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  1.  32
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2000). The Myth of Pain. MIT Press.
    or Browse over 3500 reviews in " by Valerie Hardcastle, Ph.D. " _Metapsychology_.
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  2. David J. Buller & Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2000). Evolutionary Psychology, Meet Developmental Neurobiology: Against Promiscuous Modularity. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 1 (3):307-25.
    Evolutionary psychologists claim that the mind contains “hundreds or thousands” of “genetically specified” modules, which are evolutionary adaptations for their cognitive functions. We argue that, while the adult human mind/brain typically contains a degree of modularization, its “modules” are neither genetically specified nor evolutionary adaptations. Rather, they result from the brain’s developmental plasticity, which allows environmental task demands a large role in shaping the brain’s information-processing structures. The brain’s developmental plasticity is our fundamental psychological adaptation, and the “modules” that result (...)
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  3.  15
    Brendan A. Maher, A. W. Young, Philip Gerrans, John Campbell, Kai Vogeley, Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Owen Flanagan, Robert L. Woolfolk, Barry Smith & Joëlle Proust (1999). Cognitive Theories of Mental Illness. The Monist 82 (4).
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  4.  17
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1999). Where Biology Meets Psychology: Philosophical Essays. MIT Press.
    This book is perhaps the first to open a dialogue between the two disciplines.
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  5.  3
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2015). Traumatic Brain Injury, Neuroscience, and the Legal System. Neuroethics 8 (1):55-64.
    This essay addresses the question: What is the probative value of including neuroscience data in court cases where the defendant might have had a traumatic brain injury? That is, this essay attempts to articulate how well we can connect scientific data and clinical test results to the demands of the Daubert standard in the United States’ court system, and, given the fact that neuroimaging is already being used in our courts, what, if anything, we should do about this fact. Ultimately, (...)
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  6.  75
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1997). When a Pain is Not. Journal of Philosophy 94 (8):381-409.
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  7. Valerie Gray Hardcastle & C. Matthew Stewart (2002). What Do Brain Data Really Show? Philosophy of Science 69 (3):572-582.
    There is a bias in neuroscience toward localizing and modularizing brain functions. Single cell recording, imaging studies, and the study of neurological deficits all feed into the Gallian view that different brain areas do different things and the things being done are confined to particular processing streams. At the same time, there is a growing sentiment that brains probably don’t work like that after all; it is better to conceive of them as fundamentally distributed units, multi‐tasking at every level. This (...)
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  8.  20
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2014). Pleasure Gone Awry? A New Conceptualization of Chronic Pain and Addiction. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):71-85.
    I examine what happens in the brain when patients experience chronic pain and when subjects are addicted to alcohol. We can find important parallels between these two cases, and these parallels can perhaps point us toward new ways of treating (or at least understanding) both issues. Interestingly, we can understand both cases as our pleasure system gone awry. In brief, I argue that chronic pain and alcohol addiction both stem from a dysregulation in our brain’s reward structure. This dysregulation in (...)
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  9.  9
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1995). Locating Consciousness. John Benjamins.
    Spelling out in detail what we do and do not know about phenomenological experience, this book denies the common view of consciousness as a central decision...
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  10. Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2003). Attention Versus Consciousness: A Distinction with a Difference. In Naoyuki Osaka (ed.), Neural Basis of Consciousness. John Benjamins 105.
  11.  17
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1996). How to Build a Theory in Cognitive Science. SUNY Press.
    What is required to be an interdisciplinary theory in cognitive science is for it to span more than one traditional domain. Generally speaking, as I discuss ...
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  12. Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1996). The Why of Consciousness: A Non-Issue for Materialists. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):7-13.
    In this essay, I hope to make clearer what the points of division between the materialists and the sceptics are. I argue that the rifts are quite deep and turn on basic differences in understanding the scientific enterprise. In section I, I outline the disagreements between David Chalmers and me, arguing that consciousness is not a brute fact about the world. In section II, I point out the fundamental difference between the materialists and the sceptics, suggesting that this difference is (...)
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  13. Eric Dietrich & Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2002). A Connecticut Yalie in King Descartes' Court. Newsletter of Cognitive Science Society (Now Defunct).
    What is consciousness? Of course, each of us knows, privately, what consciousness is. And we each think, for basically irresistible reasons, that all other conscious humans by and large have experiences like ours. So we conclude that we all know what consciousness is. It's the felt experiences of our lives. But that is not the answer we, as cognitive scientists, seek in asking our question. We all want to know what physical process consciousness is and why it produces this very (...)
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  14.  53
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1994). Psychology's "Binding Problem" and Possible Neurobiological Solutions. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (1):66-90.
    Given what we know about the segregated nature of the brain and the relative absence of multi-modal association areas in the cortex, how percepts become unified is not clear. However, if we could work out how and where the brain joins together segregated outputs, we would have a start in localizing the neuronal processes that correlate with conscious perceptual experiences. In this essay, I critically examine data relevant for understanding the neurophysiological underpinnings of perception. In particular, I examine the possibility (...)
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  15.  43
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1998). On the Matter of Minds and Mental Causation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):1-25.
    There is a difference between someone breaking a glass by accidentally brushing up against it and smashing a glass in a fit of anger. In the first case, the person's cognitive state has little to do with the event, but in the second, the mental state qua anger is quite relevant. How are we to understand this difference? What is the proper way to understand the relation between the mind, the brain, and the resultant behavior? This paper explores the popular (...)
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  16.  68
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2002). On the Normativity of Functions. In Andre Ariew (ed.), Functions. Oxford University Press
  17. Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1995). A Critique of Information Processing Theories of Consciousness. Minds and Machines 5 (1):89-107.
    Information processing theories in psychology give rise to executive theories of consciousness. Roughly speaking, these theories maintain that consciousness is a centralized processor that we use when processing novel or complex stimuli. The computational assumptions driving the executive theories are closely tied to the computer metaphor. However, those who take the metaphor serious — as I believe psychologists who advocate the executive theories do — end up accepting too particular a notion of a computing device. In this essay, I examine (...)
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  18.  46
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1992). Reduction, Explanatory Extension, and the Mind/Brain Sciences. Philosophy of Science 59 (3):408-28.
    In trying to characterize the relationship between psychology and neuroscience, the trend has been to argue that reductionism does not work without suggesting a suitable substitute. I offer explanatory extension as a good model for elucidating the complex relationship among disciplines which are obviously connected but which do not share pragmatic explanatory features. Explanatory extension rests on the idea that one field can "illuminate" issues that were incompletely treated in another. In this paper, I explain how this "illumination" would work (...)
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  19.  58
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2004). HOT Theories of Consciousness: More Sad Tales of Philosophical Intuitions Gone Astray. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins 277.
  20.  58
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2003). Emotions and Narrative Selves. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (4):353-356.
  21.  9
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle & Rosalyn Walker Stewart (2002). Supporting Irrational Suicide. Bioethics 16 (5):425–438.
  22.  52
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1994). The Image of Observables. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):585-597.
    This paper challenges a central tenet of constructive empiricism, namely that empirical adequacy has a privileged epistemic status. I argue that perceptions of observables are theory-wrought, and theory-wrought in the same ways as the observation sentences we use to describe those perceptions, van Fraassen can draw no privileged or fundamental distinction between what we observe and interpreting those observations through theory. Since empirical adequacy depends upon accurately describing what we observe, and we have no theory-independent reason to believe that what (...)
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  23.  28
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1995). Computationalism. Synthese 105 (3):303-17.
    What counts as a computation and how it relates to cognitive function are important questions for scientists interested in understanding how the mind thinks. This paper argues that pragmatic aspects of explanation ultimately determine how we answer those questions by examining what is needed to make rigorous the notion of computation used in the (cognitive) sciences. It (1) outlines the connection between the Church-Turing Thesis and computational theories of physical systems, (2) differentiates merely satisfying a computational function from true computation, (...)
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  24.  10
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2000). C. Richard Chapman, Yoshio Nakamura and Chris-Topher N. Chapman/Pain and Folk Theory 209–222 Don Gustafson/on the Supposed Utility of a Folk Theory of Pain 223–228 Kenneth J. Sufka/Searching for a Common Ground: A Commentary on Resnik's Folk Psychology of Pain 229–231. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 1:409-411.
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  25.  55
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle, The Binding Problem.
    It is important to separate the question of binding from the problem of consciousness. Undoubtedly, there are some close connections between the two: my conscious experience is of a bound unity. But my unconscious experiences -- subliminal impressions, masked primings, etc. -- might be bound too for all I know. Hence, some of the recent commentators speak too loosely when they talk of 40 Hz oscillations solving some problem of conscious perception.
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  26.  8
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1993). The Naturalists Versus the Skeptics: The Debate Over a Scientific Understanding of Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 14 (1):27-50.
    There are three basic skeptical arguments against developing a scientific theory of consciousness: theory cannot capture a first person perspective; consciousness is causally inert with respect to explaining cognition; and the notion "consciousness" is too vague to be a natural kind term. Although I am sympathetic to naturalists' counter-arguments, I also believe that most of the accounts given so far of how explaining consciousness would fit into science are incorrect. In this essay, I indicate errors my colleagues on both sides (...)
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  27.  9
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2004). Getting to Grips with the Brain Problem. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (8):339-340.
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  28.  42
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1998). The Puzzle of Attention, the Importance of Metaphors. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):331-351.
    I have two goals in this paper. First, I want to show by example that inferences about theoretical entities are relatively contingent affairs. Previously accepted conceptual metaphors in science set both the general form of new theories and our acceptance of the theories as plausible. In addition, they determine how we define the relevant parameters in investigating phenomena in the first place. These items then determine how we conceptualize things in the world. Second, and maybe more importantly, I want to (...)
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  29. Eric Dietrich & Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2004). Sisyphus's Boulder: Consciousness and the Limits of the Knowable. John Benjamins.
    In Sisyphus's Boulder, Eric Dietrich and Valerie Hardcastle argue that we will never get such a theory because consciousness has an essential property that..
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  30. Andrew Garnar & Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2004). The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  31.  24
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2004). The Elusive Illusion of Sensation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):662-663.
    The sensation of will is not the same thing as the will itself any more than the sensation of hunger is the same thing as being devoid of nutrients. This is not a really surprising claim, but it is the only claim to which Wegner is entitled in his book.
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  32.  16
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1991). Partitions, Probabilistic Causal Laws, and Simpson's Paradox. Synthese 86 (2):209 - 228.
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  33.  23
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1996). Functionalism's Response to the Problem of Absent Qualia. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):357-73.
    It seems that we could be physically the same as we are now, only we would lack conscious awareness. If so, then nothing about our physical world is necessary for qualitative experience. However, a proper analysis of psychological functionalism eliminates this problem concerning the possibility of zombies. ‘Friends of absent qualia’ rely on an overly simple view of what counts as a functional analysis and of the function/structure distinction. The level of thought is not the only level at which one (...)
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  34. Guven Guzeldere, Owen J. Flanagan & Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2000). The Nature and Function of Consciousness: Lessons From Blindsight. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The New Cognitive Neurosciences: 2nd Edition. MIT Press
  35.  52
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1997). [Explanation] is Explanation Better. Philosophy of Science 64 (1):154-60.
    Robert Wilson (1994) maintains that many interesting and fundamental aspects of psychology are non-individualistic because large chunks of psychology depend upon organisms being deeply embedded in some environment. I disagree and present one version of narrow content that allows enough reference to the environment to meet any wide challenge. I argue that most psychologists are already this sort of narrow content theorist and that these narrow content explanations of psychological phenomena meet Wilson's criteria for being a good explanation better than (...)
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  36.  3
    Bruce Glymour, Rick Grush, Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Brian Keeley, Joe Ramsey, Oron Shagrir & Ellen Watson (1992). The Cartesian Theater Stance. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):209-210.
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  37.  52
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2008). Review of Carl F. Craver, Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (1).
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  38. Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1996). How We Get There From Here: Dissolution of the Binding Problem. Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (3):251-66.
    On the one hand, we think that our conscious perceptions are tied to some stage of whatever processing stream we have. On the other hand, we think that our conscious experiences have to resemble the computational states that instantiate them. However, nothing in our alleged stream resembles our experienced perceptions. Hence, a conflict. The question is: How can we go from what we know about neurons, their connections, and firing patterns, to explaining what conscious perceptual experiences are like? No intuitive (...)
     
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  39.  50
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2008). Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness - by Daniel Stoljar. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 49 (3):274-275.
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  40. Valerie Gray Hardcastle & C. Matthew Stewart (2005). Localization in the Brain and Other Illusions. In Andrew Brook (ed.), Cognition and the Brain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
     
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  41.  27
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1993). Evolutionary Epistemology as an Overlapping, Interlevel Theory. Biology and Philosophy 8 (2):173-192.
    I examine the branch of evolutionary epistemology which tries to account for the character of cognitive mechanisms in animals and humans by extending the biological theory of evolution to the neurophysiological substrates of cognition. Like Plotkin, I construe this branch as a struggling science, and attempt to characterize the sort of theory one might expect to find this truly interdisciplinary endeavor, an endeavor which encompasses not only evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, and developmental neuroscience, but also and especially, the computational modeling (...)
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  42.  15
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1999). Scientific Papers Have Various Structures. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):415-439.
    Fred Suppe claims that the refereed journal article is an appropriate unit of scientific debate for philosophical analysis. He also claims that when we regiment scientific papers correctly, we can see that the hypothetico-deductive method, Baysian induction, and inference to the best explanation fail to capture the structure of scientific articles adequately. In what follows I demonstrate that the coding scheme Suppe used for uncovering the structure of a scientific paper is not appropriate under all circumstances, illustrate alternative structures found (...)
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  43.  44
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle & C. Matthew Stewart (2004). Neuroscience and the Art of Single-Cell Recordings. Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):195-208.
    This article examines how scientists move from physical measurementsto actual observation of single-cell recordings in the brain. We highlight how easy it is to change the fundamental nature of ourobservations using accepted methodological techniques for manipulatingraw data. Collecting single-cell data is thoroughly pragmatic. Weconclude that there is no deep or interesting difference betweenaccounting for observations by measurements and accounting forobservations by theories.
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  44.  44
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1998). Assuming Away the Explanatory Gap. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):173-179.
  45.  44
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1997). Why Science is Important for Philosophy. Psycoloquy.
    Levine claims that Locating Consciousness does not seriously address the problem of the explanatory gap; instead it merely provides lots of data. Here I argue that, contrary to the intuitions of some philosophers, the best remedy for our gaps in explanation and understanding is in fact through empirical investigation.
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  46. Andrew Garnar & Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2004). Neurobiological Models: An Unnecessary Divide--Neural Models in Psychiatry. In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press
  47.  43
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2003). The Development of the Self. In Gary D. Fireman, T. E. McVay & Owen J. Flanagan (eds.), Narrative and Consciousness. Oxford University Press
  48.  13
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1997). Consciousness and the Neurobiology of Perceptual Binding. Seminars in Neurology 17:163-70.
  49.  11
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1999). It's Ok to Be Complicated: The Case of Emotion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (11-12):237-249.
    Since at least the time of Darwin, we have recognized that our human emotional life is very similar to the emotional life of other creatures. We all react in characteristic ways to emotionally valenced stimuli. Though other animals may not blush or cry, we all have prototypical ways of expressing anger, disgust, fear, sadness, happiness, and curiosity. In assuming that the neural circuits underlying these reactions are homologous or at least analogous across species, neurophysiologists and neuropsychologists have been able to (...)
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  50. Valerie Gray Hardcastle & C. Matthew Stewart (2001). Theory Structure in Neuroscience. In Peter K. Machamer, Peter McLaughlin & Rick Grush (eds.), Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh Press
     
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