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  1. Victor A. F. Lamme (2006). Towards a True Neural Stance on Consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (11):494-501.
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  2. Victor A. F. Lamme (2006). Zap! Magnetic Tricks on Conscious and Unconscious Vision. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (5):193-195.
  3. Victor A. F. Lamme (2005). Independent Neural Definitions of Visual Awareness and Attention. In Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: Attention, Action, Strategies, and Bottom-Up Constraints. Nova Science Publishers. 171-191.
  4. Victor A. F. Lamme (2004). Separate Neural Definitions of Visual Consciousness and Visual Attention: A Case for Phenomenal Awareness. Neural Networks 17 (5):861-872.
  5. Victor A. F. Lamme (2003). Why Visual Attention and Awareness Are Different. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):12-18.
  6. Victor A. F. Lamme (2001). Blindsight: The Role of Feedforward and Feedback Corticocortical Connections. Acta Psychologica 107 (1):209-228.
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  7. Victor A. F. Lamme (2001). Neural Mechanisms of Visual Awareness: A Linking Proposition. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 1 (3):385-406.
    Recent developments in psychology and neuroscience suggest away to link the mental phenomenon of visual awareness with specific neural processes. Here, it is argued that the feed-forward activation of cells in any area of the brain is not sufficient to generate awareness, but that recurrent processing, mediated by horizontal and feedback connections is necessary. In linking awareness with its neural mechanisms it is furthermore important to dissociate phenomenal awareness from visual attention or decision processes.
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  8. Victor A. F. Lamme & Rogier Landman (2001). Attention Sheds No Light on the Origin of Phenomenal Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):993-993.
    In O'Regan & Noë's (O&N's) account for the phenomenal experience of seeing, awareness is equated to what is within the current focus of attention. They find no place for a distinction between phenomenal and access awareness. In doing so, they essentially present a dualistic solution to the mind-brain problem, and ignore that we do have phenomenal experience of what is outside the focus of attention.
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  9. Pieter R. Roelfsema & Victor A. F. Lamme (2001). Which Brain Mechanism Cannot Count Beyond Four? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):142-143.
    Cowan makes an intriguing case for a fundamental limit in the number of chunks that can be stored in short term memory (STM). Chunks are collections of concepts that have strong associations to one another and much weaker associations to other chunks. A translation of this definition for the visual domain would be that a visual chunk is a collection of features that belong to the same perceptual group (see also Mahoney & Ullman 1988). Here, we will first address (...)
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  10. Victor A. F. Lamme, H. Landman Super, P. R. R. Roelfsema & H. Spekreijse (2000). The Role of Primary Visual Cortex (V1) in Visual Awareness. Vision Research 40 (10):1507-21.