L’ouvrage que publie Valérie Beaudouin, tiré de sa thèse soutenue en 2000, se signale par de nombreuses qualités, parmi lesquelles on distinguera l’ampleur de la matière étudiée, l’originalité de la démarche et des méthodes, l’intérêt neuf et majeur de maints résultats, le renouvellement méthodologique qu’il apporte dans le domaine de la métrique française. L’auteur s’est proposé de décrire le vers du théâtre classique, en s’appuyant sur un corpus constitué de la totalité des pièces de Cornei..
It's very interesting to see neurophysiological evidence brought to bear on the puzzling question of conscious experience. Many have observed that information-processing models of cognition seem to leave consciousness untouched; it is natural to hope that turning to neurophysiology might lead us to the Holy Grail. Still, I think there are reasons to be skeptical. There are good reasons to suppose that neurophysiological investigation contributes to cognitive explanation at best in virtue of constraining the information-processing structure of cognition. Of course (...) this is a very large and significant role for it to play, but it may be over-optimistic to suppose that it can play some further explanatory role, taking us where information-processing theories cannot. If so, then neurophysiological accounts will be no more and no less successful at dealing with consciousness than information-processing accounts are. (shrink)
Valérie Chevassus-Marchionni | : Le « cas » de Marie de la Trinité illustre d’une manière particulière la thématique « croyance et psychanalyse ». En effet, chez cette soeur dominicaine des campagnes, la foi religieuse et la croyance en sa vocation de dévotion interfèrent très étroitement avec l’expérience psychanalytique : d’une part, elle se prête pendant quatre années à une cure psychanalytique avec le docteur Jacques Lacan, d’autre part, elle exercera elle-même quelque temps la profession de psychothérapeute. Pour Marie de (...) la Trinité, la psychanalyse arrive à un moment critique de son existence, alors que ce qu’elle nomme ses « obsessions » lui rendent la vie impossible et lui interdisent même de pratiquer sa foi ; elle se tourne alors vers des traitements divers, parfois brutaux et inhumains. Ce n’est pas la psychanalyse qui la guérira, mais c’est à partir de cette expérience qu’il lui sera donné de triompher de son mal et, en comprenant quelle en était l’origine, d’entreprendre « sa propre rééducation » et de connaître « la lumière et l’harmonie » dans sa vie de dévotion. | : The case of Mary of the Trinity illustrates in a particular way the thematic of “belief and psychoanalysis”. Indeed, in this Dominican sister, a missionary in the country, religious faith and belief in her vocation of devotion closely interfere with psychoanalytical experience : on the one hand she undergoes a four year psychoanalytical cure with Doctor Jacques Lacan ; on the other hand she works for a while as a psychotherapeutist. For Mary of the Trinity psychoanalysis appears at a critical moment in her life, just as what she calls her “obsessions” make her life unbearable and even prevent her from practising her faith ; then she tries many different treatments, sometimes brutal and inhuman. Psychoanalysis won’t cure her, but thanks to this experience, she will overcome her pain and by understanding its origin will undertake “her own reeducation” and know “light and harmony” in her life of devotion. (shrink)
In "Virtue and Right" Robert Johnson argues that virtue ethics that accept standards such as Virtuous Agent (A's x-ing is right in circumstances c iff a fully virtuous agent would x in c) are incomplete, since they cannot account for duties of moral self-improvement. This paper offers four solutions to the problem of incompleteness: the first discards Virtuous Agent and counts actions as wrong iff a vicious person would perform them; the second retains Virtuous Agent but counts self-improving actions as (...) countererogatory: wrong but nonetheless good to do; the third replaces Virtuous Agent with a standard appealing to the Mengzian virtue of righteousness, understood as situational appropriateness; the fourth replaces Virtuous Agent with a standard that holds an action right if it promotes the agent's virtue. Each solution accommodates duties of moral self-improvement, so a virtue ethics embracing any of them would not be incomplete. (shrink)
Subject of this essay is the relationship between Celan’s and Valéry’s theory on language, aesthetic and history. Resorting to the importance of some passages of Valéry’s Cahiers for the conception of Celan’s theoretical doctrine of the poetry, the author underwrites the centrality of this philosophical heritage for the explanation and the justification of Celan’s linguistic choices and of their historical and political meaning.
Body, sensibility and experience: Paul Valéry’s reflection and pragmatist aesthetic The pragmatist aesthetic of Dewey and Shusterman can be useful to understand the complexity of the Valéry’s thought: this paper aims to highlight a pragmatist attitude on the Valéry’s aesthetic through the links of the triad Corps, Esprit, Monde and underline the crucial role that the body and the senses play in experience.
Contrary to the prevailing view, there is not one, but at least two poetic theories in Paul Valéry: the intellectual, formalist and technical poetics Valéry is usually associated to conflicts with another poetics, which highlights sensitivity, lyricism and subjectivity. The constitutive duplicity of Valéry’s literary theory has probably something to do with the ambiguity of his relationship with Stéphane Mallarmé.
This paper aims to outline the importance of Valéry with respect to some cornerstones of Adorno’s aesthetic theory as a negative-dialectical thought. Adorno’s concept of aesthetic experience finds in Valéry as an “Artist” (not simply as a “Künstler”) a sort of lieutenant: he helps to specify notions like “apparition”, “form”, “configuration”, and above all the idea of the aesthetic as a relation by which something happens in the field of human experience without being a determinate, or determinable, content of it.
In his Cahiers , Valéry says that writing two of his major dialogues, Eupalinos and L’âme et la danse , was an antidote to his ravaging mood: literature and spirituality are the remedy generated by a necessary and not eliminable evil, particularly the one that shows itself as ‘rage’ in love. The essay investigates thoroughly this contradictory logic and focuses on the problem of sensitiveness in Valéry’s work, pointing out a twofold presence of the ‘body’. Preserving these two presences, the (...) writing incessantly tries to make up “une fureur intelligente et expérimentale” and to give a new form, without deleting it, to sensitiveness’ acute pain. (shrink)
Since the early reflections, Valéry shows to be a real precursor of semantic investigation and some crucial issues of analytic philosophy. Animated by the search of the connection between the sensitive-emotional sphere and the linguistics one, he wants to build a “physiology” of language. Moreover, his investigation of the properties and function of language leads to questions about the domain of aesthetic and spiritual experience. Through its symbolic power and guided by self-consciousness , then the word can express everything that (...) moves and excites man by the form. (shrink)
Demonstrating the importance of the circumstantial writings by Paul Valéry, the present essay points out his very first “commission” on Leonardo da Vinci as emblematic of a new sensitive philosophical reflexiveness. In fact, Valéry kept returning to the great renaissance phenomenon of Leonardo, in his twisted Introduction à la Méthode de Léonard de Vinci (1894), rewritten some 25 years later with Note et digression (1919), as well in his staging of philosophers and artists in Léonard et les philosophes (1929). The (...) dislocations taking place within these texts outline an emphasis on the sensible, which remained almost hidden in Valéry’s well-known promotion of the spirit in art. (shrink)
In this contribution, we shall examine how Valéry leaves Descartes, and the paradigm of sight, in favor of the dancer Athiktè, typical of the paradigm of hearing and touch. If Descartes offers the pattern of an analytic mapping, that method reveals itself irrelevant to take into account what Valéry calls the C.E.M (Corps Esprit Monde). On the other side, a dancer, like Athiktè appears as the model of poiesis, showing the natura naturans in progress.
Sensibilité is in Valéry’s theory the name of a large grasp of functions, involving both perception and creation, and involved both in art and in experience. So far, this key word of Valéry’s aesthetics can be read as the bridge between his conceptions of art and his idea of the self in order to understand the way this author writes and conceives what philosophy can aim to.
Valéry’s conceptions of mind, literature and even philosophy often stress the importance of an effort against heterogeneity that should be led in the name of what the author himself calls pureté. On the other hand, the theories that Valéry develops about composition - which is intended both as an aesthetic and a theoretical concept - show the importance of complexity in his representation of the esprit and allows to compare Valéry’s descriptions of the self with the way he represents creative (...) process and even draws the structure of his own works. (shrink)
This article studies Paul Valéry's personal reflection on photography, as it appears in his essay ?Le Discours du Centenaire de la Photographie,? based on a speech given at the Sorbonne in 1939 to members of the French Academy. It stresses the relationship between this essay and the French poet's writings on painting and aesthetics, in particular his work on Corot. Moreover, it analyzes the synthetic character of Valéry's critical approach, which attempts to bring together the language of poetry, philosophy and (...) science when dealing with this utterly modern visual language. Photography is celebrated here as a unique art form that can at the same time imitate and reproduce nature perfectly, while allowing mankind to create a cosmological vision of life and the universe. In other words, the poet underlines in this text the utmost modernity of photography, at a time when many in France were still reluctant to acknowledge its artistic identity. (shrink)
Intuitively, there is a difference between knowledge and mere belief. Contemporary philosophical work on the nature of this difference has focused on scenarios known as “Gettier cases.” Designed as counterexamples to the classical theory that knowledge is justified true belief, these cases feature agents who arrive at true beliefs in ways which seem reasonable or justified, while nevertheless seeming to lack knowledge. Prior empirical investigation of these cases has raised questions about whether lay people generally share philosophers’ intuitions about these (...) cases, or whether lay intuitions vary depending on individual factors (e.g. ethnicity) or factors related to specific types of Gettier cases (e.g. cases that include apparent evidence). We report an experiment on lay attributions of knowledge and justification for a wide range of Gettier Cases and for a related class of controversial cases known as Skeptical Pressure cases, which are also thought by philosophers to elicit intuitive denials of knowledge. Although participants rated true beliefs in Gettier and Skeptical Pressure cases as being justified, they were significantly less likely to attribute knowledge for these cases than for matched true belief cases. This pattern of response was consistent across different variations of Gettier cases and did not vary by ethnicity or gender, although attributions of justification were found to be positively related to measures of empathy. These findings therefore suggest that across demographic groups, laypeople share similar epistemic concepts with philosophers, recognizing a difference between knowledge and justified true belief. (shrink)
Evolutionary psychologists claim that the mind contains “hundreds or thousands” of “genetically speciﬁed” modules, which are evolutionary adaptations for their cognitive functions. We argue that, while the adult human mind/brain typically contains a degree of modularization, its “modules” are neither genetically speciﬁed nor evolutionary adaptations. Rather, they result from the brain’s developmental plasticity, which allows environmental task demands a large role in shaping the brain’s information-processing structures. The brain’s developmental plasticity is our fundamental psychological adaptation, and the “modules” that result (...) from it are adaptive responses to local conditions, not past evolutionary environments. If different individuals share common environ- ments, however, they may develop similar “modules,” and this process can mimic the development of genetically speciﬁed modules in the evolutionary psychologist’s sense. (shrink)
I argue that the explanatory gap is generated by factors consistent with the view that qualia are physical properties. I begin by considering the most plausible current approach to this issue based on recent work by Valerie Hardcastle and Clyde Hardin. Although their account of the source of the explanatory gap and our potential to close it is attractive, I argue that it is too speculative and philosophically problematic. I then argue that the explanatory gap should not concern physicalists (...) because it makes excessive demands on physical theory. (shrink)