Search results for 'Veridical Perception' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Shannon Vallor (2006). An Enactive-Phenomenological Approach to Veridical Perception. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):39-60.score: 204.0
    Most accounts of veridical perception draw upon conventional causal theories of perception for an explanatory framework. Recently developed enactive or sensorimotor theories of perception pose a challenge to such accounts, necessitating a redefinition of veridical perception. I propose and defend one such definition, drawing upon empirical studies of perception, the resources of the enactive approach and phenomenology. I argue that perceptual experience engages an organism in a network of sensorimotor dependencies with the perceived (...)
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  2. A. B. Morland (1999). Conscious and Veridical Motion Perception in a Human Hemianope. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (5):43-53.score: 120.0
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  3. Wayne Hershberger & David L. Carpenter (1972). Veridical Rotation in Depth in Unidimensional Polar Projections Devoid of Three Motion-Parallax Cues. Journal of Experimental Psychology 93 (1):213.score: 90.0
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  4. Michael Sollberger (2011). Rethinking Synesthesia. Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):171 - 187.score: 86.0
    Synesthetes are people who report having perceptual experiences that are very unusual, such as ?seeing? sounds as colors or ?smelling? colors as odors. It is commonly assumed these days that such synesthetic experiences must be instances of misperceptions. Against this widespread assumption, I will highlight that there is reason to think that at least some synesthetic experiences can be viewed as truly veridical perceptions, and not as illusions or hallucinations. On this view, which I will back up by conceptual (...)
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  5. Manish Singh & Donald D. Hoffman (1999). Perception, Inference, and the Veridicality of Natural Constraints. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):395-396.score: 84.0
    Pylyshyn's target article argues that perception is not inferential, but this is true only under a narrow construal of inference. A more general construal is possible, and has been used to provide formal theories of many visual capacities. This approach also makes clear that the evolution of natural constraints need not converge to the “veridical” state of the world.
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  6. Patricia Cain Smith & Olin W. Smith (1961). Veridical Perceptions of Cylindricality: A Problem of Depth Discrimination and Object Identification. Journal of Experimental Psychology 62 (2):145.score: 84.0
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  7. Pendaran Roberts & Kelly Schmidtke (2012). In Defense of Incompatibility, Objectivism, and Veridicality About Color. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):547-558.score: 72.0
    Are the following propositions true of the colors: No object can be more than one determinable or determinate color all over at the same time (Incompatibility); the colors of objects are mind-independent (Objectivism); and most human observers usually perceive the colors of objects veridically in typical conditions (Veridicality)? One reason to think not is that the empirical literature appears to support the proposition that there is mass perceptual disagreement about the colors of objects amongst human observers in typical conditions (P-Disagreement). (...)
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  8. Zoltán Jakab (2005). Opponent Processing, Linear Models, and the Veridicality of Color Perception. In Andrew Brook (ed.), Cognition and the Brain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 336--378.score: 70.0
  9. Farid Masrour, Space Perception, Visual Dissonance and the Fate of Standard Representationalism.score: 66.0
    This paper argues that a common form of representationalism has trouble accommodating empirical findings about visual space perception. Vision science tells us that the visual system systematically gives rise to different experiences of the same spatial property. This, combined with a naturalistic account of content, suggests that the same spatial property can have different veridical looks. I use this to argue that a common form of representationalism about spatial experience must be rejected. I conclude by considering alternatives to (...)
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  10. J. Dokic (1998). The Ontology of Perception: Bipolarity and Content. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 48 (2):153-69.score: 66.0
    The notion of perceptual content is commonly introduced in the analysis of perception. It stems from an analogy between perception and propositional attitudes. Both kinds of mental states, it is thought, have conditions of satisfaction. I try to show that on the most plausible account of perceptual content, it does not determine the conditions under which perceptual experience is veridical. Moreover, perceptual content must be bipolar (capable of being correct and capable of being incorrect), whereas perception (...)
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  11. Robin Le Poidevin (2013). Stopped Clocks, Silent Telephones and Sense Data: Some Problems of Time Perception. [REVIEW] Topoi:1-8.score: 66.0
    When philosophers of perception contemplate concrete examples, the tendency is to choose perceptions whose content does not essentially involve time, but concern how things are at the moment they are perceived. This is true whether the cases are veridical (seeing a tree as a tree) or illusory (misperceiving the colour or spatial properties of an object). Less discussed, and arguably more complex and interesting cases do involve time as an essential element: perceiving movement, for example, or perceiving the (...)
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  12. Matthew Soteriou, The Disjunctive Theory of Perception. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 edition).score: 60.0
    Perceptual experiences are often divided into the following three broad categories: veridical perceptions, illusions, and hallucinations. For example, when one has a visual experience as of a red object, it may be that one is really seeing an object and its red colour (veridical perception), that one is seeing a green object (illusion), or that one is not seeing an object at all (hallucination). Many maintain that the same account should be given of the nature of the (...)
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  13. Marcus Willaschek (ed.) (2013). Disjunctivism: Disjunctive Accounts in Epistemology and in the Philosophy of Perception. Routledge.score: 56.0
    Does perception provide us with direct and unmediated access to the world around us? The so-called 'argument from illusion ' has traditionally been supposed to show otherwise: from the subject's point of view, perceptual illusions are often indistinguishable from veridical perceptions; hence, perceptual experience, as such, cannot provide us with knowledge of the world, but only with knowledge of how things appear to us. Disjunctive accounts of perceptual experience, first proposed by John McDowell and Paul Snowdon in the (...)
     
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  14. William Fish (2013). Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion: Reply to My Critics. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 163 (1):57-66.score: 54.0
    This book provides the first full-length treatment of disjunctivism about visual experiences in the service of defending a naive realist theory of veridical visual perception. It includes detailed theories of hallucination and illusion that show how such states can be indistinguishable from veridical experiences without sharing any common character.
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  15. Jan Almäng (2013). The Causal Self‐Referential Theory of Perception Revisited. Dialectica 67 (1):29-53.score: 54.0
    This is a paper about The Causal Self-Referential Theory of Perception. According to The Causal Self-Referential Theory as developed by above all John Searle and David Woodruff Smith, perceptual content is satisfied by an object only if the object in question has caused the perceptual experience. I argue initially that Searle's account cannot explain the distinction between hallucination and illusion since it requires that the state of affairs that is presented in the perceptual experience must exist in order for (...)
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  16. Robert J. Howell (2013). Perception From the First‐Person Perspective. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2).score: 54.0
    This paper develops a view of the content of perceptual states that reflects the cognitive significance those states have for the subject. Perhaps the most important datum for such a theory is the intuition that experiences are ‘transparent’, an intuition promoted by philosophers as diverse as Sartre and Dretske. This paper distinguishes several different transparency theses, and considers which ones are truly supported by the phenomenological data. It is argued that the only thesis supported by the data is much weaker (...)
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  17. Boyd Millar (2014). The Phenomenological Problem of Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):625-654.score: 48.0
    A perceptual experience of a given object seems to make the object itself present to the perceiver’s mind. Many philosophers have claimed that naïve realism (the view that to perceive is to stand in a primitive relation of acquaintance to the world) provides a better account of this phenomenological directness of perceptual experience than does the content view (the view that to perceive is to represent the world to be a certain way). But the naïve realist account of this phenomenology (...)
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  18. Michael K. Shim (2005). The Duality of Non-Conceptual Content in Husserl's Phenomenology of Perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2):209-229.score: 48.0
    Recently, a number of epistemologists have argued that there are no non-conceptual elements in representational content. On their view, the only sort of non-conceptual elements are components of sub-personal organic hardware that, because they enjoy no veridical role, must be construed epistemologically irrelevant. By reviewing a 35-year-old debate initiated by Dagfinn F.
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  19. Philippe Chuard (2010). Non-Transitive Looks & Fallibilism. Philosophical Studies 149 (2):161 - 200.score: 48.0
    Fallibilists about looks deny that the relation of looking the same as is non-transitive. Regarding familiar examples of coloured patches suggesting that such a relation is non-transitive, they argue that, in fact, indiscriminable adjacent patches may well look different, despite their perceptual indiscriminability: it’s just that we cannot notice the relevant differences in the chromatic appearances of such patches. In this paper, I present an argument that fallibilism about looks requires commitment to an empirically false consequence. To succeed in deflecting (...)
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  20. Philip W. Davidson (1972). Haptic Judgments of Curvature by Blind and Sighted Humans. Journal of Experimental Psychology 93 (1):43.score: 48.0
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  21. J. Trojan, A. M. Stolle, A. M. Carl, D. Kleinböhl, H. Z. Tan & R. Hölzl (2009). Spatiotemporal Integration in Somatosensory Perception: Effects of Sensory Saltation on Pointing at Perceived Positions on the Body Surface. Frontiers in Psychology 1:206-206.score: 48.0
    In the past, sensory saltation phenomena (Geldard & Sherrick, Science, 1972) have been used repeatedly to analyze the spatiotemporal integration capacity of somatosensory and other sensory mechanisms by means of their psychophysical characteristic. The core phenomenon consists in a systematic mislocalization of one tactile stimulus (the attractee) towards another successive tactile stimulus (the attractant) presented at another location, increasing with shorter intervals. In a series of four experiments, sensory saltation characteristics were studied at the forearm and the abdomen. Participants reported (...)
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  22. Michael G. F. Martin (2006). On Being Alienated. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.score: 42.0
    Disjunctivism about perceptual appearances, as I conceive of it, is a theory which seeks to preserve a naïve realist conception of veridical perception in the light of the challenge from the argument from hallucination. The naïve realist claims that some sensory experiences are relations to mind-independent objects. That is to say, taking experiences to be episodes or events, the naïve realist supposes that some such episodes have as constituents mind-independent objects. In turn, the disjunctivist claims that in a (...)
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  23. István Aranyosi (forthcoming). Silencing the Argument From Hallucination. In Fiona MacPherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination (MIT Press).score: 42.0
    Ordinary people tend to be realists regarding perceptual experience, that is, they take perceiving the environment as a direct, unmediated, straightforward access to a mindindependent reality. Not so for (ordinary) philosophers. The empiricist influence on the philosophy of perception, in analytic philosophy at least, made the problem of perception synonymous with the view that realism is untenable. Admitting the problem (and trying to offer a view on it) is tantamount to rejecting ordinary people’s implicit realist assumptions as naive. (...)
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  24. Katalin Farkas (2006). Indiscriminability and the Sameness of Appearance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2):39-59.score: 42.0
    Abstract: How exactly should the relation between a veridical perception and a corresponding hallucination be understood? I argue that the epistemic notion of ‘indiscriminability’, understood as lacking evidence for the distinctness of things, is not suitable for defining this relation. Instead, we should say that a hallucination and a veridical perception involve the same phenomenal properties. This has further consequences for attempts to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of phenomenal properties in terms of (...)
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  25. Sean Wilkie (1996). The Causal Theory of Veridical Hallucinations. Philosophy 71 (276):245-254.score: 42.0
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  26. James Genone (2014). Appearance and Illusion. Mind 123 (490):339-376.score: 38.0
    Recent debates between representational and relational theories of perceptual experience sometimes fail to clarify in what respect the two views differ. In this essay, I explain that the relational view rejects two related claims endorsed by most representationalists: the claim that perceptual experiences can be erroneous, and the claim that having the same representational content is what explains the indiscriminability of veridical perceptions and phenomenally matching illusions or hallucinations. I then show how the relational view can claim that errors (...)
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  27. Bence Nanay (2014). The Representationalism Versus Relationalism Debate: Explanatory Contextualism About Perception. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2).score: 38.0
    There are two very different ways of thinking about perception. According to representationalism, perceptual states are representations: they represent the world as being a certain way. They have content, which may or may not be different from the content of beliefs. They represent objects as having properties, sometimes veridically, sometimes not. According to relationalism, perception is a relation between the agent and the perceived object. Perceived objects are literally constituents of our perceptual states and not of the contents (...)
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  28. Ioannis Votsis (forthcoming). Perception and Observation Unladened. Philosophical Studies:1-23.score: 38.0
    Let us call ‘veridicalism’ the view that perceptual beliefs and observational reports are largely truthful. This paper aims to make a case for veridicalism by, among other things, examining in detail and ultimately deflating in import what many consider to be the view’s greatest threat, the so-called ‘theory-ladenness’ of perception and/or observation. In what follows, it is argued that to the extent that theoretical factors influence the formation of perceptual beliefs and observational reports, as theory-ladenness demands, that influence is (...)
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  29. Louise Antony (2011). The Openness of Illusions. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):25-44.score: 36.0
    Illusions are thought to make trouble for the intuition that perceptual experience is "open" to the world. Some have suggested, in response to the this trouble, that illusions differ from veridical experience in the degree to which their character is determined by their engagement with the world. An understanding of the psychology of perception reveals that this is not the case: veridical and falsidical perceptions engage the world in the same way and to the same extent. While (...)
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  30. Susanna Siegel (2008). The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 205--224.score: 36.0
    Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for (...)
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  31. David R. Hilbert (2004). Hallucination, Sense-Data and Direct Realism. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):185-191.score: 36.0
    Although it has been something of a fetish for philosophers to distinguish between hallucination and illusion, the enduring problems for philosophy of perception that both phenomena present are not essentially different. Hallucination, in its pure philosophical form, is just another example of the philosopher’s penchant for considering extreme and extremely idealized cases in order to understand the ordinary. The problem that has driven much philosophical thinking about perception is the problem of how to reconcile our evident direct perceptual (...)
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  32. William C. Fish (2008). Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability, and the Nature of Hallucination. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 144--167.score: 36.0
    In the eyes of some of its critics, disjunctivism fails to support adequately the key claim that a particular hallucination might be indistinguishable from a certain kind of veridical perception despite the two states having nothing other than this in common. Scott Sturgeon, for example, has complained that disjunctivism ‘‘offers no positive story about hallucination at all’’ (2000: 11) and therefore ‘‘simply takes [indistinguishability] for granted’’ (2000: 12). So according to Sturgeon, what the disjunctivist needs to provide is (...)
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  33. Paul Coates (2000). Deviant Causal Chains and Hallucinations: A Problem for the Anti-Causalist. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):320-331.score: 36.0
    The subjective character of a given experience leaves open the question of its precise status. If it looks to a subject K as if there is an object of a kind F in front of him, the experience he is having could be veridical, or hallucinatory. Advocates of the Causal Theory of perception (whom I shall call.
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  34. Mark Crooks (2003). Phenomenology in Absentia: Dennett's Philosophy of Mind. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):102-148.score: 36.0
    : Daniel Dennett's philosophical abolition of mind is examined with reference to its methodology, intent, philosophic origins, and internal consistency. His treatment of the contents of perception and introspection is shown to be derivative from realist reductionist misinterpretations of physics, physiology, and phenomenology of perception. In order to rectify inconsistencies of that realistic paradigm devolved from psycho-neural identity theory of mid-twentieth century, Dennett radicalizes its logic and redefines even veridical phenomenology of exteroception to be "illusory." This measure (...)
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  35. Howard Robinson (2005). Reply to Nathan: How to Reconstruct the Causal Argument. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 20 (36):7-10.score: 36.0
    Nicholas Nathan tries to resist the current version of the causal argument for sense-data in two ways. First he suggests that, on what he considers to be the correct reconstruction of the argument, it equivocates on the sense of proximate cause. Second, he defends a form of disjunctivism, by claiming that there might be an extra mechanism involved in producing veridical hallucination that is not present in perception. I argue that Nathan’s reconstruction of the argument is not the (...)
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  36. Ram Neta (2008). In Defense of Disjunctivism. In Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 311--29.score: 36.0
    Right now, I see a computer in front of me. Now, according to current philosophical orthodoxy, I could have the very same perceptual experience that I’m having right now even if I were not seeing a computer in front of me. Indeed, such orthodoxy tells us, I could have the very same experience that I’m having right now even if I were not seeing anything at all in front of me, but simply suffering from a hallucination. More generally, someone can (...)
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  37. Peter Ulric Tse (2003). If Vision is “Veridical Hallucination,” What Keeps It Veridical? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):426-427.score: 36.0
    If perception is constructed, what keeps perception from becoming mere hallucination unlinked to world events? The visual system has evolved two strategies to anchor itself and correct its errors. One involves completing missing information on the basis of knowledge about what most likely exists in the scene. For example, the visual system fills in information only in cases where it might be responsible for the data loss. The other strategy involves exploiting the physical stability of the environment as (...)
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  38. E. Freeman & G. M. Boynton (2004). Subjective Direction of Ambiguous Transparent Motion is Biased by Veridical Motion of a Translucent but Not Opaque Context. In Robert Schwartz (ed.), Perception. Malden Ma: Blackwell Publishing. 33-33.score: 36.0
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  39. Michael Tye (2007). Intentionalism and the Argument From No Common Content. Noûs 41 (1):589 - 613.score: 30.0
    Disjunctivists (Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1990, Martin 2002, 2006) often motivate their approach to perceptual experience by appealing in part to the claim that in cases of veridical perception, the subject is directly in contact with the perceived object. When I perceive a table, for example, there is no table-like sense-impression that stands as an intermediary between the table and me. Nor am I related to the table as I am to a deer when I see its footprint in (...)
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  40. Brad J. Thompson (2010). The Spatial Content of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.score: 30.0
    To what extent is the external world the way that it appears to us in perceptual experience? This perennial question in philosophy is no doubt ambiguous in many ways. For example, it might be taken as equivalent to the question of whether or not the external world is the way that it appears to be? This is a question about the epistemology of perception: Are our perceptual experiences by and large veridical representations of the external world? Alternatively, the (...)
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  41. Berit Brogaard (2011). Primitive Knowledge Disjunctivism. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):45-73.score: 30.0
    I argue that McDowell-style disjunctivism, as the position is often cashed out, goes wrong because it takes the good epistemic standing of veridical perception to be grounded in “manifest” facts which do not necessarily satisfy any epistemic constraints. A better form of disjunctivism explains the difference between good and bad cases in terms of epistemic constraints that the states satisfy. This view allows us to preserve McDowell’s thesis that good cases make facts manifest, as long as manifest facts (...)
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  42. Andrew R. Bailey (2005). What is It Like to See a Bat? A Critique of Dretske's Representationalist Theory of Qualia. Disputatio 1 (18):1 - 27.score: 30.0
    This paper critiques the representationalist account of qualia, focussing on the Representational Naturalism presented by Fred Dretske in Naturalizing the Mind. After laying out Dretske�s theory of qualia and making clear its externalist consequences, I argue that Dretske�s definition is either too liberal or runs into problems defending its requirements, in particular �naturalness� and �mentalness.� I go on to show that Dretske�s account of qualia falls foul of the argument from misperception in such a way that Dretske must either admit (...)
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  43. Michael Sollberger (2008). Naïve Realism and the Problem of Causation. Disputatio 3 (25):1-19.score: 30.0
    In the present paper, I shall argue that disjunctively construed naïve realism about the nature of perceptual experiences succumbs to the empirically inspired causal argument. The causal argument highlights as a first step that local action necessitates the presence of a type-identical common kind of mental state shared by all perceptual experiences. In a second step, it sets out that the property of being a veridical perception cannot be a mental property. It results that the mental nature of (...)
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  44. Søren Overgaard (2010). On the Looks of Things. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):260-284.score: 30.0
    In recent publications, Michael Tye and Alva Noë have claimed that there is a sense in which a tilted plate looks round and another sense in which it looks elliptical. This paper argues that their proposal faces decisive objections. On Tye and Noë's account of ordinary, veridical perception, appearances are in constant conflict. As a characterization of ordinary visual experience, this cannot be correct. I examine various responses to this criticism, and conclude that they all fail. I then (...)
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  45. William Fish, Disjunctivism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 30.0
    Disjunctivism, as a theory of visual experience, claims that the mental states involved in a “good case” experience of veridical perception and a “bad case” experience of hallucination differ, even in those cases in which the two experiences are indistinguishable for their subject. Consider the veridical perception of a bar stool and an indistinguishable hallucination; both of these experiences might be classed together as experiences (as) of a bar stool or experiences of seeming to see a (...)
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  46. Kirk A. Ludwig (1996). Explaining Why Things Look the Way They Do. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.score: 30.0
    How are we able to perceive the world veridically? If we ask this question as a part of the scientific investigation of perception, then we are not asking for a transcendental guarantee that our perceptions are by and large veridical; we presuppose that they are. Unless we assumed that we perceived the world for the most part veridically, we would not be in a position to investigate our perceptual abilities empirically. We are interested, then, not in how it (...)
     
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  47. Bosuk Yoon (2008). What is the Subjectivity of Perceptual Experience? Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:215-222.score: 30.0
    For the purpose of this paper, I take it for granted that subjectivity is an essential character of perceptual experience. What I take issue with is the further claim that subjectivity of experience tends to support the view that phenomenal characters are intrinsic properties of experience. A criticism of the claim can be presented from the perspective of representationalism according to which phenomenal character is a kind of representational character. But representationalism fails to do justice to the fact that from (...)
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  48. Tom Roberts (2012). Exploring Enactive Realism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2):239-254.score: 30.0
    Abstract The paper considers the success of enactive realism about perception; the theory that perceivers gain direct access to the mind-independent physical world through their exercise of sensorimotor skills and understanding. I argue that while it is plausible that the possession of some forms of knowledge, conceptual or practical, may enable perceptual contact with the environment, the role of sensorimotor mastery is not as pervasive as the enactive realist proposes. Non-veridical perception, furthermore, cannot be captured adequately by (...)
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  49. Inez Myin-Germeys & Erik Myin (2004). Getting Real About Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):801-802.score: 30.0
    The idea that experience is essentially subjective rather than of the real world is paradoxical and deeply flawed. The external world is, much more than a mere constraint, essential to meaningfully describe experience and neural activity. This is illustrated by an analysis of the phenomenology of veridical perception and by the study of experience in psychopathology by the Experience Sampling Method (ESM).
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