Search results for 'Vagueness' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Pablo Cobreros (2011). Supervaluationism and Fara's Argument Concerning Higher-Order Vagueness. In Paul Egré & Klinedinst Nathan (eds.), Vagueness and Language Use, Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 27.0
    This paper discusses Fara's so-called 'Paradox of Higher-Order Vagueness' concerning supervaluationism. In the paper I argue that supervaluationism is not committed to global validity, as it is largely assumed in the literature, but to a weaker notion of logical consequence I call 'regional validity'. Then I show that the supervaluationist might solve Fara's paradox making use of this weaker notion of logical consequence. The paper is discussed by Delia Fara in the same volume.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Paula Sweeney & Elia Zardini (2011). Vagueness and Practical Interests. In Paul Egre & Nathan Klinedinst (eds.), Vagueness and Language Use. Palgrave MacMillan.score: 27.0
    In this paper we focus mainly on a kind of contextualism theory of vagueness according to which the context dependence has its source in the variation of our practical interests. We largely focus on Fara's version of the theory but our observations work at different levels of generality, some relevant only to the specifics of Fara's theory others relevant to all contextualist theories of a certain type.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. N. Angel Pinillos (forthcoming). Attitudes, Supervaluations and Vagueness in the World. In K. Akiba (ed.), Vague Objects and Vague Identity. Verlag.score: 25.0
    I consider two possible sources of vagueness. The first is indeterminacy about which intension is expressed by a word. The second is indeterminacy about which referent (extension) is determined by an intension. Focusing on a Fregean account of intensions, I argue that whichever account is right will matter to whether vagueness turns out to be a representational phenomenon (as opposed to being “in the world”). In addition, it will also matter to whether supervaluationism is a viable semantic framework. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Daniel Z. Korman (2010). The Argument From Vagueness. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):891-901.score: 24.0
    A presentation of the Lewis-Sider argument from vagueness for unrestricted composition and possible responses.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Ryan Perkins (2012). Vagueness and the Philosophy of Perception. Dissertation, University of Oxfordscore: 24.0
    This dissertation explores several illuminating points of intersection between the philosophy of perception and the philosophy of vagueness. Among other things, I argue: (i) that it is entirely unhelpful to theorize about perception or consciousness using Nagelian "what it's like" talk; (ii) that a popular recent account of perceptual phenomenology (representationalism) conflicts with our best theory of vagueness (supervaluationism); (iii) that there are no vague properties, for Evans-esque reasons; (iv) that it is impossible to insert "determinacy" operators into (...)
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Susanne Bobzien (2012). If It's Clear, Then It's Clear That It's Clear, or is It? Higher-Order Vagueness and the S4 Axiom. In B. Morison K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), Episteme, etc. OUP UK.score: 24.0
    The purpose of this paper is to challenge some widespread assumptions about the role of the modal axiom 4 in a theory of vagueness. In the context of vagueness, axiom 4 usually appears as the principle ‘If it is clear (determinate, definite) that A, then it is clear (determinate, definite) that it is clear (determinate, definite) that A’, or, more formally, CA → CCA. We show how in the debate over axiom 4 two different notions of clarity are (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Christopher Kennedy (2007). Vagueness and Grammar: The Semantics of Relative and Absolute Gradable Adjectives. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (1):1 - 45.score: 24.0
    This paper investigates the way that linguistic expressions influence vagueness, focusing on the interpretation of the positive (unmarked) form of gradable adjectives. I begin by developing a semantic analysis of the positive form of ‘relative’ gradable adjectives, expanding on previous proposals by further motivating a semantic basis for vagueness and by precisely identifying and characterizing the division of labor between the compositional and contextual aspects of its interpretation. I then introduce a challenge to the analysis from the class (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Susanne Bobzien (2013). Higher-Order Vagueness and Borderline Nestings: A Persistent Confusion. Analytic Philosophy 54 (1):1-43.score: 24.0
    ABSTRACT: This paper argues that the so-called paradoxes of higher-order vagueness are the result of a confusion between higher-order vagueness and the distribution of the objects of a Sorites series into extensionally non-overlapping non-empty classes.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Cristian Constantinescu (2014). Moral Vagueness: A Dilemma for Non-Naturalism. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 9. Oxford University Press. 152-185.score: 24.0
    In this paper I explore the implications of moral vagueness (viz., the vagueness of moral predicates) for non-naturalist metaethical theories like those recently championed by Shafer-Landau, Parfit, and others. I characterise non-naturalism in terms of its commitment to 7 theses: Cognitivism, Correspondence, Atomism, Objectivism, Supervenience, Non-reductivism, and Rationalism. I start by offering a number of reasons for thinking that moral predicates are vague in the same way in which ‘red’, ‘tall’, and ‘heap’ are said to be. I then (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Susanne Bobzien (2011). In Defense of True Higher-Order Vagueness. Synthese 180 (3):317-335.score: 24.0
    ABSTRACT: Stewart Shapiro recently argued that there is no higher-order vagueness. More specifically, his thesis is: (ST) ‘So-called second-order vagueness in ‘F’ is nothing but first-order vagueness in the phrase ‘competent speaker of English’ or ‘competent user of “F”’. Shapiro bases (ST) on a description of the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness and two accounts of ‘borderline case’ and provides several arguments in its support. We present the phenomenon (as Shapiro describes it) and the accounts; then discuss (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Ryan Perkins & Tim Bayne (2013). Representationalism and the Problem of Vagueness. Philosophical Studies 162 (1):71-86.score: 24.0
    This paper develops a novel problem for representationalism (also known as "intentionalism"), a popular contemporary account of perception. We argue that representationalism is incompatible with supervaluationism, the leading contemporary account of vagueness. The problem generalizes to naive realism and related views, which are also incompatible with supervaluationism.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Pablo Cobreros (2013). Vagueness: Subvaluationism. Philosophy Compass 8 (5):472-485.score: 24.0
    Supervaluationism is a well known theory of vagueness. Subvaluationism is a less well known theory of vagueness. But these theories cannot be taken apart, for they are in a relation of duality that can be made precise. This paper provides an introduction to the subvaluationist theory of vagueness in connection to its dual, supervaluationism. A survey on the supervaluationist theory can be found in the Compass paper of Keefe (2008); our presentation of the theory in this paper (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Kirk Ludwig (2002). Vagueness And The Sorites Paradox. Noûs 36 (s16):419-461.score: 24.0
    A sorites argument is a symptom of the vagueness of the predicate with which it is constructed. A vague predicate admits of at least one dimension of variation (and typically more than one) in its intended range along which we are at a loss when to say the predicate ceases to apply, though we start out confident that it does. It is this feature of them that the sorites arguments exploit. Exactly how is part of the subject of this (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Graham Priest (2010). Inclosures, Vagueness, and Self-Reference. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (1):69-84.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I start by showing that sorites paradoxes are inclosure paradoxes. That is, they fit the Inclosure Scheme which characterizes the paradoxes of self-reference. Given that sorites and self-referential paradoxes are of the same kind, they should have the same kind of solution. The rest of the paper investigates what a dialetheic solution to sorites paradoxes is like, connections with a dialetheic solution to the self-referential paradoxes, and related issues—especially so called "higher order" vagueness.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. John Hawthorne & Andrew McGonigal (2008). The Many Minds Account of Vagueness. Philosophical Studies 138 (3):435 - 440.score: 24.0
    This paper presents an new epistemicist account of vagueness, one that avoids standard arbitrariness worries by exploiting a plenitudinous metaphysic.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Susanne Bobzien (2002). Chrysippus and the Epistemic Theory of Vagueness. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):217-238.score: 24.0
    ABSTRACT: Recently a bold and admirable interpretation of Chrysippus’ position on the Sorites has been presented, suggesting that Chrysippus offered a solution to the Sorites by (i) taking an epistemicist position1 which (ii) made allowances for higher-order vagueness. In this paper I argue (i) that Chrysippus did not take an epistemicist position, but − if any − a non-epistemic one which denies truth-values to some cases in a Sorites-series, and (ii) that it is uncertain whether and how he made (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Crispin Wright (2009). The Illusion of Higher-Order Vagueness. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    It is common among philosophers who take an interest in the phenomenon of vagueness in natural language not merely to acknowledge higher-order vagueness but to take its existence as a basic datum— so that views that lack the resources to account for it, or that put obstacles in the way, are regarded as deficient just on that score. My main purpose in what follows is to loosen the hold of this deeply misconceived idea. Higher-order vagueness is no (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Tuomas E. Tahko (2009). Against the Vagueness Argument. Philosophia 37 (2):335-340.score: 24.0
    In this paper I offer a counterexample to the so called vagueness argument against restricted composition. This will be done in the lines of a recent suggestion by Trenton Merricks, namely by challenging the claim that there cannot be a sharp cut-off point in a composition sequence. It will be suggested that causal powers which emerge when composition occurs can serve as an indicator of such sharp cut-off points. The main example will be the case of a heap. It (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Achille C. Varzi (2003). Vagueness. In Lynn Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Vol. 4. Nature Publishing Group. 459–464.score: 24.0
    This is an encyclopedia entry on vagueness, focusing mainly on the opposition between re re and de dicta (linguistic or cognitive) accounts.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Timothy Williamson (1994). Vagueness. Routledge.score: 24.0
    Vagueness provides the first comprehensive examination of a topic of increasing importance in metaphysics and the philosophy of logic and language. Timothy Williamson traces the history of this philosophical problem from discussions of the heap paradox in classical Greece to modern formal approaches such as fuzzy logic. He illustrates the problems with views which have taken the position that standard logic and formal semantics do not apply to vague language, and defends the controversial realistic view that vagueness is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Susanne Bobzien (2010). Higher-Order Vagueness, Radical Unclarity, and Absolute Agnosticism. Philosophers' Imprint 10 (10):1-30.score: 24.0
    The paper presents a new theory of higher-order vagueness. This theory is an improvement on current theories of vagueness in that it (i) describes the kind of borderline cases relevant to the Sorites paradox, (ii) retains the ‘robustness’ of vague predicates, (iii) introduces a notion of higher-order vagueness that is compositional, but (iv) avoids the paradoxes of higher-order vagueness. The theory’s central building-blocks: Borderlinehood is defined as radical unclarity. Unclarity is defined by means of competent, rational, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Andrew Bacon, Vagueness at Every Order: The Prospects of Denying B.score: 24.0
    A number of arguments purport to show that vague properties determine sharp boundaries at higher orders. That is, although we may countenance vagueness concerning the location of boundaries for vague predicates, every predicate can instead be associated with precise knowable cut-off points deriving from precision in their higher order boundaries. -/- I argue that this conclusion is indeed paradoxical, and identify the assumption responsible for the paradox as the Brouwerian principle B for vagueness: that if p then it's (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Maureen Donnelly (2009). Mereological Vagueness and Existential Vagueness. Synthese 168 (1):53 - 79.score: 24.0
    It is often assumed that indeterminacy in mereological relations—in particular, indeterminacy in which collections of objects have fusions—leads immediately to indeterminacy in what objects there are in the world. This assumption is generally taken as a reason for rejecting mereological vagueness. The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between mereological vagueness and existential vagueness. I hope to show that the connection between the two forms of vagueness is not nearly so clear-cut as has (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Haim Gaifman (2010). Vagueness, Tolerance and Contextual Logic. Synthese 174 (1):5 - 46.score: 24.0
    The goal of this paper is a comprehensive analysis of basic reasoning patterns that are characteristic of vague predicates. The analysis leads to rigorous reconstructions of the phenomena within formal systems. Two basic features are dealt with. One is tolerance: the insensitivity of predicates to small changes in the objects of predication (a one-increment of a walking distance is a walking distance). The other is the existence of borderline cases. The paper shows why these should be treated as different, though (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Duncan MacIntosh (2010). Intransitive Preferences, Vagueness, and the Structure of Procrastination. In Chrisoula Andreou & Mark D. White (eds.), The Thief of Time. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Chrisoula Andreou says procrastination qua imprudent delay is modeled by Warren Quinn’s self-torturer, who supposedly has intransitive preferences that rank each indulgence in something that delays his global goals over working toward those goals and who finds it vague where best to stop indulging. His pair-wise choices to indulge result in his failing the goals, which he then regrets. This chapter argues, contra the money-pump argument, that it is not irrational to have or choose from intransitive preferences; so the agent’s (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Rosanna Keefe (2000). Theories of Vagueness. Cambridge University Press.score: 24.0
    Most expressions in natural language are vague. But what is the best semantic treatment of terms like 'heap', 'red' and 'child'? And what is the logic of arguments involving this kind of vague expression? These questions are receiving increasing philosophical attention, and in this timely book Rosanna Keefe explores the questions of what we should want from an account of vagueness and how we should assess rival theories. Her discussion ranges widely and comprehensively over the main theories of (...) and their supporting arguments, and she offers a powerful and original defence of a form of supervaluationism, a theory that requires almost no deviation from standard logic yet can accommodate the lack of sharp boundaries to vague predicates and deal with the paradoxes of vagueness in a methodologically satisfying way. Her study will be of particular interest to readers in philosophy of language and of mind, philosophical logic, epistemology and metaphysics. (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Pablo Cobreros (2010). Paraconsistent Vagueness: A Positive Argument. Synthese 183 (2):211-227.score: 24.0
    Paraconsistent approaches have received little attention in the literature on vagueness (at least compared to other proposals). The reason seems to be that many philosophers have found the idea that a contradiction might be true (or that a sentence and its negation might both be true) hard to swallow. Even advocates of paraconsistency on vagueness do not look very convinced when they consider this fact; since they seem to have spent more time arguing that paraconsistent theories are at (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Peter van Inwagen (2002). Why Vagueness is a Mystery. Acta Analytica 17 (1):11 - 17.score: 24.0
    This paper considers two “mysteries” having to do with vagueness. The first pertains to existence. An argument is presented for the following conclusion: there are possible cases in which ‘There exists something that is F’ is of indeterminate truth-value and with respect to which it is not assertable that there are borderline-cases of “being F.” It is contended that we have no conception of vagueness that makes this result intelligible. The second mystery has to do with “ordinary” vague (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Jiri Benovsky (2011). Vagueness : A Statistical Epistemicist Approach. Teorema (3):97-112.score: 24.0
    There are three main traditional accounts of vagueness : one takes it as a genuinely metaphysical phenomenon, one takes it as a phenomenon of ignorance, and one takes it as a linguistic or conceptual phenomenon. In this paper I first very briefly present these views, especially the epistemicist and supervaluationist strategies, and shortly point to some well-known problems that the views carry. I then examine a 'statistical epistemicist' account of vagueness that is designed to avoid precisely these problems (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. E. J. Lowe (2013). Ontological Vagueness, Existence Monism and Metaphysical Realism. Metaphysica 14 (2):265-274.score: 24.0
    Recently, Terry Horgan and Matjaž Potrč have defended the thesis of ‘existence monism’, according to which the whole cosmos is the only concrete object. Their arguments appeal largely to considerations concerning vagueness. Crucially, they claim that ontological vagueness is impossible, and one key assumption in their defence of this claim is that vagueness always involves ‘sorites-susceptibility’. I aim to challenge both the claim and this assumption. As a consequence, I seek to undermine their defence of existence monism (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Nikk Effingham (2011). Sider, Hawley, Sider and the Vagueness Argument. Philosophical Studies 154 (2):241 - 250.score: 24.0
    The Vagueness Argument for universalism only works if you think there is a good reason not to endorse nihilism. Sider's argument from the possibility of gunk is one of the more popular reasons. Further, Hawley has given an argument for the necessity of everything being either gunky or composed of mereological simples. I argue that Hawley's argument rests on the same premise as Sider's argument for the possibility of gunk. Further, I argue that that premise can be used to (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Igor Douven, Lieven Decock, Richard Dietz & Paul Égré (2013). Vagueness: A Conceptual Spaces Approach. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):137-160.score: 24.0
    The conceptual spaces approach has recently emerged as a novel account of concepts. Its guiding idea is that concepts can be represented geometrically, by means of metrical spaces. While it is generally recognized that many of our concepts are vague, the question of how to model vagueness in the conceptual spaces approach has not been addressed so far, even though the answer is far from straightforward. The present paper aims to fill this lacuna.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Rosanna Keefe (2012). Modelling Vagueness: What Can We Ignore? Philosophical Studies 161 (3):453-470.score: 24.0
    A theory of vagueness gives a model of vague language and of reasoning within the language. Among the models that have been offered are Degree Theorists’ numerical models that assign values between 0 and 1 to sentences, rather than simply modelling sentences as true or false. In this paper, I ask whether we can benefit from employing a rich, well-understood numerical framework, while ignoring those aspects of it that impute a level of mathematical precision that is not present in (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Mark Colyvan (2001). Russell on Metaphysical Vagueness. Principia 5 (1-2):87-98.score: 24.0
    Recently a fascinating debate has been rekindled over whether vagueness is metaphysical or linguistic. That is, is vagueness an objective feature of reality or is it merely an artifact of our language? Bertrand Russell's contribution to this debate is considered by many to be decisive. Russell suggested that it is a mistake to conclude that the world is vague simply because the language we use to describe it is vague. He argued that to draw such an inference is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Paul Égré & Denis Bonnay (2010). Vagueness, Uncertainty and Degrees of Clarity. Synthese 174 (1):47 - 78.score: 24.0
    In this paper we compare different models of vagueness viewed as a specific form of subjective uncertainty in situations of imperfect discrimination. Our focus is on the logic of the operator “clearly” and on the problem of higher-order vagueness. We first examine the consequences of the notion of intransitivity of indiscriminability for higher-order vagueness, and compare several accounts of vagueness as inexact or imprecise knowledge, namely Williamson’s margin for error semantics, Halpern’s two-dimensional semantics, and the system (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Timothy Williamson (2002). Reply to Machina and Deutsch on Vagueness, Ignorance, and Margins for Error. Acta Analytica 17 (1):47-61.score: 24.0
    In their paper “Vagueness, Ignorance, and Margins for Error” Kenton Machina and Harry Deutsch criticize the epistemic theory of vagueness. This paper answers their objections. The main issues discussed are: the relation between meaning and use; the principle of bivalence; the ontology of vaguely specified classes; the proper form of margin for error principles; iterations of epistemic operators and semantic compositionality; the relation or lack of it between quantum mechanics and theories of vagueness.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Kristie Miller (2006). Vagueness, Persistence and Indeterminate Identity. Erkenntnis 64 (2):223 - 230.score: 24.0
    I argue that for those who follow Evans in finding indeterminacy of de re identity statements problematic, ontic vagueness within a three-dimensionalist metaphysics will raise some problems that are not faced by the four-dimensionalist. For the types of strategies used to avoid de re indeterminacy within the context of ontic vagueness at-at-time, that is, spatial vagueness, are problematic within a three-dimensionalist framework when put to use within the context of ontic vagueness across-time, that is temporal (...). (shrink)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Irem Kurtsal Steen (2010). Three-Dimensionalist's Semantic Solution to Diachronic Vagueness. Philosophical Studies 150 (1):79-96.score: 24.0
    A standard response to the problem of diachronic vagueness is ‘the semantic solution’, which demands an abundant ontology. Although it is known that the abundant ontology does not logically preclude endurantism, their combination is rejected because it necessitates massive coincidence between countless objects. In this paper, I establish that the semantic solution is available not only to perdurantists but also to endurantists by showing that there is no problem with such ubiquitous and principled coincidence.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Delia Graff Fara (2003). Gap Principles, Penumbral Consequence, and Infinitely Higher-Order Vagueness. In J. C. Beall (ed.), New Essays on the Semantics of Paradox. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Philosophers disagree about whether vagueness requires us to admit truth-value gaps, about whether there is a gap between the objects of which a given vague predicate is true and those of which it is false on an appropriately constructed sorites series for the predicate—a series involving small increments of change in a relevant respect between adjacent elements, but a large increment of change in that respect between the endpoints. There appears, however, to be widespread agreement that there is some (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Andrea Borghini & Achille C. Varzi (2006). Event Location and Vagueness. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):313-336.score: 24.0
    Most event-referring expressions are vague; it is utterly difficult, if not impossible, to specify the exact spatiotemporal location of an event from the words that we use to refer to it. We argue that in spite of certain prima facie obstacles, such vagueness can be given a purely semantic (broadly supervaluational) account.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.) (2010). Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature, and its Logic. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Vagueness is a familiar but deeply puzzling aspect of the relation between language and the world. It is highly controversial what the nature of vagueness is -- a feature of the way we represent reality in language, or rather a feature of reality itself? May even relations like identity or parthood be affected by vagueness? Sorites arguments suggest that vague terms are either inconsistent or have a sharp boundary. The account we give of such paradoxes plays a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Giovanni Boniolo & Silvio Valentini (2008). Vagueness, Kant and Topology: A Study of Formal Epistemology. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (2):141 - 168.score: 24.0
    In this paper we propose an approach to vagueness characterised by two features. The first one is philosophical: we move along a Kantian path emphasizing the knowing subject’s conceptual apparatus. The second one is formal: to face vagueness, and our philosophical view on it, we propose to use topology and formal topology. We show that the Kantian and the topological features joined together allow us an atypical, but promising, way of considering vagueness.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Achille C. Varzi (2001). Vagueness in Geography. Philosophy and Geography 4 (1):49–65.score: 24.0
    Some have argued that the vagueness exhibited by geographic names and descriptions such as ‘Albuquerque’, ‘the Outback’, or ‘Mount Everest’ is ultimately ontological: these terms are vague because they refer to vague objects, objects with fuzzy boundaries. I take the opposite stand and hold the view that geographic vagueness is exclusively semantic, or conceptual at large. There is no such thing as a vague mountain. Rather, there are many things where we conceive a mountain to be, each with (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Erik Carlson (2013). Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):449-463.score: 24.0
    John Broome has argued that incomparability and vagueness cannot coexist in a given betterness order. His argument essentially hinges on an assumption he calls the ‘collapsing principle’. In an earlier article I criticized this principle, but Broome has recently expressed doubts about the cogency of my criticism. Moreover, Cristian Constantinescu has defended Broome’s view from my objection. In this paper, I present further arguments against the collapsing principle, and try to show that Constantinescu’s defence of Broome’s position fails.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Roy A. Sorensen (2001). Vagueness and Contradiction. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Roy Sorenson offers a unique exploration of an ancient problem: vagueness. Did Buddha become a fat man in one second? Is there a tallest short giraffe? According to Sorenson's epistemicist approach, the answers are yes! Although vagueness abounds in the way the world is divided, Sorenson argues that the divisions are sharp; yet we often do not know where they are. Written in Sorenson'e usual inventive and amusing style, this book offers original insight on language and logic, the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Matjaž Potrč & Vojko Strahovnik (2013). Moral Dilemmas and Vagueness. Acta Analytica 28 (2):207-222.score: 24.0
    In this paper we point out some interesting structural similarities between vagueness and moral dilemmas as well as between some of the proposed solutions to both problems. Moral dilemma involves a situation with opposed obligations that cannot all be satisfied. Transvaluationism as an approach to vagueness makes three claims concerning the nature of vagueness: (1) it involves incompatibility between mutually unsatisfiable requirements, (2) the underlying requirements retain their normative power even when they happen to be overruled, and (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Matti Eklund (2013). Metaphysical Vagueness and Metaphysical Indeterminacy. Metaphysica 14 (2):165-179.score: 24.0
    The topic of this paper is whether there is metaphysical vagueness. It is shown that it is important to distinguish between the general phenomenon of indeterminacy and the more narrow phenomenon of vagueness (the phenomenon that paradigmatically rears its head in sorites reasoning). Relatedly, it is important to distinguish between metaphysical indeterminacy and metaphysical vagueness. One can wish to allow metaphysical indeterminacy but rule out metaphysical vagueness. As is discussed in the paper, central argument against metaphysical (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Timothy Andrew Orville Endicott (2000). Vagueness in Law. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Vagueness in law can lead to indeterminacies in legal rights and obligations. This book responds to the challenges that those indeterminacies pose to theories of law and adjudication.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Achille C. Varzi (2007). Promiscuous Endurantism and Diachronic Vagueness. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):181-189.score: 24.0
    According to a popular line of reasoning, diachronic vagueness creates a problem for the endurantist conception of persistence. Some authors have replied that this line of reasoning is inconclusive, since the endurantist can subscribe to a principle of Diachronic Unrestricted Composition (DUC) that is perfectly parallel to the principle required by the perdurantist’s semantic account. I object that the endurantist should better avoid DUC. And I argue that even DUC, if accepted, would fail to provide the endurantist with the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. C. M. Asmus (2013). Vagueness and Revision Sequences. Synthese 190 (6):953-974.score: 24.0
    Theories of truth and vagueness are closely connected; in this article, I draw another connection between these areas of research. Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth is converted into an approach to vagueness. I show how revision sequences from a general theory of definitions can be used to understand the nature of vague predicates. The revision sequences show how the meaning of vague predicates are interconnected with each other. The approach is contrasted with the similar supervaluationist approach.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000