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  1. Zoltan Domotor & Vadim Batitsky (2008). The Analytic Versus Representational Theory of Measurement: A Philosophy of Science Perspective. Measurement Science Review 8 (6):129-146.
    In this paper we motivate and develop the analytic theory of measurement, in which autonomously specified algebras of quantities (together with the resources of mathematical analysis) are used as a unified mathematical framework for modeling (a) the time-dependent behavior of natural systems, (b) interactions between natural systems and measuring instruments, (c) error and uncertainty in measurement, and (d) the formal propositional language for describing and reasoning about measurement results. We also discuss how a celebrated theorem in analysis, known as Gelfand (...)
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  2. Vadim Batitsky & Zoltan Domotor (2007). When Good Theories Make Bad Predictions. Synthese 157 (1):79 - 103.
    Chaos-related obstructions to predictability have been used to challenge accounts of theory validation based on the agreement between theoretical predictions and experimental data (Rueger & Sharp, 1996. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 47, 93–112; Koperski, 1998. Philosophy of Science, 40, 194–212). These challenges are incomplete in two respects: (a) they do not show that chaotic regimes are unpredictable in principle (i.e., with unbounded resources) and, as a result, that there is something conceptually wrong with idealized expectations of (...)
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  3. Vadim Batitsky (2002). Some Measurement-Theoretic Concerns About Hale's ‘Reals by Abstraction';. Philosophia Mathematica 10 (3):286-303.
    Hale proposes a neo-logicist definition of real numbers by abstraction as ratios defined on a complete ordered domain of quantities (magnitudes). I argue that Hale's definition faces insuperable epistemological and ontological difficulties. On the epistemological side, Hale is committed to an explanation of measurement applications of reals which conflicts with several theorems in measurement theory. On the ontological side, Hale commits himself to the necessary and a priori existence of at least one complete ordered domain of quantities, which is extremely (...)
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  4. Vadim Batitsky (2000). A Realistic Look at Putnam's Argument Against Realism. Foundations of Science 5 (3):299-321.
    Putnam's ``model-theoretic'' argument against metaphysical realism presupposes that an ideal scientific theory is expressible in a first order language. The central aim of this paper is to show that Putnam's ``first orderization'' of science, although unchallenged by numerous critics, makes his argument unsound even for adequate theories, never mind an ideal one. To this end, I will argue that quantitative theories, which dominate the natural sciences, can be adequately interpreted and evaluated only with the help of so-called theories of measurement (...)
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  5. Vadim Batitsky (2000). Measurement in Carnap's Late Philosophy of Science. Dialectica 54 (2):87–108.
  6. Vadim Batitsky (1998). A Formal Rebuttal of the Central Argument for Functionalism. Erkenntnis 49 (2):201-20.
    The central argument for functionalism is the so-called argument from multiple realizations. According to this argument, because a functionally characterized system admits a potential infinity of structurally diverse physical realizations, the functional organization of such systems cannot be captured in a law-like manner at the level of physical description (and, thus, must be treated as a principally autonomous domain of inquiry). I offer a rebuttal of this argument based on formal modeling of its premises in the framework of automata theory. (...)
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  7. Vadim Batitsky (1998). From Inexactness to Certainty: The Change in Hume's Conception of Geometry. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 29 (1):1-20.
    Although Hume's analysis of geometry continues to serve as a reference point for many contemporary discussions in the philosophy of science, the fact that the first Enquiry presents a radical revision of Hume's conception of geometry in the Treatise has never been explained. The present essay closely examines Hume's early and late discussions of geometry and proposes a reconstruction of the reasons behind the change in his views on the subject. Hume's early conception of geometry as an inexact non-demonstrative science (...)
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  8. Vadim Batitsky (1998). Empiricism and the Myth of Fundamental Measurement. Synthese 116 (1):51 - 73.