In this paper we study the Kolmogorov complexity for non-effective computations, that is, either halting or non-halting computations on Turing machines. This complexity function is defined as the length of the shortest input that produce a desired output via a possibly non-halting computation. Clearly this function gives a lower bound of the classical Kolmogorov complexity. In particular, if the machine is allowed to overwrite its output, this complexity coincides with the classical Kolmogorov complexity for halting computations relative to the first (...) jump of the halting problem. However, on machines that cannot erase their output –called monotone machines–, we prove that our complexity for non effective computations and the classical Kolmogorov complexity separate as much as we want. We also consider the prefix-free complexity for possibly infinite computations. We study several properties of the graph of these complexity functions and specially their oscillations with respect to the complexities for effective computations. (shrink)
We consider the question of randomness of the probability ΩU[X] that an optimal Turing machine U halts and outputs a string in a fixed set X. The main results are as follows: ΩU[X] is random whenever X is $\Sigma _{n}^{0}$-complete or $\Pi _{n}^{0}$-complete for some n ≥ 2. However, for n ≥ 2, ΩU[X] is not n-random when X is $\Sigma _{n}^{0}$ or $\Pi _{n}^{0}$ Nevertheless, there exists $\Delta _{n+1}^{0}$ sets such that ΩU[X] is n-random. There are $\Delta _{2}^{0}$ sets (...) X such that ΩU[X] is rational. Also, for every n ≥ 1, there exists a set X which is $\Delta _{n+1}^{0}$ and $\Sigma _{n}^{0}$-hard such that ΩU[X] is not random. We also look at the range of ΩU as an operator. We prove that the set {ΩU[X]: X ⊆ 2<ω} is a finite union of closed intervals. It follows that for any optimal machine U and any sufficiently small real r, there is a set X ⊆ 2<ω recursive in ∅′ ⊕ r, such that ΩU[X] = r. The same questions are also considered in the context of infinite computations, and lead to similar results. (shrink)
Using possibly infinite computations on universal monotone Turing machines, we prove Martin-Löf randomness in ∅′ of the probability that the output be in some set O ⊆ 2≤ω under complexity assumptions about O.
The first modern treatise of political philosophy, The Prince remains one of the world’s most influential and widely read books. Machiavelli, whose name has become synonymous with expedient exercises of will, reveals nothing less than the secrets of power: how to gain it, how to wield it, and how to keep it. But curiously, this work of outspoken clarity has, for centuries, inspired myriad interpretations as to its author’s true message. The Introduction by noted Italian Renaissance scholar Albert Russell Ascoli (...) provides a perfect opening to Peter Constantine’s illuminating new translation of this seminal work. "Constantine elegantly captures in English the pith of Machiavelli’s brilliant Italian prose." –Edward Muir, Clarence L. Ver Steeg Professor in the Arts and Sciences, Northwestern University “Peter Constantine’s excellent translation belongs in everyone’s library. Perhaps now more than ever we have much to learn from this Renaissance thinker, present at the birth of the modern world.” –John Jeffries Martin, professor of history, Duke University. (shrink)
Allan Gibbard’s book Thinking How to Live is an important sequel to his earlier and very in uential book Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. His earlier book defended a conception of morality as involving distinctive moral feelings of guilt, shame, and resentment that it is rational for someone to have and went on to defend an expressivist conception of rationality according to which judgments of rationality involve acceptance of norms for behavior and feeling. Though Gibbard offered a novel conception of the (...) semantics and logic of normative judgment, he spent much of that book discussing the evolution, psychology, and social dynamics of normative commitment. Thinking How to Live has a narrower focus. Though Gibbard regards morality as one form of normativity or practical reason, he largely avoids discussion of morality, focusing instead on normativity or practical reason. Here too, his focus is narrower, restricted primarily to issues about the semantics, logic, and epistemology of normative judgment. The new book reinterprets the earlier notion of accepting a norm in terms of planning or commitment to a plan. One consequence of this reinterpretation is to make the expressivist character of Gibbard’s account of normative judgment clearer. He then proceeds to explain normative judgment in terms of commitment to a set of contingency plans, which allows him to defend an account of normative inference and reasoning. In fact, Gibbard argues that his expressivist conception of normative judgment allows him to defend ver-. (shrink)
Max Jammer has recently proposed a model of God's eternity based on the special theory of relativity, offering it as an example of how theologians should take into account what physicists say about the world. I start evaluating this proposal by a quick look at the classic Boethius-Aquinas model of divine eternity. The major objection I advance against Jammer refers to Einstein's subtle kind of realism. I offer various reasons to show that Einstein's realism was minimal. Moreover, even this minimal (...) realism has been undermined by recent experimental work. If Jammer is suggesting that theologians should take Einstein's physics seriously because it describes the world, his argument is unconvincing because it doesn't address the crucial question of Einstein's realism, which makes all the difference. /// O artigo toma em consideração o modelo acerca da eternidade de Deus baseado na teoria especial da relatividade de Einstein recentemente proposto por Max Jammer, autor que considera ser este um exemplo de como os teólogos deveriam tomar em consideração aquilo que os físicos dizem acerca do mundo. O autor do artigo começa por fazer uma avaliação desta proposta mediante uma breve referência ao modelo clássico de Boécio e S. Tomás acerca da eternidade divina. A principal objecção levantada pelo artigo contra Jammer tem a ver com a forma subtil de realismo de Einstein. Segundo o autor do artigo, o realismo de Einstein era mínimo. Mais ainda, mesmo este realismo mínimo foi minado por trabalhos experimentais mais recentes. Com efeito, se Jammer sugere que os teólogos devem tomar a sério a física de Einstein baseados na presunção de que esta descreve o mundo, então o seu argumento, diz o autor do artigo, não convence na medida em que não trata da questão crucial acerca do realismo de Einstein, questão esta que sem dúvida faz toda a diferença. (shrink)
One of the hottest philosophical debates in recent years concerns the nature of the semantics/pragmatics divide. Some writers have expressed the reserve that this might be merely terminological, but in my view it ultimately concerns a substantive issue with empirical implications: the scope and limits of a serious scientific undertaking, formal semantics. In this critical note I discuss two arguments by Recanati: his main methodological argument --viz. that the contents posited by what he calls 'literalists' (which are, on my own (...) view, the very same ones that theoreticians in the formal semantics tradition seek to characterize) play no relevant role in communication--, and some phenomenological considerations regarding the "Availability Principle" that he appeals to in order to buttress that main argument. /// Uno de los más encarnizados debates filosóficos recientes atañe a la naturaleza de la distinción entre semántica y pragmática. Aunque algunos autores han expresado reservas en el sentido de que èste pudiera ser sólo terminológico, en mi opinión tiene que ver con una cuestión sustantiva con implicaciones empíricas: el alcance y los límites de una empresa científica seria, la semántica formal. En este texto discuto dos argumentos de Recanati: su principal argumento metodológico, que los contenidos postulados por los autores que él denomina "literalistas" (los cuales, desde mi punto de vista, son justamente los que los teóricos de la semántica formal intentan caracterizar) no desempeñan ningùn papel relevante en la comunicación, y, en segundo lugar, ciertas consideraciones fenomenológicas en torno a su "Principio de Accesibilidad", a las cuales apela para apoyar el argumento metodológico. (shrink)
The first modern treatise of political philosophy, The Prince remains one of the world’s most influential and widely read books. Machiavelli, whose name has become synonymous with expedient exercises of will, reveals nothing less than the secrets of power: how to gain it, how to wield it, and how to keep it. But curiously, this work of outspoken clarity has, for centuries, inspired myriad interpretations as to its author’s true message. The Introduction by noted Italian Renaissance scholar Albert Russell Ascoli (...) provides a perfect opening to Peter Constantine’s illuminating new translation of this seminal work. "Constantine elegantly captures in English the pith of Machiavelli’s brilliant Italian prose." –Edward Muir, Clarence L. Ver Steeg Professor in the Arts and Sciences, Northwestern University “Peter Constantine’s excellent translation belongs in everyone’s library. Perhaps now more than ever we have much to learn from this Renaissance thinker, present at the birth of the modern world.” –John Jeffries Martin, professor of history, Duke University. (shrink)
l i ver Cromwell delivered history's most famous rebuke to the heroworshiping that irons all subtlety into flawless cardboard: Mr. Lely, I desire you would use all your skill to paint my picture truly like me, and not flatter me at al l ; but remark all these roughnesses, pimples, warts, and everything as you see me, otherwise I will never pay a farthing for it. Helena Cronin, in The Ant and the Peacock , displays a raw talent clearly equal (...) to that of our finest portraitists, but has placed herself into a position even worse than Mr. Lely's. Cromwell's painter at least faced the subject himself; Cronin has produced an uncritical gloss upon a false and simplistic view that never was more than a caricature of Darwinian theory. (shrink)
The first modern treatise of political philosophy, The Prince remains one of the world’s most influential and widely read books. Machiavelli, whose name has become synonymous with expedient exercises of will, reveals nothing less than the secrets of power: how to gain it, how to wield it, and how to keep it. But curiously, this work of outspoken clarity has, for centuries, inspired myriad interpretations as to its author’s true message. The Introduction by noted Italian Renaissance scholar Albert Russell Ascoli (...) provides a perfect opening to Peter Constantine’s illuminating new translation of this seminal work. "Constantine elegantly captures in English the pith of Machiavelli’s brilliant Italian prose." –Edward Muir, Clarence L. Ver Steeg Professor in the Arts and Sciences, Northwestern University “Peter Constantine’s excellent translation belongs in everyone’s library. Perhaps now more than ever we have much to learn from this Renaissance thinker, present at the birth of the modern world.” –John Jeffries Martin, professor of history, Duke University. (shrink)
Nietzsche and Heidegger pose important philosophical questions to science and its technological projects. The resultant contributes to what may be called a continental philosophy of science and the author argues that only such a rigorously critical approach to the question of science permits a genuinely philosophical reflection on science. More than a thoughtful reflection on science, however, the heart of philosophy is also at stake in such reflections. The author defends that if Nietzsche proposes the resources of art to defend (...) us against truth and the deadly insights of tragic knowledge, then Nietzsche's more arresting claim is his equation of science and art, just as Heidegger aligns techne and poiesis. For Nietzsche, science and art draw upon the same creative powers and both science and art are directed to the purpose of life. /// O ponto de partida deste artigo é o reconhecimento de que Friedrich Nietzsche e Martin Heidegger são dois filósofos que colocam questões profundamente relevantes acerca da Ciência e dos seus projectos tecnológicos. Neste sentido, o plano da autora consiste em demonstrar a viabilidade e a importância do modo não-analítico, ou continental, de fazer Filosofia da Ciência, argumentando que uma reflexão genuinamente filosófica acerca da Ciência não se pode dispensar de um confronto com o modo crítico de fazer filosofia representado tanto por Nietzsche como por Heidegger. Para a autora, os pensamentos críticos destes pensadores acerca da Ciência são bem mais do que uma mera reflexão filosófica acerca da Ciência; na verdade, o que aqui está em causa é propriamente saber de que se trata quando a questão é a da própria Filosofia. Assim, e na medida em que Nietzsche propõe os recursos da arte para nos defender contra as invectivas da verdade e as intuições fatais do conhecimento trágico, a autora do artigo defende que o mais interessante na posição nietzscheana tem a ver com o seu modo de equacionar a relação entre Ciência e Arte, tal como Heidegger acabará por alinhar techne e poiesis. O fundo da questão está em que para Nietzsche tanto a Ciência como a Arte recorrem aos mesmos poderes criativos, para além de que a Ciência e a Arte estão orientadas para a defesa do mesmo propósito: a Vida. (shrink)
Thomas Aquinas' treatment of Moses Maimonides' via negativa has been frequently called into question. In particular, some contemporary Maimonideans have argued that Aquinas grossly misunderstands Maimonides. Other scholars argue that Maimonides' defense of his own position provides insuperable challenges to alternative ways of naming God, despite the problems Aquinas raised with the via negativa. In this article, the author attends to Aquinas' two objections to Maimonides in Summa theologiae I.13.2 in order to see if these objections are valid and further, (...) to see if Aquinas mischaracterizes Maimonides in this passage, as some have alleged. Before addressing the question of whether or not Aquinas understood Maimonides, the author offers also a brief introduction to the historical debate over religious language in the Middle Ages. /// O tratamento da via negativa de Moisés Maimónides por S. Tomás de Aquino tem sido frequentemente posta em questão. De um modo particular, os seguidores contemporâneos de Maimónides têm argumentado que S. Tomás compreendeu mal o pensador Judeu. Outros especialistas argumentam que a defesa de Maimónides da sua própria posição fornece desafios insuperáveis às maneiras alternativas de nomear Deus apesar das dificuldades identificadas por S. Tomás com a via negativa. Neste artigo, a autora ocupa-se sobretudo de duas objecções de S. Tomás de Aquino a Maimónides na Summa theologiae Ia.13.2, a fim de verificar a validade destas objecções e também para ver se S. Tomás não terá compreendido mal Maimónides nesta passagem, tal como alguns têm alegado. Antes de tratar a questão de saber se sim ou não S. Tomás compreendeu correctamente a Maimónides, a autora oferece uma breve introdução ao debate histórico sobre a linguagem religiosa na Idade Média. (shrink)
Bibliografische Information Der Deutschen Bibliothek Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Natio nal bibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb. ddb.de abrufbar. Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Je de Ver wertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zu stimmung der Zeitschirft und seines Herausgebers unzulässig und strafbar. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Über setzungen, Mikroverfil mungen und die Einspeisung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen.
Cet article souhaite élucider la philosophie de la chair développée par Michel Henry. Il s’agit de voir comment Henry parvient à penser la chair comme la possibilité principielle de l’individualité. Nous voulons montrer que la démarche henryenne repose non seulement sur une mise en question des canons de l’apparaître, mais également sur la conviction que le problème de l’individualité trouve sa solution dans une expérience charnelle radicale de soi-même permettant d’opérer un repli en-deçà du corps chosifié de la phénoménologie husserlienne. (...) C’est ce double mécanisme conceptuel qui permet à Henry de rejoindre l’individualité et de l’établir comme fondement de la vie in-ek-statique. (shrink)
In his "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of Goc" (1908), Charles Peirce argued for two dimensions of belief in God's reality. On the one side, he maintained that this belief would be useful for guiding the conduct of life; on the other side, he maintained that the belief could function as the first stage in a scientific inquiry. My suggestion in this paper is that we examine the last of Peirce's 1903 lectures on pragmatism at Harvard to see how (...) the possibility of this dual function arises out of his late theory of cognition in which the functional certainty of perception is brought to close quarters with the provisionality of hypotheses. The upshot is that for Peirce a healthful religious belief should internally "marry" science and religion —theory and practice — by allowing provisional and vague conceptions of God to carry on the work of guiding conduct. /// No texto "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (1908), Charles Peirce defende que há duas dimensões de crença na realidade de Deus. Afirma, por um lado, que esta crença poderia ser útil para orientar o comportamento (conduct of life); por outro, que ela poderia ser como que o primeiro escalão numa investigação científica. A minha sugestão neste artigo é que, examinámos as últimas conferências de Peirce de 1903 sobre o pragmatismo em Harvard para ver como a possibilidade desta dupla função surge da sua última teoria de conhecimento (cognition) em que a certeza funcional de percepção é usada para aproximar o aspecto provisório das hipóteses. A consequência disso é que para Peirce uma saudável crença religiosa deve "juntar" internamente ciência e religião - teoria e prática - permitindo as concepções provisórias e vagas de Deus para continuar a tarefa de orientar o comportamento. /// Dans ce texte "Un argument négligé pour la réalité de Dieu" (1908), Charles Peirce soutient qu'il y a deux dimensions de croyance en la réalité de Dieu. Il afflrme, d'un côté, que cette croyance pourrait être utile pour orienter le comportement (conduct of life) et, par ailleurs, qu'elle pourrait être pour ainsi dire le premier niveau dans une recherche scientifique. Ma suggestion dans le présent article est que nous examinions les dernières conférences de Peirce en 1903 sur le pragmatisme à Harvard pour voir comment Ia possibilite de cette double fonction surgit de sa dernière théorie de la connaissance dans laquelle la certitude fonctionnelle de perception est utilisée pour aborder l'aspect provisoire des hypothèses. La conséquence en est que pour Peirce une saine croyance religieuse doit "unir" intrinsèquement science et religion - théorie et pratique - en permettant les conceptions provisoires et vagues de Dieu. (shrink)
Bibliografische Information Der Deutschen Bibliothek Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Natio nal bibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb. ddb.de abrufbar. Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Je de Ver wertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zu stimmung der Zeitschirft und seines Herausgebers unzulässig und strafbar. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Über setzungen, Mikroverfil mungen und die Einspeisung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen.
I critically discuss some aspects of Mark Sainsbury's Reference without Referents, from an otherwise sympathetic viewpoint. My objections focus on the adequacy of the truth-conditional framework that Sainsbury presupposes. I argue that, as semantic theories, truth-conditional accounts are both too ambitious, and too austere to be fully explanatory, and that both problems have consequences for an account of reference. The latter problem has to do with the difficulties to capture in a truth-conditional framework the descriptive contribution of indexicals and, in (...) my view, proper names. The former has to do with the non-semantic contribution of context to the determination of truth-conditions in general and reference in particular. /// En este artículo discuto críticamente algunos aspectos del libro de Mark Sainsbury Reference without Referents, desde una perspectiva por lo demás próxima. Mis objeciones se centran en la adecuación del marco que Sainsbury presupone: la semántica de condiciones de verdad. Argumento que tales propuestas son, en tanto que teorías semánticas, a la vez demasiado ambiciosas y demasiado austeras para ser genuinamente explicativas, y que ambos problemas tienen consecuencias en lo que respecta a la explicación de la referencia. El segundo problema tiene que ver con las dificultades para representar la contribución descriptiva de los deícticos y, en mi opinión, de los nombres propios también en el marco de condiciones de verdad. El primero tiene que ver con la contribución no semántica del contexto a la determinación de las condiciones de verdad en general y la referencia en particular. (shrink)
"Estos dos modos de ver la explicación no son incompatibles entre sí; cada uno ofrece un modo razonable de analizar la explicación. De hecho, pueden ser tomados como representando dos aspectos diferentes pero compatibles de la explicación científica" (1989, p. 183). "[estos dos enfoques] se han desarrollado hasta el punto en que pueden coexistir pacíficamente como dos aspectos distintos de la explicación científica" (1992, p. 39). "No rechazo la posibilidad de una teoría [unificacionista] de este tipo; creo que ella no (...) entraría en conflicto con la explicación causal sino que la complementaría " (2001a, p. 10). (shrink)
Dans ce texte où il adopte la posture de l’observateur-participant, l’auteur propose d’abord quelques remarques sur la naissance, mi-octobre 2011, dans la ville de Québec, du mouvement Occupy. Il analyse ensuite certaines des caractéristiques de la période ou Occupons Québec s’est matérialisé dans un campement, entre le 22 octobre et le 22 novembre. Finalement, il propose sa vision de l’avenir du mouvement, à Québec et ailleurs, depuis le démantèlement de ce campement.
The main theme of this article is the phenomenality. Jan Patočka’s asubjective phenomenology distinguishes itself by the description of the plan of phenomenality, where beings can appear and that is independent from everything which appears in it. Only by an universalization of the phenomenological epoché, it is possible to turn our eyes towards the phenomenality itself and to understand its independence. To put the theme of the world and the consciousness between brackets means to discover the structure of the phenomenality, (...) which is constituted by what appears, to which something appears and the way of appearance. The world is the transcendental field of appearance. Everything appears in the world. It is the whole, always given and opened to the human being. The subjectivity is a moment of phenomenality that presupposes the relation with the world. It has a role that makes it an “existence”. It is that to which something appears. Finally the way of appearance: the characters of the phenomenality are “objective mediators”. Mediators because they show the strings that build up the field of appearance, objective because wordly. What they show, even if in the darkness of the absence, is the relation with the world. (shrink)
This essay offers a philosophical analysis of the role of the father-figure in the family. I argue that a Cartesian approach to this question is useless, and that Hegel, while he offers the beginning of an adequate analysis, falls short of the multiple-function model which an adequate analysis requires.
The concept of merit good is a problematic concept in economic theory. The concept was introduced in 1956 by Richard Musgrave. In 1990, on the occasion of an international conference on the concept of merit good, John Head wrote that the concept of merit good raises methodologically difficult and controversial issues. The concept raises doubt about the ultimate normative authority of the consumer sovereignty principle. I will demonstrate that the concept deserves the attention of the philosophical profession for multiple reasons.
Estoy interesado en indagar ¿cómo es que nuestros pensamientos demostrativos dependientes directamente de la experiencia son acerca de ciertos objetos materiales? ¿Cuál es, y cómo es la relación entre un estado mental y cierto objeto material cuando el primero es acerca del segundo? Esto es, ¿en qué consiste que el pensamiento demostrativo refiera a un objeto material? ¿Cómo es que nuestros pensamientos demostrativos acerca del mundo material se refieren a objetos del mundo material? Creo que existen dos maneras muy generales (...) de responder a esta pregunta, y cada una de estas maneras depende de la versión de la teoría de la mente que se tenga. Por un lado, existe una versión Fregeana de la mente, según la cual existen modos de presentación que delinean la forma de la mente y que determinan cuáles son los objetos acerca de los cuales la mente tiene pensamientos. Existe otra versión más científica de la mente la cual llamo No-Fregeana, según la cual no existen modos de presentación que determinen acerca de cuáles cosas la mente tiene pensamientos, sino más bien son las relaciones causales (quizá desarrolladas evolutivamente) que existen entre clases de cosas y clases de estados mentales las que determinan acerca de cuáles objetos la mente tiene pensamientos. Lo que deseo hacer es mostrar por qué creo que el tratamiento no-Fregeano de la pregunta no da una explicación satisfactoria de cómo es posible que una mente pueda tener pensamientos demostrativos verdaderos acerca de objetos materiales. Mis reparos tienen que ver con la manera como conciben la conexión entre la mente y el mundo para que el pensamiento sea posible. (shrink)
Através da leitura que Heidegger faz de Aletheia, Arendt vincula a noção de verdade à de aparência ao custo de desmantelar a conhecida dicotomia entre o ser verdadeiro e a mera aparência, deslocando a verdade do domínio dos noumena ao dos phenomena enquanto reino da visibilidade, o domínio doxástico da ação política. Doxa como desvelamento não mais nos conduz à adequação cognitiva do self interno, mas antes à dimensão arendtiana cognitiva interpessoal de seres humanos no mundo: quem nós somos no (...) espaço público. Será mostrado que não há nenhuma contradição entre dialética e persuasão, na medida em que Arendt desloca o registro positivo da doxa em direção a suas considerações sobre a faculdade de julgar, reforçando a primazia da comunicabilidade, pluralidade e diversidade de pontos de vista na construção da doxa quando alguém constitui sua visão particular e única no mundo. Finalmente, mostrar-se-á que a amizade deve ser tomada como o tipo de insight político por excelência, enquanto praxis de ver o mundo a partir da perspectiva do outro. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Amizade espaço público. Comunicabilidade. Doxa, praxis. ABSTRACT Through Heidegger’s reading of Aletheia, Arendt links the notion of truth to appearance at the expense of dismantling the well-known dichotomy between true being and mere appearance, displacing truth from the domain of noumena to the realm of phenomena which is the realm of visibility, the doxastic domain of political action. Doxa as uncovering no longer leads to the cognitive adequation of the inner self, but rather to Arendt’s main interpersonal dimension of men into the appearing world: who we are in the public space. Thus, it will be asserted that there is by no means sheer contradiction between the dialectics and persuasion. It will also be claimed that Arendt displaces the positive account of doxa toward her considerations on the faculty of judging, reinforcing the primacy of communicability, plurality and diversity of viewpoints in building up someone’s doxa, in how one constitutes ones particular view and uniqueness, into the world. Finally, friendship is claimed to hold the political kind of insight par excellence, as the praxis of seeing the world from the other’s viewpoint. KEY WORDS – Communicability. Doxa. Friendship. Praxis. Public space. (shrink)
A palavra-chave é encontro, ou, talvez sua estranha intenção: a impossibilidade de expressar uma experiência que certos modos de classificação, ou uma tradição, impedem de ver o que é. Experiência que resiste ao acabado e inicia um processo de reconhecimento para dar lugar à expressão de seus vazios. Como criar esse percurso que se apodera de singularidades que a constituem? Deparamos-nos com a expressão de um ser em potência: toda vez que se tenta apreendê-lo, ele se deixa unir novamente por (...) aquilo que não tinha nada em comum, impelindo-me à criação. Expressa a necessidade de compreender os caminhos pelos quais alcancei a revelação dos pensamentos indizíveis que permitiram apreender como se engendram em nossa experiência. Descolando-se do plano da educação, seus procedimentos dirigem-se ao externo, em direção a outros planos, além do humano, passando por um plano de experiências interiores; recolhem vestígios atemporais da nossa experiência e os agrupa de tal maneira que se explicam por meios pouco confessáveis, complicando-se na expressão. Dado o desenvolvimento singular da revelação que surge com a necessidade da expressão, só mais tarde é que pude entender: o que parecia falta de sentido era justamente o sentido. É complexo descrever o que nos aconteceu. Mas foi justamente na frustração de tentar capturar o aprendizado que conseguimos de alguma forma compreendê-lo, embora não soubéssemos inicialmente traduzir essa compreensão em palavras: aí nasceram os pensamentos indizíveis. Tenho sempre comigo a sensação de que sua concepção está comprometida, donde surge um tal de desconforto, cada vez que tentamos enquadrá-los em uma explicação. Embora toda explicação exista neles e deles dependa de tal maneira que não pode ser concebida sem eles, contanto que venha depois. No instante em que surge a necessidade de dar a conhecer, esta se constitui em si mesma em um objetivo concreto. Deixo aqui palavras inspiradas em experiências mal sucedidas e encontros subseqüentes. (shrink)
Historia del desarrollo de la comprensión de lo natural a través de todos los tiempos, que inicia en la Edad Clásica, pasa por el Renacimiento y llega hasta la Edad Moderna. Las preguntas e investigaciones que tienen como objeto el conocimiento natural o ciencia de la naturaleza constituyen, desde la perspectiva del autor, un testimonio de la existencia del hombre; la idea de la naturaleza adquiere la realidad de la historicidad porque el hombre se construye y elabora su mundo a (...) partir de la historia. Luego de más de medio siglo transcurrido desde su primera edición, y a la luz de los descubrimientos científicos que Collingwood no pudo ver, esta obra pondrá el lector en contacto con los dramáticos cambios que ha sufrido nuestra idea de la naturaleza. (shrink)
En retracant l'histoire de cet ecart qui se dissimule dans le rapport entre Blanchot et Levinas, cette etude veut a la fois sonder son origine, interroger son insistance et en degager les termes qui exposent le differend comme une condition ...
