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  1. Vassilios Livanios (2014). Radical Non-Dispositionalism and the Permutation Problem. Axiomathes 24 (1):45-61.
    Radical non-dispositionalism is the view according to which the actual causal/nomic roles of natural properties are totally irrelevant to their de re modal representation. The major difficulty besetting all forms of radical non-dispositionalism is that the latter allegedly allows the metaphysical possibility of two natural properties swapping their actual causal/nomic roles. The aim of this paper is to provide a plausible solution to that problem. To this end, I describe the necessary steps that a proponent of the view may take (...)
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  2. Vassilios Livanios (2013). Is There a (Compelling) Gauge-Theoretic Argument Against the Intrinsicality of Fundamental Properties? European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (2):30-38.
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  3. Vassilios Livanios (2012). Exploring the Metaphysics of Nomic Relations. Acta Analytica 27 (3):247-264.
    After defending the ontologically genuine existence of at least some of the actual nomic relations, I discuss some issues concerning their metaphysical features. I firstly argue in favour of the metaphysical contingency of nomic relations and then I suggest that their relata-specificity is the most plausible metaphysical view that guarantees the unity of facts that the laws of nature are. Finally, I present a novel account according to which some of the actual nomic relations are neither external nor external but (...)
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  4. Vassilios Livanios (2011). On the Possibility of Contigently Dispositional Properties. Abstracta 6 (1):3-17.
    Metaphysicians who hold that there is an ontological distinction between two kinds of fundamental natural properties assume that properties are dispositional or non-dispositional necessarily. In contrast to this, I suggest that one can admit the existence of fundamental contingently dispositional properties. After some clarifications concerning the content of the suggested view, I respond to several objections regarding its intelligibility and viability and outline two of its important consequences.
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  5. Vassilios Livanios (2010). Symmetries, Dispositions and Essences. Philosophical Studies 148 (2):295 - 305.
    Dispositional essentialists ultimately appeal to dispositional essences in order to provide (a) an explanation of the conservation of physical quantities and (b) identity conditions for fundamental physical properties. This paper aims to offer alternative suggestions based on symmetry considerations and exhibits their consequences for the thesis of dispositional essentialism.
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  6. Vassilios Livanios (2008). Bird and the Dispositional Essentialist Account of Spatiotemporal Relations. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 39 (2):383 - 394.
    The basic principles of dispositional essentialism do not require that the fundamental spatiotemporal relations are dispositional in nature. Nevertheless, Bird (who defends dispositional monism) argues that they possess dispositional essences in virtue of the fact that the obtaining of these relations can be characterised by the satisfaction of a certain counterfactual. In this paper I argue that his suggestion fails, and so, despite his attempt, the case of the spatiotemporal relations remains the ‘big bad bug’ for the thesis of dispositional (...)
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  7. Vassilios Livanios (2007). Tropes, Particularity, and Space-Time. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 38 (2):357 - 368.
    Several difficulties, concerning the individuation and the variation of tropes, beset the initial classic version of trope theory. K. Campbell (Abstract particulars, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1990) presented a modified version that aims to avoid those difficulties. Unfortunately, the revised theory cannot make the case that one of the fundamental tropes, space-time, is a genuine particular.
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