Search results for 'Veridical Perception' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  51
    Shannon Vallor (2006). An Enactive-Phenomenological Approach to Veridical Perception. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):39-60.
    Most accounts of veridical perception draw upon conventional causal theories of perception for an explanatory framework. Recently developed enactive or sensorimotor theories of perception pose a challenge to such accounts, necessitating a redefinition of veridical perception. I propose and defend one such definition, drawing upon empirical studies of perception, the resources of the enactive approach and phenomenology. I argue that perceptual experience engages an organism in a network of sensorimotor dependencies with the perceived (...)
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  2.  1
    A. B. Morland (1999). Conscious and Veridical Motion Perception in a Human Hemianope. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (5):43-53.
    Following lesions to the primary visual cortex, some patients maintain visual capacities within areas of the visual field in which they are defined as clinically blind by static field perimetry. Blindsight describes the ability to discriminate visual stimuli in the absence of awareness of the stimuli in such patients. Some patients exhibit blindsight, but others are aware of the stimuli with which they are presented, a response mode that has been referred to as residual vision. The two response modes are (...)
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  3.  3
    Wayne Hershberger & David L. Carpenter (1972). Veridical Rotation in Depth in Unidimensional Polar Projections Devoid of Three Motion-Parallax Cues. Journal of Experimental Psychology 93 (1):213.
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  4.  56
    Michael Sollberger (2011). Rethinking Synesthesia. Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):171 - 187.
    Synesthetes are people who report having perceptual experiences that are very unusual, such as ?seeing? sounds as colors or ?smelling? colors as odors. It is commonly assumed these days that such synesthetic experiences must be instances of misperceptions. Against this widespread assumption, I will highlight that there is reason to think that at least some synesthetic experiences can be viewed as truly veridical perceptions, and not as illusions or hallucinations. On this view, which I will back up by (...)
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  5.  6
    Andrew Stephenson (2011). Kant on Non-Veridical Experience. Kant Yearbook 3 (1).
    In this paper I offer an interpretation of Kant’s theory of perceptual error based on his remarks in the Anthropology. Both hallucination and illusion, I argue, are for Kant species of experience and therefore require the standard co-operation of sensibility and understanding. I develop my account in a conceptualist framework according to which the two canonical classes of non-veridical experience involve error in the basic sense that how they represent the world as being is not how the world is. (...)
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  6.  41
    Noell Birondo (2001). Aristotle on Illusory Perception. Ancient Philosophy 21 (1):57-71.
    In De Anima III.3 Aristotle presents his official discussion of phantasia (“imagination” in most translations). At the very outset of the discussion Aristotle offers as an endoxon that “phantasia is that in virtue of which we say that a phantasma occurs to us” (428a1-2). Now a natural reading of this claim, taken up by many commentators, can pose a problem for Aristotle’s overall account of perception. Here I argue that, although it would be silly to deny that Aristotle considers (...)
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  7.  57
    Dimitris Platchias (2004). The Veil of Perception and Contextual Relativism. Sorites 15 (December):76-86.
    In this paper I point out main shortfalls of the three main families of theories of perception and I propose a sort of inferential realism. In addition, I argue that there cannot be a scientific variant of direct realism and illustrate this point with reference to P.F.Strawson's attempt to reconcile, not naïve realism and the scientific variant as he amounts to, but rather, direct and indirect realism. I draw the distinction between four cases of illusion, and I refer to (...)
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  8.  58
    Jon Altschul (2015). Burge on Perception and the Disjunction Problem. Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 30 (2):251-269.
    According to the Disjunction Problem, teleological theories of perceptual content are unable to explain why it is that a subject represents an F when an F causes the perception and not the disjunction F v G, given that the subject has mistaken G’s for F’s in the past. Without an adequate explanation these theories are stuck without an account of how non-veridical representation is possible, which would be an unsettling result. In this paper I defend Burge’s teleological theory (...)
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  9. Farid Masrour, Space Perception, Visual Dissonance and the Fate of Standard Representationalism.
    This paper argues that a common form of representationalism has trouble accommodating empirical findings about visual space perception. Vision science tells us that the visual system systematically gives rise to different experiences of the same spatial property. This, combined with a naturalistic account of content, suggests that the same spatial property can have different veridical looks. I use this to argue that a common form of representationalism about spatial experience must be rejected. I conclude by considering alternatives to (...)
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  10. J. Dokic (1998). The Ontology of Perception: Bipolarity and Content. Erkenntnis 48 (2):153-69.
    The notion of perceptual content is commonly introduced in the analysis of perception. It stems from an analogy between perception and propositional attitudes. Both kinds of mental states, it is thought, have conditions of satisfaction. I try to show that on the most plausible account of perceptual content, it does not determine the conditions under which perceptual experience is veridical. Moreover, perceptual content must be bipolar (capable of being correct and capable of being incorrect), whereas perception (...)
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  11.  9
    Jérôme Dokic (forthcoming). Knowledge, Perception, and the Art of Camouflage. Synthese:1-9.
    I present a novel argument against the epistemic conception of perception according to which perception either is a form of knowledge or puts the subject in a position to gain knowledge about what is perceived. ECP closes the gap between a perceptual experience that veridically presents a given state of affairs and an experience capable of yielding the knowledge that the state of affairs obtains. Against ECP, I describe a particular case of perceptual experience in which the following (...)
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  12.  20
    Robin Le Poidevin (2013). Stopped Clocks, Silent Telephones and Sense Data: Some Problems of Time Perception. [REVIEW] Topoi 34 (1):1-8.
    When philosophers of perception contemplate concrete examples, the tendency is to choose perceptions whose content does not essentially involve time, but concern how things are at the moment they are perceived. This is true whether the cases are veridical (seeing a tree as a tree) or illusory (misperceiving the colour or spatial properties of an object). Less discussed, and arguably more complex and interesting cases do involve time as an essential element: perceiving movement, for example, or perceiving the (...)
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  13.  33
    Sean Wilkie (1996). The Causal Theory of Veridical Hallucinations. Philosophy 71 (276):245-254.
    At the very heart of the causal theory of perception are the peculiar examples sometimes called veridical hallucinations. These examples originate with Grice, who used them to prove ‘conclusively’ that when we say, for example, ‘Jane saw John’, we mean that John is the cause of certain visual experiences or impressions had by Jane.
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  14.  16
    Margaret Macdonald (1953). Linguistic Philosophy and Perception. Philosophy 28 (October):311-324.
    Philosophical theories of perception are generally admitted to be responses to certain problems or puzzles allied to the ancient dichotomy between Appearance and Reality. For they have been mainly provoked by the incompatibility of the common–sense assumption that an external, physical world exists and is revealed to the senses with the well–known facts of perceptual variation and error. If only what is real were perceived just as if only what is right were done it is possible that many of (...)
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  15. Pendaran Roberts & Kelly Schmidtke (2012). In Defense of Incompatibility, Objectivism, and Veridicality About Color. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):547-558.
    Are the following propositions true of the colors: No object can be more than one determinable or determinate color all over at the same time (Incompatibility); the colors of objects are mind-independent (Objectivism); and most human observers usually perceive the colors of objects veridically in typical conditions (Veridicality)? One reason to think not is that the empirical literature appears to support the proposition that there is mass perceptual disagreement about the colors of objects amongst human observers in typical conditions (...)
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  16. Matthew Soteriou, The Disjunctive Theory of Perception. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 edition).
    Perceptual experiences are often divided into the following three broad categories: veridical perceptions, illusions, and hallucinations. For example, when one has a visual experience as of a red object, it may be that one is really seeing an object and its red colour (veridical perception), that one is seeing a green object (illusion), or that one is not seeing an object at all (hallucination). Many maintain that the same account should be given of the nature of the (...)
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  17.  29
    Jan Almäng (2013). The Causal Self‐Referential Theory of Perception Revisited. Dialectica 67 (1):29-53.
    This is a paper about The Causal Self-Referential Theory of Perception. According to The Causal Self-Referential Theory as developed by above all John Searle and David Woodruff Smith, perceptual content is satisfied by an object only if the object in question has caused the perceptual experience. I argue initially that Searle's account cannot explain the distinction between hallucination and illusion since it requires that the state of affairs that is presented in the perceptual experience must exist in order for (...)
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  18.  8
    Robert J. Howell (2013). Perception From the First‐Person Perspective. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):n/a-n/a.
    This paper develops a view of the content of perceptual states that reflects the cognitive significance those states have for the subject. Perhaps the most important datum for such a theory is the intuition that experiences are ‘transparent’, an intuition promoted by philosophers as diverse as Sartre and Dretske. This paper distinguishes several different transparency theses, and considers which ones are truly supported by the phenomenological data. It is argued that the only thesis supported by the data is much weaker (...)
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  19.  68
    William Fish (2013). Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion: Reply to My Critics. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 163 (1):57-66.
    This book provides the first full-length treatment of disjunctivism about visual experiences in the service of defending a naive realist theory of veridical visual perception. It includes detailed theories of hallucination and illusion that show how such states can be indistinguishable from veridical experiences without sharing any common character.
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  20.  16
    Manish Singh & Donald D. Hoffman (1999). Perception, Inference, and the Veridicality of Natural Constraints. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):395-396.
    Pylyshyn's target article argues that perception is not inferential, but this is true only under a narrow construal of inference. A more general construal is possible, and has been used to provide formal theories of many visual capacities. This approach also makes clear that the evolution of natural constraints need not converge to the “veridical” state of the world.
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  21. Marcus Willaschek (ed.) (2013). Disjunctivism: Disjunctive Accounts in Epistemology and in the Philosophy of Perception. Routledge.
    Does perception provide us with direct and unmediated access to the world around us? The so-called 'argument from illusion ' has traditionally been supposed to show otherwise: from the subject's point of view, perceptual illusions are often indistinguishable from veridical perceptions; hence, perceptual experience, as such, cannot provide us with knowledge of the world, but only with knowledge of how things appear to us. Disjunctive accounts of perceptual experience, first proposed by John McDowell and Paul Snowdon in the (...)
     
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  22. Marcus Willaschek (ed.) (2012). Disjunctivism: Disjunctive Accounts in Epistemology and in the Philosophy of Perception. Routledge.
    Does perception provide us with direct and unmediated access to the world around us? The so-called 'argument from illusion ' has traditionally been supposed to show otherwise: from the subject's point of view, perceptual illusions are often indistinguishable from veridical perceptions; hence, perceptual experience, as such, cannot provide us with knowledge of the world, but only with knowledge of how things appear to us. Disjunctive accounts of perceptual experience, first proposed by John McDowell and Paul Snowdon in the (...)
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  23. Boyd Millar (2014). The Phenomenological Problem of Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):625-654.
    A perceptual experience of a given object seems to make the object itself present to the perceiver’s mind. Many philosophers have claimed that naïve realism (the view that to perceive is to stand in a primitive relation of acquaintance to the world) provides a better account of this phenomenological directness of perceptual experience than does the content view (the view that to perceive is to represent the world to be a certain way). But the naïve realist account of this phenomenology (...)
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  24. Michael K. Shim (2005). The Duality of Non-Conceptual Content in Husserl's Phenomenology of Perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2):209-229.
    Recently, a number of epistemologists have argued that there are no non-conceptual elements in representational content. On their view, the only sort of non-conceptual elements are components of sub-personal organic hardware that, because they enjoy no veridical role, must be construed epistemologically irrelevant. By reviewing a 35-year-old debate initiated by Dagfinn F.
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  25.  73
    Philippe Chuard (2010). Non-Transitive Looks & Fallibilism. Philosophical Studies 149 (2):161 - 200.
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  26.  2
    Philip W. Davidson (1972). Haptic Judgments of Curvature by Blind and Sighted Humans. Journal of Experimental Psychology 93 (1):43.
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  27. Michael G. F. Martin (2006). On Being Alienated. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press
    Disjunctivism about perceptual appearances, as I conceive of it, is a theory which seeks to preserve a naïve realist conception of veridical perception in the light of the challenge from the argument from hallucination. The naïve realist claims that some sensory experiences are relations to mind-independent objects. That is to say, taking experiences to be episodes or events, the naïve realist supposes that some such episodes have as constituents mind-independent objects. In turn, the disjunctivist claims that in a (...)
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  28.  62
    Neil McDonnell (2015). The Deviance in Deviant Causal Chains. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):162-170.
    Causal theories of action, perception and knowledge are each beset by problems of so-called ‘deviant’ causal chains. For each such theory, counterexamples are formed using odd or co-incidental causal chains to establish that the theory is committed to unpalatable claims about some intentional action, about a case of veridical perception or about the acquisition of genuine knowledge. In this paper I will argue that three well-known examples of a deviant causal chain have something in common: they each (...)
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  29. Katalin Farkas (2006). Indiscriminability and the Sameness of Appearance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2):39-59.
    Abstract: How exactly should the relation between a veridical perception and a corresponding hallucination be understood? I argue that the epistemic notion of ‘indiscriminability’, understood as lacking evidence for the distinctness of things, is not suitable for defining this relation. Instead, we should say that a hallucination and a veridical perception involve the same phenomenal properties. This has further consequences for attempts to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of phenomenal properties in terms of (...)
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  30. István Aranyosi (forthcoming). Silencing the Argument From Hallucination. In Fiona MacPherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination (MIT Press).
    Ordinary people tend to be realists regarding perceptual experience, that is, they take perceiving the environment as a direct, unmediated, straightforward access to a mindindependent reality. Not so for (ordinary) philosophers. The empiricist influence on the philosophy of perception, in analytic philosophy at least, made the problem of perception synonymous with the view that realism is untenable. Admitting the problem (and trying to offer a view on it) is tantamount to rejecting ordinary people’s implicit realist assumptions as naive. (...)
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  31.  72
    Kirk A. Ludwig (1996). Explaining Why Things Look the Way They Do. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press 18-60.
    How are we able to perceive the world veridically? If we ask this question as a part of the scientific investigation of perception, then we are not asking for a transcendental guarantee that our perceptions are by and large veridical; we presuppose that they are. Unless we assumed that we perceived the world for the most part veridically, we would not be in a position to investigate our perceptual abilities empirically. We are interested, then, not in how it (...)
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  32.  4
    J. A. Judge (forthcoming). Does the ‘Missing Fundamental’ Require an Inferentialist Explanation? Topoi:1-11.
    In arbitrating between representational and relational theories of perception, perceptual illusions—cases in which a subject’s perceptual experience diverges from the way the world really is—constitute an important battleground. The debate has, however, been dominated by discussions of visual perception. In attempting to extend the debate to audition, it is appropriate to start by considering what is thought to be a key case of auditory illusion. I consider the phenomenon of the ‘missing fundamental’, as well as examining a notion (...)
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  33. James Genone (2014). Appearance and Illusion. Mind 123 (490):339-376.
    Recent debates between representational and relational theories of perceptual experience sometimes fail to clarify in what respect the two views differ. In this essay, I explain that the relational view rejects two related claims endorsed by most representationalists: the claim that perceptual experiences can be erroneous, and the claim that having the same representational content is what explains the indiscriminability of veridical perceptions and phenomenally matching illusions or hallucinations. I then show how the relational view can claim that errors (...)
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  34. William C. Fish (2008). Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability, and the Nature of Hallucination. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press 144--167.
    In the eyes of some of its critics, disjunctivism fails to support adequately the key claim that a particular hallucination might be indistinguishable from a certain kind of veridical perception despite the two states having nothing other than this in common. Scott Sturgeon, for example, has complained that disjunctivism ‘‘offers no positive story about hallucination at all’’ (2000: 11) and therefore ‘‘simply takes [indistinguishability] for granted’’ (2000: 12). So according to Sturgeon, what the disjunctivist needs to provide is (...)
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  35.  51
    Colin Marshall (forthcoming). Lockean Empathy. Southern Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper offers an epistemic defense of empathy, drawing on John Locke’s theory of ideas. Locke held that ideas of shape, unlike ideas of color, had a distinctive value: resembling qualities in their objects. I argue that the same is true of empathy, as when someone is pained by someone’s pain. This means that empathy has the same epistemic value or objectivity that Locke and other early modern philosophers assigned to veridical perceptions of shape. For this to hold, pain (...)
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  36. Susanna Siegel (2008). The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press 205--224.
    Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for (...)
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  37. Louise Antony (2011). The Openness of Illusions. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):25-44.
    Illusions are thought to make trouble for the intuition that perceptual experience is "open" to the world. Some have suggested, in response to the this trouble, that illusions differ from veridical experience in the degree to which their character is determined by their engagement with the world. An understanding of the psychology of perception reveals that this is not the case: veridical and falsidical perceptions engage the world in the same way and to the same extent. While (...)
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  38. Matthew Nudds (2009). Recent Work in Perception: Naïve Realism and its Opponents. Analysis 69 (2):334-346.
    Suppose that you are looking at a vase of flowers on the table in front of you. You can visually attend to the vase and to the flowers, noticing their different features: their colour, their shape and the way they are arranged. In attending to the vase, the flowers and their features, you are attending to mind-independent objects and features. Suppose, now, that you introspectively reflect on the visual experience you have when looking at the vase of flowers. In doing (...)
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  39. David R. Hilbert (2004). Hallucination, Sense-Data and Direct Realism. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):185-191.
    Although it has been something of a fetish for philosophers to distinguish between hallucination and illusion, the enduring problems for philosophy of perception that both phenomena present are not essentially different. Hallucination, in its pure philosophical form, is just another example of the philosopher’s penchant for considering extreme and extremely idealized cases in order to understand the ordinary. The problem that has driven much philosophical thinking about perception is the problem of how to reconcile our evident direct perceptual (...)
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  40.  47
    Ram Neta (2008). In Defense of Disjunctivism. In Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press 311--29.
    Right now, I see a computer in front of me. Now, according to current philosophical orthodoxy, I could have the very same perceptual experience that I’m having right now even if I were not seeing a computer in front of me. Indeed, such orthodoxy tells us, I could have the very same experience that I’m having right now even if I were not seeing anything at all in front of me, but simply suffering from a hallucination. More generally, someone can (...)
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  41.  82
    Paul Coates (2000). Deviant Causal Chains and Hallucinations: A Problem for the Anti-Causalist. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):320-331.
    The subjective character of a given experience leaves open the question of its precise status. If it looks to a subject K as if there is an object of a kind F in front of him, the experience he is having could be veridical, or hallucinatory. Advocates of the Causal Theory of perception (whom I shall call.
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  42.  19
    E. Freeman & G. M. Boynton (2004). Subjective Direction of Ambiguous Transparent Motion is Biased by Veridical Motion of a Translucent but Not Opaque Context. In Robert Schwartz (ed.), Perception. Malden Ma: Blackwell Publishing 33-33.
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  43.  54
    Howard Robinson (2005). Reply to Nathan: How to Reconstruct the Causal Argument. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 20 (36):7-10.
    Nicholas Nathan tries to resist the current version of the causal argument for sense-data in two ways. First he suggests that, on what he considers to be the correct reconstruction of the argument, it equivocates on the sense of proximate cause. Second, he defends a form of disjunctivism, by claiming that there might be an extra mechanism involved in producing veridical hallucination that is not present in perception. I argue that Nathan’s reconstruction of the argument is not the (...)
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  44.  56
    Mark Crooks (2003). Phenomenology in Absentia: Dennett's Philosophy of Mind. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):102-148.
    : Daniel Dennett's philosophical abolition of mind is examined with reference to its methodology, intent, philosophic origins, and internal consistency. His treatment of the contents of perception and introspection is shown to be derivative from realist reductionist misinterpretations of physics, physiology, and phenomenology of perception. In order to rectify inconsistencies of that realistic paradigm devolved from psycho-neural identity theory of mid-twentieth century, Dennett radicalizes its logic and redefines even veridical phenomenology of exteroception to be "illusory." This measure (...)
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  45.  9
    Tadeusz Szubka (2000). Quine and Davidson on Perceptual Knowledge. In A. Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.), Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine. Kluwer Academic Print on Demand 7--19.
    One of the main differences between Quine’s and Davidson’s theories of knowledge and mind lies in their accounts of the content of perception and the way in which it contributes to our knowledge of the external world. Both thinkers are very sensitive to these differences and it has been the subject of discussion between them in recent publications. To put it very roughly, Quine holds firmly to the position that although we finally manage to get veridical knowledge of (...)
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  46.  21
    Peter Ulric Tse (2003). If Vision is “Veridical Hallucination,” What Keeps It Veridical? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):426-427.
    If perception is constructed, what keeps perception from becoming mere hallucination unlinked to world events? The visual system has evolved two strategies to anchor itself and correct its errors. One involves completing missing information on the basis of knowledge about what most likely exists in the scene. For example, the visual system fills in information only in cases where it might be responsible for the data loss. The other strategy involves exploiting the physical stability of the environment as (...)
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  47. James J. Gibson (1979). The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Houghton Mifflin.
    And in the end I came to believe that the whole theory of depth perception was false. I suggested a new theory in a book on what I called the visual world ...
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  48. Alva Noë (2005). Action in Perception. The MIT Press.
    "Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us," writes Alva Noe. "It is something we do." In Action in Perception, Noe argues that perception and perceptual consciousness depend on capacities for action and thought — that ...
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  49. Michael Tye (2007). Intentionalism and the Argument From No Common Content. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):589-613.
    Disjunctivists (Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1990, Martin 2002, 2006) often motivate their approach to perceptual experience by appealing in part to the claim that in cases of veridical perception, the subject is directly in contact with the perceived object. When I perceive a table, for example, there is no table-like sense-impression that stands as an intermediary between the table and me. Nor am I related to the table as I am to a deer when I see its footprint in (...)
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  50. Dustin Stokes, Attention and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.
    One sceptical rejoinder to those who claim that sensory perception is cognitively penetrable is to appeal to the involvement of attention. So, while a phenomenon might initially look like one where, say, a perceiver’s beliefs are influencing her visual experience, another interpretation is that because the perceiver believes and desires as she does, she consequently shifts her spatial attention so as to change what she senses visually. But, the sceptic will urge, this is an entirely familiar phenomenon, and it (...)
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