One way to obtain a comprehensive semantics for various systems of modal logic is to use a general notion of non-normal world. In the present article, a general notion of modal system is considered together with a semantic framework provided by such a general notion of non-normal world. Methodologically, the main purpose of this paper is to provide a logical framework for the study of various modalities, notably prepositional attitudes. Some specific systems are studied together with semantics using non-normal worlds (...) of different kinds. (shrink)

We revive the idea that a deductive-nomological explanation of a scientific theory by its successor may be defensible, even in those common and troublesome cases where the theories concerned are mutually incompatible; and limiting, approximating and counterfactual assumptions may be required in order to define a logical relation between them. Our solution is based on a general characterization of limiting relations between physical theories using the method of nonstandard analysis.

This essay is an attempt to consider dynamic aspects of scientific theorising from a formal perspective. Our emphasis will be on the aims and methods for constructing formal models of theory dynamics which will be conceived from a general or 'theoretical' rather than 'applied' standpoint.

In this paper we give the gist of our reconstructed notion of (limiting case) correspondence. Our notion is very general, so that it should be applicable to all the cases in which a correspondence has been said to exist in actual science.

The doctrines of scientific realism have enjoyed a close and enduring, if not always harmonious, association with Tarski's semantic conception of truth and theories of formal semantics generally. From its inception Tarski's theory received unqualified support from some realists, like Karl Popper, who saw it as legitimizing the use of semantic notions in epistemology and the philosophy of science.

A systematic attempt to understand cognitive characteristics of translation by bringing its logical, pragmatic, and hermeneutic features together and examining a number of scientific, logical (philosophical and formal),and philosophical applications. The notion of translation investigated here is called explanatory since it is not a translation in the standard, meaning-saving sense but aims to provide an explanation for the meaning change in exact terms.

Though formal metascience has made rapid advances over the past few decades, it has seldom been seen to contribute much to the rational reconstruction of scientic development; for the most part, logical concepts have found application in the synchronic analysis of scientic theories. It should be important, therefore, to consider to what extent diachronic or dynamic aspects of scientic theorizing may also be captured within the connes of a formal metascientic framework, and what tools are best suited for constructing a (...) general model of theory dynamics. (shrink)

The first half of this collection addresses these themes as given voice by the philosopher and critic Arthur Danto, while the second part contains essays of a more independent cast which assume a variety of stating points aimed at illuminating the theoreticity, temporality, computability, and abstract possibilities of present and future arts.

It used to be a common view in the philosophy of science as well as among the scientists themselves that scientic change has been and will be continuos. Even in the most radical changes of theories the growth of knowledge was claimed to be cumulative. Thus, for instance, physicists may say that in radical, revolutionary changes of theories there obtains, however, some kind of correspondence between the old and new theories; the old theory can be regarded at least as a (...) limiting case of the new one. Thus, for instance, classical particle mechanics is a limiting case of both relativistic particle mechanics and quantum mechanics. Some philosophers, as, e.g., Stegmuller [17], go even further when they claim that there always obtains a reductive correlation in scientic change. The old theory can be reduced to the new one in some specic, or perhaps only intuitive, sense of reduction. However, in the light of what physicists say about correspondence and logicians about reduction, it seems obvious that correspondence should be distinguished from reduction and that one may claim the existence of the former relation, rather than the latter, in the scientic changes. We are not ready to say here what a correspondence relation would exactly consist of, but we will discuss what we think ought to be at least required in comparison with reduction and the related notion of interpre- tation. A detailed case study seems to sustain our views correspondence. (shrink)

This is an interdisciplinary study of what is cognitively going on when we interpret, respresent, or evaluate cultural entities, works of art included. In addition, the role of interpretation in experience and in cultural objects is elucidated from a cognitive point of view. The book relies on theories of action, perception, possible worlds, modalities, intentionality. cognition, and brain research, and it contains anumber of case studies. The book ptovides some new insights into some much-discussed problems related to interpretation.

The book studies philosophical and mathematical-logical problems of modal notions. Its starting points are possible worlds semantics and Kripke models, and it also concentrates on proof-theoretic methods.

Two different but closely related issues in current cognitive science will be considered in this essay. One is the controversial and extensively discussed question of how connectionist and symbolic representations of knowledge are related to each other. The other concerns the notion of connectionist learning and its relevance for the understanding of the distinction between propositional and nonpropositional knowledge. More specifically, I shall give an overview of a result in Rantala and Vadén (1994) establishing a limiting case correspondence between symbolic (...) and connectionist representations and, on the other hand, study the problem, preliminarily investigated in Rantala (1998), of how propositional knowledge may arise from nonpropositional knowledge. I shall also try to point out that on some more or less plausible assumptions, often made by cognitive scientists, these results may have some significance when we try to comprehend the nature of human knowledge representation. Some of these assumptions are rather hypothethical and debatable for the time being and they will become justified in the future only if there will be more progress in the empirical and theoretical research on the brain and on artificial networks. The assumptions concern, besides some questions of the behavior of neural networks, such things as the relevance of pattern recognition for modelling human cognition, in particular, knowledge acquisition, and the relation between emergence and reduction. (shrink)

Finland is internationally known as one of the leading centers of twentieth century analytic philosophy. This volume offers for the first time an overall survey of the Finnish analytic school. The rise of this trend is illustrated by original articles of Edward Westermarck, Eino Kaila, Georg Henrik von Wright, and Jaakko Hintikka. Contributions of Finnish philosophers are then systematically discussed in the fields of logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, history of philosophy, ethics and social philosophy. Metaphilosophical reflections on (...) the nature of philosophy are highlighted by the Finnish dialogue between analytic philosophy, phenomenology, pragmatism, and critical theory. (shrink)