1. Philip Gerrans & Valerie E. Stone (2008). Generous or Parsimonious Cognitive Architecture? Cognitive Neuroscience and Theory of Mind. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):121-141.
    Recent work in cognitive neuroscience on the child's Theory of Mind (ToM) has pursued the idea that the ability to metarepresent mental states depends on a domain-specific cognitive subystem implemented in specific neural circuitry: a Theory of Mind Module. We argue that the interaction of several domain-general mechanisms and lower-level domain-specific mechanisms accounts for the flexibility and sophistication of behavior, which has been taken to be evidence for a domain-specific ToM module. This finding is of more general interest since it (...)
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  2. Catherine L. Reed, Valerie E. Stone & John E. McGoldrick (2006). Not Just Posturing. In Günther Knoblich, Ian M. Thornton, Marc Grosjean & Maggie Shiffrar (eds.), Human Body Perception From the Inside Out. Oxford University Press. 229.
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  3. Valerie E. Stone (2002). Footloose and Fossil-Free No More: Evolutionary Psychology Needs Archaeology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):420-421.
    Evolutionary theories of human cognition should refer to specific times in the primate or hominid past. Though alternative accounts of tool manufacture from Wynn's are possible (e.g., frontal lobe function), Wynn demonstrates the power of archaeology to guide cognitive theories. Many cognitive abilities evolved not in the “Pleistocene hunter-gatherer” context, but earlier, in the context of other patterns of social organization and foraging.
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