Works by Vann Mcgee ( view other items matching `Vann Mcgee`, view all matches )

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Profile: Vann McGee (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
  1. Vann McGee (2010). Field's Logic of Truth. Philosophical Studies 147 (3).
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  2. Vann McGee (2006). There Are Many Things. In Judith Jarvis Thomson & Alex Byrne (eds.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford University Press.
     
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  3. Vann McGee (2006). There's a Rule for Everything. In Agustín Rayo & Gabriel Uzquiano (eds.), Absolute Generality. Oxford University Press.
     
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  4. Vann McGee (2005). Inscrutability and its Discontents. Noûs 39 (3):397–425.
    That reference is inscrutable is demonstrated, it is argued, not only by W. V. Quine's arguments but by Peter Unger's "Problem of the Many." Applied to our own language, this is a paradoxical result, since nothing could be more obvious to speakers of English than that, when they use the word "rabbit," they are talking about rabbits. The solution to this paradox is to take a disquotational view of reference for one's own language, so that "When I use 'rabbit,' I (...)
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  5. Vann Mcgee (2004). Critical Studies / Book Reviews. Philosophia Mathematica 12 (3):278-284.
  6. Vann Mcgee & Brian P. Mclaughlin (2004). Logical Commitment and Semantic Indeterminacy: A Reply to Williamson. Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (1):123-136.
  7. Vann Mcgee (2001). Truth by Default. Philosophia Mathematica 9 (1).
    There is no preferred reduction of number theory to set theory. Nonetheless, we confidently accept axioms obtained by substituting formulas from the language of set theory into the induction axiom schema. This is only possible, it is argued, because our acceptance of the induction axioms depends solely on the meanings of aritlunetical and logical terms, which is only possible if our 'intended models' of number theory are standard. Similarly, our acceptance of the second-order natural deduction rules depends solely on the (...)
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  8. Vann McGee (2000). To Tell the Truth About Conditionals. Analysis 60 (1):107–111.
  9. Vann McGee & Agustín Rayo (2000). A Puzzle About de Rebus Beliefs. Analysis 60 (4):297–299.
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  10. Vann McGee (1999). An Airtight Dutch Book. Analysis 59 (4):257–265.
  11. Vann McGee & Brian McLaughlin (1998). Timothy Williamson, Vagueness: London and New York: 1994. Linguistics and Philosophy 21 (2):221-235.
  12. Vann McGee (1997). How We Learn Mathematical Language. Philosophical Review 106 (1):35-68.
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  13. Vann McGee (1997). Revision. Philosophical Issues 8:387-406.
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  14. Vann McGee (1997). The Complexity of the Modal Predicate Logic of "True in Every Transitive Model of ZF". Journal of Symbolic Logic 62 (4):1371-1378.
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  15. Vann McGee (1996). Logical Operations. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (6):567 - 580.
    Tarski and Mautner proposed to characterize the logical operations on a given domain as those invariant under arbitrary permutations. These operations are the ones that can be obtained as combinations of the operations on the following list: identity; substitution of variables; negation; finite or infinite disjunction; and existential quantification with respect to a finite or infinite block of variables. Inasmuch as every operation on this list is intuitively logical, this lends support to the Tarski-Mautner proposal.
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  16. Vann McGee (1996). The Revision Theory of Truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):727-730.
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  17. Vann McGee & Brian McLaughlin (1995). Distinctions Without a Difference. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):203-251.
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  18. Vann McGee (1994). Learning the Impossible. In Ellery Eells & Brian Skyrms (eds.), Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Cambridge University Press.
  19. Vann McGee (1994). On the Degrees of Unsolvability of Modal Predicate Logics of Provability. Journal of Symbolic Logic 59 (1):253-261.
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  20. Vann McGee (1993). A Semantic Conception of Truth? Philosophical Topics 21 (2):83-111.
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  21. Vann Mcgee (1993). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Mind 102 (408):518-.
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  22. Vann McGee (1993). If P, Then Q. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):239-242.
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  23. Vann McGee (1992). Maximal Consistent Sets of Instances of Tarski's Schema (T). Journal of Philosophical Logic 21 (3):235 - 241.
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  24. Vann McGee (1992). Two Problems with Tarski's Theory of Consequence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92:273 - 292.
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  25. Keith Lehrer & Vann McGee (1991). An Epistemic Principle Which Solves Newcomb's Paradox. Grazer Philosophische Studien 40:197-217.
    If it is certain that performing an observation to determine whether P is true will in no way influence whether P is tme, then the proposition that the observation is performed ought to be probabilistically independent of P. Applying the notion of "observation" liberally, so that a wide variety of actions are treated as observations, this proposed new principle of belief revision yields the result that simple utihty maximization gives the correct solution to the Fisher smoking paradox and the two-box (...)
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  26. Vann McGee (1991). Comments on NUTE and Sanford. Noûs 25 (2):212-213.
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  27. Vann McGee (1991). Reply to Christian Piller. Grazer Philosophische Studien 40:229-232.
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  28. Vann McGee (1991). Truth, Vagueness and Paradox. Hackett.
     
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  29. Vann McGee (1991). We Turing Machines Aren't Expected-Utility Maximizers (Even Ideally). Philosophical Studies 64 (1):115 - 123.
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  30. Vann McGee & Richard T. Oehrle (1990). Logic and Linguistics Meeting, Tucson, 1989. Journal of Symbolic Logic 55 (1):446.
  31. Vann McGee (1989). Applying Kripke's Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 86 (10):530-539.
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  32. Vann McGee (1989). Conditional Probabilities and Compounds of Conditionals. Philosophical Review 98 (4):485-541.
  33. George Boolos & Vann McGee (1987). The Degree of the Set of Sentences of Predicate Provability Logic That Are True Under Every Interpretation. Journal of Symbolic Logic 52 (1):165-171.
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  34. Vann McGee (1985). A Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Journal of Philosophy 82 (9):462-471.
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  35. Vann McGee (1985). ``A Counterexample to Modus Ponens&Quot. Journal of Philosophy 83:462-471.
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  36. Vann McGee (1985). How Truthlike Can a Predicate Be? A Negative Result. Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (4):399 - 410.
  37. Vann McGee (1981). Finite Matrices and the Logic of Conditionals. Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (3):349 - 351.
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