We often feel powerless in our lives. We have many desires but are limited in our ability to transform those wishes into tangible results. We are confused and unsure about what will really make us happy. In Eternal Dharma, Vishnu Swami guides you on a journey to align yourself with the natural flow of existence through the ancient Eastern knowledge of Veda. Eternal Dharma distills 5,000 years of spiritual wisdom so you can learn to live an enlightened, effective, and (...) fulfilled life. Vishnu Swami inspires you to take action and manifest your fullest spiritual potential in everything you do: Explore the subtle and physical domains to achieve a totally new relationship with reality. Learn the radical new system of effectiveness. Gain clarity on all spiritual and religious paths. Free yourself from pain and suffering to reach pure, transcendental love. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a puzzle about the connection between an agent’s knowledge and her rationality and a way to solve it. The puzzle is that, intuitively, many of us want to accept both that it is rational for an agent to act on what she knows and that it is irrational for an agent to take what she knows for granting in her practical reasoning. These two claims about rationality present us with a puzzle because, holding fixed our (...) interpretation of rationality, we cannot accept them both. According to my view, the most compelling way of solving this puzzle is to distinguish between our primary and dispositional evaluations of actions. By making this distinction, we not only gain a unique perspective on the relationship between knowledge and rationality, we also see how doing what we know is best might still manifest an undesirable habit. (shrink)

In both the Consequences of Compassion and his response to my article, Goodman outlines a consequentialist theory that is both coherent and, in many ways, compelling. One can imagine that out of a concern toward—as Goodman puts it—“the impersonal events which fill the world”, we will accept “momentary experiences as the morally significant units”, and our actions will aim to promote the existence of “good dharmas.” However, as this brief reply argues, Goodman’s equating of a consequentialism focused on good dharmas (...) to a consequentialism focused on individual well-being is unjustified, and, as a consequence, the textual evidence he presents does not support his consequentialist view... (shrink)

There is an emerging consensus that human behavior is governed by two types of processes: System 1 processes, which are quicker, automatic, and run in parallel, and System 2 processes, which are slower, more conscious, and run in serial. Among such “dual-process” theorists, however, there is disagreement about whether the premises we use in our conscious, S2 reasoning should be considered as beliefs. In this exchange, one facet that has been largely overlooked is how conscious beliefs are structurally and functionally (...) similar to episodic memories. This article will argue that the similarities between beliefs and episodic memories, specifically in light of Daniel Schacter’s widely influential constructive memory framework, highlight a heretofore unexamined empirical weakness of dispositional accounts of S2 beliefs. In addition, this perspective helps situate beliefs within our broader understanding of how information is encoded and retrieved in the brain. (shrink)

Despite the salient experience of encoding threatening events, these memories are prone to distortions and often non-veridical from encoding to recall. Further, threat has been shown to preferentially disrupt the binding of event details and enhance goal-relevant information. While extensive work has characterised distinctive features of emotional memory, research has not fully explored the influence threat has on temporal memory, a process putatively supported by the binding of event details into a temporal context. Two primary competing hypotheses have been proposed; (...) that threat can impair or enhance temporal memory. We analysed two datasets to assess temporal memory for an in-person haunted house experience. In study 1, we examined the temporal structure of memory by characterising memory contiguity in free recall as a function of individual levels of heart rate as a proxy of threat. In study 2, we replicated marginal findings of threat-related increases in memory contiguity found in study 1. We extended these findings by showing threat-related increases in recency discriminations, an explicit test of temporal memory. Together, these findings demonstrate that threat enhances temporal memory regarding free recall structure and during explicit memory judgments. (shrink)

A number of scholars have attempted to situate the Buddha’s teachings within the primary Western ethical theories, namely consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. One challenge that each has confronted is Buddhism’s emphasis on the ultimate non-existence of the self. In his writings, Charles Goodman has put forward an account of how the realization of the ultimate non-existence of the self would lead a practitioner to consequentialism. The present comment challenges the account offered by Goodman, and argues that an ethical-particularist account (...) better squares Buddhist ethics with Buddhist metaphysics. This comment also shows how Goodman’s more recent work, while constituting a significant retreat from his.. (shrink)

Lorsque l’on réfléchit à la signification positive que Foucault a pu octroyer à l’ontologie, en plaidant pour que la philosophie s’impose comme une « ontologie historique », ou bien une « ontologie critique de nous-mêmes », il peut être utile au préalable de préciser ce que le recours foucaldien à une telle notion ne doit pas, et ne souhaite pas devoir à l’autre grand projet de pensée qui, au XXe siècle,...

It’s widely accepted that whether or not an agent merits praise for performing a particular action importantly depends on her motivation in doing so. What has received less attention is the importance of an agent’s moral understanding to whether she merits praise for performing a particular action, or whether her action has ‘moral worth.’ The first task of this paper is relatively straightforward: to show that two prominent attempts to address the importance of moral understanding to moral worth, namely that (...) of Zoe Johnson King and Paulina Sliwa, are unsuccessful. The second task of this paper, which is more novel and ambitious, is to show that agents who lack moral understanding are a challenge to more accounts of moral worth than has been previously recognized. My goal in this paper is largely negative: to show that extant accounts of such conditions are unable to account for the relevance of an agent’s understanding to her praiseworthiness for performing a particular action. In making clear these shortcomings, however, I also hope to make clear just how complicated it is to pin down exactly when an agent merits praise for her actions. (shrink)

There’s more to meriting praise than doing what’s objectively right. After all, one might do what’s objectively right as the result of a fluke or with malicious intent. While doing what’s objectively right is not enough to merit praise, it’s natural to think that some list of sufficient conditions can be assembled. The most common approach to such lists entails that, when one does what is objectively right with the appropriate epistemic state and/or motivation, one merits praise for one’s action. (...) In other words, according to the most influential extant views, if one both does what’s right and meets certain additional criteria, one will not only succeed in doing what is morality required but will also succeed in deserving positive moral evaluation for what one has done. In this paper, I use the example of extended actions to show that drawing any sort of link between doing what’s objectively right and being worthy of praise is much more difficult than has been previously appreciated. (shrink)

Context is an important construct in many domains of cognition, including learning, memory, and emotion. We used dynamical systems methods to demonstrate the episodic nature of experience by showing a natural separation between the scales over which within-context and between-context relationships operate. To do this, we represented an individual's emails extending over about 5 years in a high-dimensional semantic space and computed the dimensionalities of the subspaces occupied by these emails. Personal discourse has a two-scaled geometry with smaller within-context dimensionalities (...) than between-context dimensionalities. Prior studies have shown that reading experience and visual experience have a similar two-scaled structure. Furthermore, the recurrence plot of the emails revealed that experience is predictable and hierarchical, supporting the constructs of some influential theories of memory. The results demonstrate that experience is not scale-free and provide an important target for accounts of how experience shapes cognition. (shrink)

In his book The Opacity of Mind, Peter Carruthers presents the Interpretive Sensory Awareness theory, which holds that while we have direct access to our own sensory states, our access to “self-knowledge” is almost always interpretive. In presenting his view, Carruthers also claims that his account is the first of its kind; after a cursory examination of major theories of mind, he concludes that “transparent access” accounts of self-knowledge—the alternative to ISA—have been endorsed throughout history. This paper challenges this latter (...) claim. Contrary to Carruthers’ view, the paper argues that Buddhist theories of mind are not “transparent access” accounts. Instead, they not only have an analysis of sensory processing and conscious experience similar to that of ISA, but also share what Carruthers sees as ISA’s central tenet: individuals lack transparent, conscious access to most of their propositional attitudes. Given this fundamental alignment, the Buddhist perspective can offer u.. (shrink)

In exploring the impact of cognitive science findings on compatibilist theories of moral responsibility such as Fischer and Ravizza’s, most attention has focused on whether agents are, in fact, responsive to reasons. In doing so, however, we have largely ignored our improved understanding of agents’ epistemic access to their reasons for acting. The “ownership” component of Fischer and Ravizza’s theory depends on agents being able to see the causal efficacy of their conscious deliberation. Cognitive science studies make clear that a (...) variety of situational factors, implicit attitudes, and unconscious mental states influence agents’ behavior, and that they are generally unaware of their impact. If an agent is skeptical of the extent to which her conscious deliberation has causal upshots in the world, then she – like a natural incompatibilist – may not take ownership over her action-generating mechanism. Instead, she may seek a more general account of moral responsibility or revise her moral intuitions altogether. (shrink)

Many accounts of moral responsibility have emerged recently that question the importance of conscious choice for moral responsibility. Instead of this ‘volitional’ requirement, these ‘attributionist’ accounts claim that agents are responsible for their actions when their actions reflect who they are and what they value. This paper argues that attributionist accounts are too quick to dismiss the connection between volition and moral responsibility. By excising conscious control from their accounts, attributionists leave open the undesirable possibility that an agent may fulfil (...) all necessary conditions for moral responsibility even when she is under the conscious control of another person. Through analyzing situations in which attributionist conditions for moral responsibility are met while an agent is controlled by someone else, the link between an agent's volition and her moral responsibility becomes more apparent. (shrink)

Anxieties stemming from rising inequalities have led significant sections of the world’s population to reject democratic practices and place their trust in politicians with fascist tendencies who promise to wrest control of their destinies from elites. Ironically, elite interests, far from being threatened, are bolstered by the rise of fascism, as discredited democratic institutions can be dismantled with impunity. The emerging alliance between the neoliberal project and fascist politics is a phenomenon that the business and society scholarship is ill-equipped to (...) confront as it remains trapped in the same neoliberal pro-elite paradigms that neglect meaningful attention to material equality and focus instead on ensuring a minimum floor of rights required for subsistence. Neglecting the concentration of wealth among the elite, particularly in countries with historic legacies of inequalities based on race, caste, ethnicity, and religion, creates ideal conditions for the eruption of fascisms premised upon programmatic denial of the full range of civil rights to one or more sections of the population, so that even the floor minimum becomes impossible to achieve for all. This paper argues that corporate collusions with fascism can be challenged only by a commitment to redistribution of wealth and creating critical citizens and by generating knowledge that can question authority: in other words, scholarship must become a subversive activity. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage met en œuvre une confrontation philosophique entre Heidegger et Patočka, deux figures majeures de la tradition phénoménologique, en prenant pour fil conducteur leurs interprétations respectives des concepts fondamentaux de la Physique d’Aristote. Mais tout d’abord, le point d’accord : l’herméneutique de l’aristotélisme représente aux yeux de Heidegger et de Patočka une première entrée pensante dans l’affaire même de la pensée, où le mouvement, irréductible au déplacement d’un étant dans l’espace, désigne le procès d’advenue au paraître qui sous-tend l’éclosion (...) à l’être des choses. Aristote met au jour la différence ontologique entre l’être et l’étant, en sorte que la Physique constitue de ce point de vue pour Heidegger et Patočka le véritable Grundbuch de la philosophie occidentale. Cependant, Heidegger et Patočka ne comprennent pas de la même manière le sens de ce mouvement ontologique au cœur de l’être. À travers l’examen de ces différences, l’enjeu de cet ouvrage est de mettre en évidence un point de tension au sein de la phénoménologie qui n’a pas encore été suffisamment remarqué, entre d’une part l’approche heideggérienne qui soumet l’être au sens, et s’expose de la sorte au risque d’un anthropocentrisme ontologique larvé. Et d’autre part, la tentative d’un réalisme phénoménologique, dont Patočka fut l’un des représentants, dans la double mesure où il brise l’identité classique de l’être et de l’intelligibilité, et où il pense l’homme comme radicalement décentré, prétendant en finir ainsi avec le sujet et tous ses avatars ; réalisme radical dont on peut toutefois se demander s’il ne met pas à mal le paradigme phénoménologique de l’a priori de la corrélation entre l’apparaître et ses modes subjectifs de donnée, et s’il ne remet pas en cause ainsi la possibilité même de la phénoménologie en la poussant au-delà de sa propre limite. (shrink)

La tolérance pose certaines questions essentielles aux analyses phénoménologiques de l’intersubjectivité. Tout d’abord, comme Sartre ou Heidegger l’avaient souligné, dans quelle mesure la tolérance ne se retourne-t‑elle pas toujours en une intolérance plus profonde, sous les formes de l’indifférence à l’égard de l’autre ou bien d’une domination qui réduit l’altérité d’autrui à des propriétés imposées, le privant de sa liberté? Mais si l’on prend au contraire le parti de construire un concept positif de tolérance pour penser la relation éthique, alors (...) le problème est de maintenir une double exigence : celle d’accueillir autrui en s’ouvrant à son altérité par rapport à moi, mais aussi celle de ne pas traiter cette altérité comme une différence abstraite. Il s’agit de reconnaître que la manifestation d’autrui est toujours située dans le monde, impliquant un ensemble de valeurs et de croyances susceptibles d’être en inadéquation avec les miennes, et qui doivent être supportées ou endurées malgré tout dans certaines limites sûrement impossibles à fixer a priori. Ainsi le phénomène de la tolérance demande que l’on envisage les normes absolues de la rationalité éthique comme toujours déjà particularisées dans des situations sociales concrètes, avec leurs caractéristiques politiques, culturelles, cultuelles et historiques contingentes. Nous montrons dans cet article que c’est précisément ce que Levinas (et Derrida à sa suite) comprend lorsqu’il aborde la question de l’intersubjectivité à partir du problème du tiers. La tolérance donne ainsi l’opportunité de penser les conditions du cosmopolitisme comme structure phénoménologique de la relation intersubjective (le rapport à l’autre comme rapport situé mondainement), même si l’on pourra alors se demander, en conclusion, si la tolérance abordée dans une perspective de l’émancipation, au sein d’une « histoire universelle d’un point de vue cosmopolitique », n’appartient pas à la vision philosophique des Modernes et de l’ Aufklärung, et si elle est encore tenable dans un monde de plus en plus dominé par l’essence de la technique. (shrink)

La tolérance pose certaines questions essentielles aux analyses phénoménologiques de l’intersubjectivité. Tout d’abord, comme Sartre ou Heidegger l’avaient souligné, dans quelle mesure la tolérance ne se retourne-t‑elle pas toujours en une intolérance plus profonde, sous les formes de l’indifférence à l’égard de l’autre ou bien d’une domination qui réduit l’altérité d’autrui à des propriétés imposées, le privant de sa liberté? Mais si l’on prend au contraire le parti de construire un concept positif de tolérance pour penser la relation éthique, alors (...) le problème est de maintenir une double exigence : celle d’accueillir autrui en s’ouvrant à son altérité par rapport à moi, mais aussi celle de ne pas traiter cette altérité comme une différence abstraite. Il s’agit de reconnaître que la manifestation d’autrui est toujours située dans le monde, impliquant un ensemble de valeurs et de croyances susceptibles d’être en inadéquation avec les miennes, et qui doivent être supportées ou endurées malgré tout dans certaines limites sûrement impossibles à fixer a priori. Ainsi le phénomène de la tolérance demande que l’on envisage les normes absolues de la rationalité éthique comme toujours déjà particularisées dans des situations sociales concrètes, avec leurs caractéristiques politiques, culturelles, cultuelles et historiques contingentes. Nous montrons dans cet article que c’est précisément ce que Levinas (et Derrida à sa suite) comprend lorsqu’il aborde la question de l’intersubjectivité à partir du problème du tiers. La tolérance donne ainsi l’opportunité de penser les conditions du cosmopolitisme comme structure phénoménologique de la relation intersubjective (le rapport à l’autre comme rapport situé mondainement), même si l’on pourra alors se demander, en conclusion, si la tolérance abordée dans une perspective de l’émancipation, au sein d’une « histoire universelle d’un point de vue cosmopolitique », n’appartient pas à la vision philosophique des Modernes et de l’ Aufklärung, et si elle est encore tenable dans un monde de plus en plus dominé par l’essence de la technique. (shrink)

On Vishnu, Hindu deity as portrayed in Bhāgavatapurāna, Hindu mythological text and Vaiṣṇava philosophy.

Demoting Vishnu: Ritual, Politics, and the Unraveling of Nepal’s Hindu Monarchy. By Anne T. Mocko. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. ix + 246.

Through the influence of the religious mystical thought, which interprets the human as a traveler and the world as a destination to settle in and migrate from, numerous connotations as to the road, the passenger as well as the journey have been created in Turkish Ṣūfī poetry. The caravan, which takes place in poetry as an element of simile (tashbīḥ) and generally within the framework of metaphor (majāz) is one of these associations. In Ṣūfī texts, the caravan symbolizes (...) the spiritual journey of the sālik, who wants to reach the rank (maqām) of the Perfect Human Being in the footsteps of the leading figures of the religion and Ṣūfīsm (Taṣawwuf). The caravan has passed, which is understood as a symbol peculiar to the lore language, looks like a formula of a series of advice that reminds and warns people of the responsibilities they are obliged to fulfill even though life is short and the world is temporary. Being delayed of the unwary traveler when the caravan has passed was used in the sense that the sālik could not make use of his life, time, and opportunities; and the situation of the person who was left behind and separated from the caravan was generally met with the analogy of a lame donkey. In this study, which is about the caravan as a mystical metaphor (majāz), the survey model, one of the qualitative research methods, was used. The research aims to determine the use of the caravan metaphor (majāz) in the examples of Ṣūfī poetry and meanings it has gained in Ṣūfī terminology. For this purpose, the major works written between the 12th and 19th centuries in Turkish Ṣūfī poetry have been investigated, and the data obtained have been evaluated in the light of the works and views of the leading figures who have been influential on Turkish Ṣūfī culture and literature. The study, which is thought to contribute to the understanding of the metaphors (majāzs) that Turkish Ṣūfī poetry is based on is important since it reveals that the usages the caravan has passed is one of the common symbols of Ṣūfīsm (Taṣawwuf). As a result of the research, it was found out that the metaphor (majāz) of the caravan has existed in poetry uninterruptedly since the 12th century when Turkish Ṣūfī literature began to take shape. Although time, place, and persons change, the meanings attributed to the metaphor (majāz) of the caravan are almost the same. Especially in the poems containing advice, the metaphor (majāz) of the caravan was frequently used to guide people and human life was associated with the caravan. In this respect, it can be said that the metaphor (majāz) of the caravan has a traditional usage in Turkish Ṣūfī poetry. On the other hand, the usage of the caravan metaphor (majāz) in Turkish Ṣūfī poetry and the usage in Iranian literature show similarity. As a matter of fact, starting with Aḥmed Yesevī (d. 562/1166), many Ṣūfī poets depicted the same journey in a similar way, and Saʿdī-i Shīrāzī (d. 691/1292) dealt with the same theme in a way that coincided with the narrative and vocabulary of Turkish poets. The fact that the caravan is determined with similar uses in the poems of different societies as a Ṣūfī symbol shows that the metaphor (majāz) of the caravan has a common usage regarding Ṣūfīsm (Taṣawwuf) in the wide cultural geography of Islam. The metaphor (majāz) of the caravan has a special usage in Turkish Ṣūfī poetry in the form of the caravan has passed. Expressions in the style of the caravan has passed which succinctly fit a long adventure into two words, are symbols peculiar to the lore language, and serve as psychological advice in Turkish Ṣūfī poetry. On the one hand, this symbol deals with the caravan journey in the dimension of truth, on the other hand, it gives metaphorical meanings to the word, referring to the spiritual journey of sālik. In this sense, the caravan has passed is a powerful metaphor (majāz) that warns people to make the best use of the rest of their life, or rather the moment they are in, and it looks like a formula of a series of advice that warns them. The advice in question is closely related to the words die before you die and time is a sharp sword, often used by the leading figures of religion and mysticism. Therefore, the caravan has passed is a kind of contemplation and presents a vivid picture of the journey that takes its source from the social life so that the traveler does not forget that he is on the way by reminding him of death. The advice style is generally dominant in the poems in which the metaphor (majāz) of the caravan is used, especially in the poems describing the caravan’s passing and the heedless traveler staying on the road. However, it is obvious that the subject is presented in a lyrical and impressive style, especially in poets such as Aḥmed Yesevī, Yūnus Emre (d. 720/1320 [?]) and Niyāzī-i Mıṣrī (d. 1105/1694). (shrink)

In their recent article, scholars Keisha Ray and Jane Fallis Cooper claim that “bioethicists should not be deterred from advocating for a healthy environment […] instead, […] underscore the importa...

Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby (2024) argues that “[i]t is time for bioethics to end talk about personhood” (11). The author calls on the field to ask different kinds of normative questions about the mo...

Comprehensive work on Hindu philosophy and spiritual life.

The insulin/insulin‐like growth factor‐1 (IGF‐1) signaling (IIS) pathway is a pivotal genetic program regulating cell growth, tissue development, metabolic physiology, and longevity of multicellular organisms. IIS integrates a fine‐tuned cascade of signaling events induced by insulin/IGF‐1, which is precisely controlled by post‐translational modifications. The ubiquitin/proteasome‐system (UPS) influences the functionality of IIS through inducible ubiquitylation pathways that regulate internalization of the insulin/IGF‐1 receptor, the stability of downstream insulin/IGF‐1 signaling targets, and activity of nuclear receptors for control of gene expression. An age‐related (...) decline in UPS activity is often associated with an impairment of IIS, contributing to pathologies such as cancer, diabetes, cardiovascular, and neurodegenerative disorders. Recent findings identified a key role of diverse ubiquitin modifications in insulin signaling decisions, which governs dynamic adaption upon environmental and physiological changes. In this review, we discuss the mutual crosstalk between ubiquitin and insulin signaling pathways in the context of cellular and organismal homeostasis. (shrink)

Commentary to the "Harikathāmr̥tasāra." work of Jagannāthadāsa, 1728-1809, on the quintessence of Dvaita Vedanta, and on Vishnu, Hindu deity.

Text and commentary on Kakṣa tāratamya sandhi, 32nd chapter of Harikathāmr̥tasāra, Kannada verse work on the quintessence of Dvaita Vedanta, and on Vishnu, Hindu deity.

Concern for corporate influence on democratic decisions has mostly focused on campaign funding and access to legislators. While these are certainly worrisome, corporations have another tool to influence decisions, which they are increasingly using. They can threaten to move their operations or cancel expansion plans in a municipality unless its public officials pass (or kill) certain policies. In one sense, this is business as usual. Companies have the right to decide where to operate, and it is important for officials to (...) consider how policy will impact local businesses that provide jobs and tax revenue. On the other hand, companies can use these threats to get their way on any policy, whether or not it impacts them. How do we tell when this kind of corporate action is illegitimate? We argue that such actions are illegitimate when they violate democratic norms of reason-giving, which occurs when companies offer the public “created” rather than “natural” reasons for their proposed policy. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

Cet essai propose de contribuer au développement d'une cosmologie phénoménologique, dans la voie ouverte par Fink, Patocka ou Renaud Barbaras. Au regard de cette approche, il faut combattre le naturalisme, car les choses (les phénomènes) ne sont pas des systèmes matériels réductibles en dernière instance à leurs constituants élémentaires. Mais face au subjectivisme, les phénomènes ne sont pas non plus assimilables à leur sens constitué dans la conscience. Celle-ci, comme toute chose, est située dans le monde, lequel seul fait apparaître (...) tout ce qui est. Apparaître signifie entrer en présence, accéder à l'individuation par un mouvement qui a pour fond producteur le monde lui-même, mouvement dont on soutient dans ce travail qu'il est une structure essentielle de l'apparaître, ou ce que Husserl aurait nommé un a priori matériel. Reste à comprendre comment la conscience peut accéder à de telles structures, si elle est elle-même limitée par la constitution finie des facultés anthropologiques qui médiatisent son ouverture. La cosmologie phénoménologique d'inspiration réaliste doit-elle réinvestir l'opposition kantienne entre choses en soi et phénomènes? Il faut surtout montrer comment la conscience, en dépit de sa finitude, a accès à l'absolu en tant qu'il se montre, et envisager ainsi la phénoménologie comme voie méthodologique vers une forme renouvelée de métaphysique. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

Social movements driven by a combination of religious nationalism and economic fundamentalism are globally grabbing the levers of political, economic, and intellectual control. The consequence is a policy climate premised on polarization in which inequality and destruction of the natural environment are condoned. This creates demands on key academic institutions like business schools, with stakeholders who are complicit in the sustenance of these social movements. Scholars in these schools have an opportunity to respond through curricula that facilitate reflection on the (...) ideological preferences of such groups under their influence. However, stakeholders influenced by religious nationalism tend to reject the premises of liberal secular vocabulary as elitist or alien and hence suspicious. This article considers a teaching strategy to instill values of equality and respect for nature among the stakeholders by grounding curriculums in the tenets of the same religion valorized by the social movements. The consequences of such a strategy is discussed through its application to the business curriculums taught in India, where a regressive social movement with totalitarian pretensions—Hindutva—combined with neoliberalism has secured unparalleled power. Elements of this strategy could inform educators in other democratic societies facing similar challenges. (shrink)

Bastin et al. present a framework that draws heavily on existing ideas of dual processes in memory in order to make predictions about memory deficits in clinical populations. It has been difficult to find behavioral evidence for multiple memory processes but we offer some evidence for dual processes in a related domain: memory for the time-of-occurrence of events.