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Profile: Victor Kumar (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor)
  1. Hannah Tierney, Chris Howard, Victor Kumar, Trevor Kvaran & Shaun Nichols (forthcoming). How Many of Us Are There? In Justin Sytsma (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind. Continuum Press.
  2. Victor Kumar (2014). 'Knowledge' as a Natural Kind Term. Synthese 191 (3):439-457.
    Naturalists who conceive of knowledge as a natural kind are led to treat ‘knowledge’ as a natural kind term. ‘Knowledge,’ then, must behave semantically in the ways that seem to support a direct reference theory for other natural kind terms. A direct reference theory for ‘knowledge,’ however, appears to leave open too many possibilities about the identity of knowledge. Intuitively, states of belief count as knowledge only if they meet epistemic criteria, not merely if they bear a causal/historical relation to (...)
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  3. Richmond Campbell & Victor Kumar (2013). Pragmatic Naturalism and Moral Objectivity. Analysis 73 (3):446-455.
    In Kitcher’s ‘pragmatic naturalism’ moral evolution consists in pragmatically motivated moral changes in response to practical difficulties in social life. No moral truths or facts exist that could serve as an ‘external’ measure for moral progress. We propose a psychologically realistic conception of moral objectivity consistent with this pragmatic naturalism yet alive to the familiar sense that moral progress has an objective basis that transcends convention and consensus in moral opinion, even when these are products of serious, extended and collaborative (...)
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  4. Theodore Bach, Richmond Campbell, Victor Kumar, Justin Clarke-Doane, Glen Pettigrove, Christopher Heath Wellman, Jonathan Crowe, Lawrence J. Hatab, Kris McDaniel & Robert Kane (2012). 10. Ian Shapiro, The Real World of Democratic Theory Ian Shapiro, The Real World of Democratic Theory (Pp. 440-444). Ethics 122 (2).
     
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  5. Richmond Campbell & Victor Kumar (2012). Moral Reasoning on the Ground. Ethics 122 (2):273-312.
    We present a unified empirical and philosophical account of moral consistency reasoning, a distinctive form of moral reasoning that exposes inconsistencies among moral judgments about concrete cases. Judgments opposed in belief or in emotion and motivation are inconsistent when the cases are similar in morally relevant respects. Moral consistency reasoning, we argue, regularly shapes moral thought and feeling by coordinating two systems described in dual process models of moral cognition. Our empirical explanation of moral change fills a gap in the (...)
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  6. Victor Kumar & Richmond Campbell (2012). On the Normative Significance of Experimental Moral Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):311-330.
    Experimental research in moral psychology can be used to generate debunking arguments in ethics. Specifically, research can indicate that we draw a moral distinction on the basis of a morally irrelevant difference. We develop this naturalistic approach by examining a recent debate between Joshua Greene and Selim Berker. We argue that Greene's research, if accurate, undermines attempts to reconcile opposing judgments about trolley cases, but that his attempt to debunk deontology fails. We then draw some general lessons about the possibility (...)
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  7. Victor Kumar (2011). In Support of Anti-Intellectualism. Philosophical Studies 152 (1):135-54.
    Intellectualist theories attempt to assimilate know how to propositional knowledge and, in so doing, fail to properly explain the close relation know how bears to action. I develop here an anti-intellectualist theory that is warranted, I argue, because it best accounts for the difference between know how and mere “armchair knowledge.” Know how is a mental state characterized by a certain world-to-mind direction of fit (though it is non-motivational) and attendant functional role. It is essential of know how, but not (...)
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