Recent models on speech perception propose a dual stream processing network, with a dorsal stream, extending from the posterior temporal lobe of the left hemisphere through inferior parietal areas into the left inferior frontal gyrus, and a ventralstream that is assumed to originate in the primary auditory cortex in the upper posterior part of the temporal lobe and to extend towards the anterior part of the temporal lobe, where it may connect to the ventral (...) part of the inferior frontal gyrus. This article describes and reviews the results from a series of complementary functional magnetic imaging (fMRI) studies that aimed to trace the hierarchical processing network for speech comprehension within the left and right hemisphere with a particular focus on the temporal lobe and the ventralstream. As hypothesised, the results demonstrate a bilateral involvement of the temporal lobes in the processing of speech signals. However, an increasing leftward asymmetry was detected from auditory-phonetic to lexico-semantic processing and along the posterior-anterior axis, thus forming a “lateralisation” gradient. This increasing leftward lateralisation was particularly evident for the left superior temporal sulcus (STS) and more anterior parts of the temporal lobe. (shrink)
Opposed to Norman's proposal, processing of affordance is likely to occur not solely in the dorsal stream but also in the ventralstream. Moreover, the dorsal stream might do more than just serve an important role in motor actions. It supports egocentric location coding as well. As such, it would possess a form of representational memory, contrary to Norman's proposal.
Several lines of evidence indicate that rapid target-aiming movements, involving both the eyes and hand, can be biased by the visual context in which the movements are performed. Some of these contextual influences carry-over from trial to trial. This research indicates that dissociation between the dorsal and ventral systems based on speed, conscious awareness, and frame of reference is far from clear.
David Milner and Melvyn Goodale’s dissociation hypothesis is commonly taken to state that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in striate (V1) cortex: a dorsal, action-related “unconscious” stream and a ventral, perception-related “conscious” stream. As Milner and Goodale acknowledge, findings from blindsight studies suggest a more sophisticated picture that replaces the distinction between unconscious vision for action and conscious vision for perception with a tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision (...) for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. The combination excluded by the tripartite division is the possibility of conscious vision for action. But are there good grounds for concluding that there is no conscious vision for action? There is now overwhelming evidence that illusions and perceived size can have a significant effect on action (Bruno & Franz, 2009; Dassonville & Bala, 2004; Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008; McIntosh & Lashley, 2008). There is also suggestive evidence that any sophisticated visual behavior requires collaboration between the two visual streams at every stage of the process (Schenk & McIntosh, 2010). I nonetheless want to make a case for the tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. My aim here is not to refute the evidence showing that conscious vision can affect action but rather to argue (a) that we cannot gain cognitive access to action-guiding dorsal stream representations, and (b) that these representations do not correlate with phenomenal consciousness. This vindicates the semi-conservative view that the dissociation hypothesis is best understood as a tripartite division. (shrink)
Blindsight and vision for action seem to be exemplars of unconscious visual processes. However, researchers have recently argued that blindsight is not really a kind of uncon- scious vision but is rather severely degraded conscious vision. Morten Overgaard and col- leagues have recently developed new methods for measuring the visibility of visual stimuli. Studies using these methods show that reported clarity of visual stimuli correlates with accuracy in both normal individuals and blindsight patients. Vision for action has also come under (...) scrutiny. Recent ﬁndings seem to show that information processed by the dor- sal stream for online action contributes to visual awareness. Some interpret these results as showing that some dorsal stream processes are conscious visual processes (e.g., Gallese, 2007; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003). The aim of this paper is to provide new support for the more traditional view that blindsight and vision for action are genuinely unconscious per- ceptual processes. I argue that individuals with blindsight do not have access to the kind of purely qualitative color and size information which normal individuals do. So, even though people with blindsight have a kind of cognitive consciousness, visual information process- ing in blindsight patients is not associated with a distinctly visual phenomenology. I argue further that while dorsal stream processing seems to contribute to visual awareness, only information processed by the early dorsal stream (V1, V2, and V3) is broadcast to working memory. Information processed by later parts of the dorsal stream (the parietal lobe) never reaches working memory and hence does not correlate with phenomenal awareness. I con- clude that both blindsight and vision for action are genuinely unconscious visual processes. (shrink)
Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the "two visual systems" hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in conscious visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver's bodily actions. In this paper, I review and assess three main sources (...) of evidence for the two visual systems hypothesis. I argue that the best interpretation of the evidence is in fact consistent with both claims. I conclude with some brief remarks on the relation between visual consciousness and rational agency. (shrink)
Today many philosophers of mind accept that the two cortical streams of visual processing in humans can be distinguished in terms of conscious experience. The ventralstream is thought to produce representations that may become conscious, and the dorsal stream is thought to handle unconscious vision for action. Despite a vast literature on the topic of the two streams, there is currently no account of the way in which the relevant empirical evidence could fit with basic Husserlian (...) phenomenology of vision. Here I offer such an account. In this article, I show how the empirical evidence ought to be understood in a way that is informed by phenomenology. The differences in the two streams are better described as differences in spatial and temporal processing. Rather than simply “unconscious,” the dorsal stream can be better described as making a special contribution to what Husserl identified as the visual horizon. (shrink)
The author argues that the theory of a dorsal/ventralstream for visual processing can be used to reconcile the constructivist and direct perception theories. My commentary discusses neurophysiological and psychophysical studies that run counter to the view. In addition, the central issue of debate between the constructionist and direct perception approaches regarding what is visual information is discussed.
Higher order sensory processing follows a general subdivision into a ventral and a dorsal stream for visual, auditory, and tactile information. Object identification is processed in temporal structures (ventralstream), whereas object localization leads to activation of parietal structures (dorsal stream). To examine whether the chemical senses demonstrate a similar dissociation, we investigated odor identification and odor localization in 16 healthy young subjects using functional MRI. We used two odors (1. eucalyptol; 2. a mixture of (...) phenylethanol and carbon dioxide) which were delivered to only one nostril. During odor identification subjects had to recognize the odor; during odor localisation they had to detect the stimulated nostril. We used General Linear Model (GLM) as a classical method as well as Independent Component Analysis (ICA) in order to investigate a possible neuroanatomical dissociation between both tasks. Both methods showed differences between tasks - confirming a dual processing stream in the chemical senses - but revealed complementary results. Specifically, GLM identified the left intraparietal sulcus and the right superior frontal sulcus to be more activated when subjects were localising the odorants. For the same task, ICA identified a significant cluster in the left parietal lobe (paracentral lobule) but also in the right hippocampus. While GLM did not find significant activations for odor identification, ICA revealed two clusters (in the left central fissure and the left superior frontal gyrus) for this task. These data demonstrate that higher order chemosensory processing shares the general subdivision into a ventral and a dorsal processing stream with other sensory systems and suggest that this is a global principle, independent of sensory channels. (shrink)
Milner and Goodale’s influential account of the primate cortical visual streams involves a division of consciousness between them, for it is the ventralstream that has the responsibility for visual consciousness. Hence, the dorsal visual stream is a “zombie” stream. In this paper, I argue that certain information carried by the dorsal stream likely plays a central role in the egocentric spatial content of experience, especially the experience of visual spatial constancy. Thus, the dorsal (...) class='Hi'>stream contributes to a pervasive feature of consciousness. (shrink)
Stream of Consciousness is about the phenomenology of conscious experience. Barry Dainton shows us that stream of consciousness is not a mosaic of discrete fragments of experience, but rather an interconnected flowing whole. Through a deep probing into the nature of awareness, introspection, phenomenal space and time consciousness, Dainton offers a truly original understanding of the nature of consciousness.
In his paper, “The Dorsal Stream and the Visual Horizon,” Michael Madary argues that “dorsal stream processing plays a main role in the spatiotemporal limits of visual perception, in what Husserl identified as the visual horizon” (Madary 2011, p. 424). Madary regards himself as thereby providing a theoretical framework “sensitive to basic Husserlian phenomenology” (Madary 2011). In particular, Madary draws connections between perceptual anticipations and the experience of the indeterminate spatial margins, on the one hand, and the Husserlian (...) spatiotemporal visual horizons, on the other. I argue that Madary’s arguments, for a Husserlian view of the two visual systems, are not convincing. When the notion of visual horizon is adequately understood as a constitutive notion, there will be reason to regard the connections between dorsal processing and the Husserlian spatiotemporal horizons as tenuous at best. (shrink)
The build-up of auditory stream segregation refers to the notion that sequences of alternating A and B sounds initially tend to be heard as a single stream, but with time appear to split into separate streams. The central assumption in the analysis of this phenomenon is that streaming sequences are perceived as one stream at the beginning by default. In the present study, we test the validity of this assumption and document its impact on the apparent build-up (...) phenomenon. Human listeners were presented with ABAB sequences, where A and B were harmonic tone complexes of seven different fundamental frequency separations (∆f) ranging from 2 to 14 semitones. Subjects had to indicate, as promptly as possible, their initial percept of the sequences, as either “one stream” or “two streams”, and any changes thereof during the sequences. We found that subjects did not generally indicate a one-stream percept at the beginning of streaming sequences. Instead, the first perceptual decision depended on ∆f, with the probability of a one-stream percept decreasing, and that of a two-stream percept increasing, with increasing ∆f. Furthermore, subjects required some time to make and report a decision on their perceptual organization. Taking this time into account, the resulting time courses of two-stream probabilities differ markedly from those suggested by the conventional analysis. A build-up-like increase in two-stream probability was found only for the ∆f of 6 semitones. At the other ∆f conditions no or only minor increases in two-stream probability occurred. These results shed new light on the build-up of stream segregation and its possible neural correlates. (shrink)
In functional neuroimaging studies, ventral parietal cortex (VPC) is recruited by very different cognitive tasks. Explaining the contributions VPC to these tasks has become a topic of intense study and lively debate. Perception studies frequently find VPC activations during tasks involving attention-reorienting, and memory studies frequently find them during tasks involving episodic recollection. According to the Attention to Memory (AtoM) model, both phenomena can be explained by the same VPC function: bottom-up attention. Yet, a recent functional MRI (fMRI) meta-analysis (...) suggested that attention-reorienting activations are more frequent in anterior VPC, whereas recollection activations are more frequent in posterior VPC. Also, there is evidence that anterior and posterior VPC regions have different functional connectivity patterns. To investigate these issues, we conducted a resting-state functional connectivity analysis using as seeds the center-of-mass of attention-reorienting and recollection activations in the meta-analysis, which were located in the supramarginal gyrus (SMG, around the temporo-parietal junction—TPJ) and in the angular gyrus (AG), respectively. The SMG seed showed stronger connectivity with ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) and occipito-temporal cortex, whereas the AG seed showed stronger connectivity with the hippocampus and default network regions. To investigate whether these connectivity differences were graded or sharp, VLPFC and hippocampal connectivity was measured in VPC regions traversing through the SMG and AG seeds. The results showed a graded pattern: VLPFC connectivity gradually decreases from SMG to AG, whereas hippocampal connectivity gradually increases from SMG to AG. Importantly, both gradients showed an abrupt break when extended beyond VPC borders. This finding suggests that functional differences between SMG and AG are more subtle than previously thought. These connectivity differences can be explained by differences. (shrink)
Normal aging is associated with a decline in different cognitive domains and local structural atrophy as well as decreases in dopamine concentration and receptor density. To date, it is largely unknown how these reductions in dopaminergic neurotransmission affect human brain regions responsible for reward-based decision making in older adults. Using a learning criterion in a probabilistic object reversal task, we found a learning stage by age interaction in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) during decision making. While young adults recruited the (...) dlPFC in an early stage of learning reward associations, older adults recruited the dlPFC when reward associations had already been learned. Furthermore, we found a reduced change in ventral striatal BOLD signal in older as compared to younger adults in response to high probability rewards. Our data are in line with behavioral evidence that older adults show altered stimulus reward learning and support the view of an altered fronto-striatal interaction during reward-based decision making in old age, which contributes to prolonged learning of reward associations. (shrink)
Humans are remarkably proficient at categorizing visually-similar objects. To better understand the cortical basis of this categorization process, we used magnetoencephalography (MEG) to record neural activity while participants learned--with feedback--to discriminate two highly-similar, novel visual categories. We hypothesized that although prefrontal regions would mediate early category learning, this role would diminish with increasing category familiarity and that regions within the ventral visual pathway would come to play a more prominent role in encoding category-relevant information as learning progressed. Early in (...) learning we observed some degree of categorical discriminability and predictability in both the prefrontal cortex and the ventral visual pathway. Predictability improved significantly above chance in the ventral visual pathway over the course of learning with the left inferiortemporal and fusiform gyri showing the greatest improvement in predictability between 150-250msec (M200) during category learning. In contrast, there was no comparable increase in discriminability in prefrontal cortex with the only significant post-learning effect being a decrease in predictability in inferior frontal gyrus between 250-350msec (M300). Thus, the ventral visual pathway appears to encode learned visual categories over the long term. At the same time these results add to our understanding of the cortical origins of previously-reported signature temporal components associated with perceptual learning. (shrink)
Deictic coding offers a useful model for understanding the interactions between the dorsal and ventral streams of visual processing in the cerebral cortex. By extending Ballard et al.'s ideas on teleassistance, I show how dedicated low-level visuomotor processes in the dorsal stream might be engaged for the services of high-level cognitive operations in the ventralstream.
O'Regan & Noë run into some difficulty in trying to reconcile their “seeing as acting” proposal with the perception and action account of the functions of the two streams of visual projections in the primate cerebral cortex. I suggest that part of the problem is their reluctance to acknowledge that the mechanisms in the ventralstream may play a more critical role in visual awareness and qualia than mechanisms in the dorsal stream.
The cortical visual mechanisms involved in processing spatial relationships remain subject to debate. According to one current view, the ''dorsal stream'' of visual areas, emanating from primary visual cortex and culminating in the posterior parietal cortex, mediates this aspect of visual processing. More recently, others have argued that while the dorsal stream provides egocentric coding of visual location for motor control, the separate ''ventral'' stream is needed for allocentric spatial coding. We have assessed the visual form (...) agnosic patient DF, whose lesion mainly affects the ventralstream, on a prehension task requiring allocentric spatial coding. She was presented with transparent circular disks. Each disk had circular holes cut in it. DF was asked to reach out and grasp the disk by placing her fingers through the holes. The disks either had three holes (for forefinger, middle finger, and thumb) or two holes (for forefinger and thumb). The distance between the forefinger and thumb holes, and the orientation of the line formed by them, were independently varied. DF was quite unable to adjust her grip aperture or her hand orientation in the three-hole task. Although she was able to orient her hand appropriately for the two-hole disks, she still remained unable to adjust her grip aperture to the distance between the holes. These findings are consistent with the idea that allocentric processing of spatial information requires a functioning ventralstream, even when the information is being used to guide a motor response. (shrink)
Whether or not the correspondence of dorsal stream functions to Gibsonian ecological psychology and the ventralstream functions to “constructivism” hold up, the overall goal of capturing a pragmatic realism should not be forgotten.
It is our contention that the concept of planning in Glover's model is too broadly defined, encompassing both action/goal selection and the programming of the constituent movements required to acquire the goal. We argue that this monolithic view of planning is untenable on neuropsychological, neurophysiological, and behavioural grounds. The evidence demands instead that a distinction be made between action planning and the specification of the initial kinematic parameters, with the former depending on processing in the ventralstream and (...) the latter on processing in the dorsal stream. (shrink)
The etiology of visual hallucinations is largely undetermined in schizophrenia. Collerton et al.'s PAD model partly concurs with what we know about neurocognition in schizophrenia, but we need to specify the types of perceptual and attentional abnormalities that are implicated in recurrent complex visual hallucinations (RCVH). Available data suggest that abnormal attentional control and top-down processing play a larger role than the ventralstream deficits.
In the target article Pylyshyn revives the spectre of the “little green man,” arguing for a largely symbolic representation of visual imagery. To clarify this problem, we provide precise definitions of the key term “picture,” present some examples of our definition, and outline an information-theoretic analysis suggesting that the problem of addressing data in the brain requires a partially analogue and partially symbolic solution. This is made concrete in the ventralstream of object recognition, from V1 to IT (...) cortex. (shrink)
Williams syndrome (WS) is a neurodevelopmental condition that occurs as a result of a contiguous deletion of ∼26-28 genes on chromosome 7q11.23. WS is often associated with a distinctive social phenotype characterized by an increased affinity toward processing faces, reduced sensitivity to fear related social stimuli and a reduced ability to form concrete social relationships. Understanding the biological mechanisms that underlie the social phenotype in WS may elucidate genetic and neural factors influencing the typical development of the social brain. In (...) this article, we review available studies investigating the social phenotype of WS throughout development and neuroimaging studies investigating brain structure and function as related to social and emotional functioning in this condition. This review makes an important contribution by highlighting several neuro-behavioral mechanisms that may be a cause or a consequence of atypical social development in WS. In particular, we discuss how distinctive social behaviors in WS may be associated with alterations or delays in the cortical representation of faces, connectivity within the ventralstream, structure and function of the amygdala and how long- and short-range connections develop within the brain. We integrate research on typical brain development and from existing behavioral and neuroimaging research on WS. We conclude with a discussion of how genetic and environmental factors might interact to influence social brain development in WS and how future neuroimaging and behavioral research can further elucidate social brain development in WS. Lastly, we describe how ongoing studies may translate to improved social developmental outcomes for individuals with WS. (shrink)
Current views of the parietal cortex have difficulty accommodating the human inferior parietal lobe (IPL) within a simple dorsal versus ventralstream dichotomy. In humans, lesions of the right IPL often lead to syndromes such as hemispatial neglect that are seemingly in accord with the proposal that this region has a crucial role in spatial processing. However, recent imaging and lesion studies have revealed that inferior parietal regions have non-spatial functions, such as in sustaining attention, detecting salient events (...) embedded in a sequence of events and controlling attention over time. Here, we review these findings and show that spatial processes and the visual guidance of action are only part of the repertoire of parietal functions. Although sub-regions in the human superior parietal lobe and intraparietal sulcus contribute to vision-for-action and spatial functions, more inferior parietal regions have distinctly non-spatial attributes that are neither conventionally 'dorsal' nor conventionally 'ventral' in nature. (shrink)
Primate inferior temporal (IT) cortex is thought to contain a high-level representation of objects at the interface between vision and semantics. This suggests that the perceived similarity of real-world objects might be predicted from the IT representation. Here we show that objects that elicit similar activity patterns in human IT tend to be judged as similar by humans. The IT representation explained the human judgments better than early visual cortex, other ventralstream regions, and a range of computational (...) models. Human similarity judgments exhibited category clusters that reflected several categorical divisions that are prevalent in the IT representation of both human and monkey, including the animate/inanimate and the face/body division. Human judgments also reflected the within-category representation of IT. However, the judgments transcended the IT representation in that they introduced additional categorical divisions. In particular, human judgments emphasized human-related additional divisions between human and nonhuman animals and between man-made and natural objects. Human IT was more similar to monkey IT than to human judgments. One interpretation is that IT has evolved visual feature detectors that distinguish between animates and inanimates and between faces and bodies because these divisions are fundamental to survival and reproduction for all primate species, and that other brain systems serve to more flexibly introduce species-dependent and evolutionarily more recent divisions. (shrink)
Single-cell studies of monkey posterior parietal cortex (PPC) have revealed the extensive neuronal representations of three-dimensional subject motion and three-dimensional layout of the environment. I propose that navigational planning integrates this PPC information, including gravity signals, with horizontal-plane based information provided by the hippocampal formation, modified in primates by expansion of the ventralstream.
Auditory scene analysis describes the ability to segregate relevant sounds out from the environment and to integrate them into a single sound stream using the characteristics of the sounds to determine whether or not they are related. This study aims to contrast task performances in objective threshold measurements of segregation and integration using identical stimuli, manipulating two variables known to influence streaming, inter-stimulus-interval (ISI) and frequency difference (Δf). For each measurement, one parameter (either ISI or Δf) was held constant (...) while the other was altered in a staircase procedure. By using this paradigm, it is possible to test within-subject across multiple conditions, covering a wide Δf and ISI range in one testing session. The objective tasks were based on across-stream temporal judgments (facilitated by integration) and within-stream deviance detection (facilitated by segregation). Results show the objective integration task is well suited for combination with the staircase procedure, as it yields consistent threshold measurements for separate variations of ISI and Δf, as well as being significantly related to the subjective thresholds. The objective segregation task appears less suited to the staircase procedure. With the integration-based staircase paradigm, a comprehensive assessment of streaming thresholds can be obtained in a relatively short space of time. This permits efficient threshold measurements particularly in groups for which there is little prior knowledge on the relevant parameter space for streaming perception. (shrink)
This paper defends and develops the structuring account of conscious attention: attention is the conscious mental process of structuring one’s stream of consciousness so that some parts of it are more central than others. In the first part of the paper, I motivate the structuring account. Drawing on a variety of resources I argue that the phenomenology of attention cannot be fully captured in terms of how the world appears to the subject, as well as against an atomistic conception (...) of attention. In the second part of the paper, I show how the structuring account can be made precise: attention causes and causally sustains phenomenal relations to hold between the parts of the stream of consciousness; most importantly the relation of one part being peripheral to another. I end by pointing out consequences for both the scientific study of attention as well as for several areas of central philosophical interest. (shrink)
William James described the stream of thought as having two components: (1) a nucleus of highly conscious, often perceptual material; and (2) a fringe of dimly felt contextual information that controls the entry of information into the nucleus and guides the progression of internally directed thought. Here I examine the neural and cognitive correlates of this phenomenology. A survey of the cognitive neuroscience literature suggests that the nucleus corresponds to a dynamic global buffer formed by interactions between different regions (...) of the brain, while the fringe corresponds to a set of mechanisms in the frontal and medial temporal lobes that control the contents of this global buffer. A consequence of this account is that there might be conscious imagistic representations that are not part of the nucleus. I argue that phenomenology can be linked to psychology and neuroscience and a meaningful way that illuminates both. (shrink)
I examine John Campbell’s claim that the determination of the reference of a perceptual demonstrative requires conscious visual object-based selective attention. I argue that although Campbell’s claim to the effect that, first, a complex binding parameter is needed to establish the referent of a perceptual demonstrative, and, second, that this referent is determined independently of, and before, the application of sortals is correct, this binding parameter does not require object-based attention for its construction. If object-based attention were indeed required then (...) the determination of the referent would necessarily involve the application of sortal concepts, since object-based attention initiates top-down cognitive effects on visual processing. I also examine Mohan Matthen’s claim that reference to objects is established only through the visual processing in the dorsal visual stream and argue that although it is true that processing in the dorsal stream can determine reference, a thesis that goes against Campbell’s view that the determination of the referent requires conscious attention, processing along the ventral visual stream can also establish the reference of perceptual demonstratives. It also claim that Matthen’s account of dorsal processing underestimates the kind of information processed along the dorsal stream and this has some implications regarding perceptual demonstratives reference fixing. (shrink)
Machine generated contents note: -- 1. Introduction -- Consciousness and Sensorimotor Dynamics: Methodological Issues -- 2. Computational consciousness, D. Ballard -- 3. Explaining what people say about sensory qualia, J. Kevin O'Regan -- 4. Perception, action, and experience: unraveling the golden braid, A. Clark -- The Two-Visual Systems Hypothesis -- 5. Cortical visual systems for perception and action, A.D. Milner and M.A. Goodale -- 6. Hermann Lotze's Theory of 'Local Sign': evidence from pointing responses in an illusory figure, (...) D.R. Melmoth -- Understanding Agency and Object Perception -- 7. Two visual systems and the feeling of presence, M. Matthen -- 8. Spatial coordinates and phenomenology in the two-visual systems model, P. Jacob and F. de Vignemont -- 9. Perceptual experience and the capacity to act, S. Schellenberg -- Perception and Action: Studies in Cognitive Neuroscience -- 10. Why does the perception-action functional dichotomy not match the ventral-dorsal streams in anatomical segregation: optic ataxia and the function of the dorsal stream, Y. Rossetti et al -- 11. Mapping the neglect syndrome onto neurofunctional streams, G. Vallar and F. Mancini -- 12. Motor representations and the perception of space: perceptual judgments of the boundary of action space, Y. Delevoye-Turrell -- The Role of Action and Sensorimotor Knowledge in Sensorimotor Theories of Perception -- 13. Vision without representation, A. Noe -- 14. Sensorimotor knowledge and the contents of experience, J. Kiverstein -- Boundaries of the Agent -- 15. Extended vision, R. A. Wilson. (shrink)
This paper combines views of Wittgenstein and Heidegger into an account of mind/ action. It does this by suggesting that these two philosophers be viewed in part as descendants of Life?philosophy (Lebensphilosophie). Part I describes the conception of life that informs and emerges from these thinkers. Parts Two and Three detail particular aspects of this conception: Wittgenstein on the constitution of states of life and Heidegger on the flow?structure of the stream of life. The Conclusion offers reasons for believing (...) their combined viewpoint. (shrink)
Experimental data suggest that the division between the visual ventral and dorsal pathways may indeed indicate that static and dynamical information is processed separately. Contrary to Hurford, it is suggested that the ventral pathway primarily generates representations of objects, whereas the dorsal pathway produces representations of events. The semantic object/event distinction may relate to the morpho-syntactic noun/verb distinction.
As many as two million people in the United Kingdom repeatedly see people, animals, and objects that have no objective reality. Hallucinations on the border of sleep, dementing illnesses, delirium, eye disease, and schizophrenia account for 90% of these. The remainder have rarer disorders. We review existing models of recurrent complex visual hallucinations (RCVH) in the awake person, including cortical irritation, cortical hyperexcitability and cortical release, top-down activation, misperception, dream intrusion, and interactive models. We provide evidence that these can neither (...) fully account for the phenomenology of RCVH, nor for variations in the frequency of RCVH in different disorders. We propose a novel Perception and Attention Deficit (PAD) model for RCVH. A combination of impaired attentional binding and poor sensory activation of a correct proto-object, in conjunction with a relatively intact scene representation, bias perception to allow the intrusion of a hallucinatory proto-object into a scene perception. Incorporation of this image into a context-specific hallucinatory scene representation accounts for repetitive hallucinations. We suggest that these impairments are underpinned by disturbances in a lateral frontal cortex–ventral visual stream system. We show how the frequency of RCVH in different diseases is related to the coexistence of attentional and visual perceptual impairments; how attentional and perceptual processes can account for their phenomenology; and that diseases and other states with high rates of RCVH have cholinergic dysfunction in both frontal cortex and the ventral visual stream. Several tests of the model are indicated, together with a number of treatment options that it generates. Key Words: Blindness; Charles Bonnet; cholinergic; cortical release; delirium; dementia; dream intrusion; hallucination; Perception and Attention Deficit (PAD) model; schizophrenia. (shrink)
New forms of river management have emerged following widespread recognition of the environmental damage caused by attempts to harness and control rivers for navigation, consumptive water use and power generation. A dominant top-down engineering-based paradigm is being challenged by catchment-framed, ecosystem-based approaches which claim to place greater emphasis on participation and equity. However, there has been limited attention given to examining these claims, and principles of justice are frequently left unarticulated or embedded in what is still presented as an essentially (...) technical, outcome-driven management process. This paper examines the contribution of an environmental justice framework in articulating and explicating the ethical and political nature of decision making in stream rehabilitation practice. Particular attention is given to distributive, procedural and relational elements of justice, and to the limitations of an anthropocentric approach. A broader-based ecological justice framework is proposed. Several key issues in applying this framework are discussed, including the need for 'situated justice', for multiple voices to be heard, for dealing with unity and diversity at the catchment scales, and in integrating knowledge through genuine transdisciplinary research and practice. (shrink)
Norman's identification of a ventral system embodying a constructivist theory of perception is rejected in favor of an ecological theory of perception and perceptual learning. We summarize research showing that a key motivation for the ventral-constructivist connection, percept-percept coupling, confuses perceptual and post-perceptual processes.
Our commentary focuses on the functional link between the ventral and dorsal systems implied by Norman, as they relate to overt movement. While issues relating to space perception and size constancy are the primary justification for this dual-process theory, the philosophical extensions of this approach are less consistent with examination of motor control and, in particular, motor learning.
To learn a visual code in an unsupervised manner, one may attempt to capture those features of the stimulus set that would contribute signiﬁcantly to a statistically eﬃcient representation (as dictated, e.g., by the Minimum Description Length principle). Paradoxically, all the candidate features in this approach need to be known before statistics over them can be computed. This paradox may be circumvented by conﬁning the repertoire of candidate features to actual scene fragments, which resemble the “what+where” receptive ﬁelds found in (...) the ventral visual stream in primates. We describe a single-layer network that learns such fragments from unsegmented raw images of structured objects. The learning method combines fast imprinting in the feedforward stream with lateral interactions to achieve single-epoch unsupervised acquisition of spatially localized features that can support systematic treatment of structured objects . (shrink)
Recent neuroimaging studies in both human and non-human primates have identified face selective activation in the ventral lateral prefrontal cortex even in the absence of working memory demands. Further, research has suggested that this face-selective response is largely driven by the presence of the eyes. However, the nature and origin of visual category responses in the ventral lateral prefrontal cortex remain unclear. Further, in a broader sense, how do these findings relate to our current understandings of lateral prefrontal (...) cortex? What do these findings tell us about the underlying function and organization principles of the ventral lateral prefrontal cortex? What is the future direction for investigating visual representations in this cortex? This review focuses on the function, topography, and circuitry of the ventral lateral prefrontal cortex to enhance our understanding of the evolution and development of this cortex. (shrink)
The ventral part of lateral posterior parietal cortex (VPC) and the posterior midline region (PMR), including the posterior cingulate cortex and precuneus, tend to show deactivation during demanding cognitive tasks, and have been associated with the default mode of the brain. Interestingly, PMR and VPC activity has been associated with successful episodic retrieval but also with unsuccessful episodic encoding. However, the differential contributions of PMR and VPC to retrieval vs. encoding has never been demonstrated within-subjects and within the same (...) experiment. Here, we directly tested the prediction that PMR and VPC activity should be associated with retrieval success but with encoding failure. Consistent with this prediction, we found across five different fMRI experiments that during retrieval, that activity in these regions is greater for hits than misses, whereas during encoding, it is greater for subsequent misses than hits. We also found that these regions overlap with the ones that show deactivations during conscious rest. Our findings further aid in clarifying the role of the default mode regions in learning and memory. (shrink)
Food waste comprises a significant portion of the waste stream in industrialized countries, contributing to ecological damages and nutritional losses. Guided by a systems approach, this study quantified food waste in one U.S. County in 1998–1999. Publications and personal interviews were used to quantify waste from food production, processing, distribution, and consumption. Approximately 10,205 tons of food waste was generated annually in this community food system. Of all food waste, production waste comprised 20%, processing 1%, distribution 19%, and 60% (...) of food waste was generated by consumers. Less than one-third (28%) of total food waste was recovered via composting (25%) and food donations (3%), and over 7,000 tons (72%) were landfilled. More than 8.8 billion kilocalories of food were wasted, enough to feed county residents for 1.5 months. This case study offers an example of procedures to quantify and compare food waste across a whole community food system. (shrink)
Repetition suppression (RS) is a rapid decrease of stimulus-related neuronal responses upon repeated presentation of a stimulus. Previous studies have demonstrated that negative emotional salience of stimuli enhances RS. It is, however, unclear how motivational salience of stimuli, such as reward-predicting value, influences RS for complex visual stimuli, and which brain regions might show differences in RS for reward-predicting and neutral stimuli. Here we investigated the influence of motivational salience on RS of complex scenes using event-related fMRI. Thirty young healthy (...) volunteers performed a monetary incentive delay (MID) task with complex scenes (indoor vs. outdoor) serving as neutral or reward-predicting cue pictures. Each cue picture was presented three times. In line with previous findings, reward anticipation was associated with activations in the ventral striatum, midbrain, and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). Stimulus repetition was associated with pronounced repetition suppression in ventral visual stream areas like the parahippocampal place area (PPA). An interaction of reward anticipation and repetition suppression was specifically observed in the anterior hippocampus, where a response decrease across repetitions was observed for the reward-predicting scenes only. Functional connectivity analysis further revealed specific activity-dependent connectivity increases of the hippocampus and the PPA and OFC. Our results suggest that hippocampal repetition suppression is sensitive to reward-predicting properties of stimuli and might therefore reflect a rapid, adaptive neural response mechanism for motivationally salient information. (shrink)