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  1. Victor Rodych, Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  2. Victor Rodych (2006). Who is Wittgenstein's Worst Enemy?: Steiner on Wittgenstein on Godel. Logique Et Analyse 49 (193):55-84.
     
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  3. Victor Rodych (2004). Barry Smith, Ed., John Searle Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 24 (5):365-367.
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  4. Victor Rodych (2003). Misunderstanding Gödel: New Arguments About Wittgenstein and New Remarks by Wittgenstein. Dialectica 57 (3):279–313.
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  5. Victor Rodych (2003). Popper Versus Wittgenstein on Truth, Necessity, and Scientific Hypotheses. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 34 (2):323-336.
    Most philosophers of science maintain Confirmationism's central tenet, namely, that scientific theories are probabilistically confirmed by experimental successes. Against this dominant (and old) conception of experimental science, Popper's well-known, anti-inductivistic Falsificationism (’Deductivism’) has stood, virtually alone, since 1934. Indeed, it is Popper who tells us that it was he who killed Logical Positivism. It is also pretty well-known that Popper blames Wittgenstein for much that is wrong with Logical Positivism, just as he despises Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinian philosophers for abdicating philosophy's (...)
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  6. Victor Rodych (2003). Searle Freed of Every Flaw. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):161-175.
    Strong Al presupposes (1) that Super-Searle (henceforth ‘Searle’) comes to know that the symbols he manipulates are meaningful , and (2) that there cannot be two or more semantical interpretations for the system of symbols that Searle manipulates such that the set of rules constitutes a language comprehension program for each interpretation. In this paper, I show that Strong Al is false and that presupposition #1 is false, on the assumption that presupposition #2 is true. The main argument of the (...)
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  7. Victor Rodych (2002). Wittgenstein on Gdel: The Newly Published Remarks. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 56 (3):379 - 397.
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  8. Victor Rodych (2001). Gödel's 'Disproof' of the Syntactical Viewpoint. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):527-555.
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  9. Victor Rodych (2000). Wittgenstein's Anti-Modal Finitism. Logique Et Analyse 43:171-172.
     
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  10. Victor Rodych (2000). Wittgenstein's Critique of Set Theory. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2):281-319.
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  11. Victor Rodych (1999). Wittgenstein's Inversion of Gödel's Theorem. Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):173-206.
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  12. Victor Rodych (1999). Wittgenstein on Irrationals and Algorithmic Decidability. Synthese 118 (2):279-304.
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  13. Victor Rodych (1997). Wittgenstein on Mathematical Meaningfulness, Decidability, and Application. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (2):195-224.
    From 1929 through 1944, Wittgenstein endeavors to clarify mathematical meaningfulness by showing how (algorithmically decidable) mathematical propositions, which lack contingent "sense," have mathematical sense in contrast to all infinitistic "mathematical" expressions. In the middle period (1929-34), Wittgenstein adopts strong formalism and argues that mathematical calculi are formal inventions in which meaningfulness and "truth" are entirely intrasystemic and epistemological affairs. In his later period (1937-44), Wittgenstein resolves the conflict between his intermediate strong formalism and his criticism of set theory by requiring (...)
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  14. Victor Rodych (1995). Review of P. Frascolla, Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. [REVIEW] Philosophia Mathematica 3 (3).