions as they are presented, on the grounds that neither can accommodate an important category of reasons, which are the reasons to realise and to try to realise dimensions of value that lie at the boundary of what is realisable, specifically, genuinely valuable ideals. I defend a third view that we can have reason to do and to try to do what we are unable to do even when we cannot, in Heuer’s sense, get closer to success. Moreover, I argue that we can have reason to realise and to try to realise genuinely valuable ideals for their own sake and not simply for the sake of achieving mundane, realisable ends. (shrink)
Ulrike Heuer argues that there can be a reason for a person to perform an action that this person cannot perform, as long as this person can take efficient steps towards performing this action. In this reply, I first argue that Heuer’s examples fail to undermine my claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person will perform this action. I then argue that, on a plausible interpretation (...) of what ‘efficient steps’ are, Heuer’s claim is consistent with my claim. I end by showing that Heuer fails to undermine the arguments I gave for my claim. (shrink)
Putnam (1975) and Burge (1979) have made a convincing case that neither mea- nings nor beliefs are in the head. Most philosophers, it seems, have accepted their argument. Putnam explained that a subject.
We examine in detail three classic reasoning fallacies, that is, supposedly ``incorrect'' forms of argument. These are the so-called argumentam ad ignorantiam, the circular argument or petitio principii, and the slippery slope argument. In each case, the argument type is shown to match structurally arguments which are widely accepted. This suggests that it is not the form of the arguments as such that is problematic but rather something about the content of those examples with which they are typically justified. This (...) leads to a Bayesian reanalysis of these classic argument forms and a reformulation of the conditions under which they do or do not constitute legitimate forms of argumentation. (shrink)
This paper investigates the dynamic and performative construction of publics in public engagement exercises. In this investigation, we, on the one hand, analyse how public engagement settings as political machineries frame particular kinds of roles and identities for the participating publics in relation to ‘the public at large’. On the other hand, we study how the participating citizens appropriate, resist and transform these roles and identities, and how they construct themselves and the participating group in relation to wider publics. The (...) empirical basis of our argument is a discussion of four different kinds of participation events in Austria. Building on these observations we develop conclusions about the public up-take of public participation in technoscience and the role of public engagement in current techno-political cultures. (shrink)
Machine generated contents note: List of figures; List of tables; Editors; Contributors; Editors' acknowledgements; Part I. The Conceptual Challenge of Researching Trust Across Different 'Cultural Spheres': 1. Introduction: unraveling the complexities of trust and culture Graham Dietz, Nicole Gillespie and Georgia Chao; 2. Trust differences across national-societal cultures: much to do or much ado about nothing? Donald L. Ferrin and Nicole Gillespie; 3. Towards a context-sensitive approach to researching trust in inter-organizational relationships Reinhard Bachmann; 4. Making sense of trust across (...) cultural contexts Alex Wright and Ina Ehnert; Part II. Trust Across Different 'Cultural Spheres': Inter-Organizational Studies: 5. Examining the relationship between trust and culture in the consultant-client relationship Stephanos Avakian, Timothy Clark and Joanne Roberts; 6. Checking, not trusting: trust, distrust and cultural experience in the auditing profession Mark R. Dibben and Jacob M. Rose; 7. Trust barriers in cross-cultural negotiations: a social psychological analysis Roderick M. Kramer; 8. Trust development in German-Ukrainian business relationships: dealing with cultural differences in an uncertain institutional context Guido Möllering and Florian Stache; 9. Culture and trust in contractual relationships: a French-Lebanese cooperation Hèla Yousfi; 10. Evolving institutions of trust: personalized and institutional bases of trust in Nigerian and Ghanaian food trading Fergus Lyon and Gina Porter; Part III. Trust Across Different 'Cultural Spheres': Intra-Organizational Studies: 11. The role of trust in international cooperation in crisis areas: a comparison of German and US-American NGO partnership strategies L. Ripley Smith and Ulrike Schwegler; 12. Antecedents of supervisor trust in collectivist cultures: evidence from Turkey and China S. Arzu Wasti and Hwee Hoon Tan; 13. Trust in turbulent times: organizational change and the consequences for intra-organizational trust Veronica Hope-Hailey, Elaine Farndale and Clare Kelliher; 14. The implications of language boundaries on the development of trust in international management teams Jane Kassis Henderson; 15. The dynamics of trust across cultures in family firms Isabelle Mari; Part IV. Conclusions and Ways Forward: 16. Conclusions and ways forward Mark N. K. Saunders, Denise Skinner and Roy J. Lewicki; Index. (shrink)
Critical (necessary or sufficient) features in categorisation have a long history, but the empirical evidence makes their existence questionable. Nevertheless, there are some cases that suggest critical feature effects. The purpose of the present work is to offer some insight into why classification decisions might misleadingly appear as if they involve critical features. Utilising Tversky's (1977) contrast model of similarity, we suggest that when an object has a sparser representation, changing any of its features is more likely to lead to (...) a change in identity than it would in objects that have richer representations. Experiment 1 provides a basic test of this suggestion with artificial stimuli, whereby objects with a rich or a sparse representation were transformed by changing one of their features. As expected, we observed more identity judgements in the former case. Experiment 2 further confirms our hypothesis, with realistic stimuli, by assuming that superordinate categories have sparser representations than subordinate ones. These results offer some insight into the way feature changes may or may not lead to identity changes in classification decisions. (shrink)
Luck, Value, and Commitment comprises eleven new essays which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929-2003).
Information generally comes from less than fully reliable sources. Rationality, it seems, requires that one take source reliability into account when reasoning on the basis of such information. Recently, Bovens and Hartmann (2003) proposed an account of the conjunction fallacy based on this idea. They show that, when statements in conjunction fallacy scenarios are perceived as coming from such sources, probability theory prescribes that the “fallacy” be committed in certain situations. Here, the empirical validity of their model was assessed. The (...) model predicts that statements added to standard conjunction problems will change the incidence of the fallacy. It also predicts that statements from reliable sources should yield an increase in fallacy rates (relative to unreliable sources). Neither the former (Experiment 1) nor the latter prediction (Experiment 3) was confirmed, although Experiment 2 showed that people can derive source reliability estimates from the likelihood of statements in a manner consistent with the tested model. In line with the experimental results, model fits and sensitivity analyses also provided very little evidence in favor of the model. This suggests that Bovens and Hartmann’s present model fails to explain fully people’s judgements in standard conjunction fallacy tasks. (shrink)
Since ancient times philosophy has dealt with the relation between technology and man. Nowadays this is especially true in the context of the philosophy of technology. Technology is interpreted as an anthropological constant to construct an environment in which man can survive. Acting in the field of technology is to act rationally with a purpose, i.e., in the framework of a means-end relation, and it is employed for coping with experiences (Widerfahrnisse) by means of using tools. Like technology, language can (...) be reconstructed as a symbolic form and thus as a technological means, as a tool so that the employment of metaphors can also be described as an employment of tools. Using technology has effects on man as well as on his self-image. Thus, philosophy of technology creates different ideas of man, which have to become subject to ethical discourses. (shrink)
The term “moral heuristic” as used by Sunstein seeks to bring together various traditions. However, there are significant differences between uses of the term “heuristic” in the cognitive and the social psychological research, and these differences are accompanied by very distinct evidential criteria. We suggest the term “moral heuristic” should refer to processes, which means that further evidence is required.
Patients suffering from mental disorders are often not treated on an equal basis with patients suffering from organic diseases. In Germany, for example, alcohol-dependent patients will be detoxified on a clinical ward to ensure that they survive acute alcohol withdrawal; however, medical insurances often do not cover treatment costs for a therapy for the addictive behavior that underlies the acute alcohol problem. While patients suffering from diabetes mellitus can also display personally harmful choices and, for example, consume sugar although they (...) know that this is detrimental for their health, medical insurances pay for the acute hyperglycemic shock treatment as well as for dietary and medical treatment of the .. (shrink)
Although argumentation plays an essential role in our lives, there is no integrated area of research on the psychology of argumentation. Instead research on argumentation is conducted in a number of separate research communities that are spread across disciplines and have only limited interaction. With a view to bridging these different strands, we first distinguish between three meanings of the word ?argument?: argument as a reason, argument as a structured sequence of reasons and claims, and argument as a social exchange. (...) All three meanings are integral to a complete understanding of human reasoning and cognition. Cognitive psychological research on argumentation has focused mostly on the first and second of these meanings, so we present perspectives on argumentation from outside of cognitive psychology, which focus on the second and third. Specifically, we give anoverview of the methods, goals, and disciplinary backgrounds of research on the production, the analysis, and the evaluation of arguments. Finally, inintroducing the experimental studies included in this special issue, which were conducted by researchers from a range of theoretical backgrounds, weunderline the breadth of argumentation research as well as stress opportunities for mutual awareness and integration. (shrink)
Shanker & King (S&K) fail to provide substantive reasons for a paradigm shift in the study of communication because nonstandard and equivocal use of terminology obscures and undercuts their arguments.
The contributions in this part of the present issue mainly originate from the Carnap Lectures 2011 in Bochum where Prof. Tim Crane (Cambridge, UK) and Prof. Katalin Farkas (Budapest) presented keynote lectures under the heading “The Boundaries of the Mental”. The full workshop program is available on our website: http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/philosophy/carnap2011/index.html.
Critical factors that appear to encourage vocal development in humans are altriciality and long immaturity. Hominid infants appear to have evolved a specific tendency to use elaborate vocalization as a means of soliciting long-term investment from caregivers. The development of such vocal capacity provides necessary infrastructure for language development across human life history.
Van Gelder's specification of the dynamical hypothesis does not improve on previous notions. All three key attributes of dynamical systems apply to Turing machines and are hence too general. However, when a more restricted definition of a dynamical system is adopted, it becomes clear that the dynamical hypothesis is too underspecified to constitute an interesting cognitive claim.
We argue that the notion of distal similarity on which Edelman's reconstruction of the process of perception and the nature of representation rests is ill defined. As a consequence, the mapping between world and description that is supposedly at stake is, in fact, a mapping between two different descriptions or “representations.”.
The key weakness of the proposed distinction between rules and similarity is that it effectively converts what was previously seen as a consequence of rule or similarity-based processing, into a definition of rule and similarity themselves – evidence is elevated into a conceptual distinction. This conflicts with fundamental intuitions about processes and erodes the relevance of the debate across cognitive science.
The Schyns et al. target article demonstrates that different classifications entail different representations, implying “flexible space learning.” We argue that flexibility is required even at the within-category level.
Clahsen's experimental data from generalization, frequency, and priming fail to support and even conflict with those aspects of his dual-route account that distinguish it from schema theories.
Looking back on the many prophets who tried to predict the future as if it were predetermined, at first sight any forward-looking activity is reminiscent of making predictions with a crystal ball. In contrast to fortune tellers, today’s exercises do not predict, but try to show different paths that an open future could take. A key motivation to undertake forward-looking activities is broadening the information basis for decision-makers to help them actively shape the future in a desired way. Experts, laypeople, (...) or stakeholders may have different sets of values and priorities with regard to pending decisions on any issue related to the future. Therefore, considering and incorporating their views can, in the best case scenario, lead to more robust decisions and strategies. However, transferring this plurality into a form that decision-makers can consider is a challenge in terms of both design and facilitation of participatory processes. In this paper, we will introduce and critically assess a new qualitative method for forward-looking activities, namely CIVISTI (Citizen Visions on Science, Technology and Innovation; www.civisti.org), which was developed during an EU project of the same name. Focussing strongly on participation, with clear roles for citizens and experts, the method combines expert, stakeholder and lay knowledge to elaborate recommendations for decision-making in issues related to today’s and tomorrow’s science, technology and innovation. Consisting of three steps, the process starts with citizens’ visions of a future 30–40 years from now. Experts then translate these visions into practical recommendations which the same citizens then validate and prioritise to produce a final product. The following paper will highlight the added value as well as limits of the CIVISTI method and will illustrate potential for the improvement of future processes. (shrink)
It is the aim of this paper to find a systematic approach to the study of induction by integrating the ideas of several disciplines to have a successful instrument for analyzing processes of inference, learning and discovery. On the way to generalities which enable sensible forecasts the social and economic sciences use empirical work and nowadays we are encouraged to use more and more experimental access to investigate analogous situations. Induction is used as a fundamental concept and experimental work has (...) brought some lights behind learning and inference. (shrink)
Rooted in Assyriology with a strong interdisciplinary outlook, this book offers the first comprehensive study of ancient Mesopotamian notions of the human person, including semantic analyses of Akkadian terms for body parts and multiple ...
In this paper we will argue: (1) that scholars, regardless of their normative stand against or for genetic enhancement indeed have a moral/professional obligation to hold on to a realistic and up-to-date conception of genetic enhancement; (2) that there is an unwarranted hype surrounding the issue of genetic enhancement in general, and gene doping in particular; and (3) that this hype is, at least partly, created due to a simplistic and reductionist conception of genetics often adopted by bioethicists.
Pluralistic ignorance is a socio-psychological phenomenon that involves a systematic discrepancy between people’s private beliefs and public behavior in certain social contexts. Recently, pluralistic ignorance has gained increased attention in formal and social epistemology. But to get clear on what precisely a formal and social epistemological account of pluralistic ignorance should look like, we need answers to at least the following two questions: What exactly is the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance? And can the phenomenon arise among perfectly rational agents? In (...) this paper, we propose answers to both these questions. First, we characterize different versions of pluralistic ignorance and define the version that we claim most adequately captures the examples cited as paradigmatic cases of pluralistic ignorance in the literature. In doing so, we will stress certain key epistemic and social interactive aspects of the phenomenon. Second, given our characterization of pluralistic ignorance, we argue that the phenomenon can indeed arise in groups of perfectly rational agents. This, in turn, ensures that the tools of formal epistemology can be fully utilized to reason about pluralistic ignorance. (shrink)
Background Time and communication are important aspects of the medical consultation. Physician behavior in real-life pediatric consultations in relation to ethical practice, such as informed consent (provision of information, understanding), respect for integrity and patient autonomy (decision-making), has not been subjected to thorough empirical investigation. Such investigations are important tools in developing sound ethical praxis. Methods 21 consultations for inguinal hernia were video recorded and observers independently assessed global impressions of provision of information, understanding, respect for integrity, and participation in (...) decision making. The consultations were analyzed for the occurrence of specific physician verbal and nonverbal behaviors and length of time in minutes. Results All of the consultations took less than 20 minutes, the majority consisting of 10 minutes or less. Despite this narrow time frame, we found strong and consistent association between increasing time and higher ratings on all components of ethical practice: information, (β = .43), understanding (β = .52), respect for integrity (β = .60), and decision making (β = .43). Positive nonverbal behaviors by physicians during the consultation were associated particularly with respect for integrity (β =.36). Positive behaviors by physicians during the physical examination were related to respect for children's integrity. Conclusion Time was of essence for the ethical encounter. Further, verbal and nonverbal positive behaviors by the physicians also contributed to higher ratings of ethical aspects. These results can help to improve quality of ethical practice in pediatric settings and are of relevance for teaching and policy makers. (shrink)
In Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Ethics the notion of reality plays a central role. The present article focuses on the ethical implications of the Chalcedonian Christology underlying this concept. This approach is tied to the debate on the relationship between the universal and specific identity of Christian social ethics in public discourse. In the opening section the article outlines the pertinence of this debate with regard to Bonhoeffer's Christological ethic. In the following section the article analyzes Bonhoeffer's concept of reality and the (...) implied Chalcedonian traits. With this foundation established the article raises the question about its social ethical implications. The final part of the article argues that Bonhoeffer's ethics and ecclesiology cannot be separated from each other, explaining why Bonhoeffer's notion of reality leads to an assertion of the church's role in letting reality become real. In the light of Bonhoeffer's notion of reality the last section argues for the reconciliation of Christian witness and participation in public discourse. (shrink)
The debate on the role and identity of Christian social ethics in liberal democracy touches upon the question about the relationship between universality and specificity. Rather than argue for the difference between these approaches, it can be argued that they are to be understood in a differentiated unity with each other. This idea can be substantiated by a figurative appropriation of a Chalcedonian Christology, particularly the communicatio idiomatum . The communicative dimension of this concept has been found to be useful (...) for a reinterpretation of the idea of responsibility. By engaging contemporary positions of communicative ethics, H. Richard Niebuhr's understanding of responsibility as responsiveness, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Christological concept of responsibility in a constructive dialogue with each other, the article has attempted to outline main tenets of a responsive concept of responsibility based on a broadly conceived Chalcedonian Christology. This responsive understanding of responsibility serves as the foundation of a third position beyond the futile antagonism of liberalism and communitarianism. Hereby it maintains the reasonableness of a liberal democratic assertion of a common political discourse, and yet it also contends the necessity of authentic particular worldviews and outlooks. In its argument for such a third-way thinking it hopes to contribute with an understanding where these positions are seen in a constructive relationship – rather than in contrast – with each other. (shrink)
Taking as a starting point the assertion of an ambiguity in the Lutheran tradition's assessment of reason, the essay argues that the Kantian unreserved confidence in reason is criticised in Bonhoeffer. Based upon a Christological understanding of reason, Bonhoeffer endorses a view of reason which is specifically Christian and yet maintains a universality. With a focus on Bonhoeffer's Ethik as the hermeneutical key to his theology, Bonhoeffer's notion is also discussed in light of contemporary Christian ethics. In this part it (...) is particularly the role of reason within a public discourse which is treated in the essay. Here it is argued that Bonhoeffer may be appropriated in attempting to outline a Christological ontology of reason holding essential implications for the sources and conditions of public discourse. (shrink)
Today, certain rule-violating behaviours, such as doping, are considered to be an issue of concern for the sport community. This paper underlines and examines the affective dimensions involved in moral responses to, and attitudes towards, rule-violating behaviours in sport. The key role played by affective processes underlying individual-level moral judgement has already been implicated by recent developments in moral psychological theories, and by neurophysiological studies. However, we propose and discuss the possibility of affective processes operating on a social level which (...) may influence athletes' individual-level attitudes. We conclude that one-sided focus on individual rule-violating behaviour and individual sanctions may prove to be ineffective in coming to terms with the issue. In this regard we recommend a twofold approach by addressing underlying social dimensions, along with preventive measures through affect-oriented education. (shrink)
