Search results for 'Vision Disorders*' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Gerald Vision (1997). Problems of Vision: Rethinking the Causal Theory of Perception. New York: Oxford University Press.score: 270.0
    In this book Gerald Vision argues for a new causal theory, one that engages provocatively with direct realism and makes no use of a now discredited subjectivism.
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  2. Martha J. Farah (1990). Visual Agnosia: Disorders of Object Recognition and What They Tell Us About Normal Vision. MIT Press.score: 126.0
  3. Melvyn Goodale & David Milner (2013/2005). Sight Unseen: An Exploration of Conscious and Unconscious Vision. Oup Oxford.score: 90.0
    In this updated and extended edition of their book, Goodale and Milner explore one of the most extraordinary neurological cases of recent years--one that profoundly changed scientific views on the visual brain. Taking us on a journey into the unconscious brain, this book is a fascinating illustration of the power of the 'unconscious' mind.
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  4. Tony Ro (2006). The Cognitive Neuroscience of Unconscious and Conscious Vision. In Haluk Ögmen & Bruno G. Breitmeyer (eds.), The First Half Second: The Microgenesis and Temporal Dynamics of Unconscious and Conscious Visual Processes. Mit Press. 335-352.score: 90.0
  5. Brian P. Keane Steven M. Silverstein, Yushi Wang (2012). Cognitive and Neuroplasticity Mechanisms by Which Congenital or Early Blindness May Confer a Protective Effect Against Schizophrenia. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 66.0
    Several authors have noted that there are no reported cases of people with schizophrenia who were born blind or who developed blindness shortly after birth, suggesting that congenital or early (C/E) blindness may serve as a protective factor against schizophrenia. By what mechanisms might this effect operate? Here, we hypothesize that C/E blindness offers protection by strengthening cognitive functions whose impairment characterizes schizophrenia, and by constraining cognitive processes that exhibit excessive flexibility in schizophrenia. After briefly summarizing evidence that schizophrenia is (...)
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  6. Steven M. Silverstein, Yushi Wang & Brian P. Keane (2012). Cognitive and Neuroplasticity Mechanisms by Which Congenital or Early Blindness May Confer a Protective Effect Against Schizophrenia. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 66.0
    Several authors have noted that there are no reported cases of people with schizophrenia who were born blind or who developed blindness shortly after birth, suggesting that congenital or early (C/E) blindness may serve as a protective factor against schizophrenia. By what mechanisms might this effect operate? Here, we hypothesize that C/E blindness offers protection by strengthening cognitive functions whose impairment characterizes schizophrenia, and by constraining cognitive processes that exhibit excessive flexibility in schizophrenia. After briefly summarizing evidence that schizophrenia is (...)
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  7. James Danckert & Yves Rossetti (2005). Blindsight in Action: What Can the Different Sub-Types of Blindsight Tell Us About the Control of Visually Guided Actions? Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 29 (7):1035-1046.score: 60.0
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  8. Victor A. F. Lamme (2001). Blindsight: The Role of Feedforward and Feedback Corticocortical Connections. Acta Psychologica 107 (1):209-228.score: 60.0
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  9. Robert W. Kentridge, Charles A. Heywood & Lawrence Weiskrantz (2004). Spatial Attention Speeds Discrimination Without Awareness in Blindsight. Neuropsychologia 42 (6):831-835.score: 60.0
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  10. Tony Ro & Robert Rafal (2006). Visual Restoration in Cortical Blindness: Insights From Natural and TMS-Induced Blindsight. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation 16 (4):377-396.score: 60.0
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  11. Alfons O. Hamm, Almut I. Weike, Harald T. Schupp, Thomas Treig, Alexander Dressel & Christof Kessler (2003). Affective Blindsight: Intact Fear Conditioning to a Visual Cue in a Cortically Blind Patient. Brain 126 (2):267-275.score: 60.0
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  12. D. Ashley Cohen, Differences in Awareness of Neuropsychological Deficits Among Three Patient Populations.score: 60.0
  13. Daniel T. Levin, Sarah B. Drivdahl, Nausheen Momen & Melissa R. Beck (2002). False Predictions About the Detectability of Visual Changes: The Role of Beliefs About Attention, Memory, and the Continuity of Attended Objects in Causing Change Blindness Blindness. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):507-527.score: 60.0
  14. Deborah Giaschi, James E. Jan, Bruce Bjornson, Simon Au Young, Matthew Tata, Christopher J. Lyons, William V. Good & Peter K. H. Wong (2003). Conscious Visual Abilities in a Patient with Early Bilateral Occipital Damage. Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology 45 (11):772-781.score: 60.0
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  15. Alan Kingstone Kirsten A. Dalrymple, Jason J. S. Barton (2013). A World Unglued: Simultanagnosia as a Spatial Restriction of Attention. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 60.0
    Simultanagnosia is a disorder of visual attention that leaves a patient’s world unglued: scenes and objects are perceived in a piecemeal manner. It is generally agreed that simultanagnosia is related to an impairment of attention, but it is unclear whether this impairment is object- or space-based in nature. We first consider the findings that support a concept of simultanagnosia as deficit of object-based attention. We then examine the evidence suggesting that simultanagnosia results from damage to a space-based attentional system, and (...)
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  16. Georgina M. Jackson, Tracy Shepherd, Sven C. Mueller, Masid Husain & Stephen R. Jackson (2006). Dorsal Simultanagnosia: An Impairment of Visual Processing or Visual Awareness? Cortex 42 (5):740-749.score: 60.0
     
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  17. Stephen Jackson (2000). Perception, Awareness and Action: Insights From Blindsight. In Yves Rossetti & Antti Revonsuo (eds.), Beyond Dissociation: Interaction Between Dissociated Implicit and Explicit Processing. John Benjamins.score: 60.0
  18. Benjamin P. Meek, Keri Locheed, Jane M. Lawrence-Dewar, Paul Shelton & Jonathan J. Marotta (2013). Posterior Cortical Atrophy: An Investigation of Scan Paths Generated During Face Matching Tasks. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 60.0
  19. Ullin T. Place (2000). Consciousness and the Zombie Within: A Functional Analysis of the Blindsight Evidence. In Yves Rossetti & Antti Revonsuo (eds.), Beyond Dissociation: Interaction Between Dissociated Implicit and Explicit Processing. John Benjamins.score: 60.0
     
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  20. John Z. Sadler (2005). Values and Psychiatric Diagnosis. Oxford University Press.score: 36.0
    The public, mental health consumers, as well as mental health practitioners wonder about what kinds of values mental health professionals hold, and what kinds of values influence psychiatric diagnosis. Are mental disorders socio-political, practical, or scientific concepts? Is psychiatric diagnosis value-neutral? What role does the fundamental philosophical question "How should I live?" play in mental health care? In his carefully nuanced and exhaustively referenced monograph, psychiatrist and philosopher of psychiatry John Z. Sadler describes the manifold kinds of values and value (...)
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  21. Steven M. Silverstein William A. Phillips (2013). The Coherent Organization of Mental Life Depends on Mechanisms for Context-Sensitive Gain-Control That Are Impaired in Schizophrenia. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 36.0
    There is rapidly growing evidence that schizophrenia involves changes in context-sensitive gain-control and probabilistic inference. In addition to the well-known cognitive disorganization to which these changes lead, basic aspects of vision are also impaired, as discussed by other papers on this Frontiers Research Topic. The aim of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of such findings by examining five central hypotheses. First, context-sensitive gain-control is fundamental to brain function and mental life. Second, it occurs in many different (...)
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  22. David Bourget, A General Reply to the Arguments From Blur, Double Vision, Perspective, and Other Kinds of Perceptual Distortion Against Representationalism.score: 24.0
    This paper offers a general reply to arguments from perceptual distortion (e.g. blur, perspective, double vision) against the representationalist thesis that the phenomenal characters of experiences supervene on their intentional contents. It has been argued that distorted and undistorted experiences are counterexamples to this thesis because they can share contents without sharing phenomenal characters. In reply, I suggest that cases of perceptual distortion do not constitute counterexamples to the representationalist thesis because the contents of distorted experiences are always impoverished (...)
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  23. Alia Al-Saji (2009). A Phenomenology of Critical-Ethical Vision: Merleau-Ponty, Bergson, and the Question of Seeing Differently. Chiasmi International 11:375-398.score: 24.0
    Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s “Eye and Mind” and Bergson’s Matière et mémoire and “La perception du changement,” I ask what resources are available in vision for interrupting objectifying habits of seeing. While both Bergson and Merleau-Ponty locate the possibility of seeing differently in the figure of the painter, I develop by means of their texts, and in dialogue with Iris Marion Young’s work, a more general phenomenology of hesitation that grounds what I am calling “critical-ethical vision.” Hesitation, I argue, (...)
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  24. Robert Schroer (2002). Seeing It All Clearly: The Real Story on Blurry Vision. American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (3):297-301.score: 24.0
    Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience supervenes upon its representational content. The phenomenon of blurry vision is thought to raise a difficulty for this position. More specifically, it is alleged that representationalists cannot account for the phenomenal difference between clearly seeing an indistinct edge and blurrily seeing a distinct edge solely in terms of represented features of the surrounding environment. I defend representationalism from this objection by offering a novel account of the phenomenal (...)
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  25. Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1999). Is Vision Continuous with Cognition? The Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365.score: 24.0
    Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to general cognition. This paper sets out some of the arguments for both sides (arguments from computer vision, neuroscience, Psychophysics, perceptual learning and other areas of vision science) and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, which may be called early (...) or just vision, is prohibited from accessing relevant expectations, knowledge and utilities - in other words it is cognitively impenetrable. That part of vision is complex and articulated and provides a representation of the 3-D surfaces of objects sufficient to serve as an index into memory, with somewhat different outputs being made available to other systems such as those dealing with motor control. The paper also addresses certain conceptual and methodological issues, including the use of signal detection theory and event-related potentials to assess cognitive penetration of vision. A distinction is made among several stages in visual processing. These include, in addition to the inflexible early-vision stage, a pre-perceptual attention allocation stage and a post-perceptual evaluation, memory-accessing, and inference stage which provide several different highly constrained ways in which cognition can affect the outcome of visual perception. The paper discusses arguments that have been presented in both computer vision and psychology showing that vision is "intelligent" and involves elements of problem solving". It is suggested that these cases do not show cognitive penetration, but rather they show that certain natural constraints on interpretation, concerned primarily with optical and geometrical properties of the world, have been compiled into the visual system. The paper also examines a number of examples where instructions and "hints" are alleged to affect. (shrink)
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  26. Berit Brogaard (2011). Conscious Vision for Action Versus Unconscious Vision for Action? Cognitive Science 35 (6):1076-1104.score: 24.0
    David Milner and Melvyn Goodale’s dissociation hypothesis is commonly taken to state that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in striate (V1) cortex: a dorsal, action-related “unconscious” stream and a ventral, perception-related “conscious” stream. As Milner and Goodale acknowledge, findings from blindsight studies suggest a more sophisticated picture that replaces the distinction between unconscious vision for action and conscious vision for perception with a tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious (...) for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. The combination excluded by the tripartite division is the possibility of conscious vision for action. But are there good grounds for concluding that there is no conscious vision for action? There is now overwhelming evidence that illusions and perceived size can have a significant effect on action (Bruno & Franz, 2009; Dassonville & Bala, 2004; Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008; McIntosh & Lashley, 2008). There is also suggestive evidence that any sophisticated visual behavior requires collaboration between the two visual streams at every stage of the process (Schenk & McIntosh, 2010). I nonetheless want to make a case for the tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. My aim here is not to refute the evidence showing that conscious vision can affect action but rather to argue (a) that we cannot gain cognitive access to action-guiding dorsal stream representations, and (b) that these representations do not correlate with phenomenal consciousness. This vindicates the semi-conservative view that the dissociation hypothesis is best understood as a tripartite division. (shrink)
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  27. Wayne Wu (2013). Visual Spatial Constancy and Modularity: Does Intention Penetrate Vision? Philosophical Studies 165 (2):647-669.score: 24.0
    Is vision informationally encapsulated from cognition or is it cognitively penetrated? I shall argue that intentions penetrate vision in the experience of visual spatial constancy: the world appears to be spatially stable despite our frequent eye movements. I explicate the nature of this experience and critically examine and extend current neurobiological accounts of spatial constancy, emphasizing the central role of motor signals in computing such constancy. I then provide a stringent condition for failure of informational encapsulation that emphasizes (...)
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  28. P. S. Kitcher (1988). Marr's Computational Theory of Vision. Philosophy of Science 55 (March):1-24.score: 24.0
    David Marr's theory of vision has been widely cited by philosophers and psychologists. I have three projects in this paper. First, I try to offer a perspicuous characterization of Marr's theory. Next, I consider the implications of Marr's work for some currently popular philosophies of psychology, specifically, the "hegemony of neurophysiology view", the theories of Jerry Fodor, Daniel Dennett, and Stephen Stich, and the view that perception is permeated by belief. In the last section, I consider what the phenomenon (...)
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  29. Zenon W. Pylyshyn (2000). Is Vision Continuous with Cognition? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365.score: 24.0
    Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to cognition. This target article sets out some of the arguments for both sides (arguments from computer vision, neuroscience, psychophysics, perceptual learning, and other areas of vision science) and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, corresponding to what some people have (...)
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  30. John L. Pollock & Iris Oved (2005). Vision, Knowledge, and the Mystery Link. Noûs 39 (1):309-351.score: 24.0
    Imagine yourself sitting on your front porch, sipping your morning coffee and admiring the scene before you. You see trees, houses, people, automobiles; you see a cat running across the road, and a bee buzzing among the flowers. You see that the flowers are yellow, and blowing in the wind. You see that the people are moving about, many of them on bicycles. You see that the houses are painted different colors, mostly earth tones, and most are one-story but a (...)
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  31. Jakob Hohwy & David Reutens (2009). A Case for Increased Caution in End of Life Decisions for Disorders of Consciousness. Monash Bioethics 28 (2):13.1-13.13.score: 24.0
    Disorders of consciousness include coma, the vegetative state and the minimally conscious state. Such patients are often regarded as unconscious. This has consequences for end of life decisions for these patients: it is much easier to justify withdrawing life support for unconscious than conscious patients. Recent brain imaging research has however suggested that some patients may in fact be conscious.
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  32. Matthew C. Keller & Geoffrey Miller (2006). Resolving the Paradox of Common, Harmful, Heritable Mental Disorders: Which Evolutionary Genetic Models Work Best? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (4):385-404.score: 24.0
    Given that natural selection is so powerful at optimizing complex adaptations, why does it seem unable to eliminate genes (susceptibility alleles) that predispose to common, harmful, heritable mental disorders, such as schizophrenia or bipolar disorder? We assess three leading explanations for this apparent paradox from evolutionary genetic theory: (1) ancestral neutrality (susceptibility alleles were not harmful among ancestors), (2) balancing selection (susceptibility alleles sometimes increased fitness), and (3) polygenic mutation-selection balance (mental disorders reflect the inevitable mutational load on the thousands (...)
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  33. Zenon W. Pylyshyn (2001). Connecting Vision with the World: Tracking the Missing Link. In Joao Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 183.score: 24.0
    You might reasonably surmise from the title of this paper that I will be discussing a theory of vision. After all, what is a theory of vision but a theory of how the world is connected to our visual representations? Theories of visual perception universally attempt to give an account of how a proximal stimulus (presumably a pattern impinging on the retina) can lead to a rich representation of a three dimensional world and thence to either the recognition (...)
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  34. Melvyn A. Goodale & A. David Milner (2004/2005). Sight Unseen: An Exploration of Conscious and Unconscious Vision. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Vision, more than any other sense, dominates our mental life. Our visual experience is just so rich, so detailed, that we can hardly distinguish that experience from the world itself. Even when we just think about the world and don't look at it directly, we can't help but 'imagine' what it looks like. We think of 'seeing' as being a conscious activity--we direct our eyes, we choose what we look at, we register what we are seeing. The series of (...)
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  35. Evan Thompson (1995). Colour Vision, Evolution, and Perceptual Content. Synthese 104 (1):1-32.score: 24.0
    b>. Computational models of colour vision assume that the biological function of colour vision is to detect surface reflectance. Some philosophers invoke these models as a basis for 'externalism' about perceptual content (content is distal) and 'objectivism' about colour (colour is surface reflectance). In an earlier article (Thompson et al. 1992), I criticized the 'computational objectivist' position on the basis of comparative colour vision: There are fundmental differences among the colour vision of animals and these differences (...)
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  36. Margaret Atherton (1990). Berkeley's Revolution in Vision. Cornell University Press.score: 24.0
    Introduction In 1709 George Berkeley published his first substantial work, An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision. As a contribution to the theory of ...
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  37. Marga Reimer (2010). Moral Aspects of Psychiatric Diagnosis: The Cluster B Personality Disorders. Neuroethics 3 (2):173-184.score: 24.0
    Medical professionals, including mental health professionals, largely agree that moral judgment should be kept out of clinical settings. The rationale is simple: moral judgment has the capacity to impair clinical judgment in ways that could harm the patient. However, when the patient is suffering from a "Cluster B" personality disorder, keeping moral judgment out of the clinic might appear impossible, not only in practice but also in theory. For the diagnostic criteria associated with these particular disorders (Antisocial, Borderline, Histrionic, Narcissistic) (...)
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  38. Cathryn Vasseleu (1998). Textures of Light: Vision and Touch in Irigaray, Levinas, and Merleau-Ponty. Routledge.score: 24.0
    Light has often been privileged as a metaphor for objectivity and truth in Western thought, a status that has been challenged by recent feminist thought as giving entitlement to the masculine. This book presents a compelling new perspective on this metaphor, and explores the role the visual plays in Western philosophy by examining the thought of Irigaray, Levinas and Merleau- Ponty. Textures of Light is one of the first studies to challenge current interpretations by presenting Irigaray as a philosopher of (...)
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  39. Evan Thompson (1995). Colour Vision: A Study in Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Perception. New York: Routledge.score: 24.0
    This book is a major contribution to the interdisciplinary project of investigating the true nature of color vision. In recent times, research into color vision has been one of the main success stories of cognitive science. Each discipline in the field--neuroscience, psychology, linguistics, computer science and philosophy--has contributed significantly to our understanding of color. Evan Thompson provides an accessible review of current scientific and philosophical discussions of color vision. He steers a course between the subjective and objective (...)
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  40. Marion Godman (2013). Psychiatric Disorders Qua Natural Kinds: The Case of the “Apathetic Children”. [REVIEW] Biological Theory 7 (2):144-152.score: 24.0
    In this article I examine some of the issues involved in taking psychiatric disorders as natural kinds. I begin by introducing a permissive model of natural kind-hood that at least prima facie seems to allow psychiatric disorders to be natural kinds. The model, however, hinges on there in principle being some grounding that is shared by all members of a kind, which explain all or most of the additional shared projectible properties. This leads us to the following question: what grounding (...)
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  41. Orsolya Friedrich (2013). Knowledge of Partial Awareness in Disorders of Consciousness: Implications for Ethical Evaluations? Neuroethics 6 (1):13-23.score: 24.0
    Recent results from neuroimaging appear to indicate that some patients in a vegetative state have partially intact awareness. These results may demonstrate misdiagnosis and suggest the need not only for alternative forms of treatment, but also for the reconsideration of end-of-life decisions in cases of disorders of consciousness. This article addresses the second consequence. First, I will discuss which aspects of consciousness may be involved in neuroimaging findings. I will then consider various factors relevant to ethical end-of-life decision-making, and analyse (...)
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  42. Wayne Wright (2006). Visual Stuff and Active Vision. Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):129-149.score: 24.0
    This paper examines the status of unattended visual stimuli in the light of recent work on the role of attention in visual perception. Although the question of whether attention is required for visual experience seems very interesting, this paper argues that there currently is no good reason to take a stand on the issue. Moreover, it is argued that much of the allure of that question stems from a continued attachment to the defective ‘inner picture view’ of experience and a (...)
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  43. Dingmar Van Eck, Huib Looren De Jong & Maurice K. D. Schouten (2006). Evaluating New Wave Reductionism: The Case of Vision. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):167-196.score: 24.0
    Faculty Of Philosophy, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands m.k.d.schouten{at}uvt.nl' + u + '@' + d + ''//--> This paper inquires into the nature of intertheoretic relations between psychology and neuroscience. This relationship has been characterized by some as one in which psychological explanations eventually will fall away as otiose, overthrown completely by neurobiological ones. Against this view it will be argued that it squares poorly with scientific practices and empirical developments in the cognitive neurosciences. We (...)
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  44. L. Syd M. Johnson (2010). Implications of Recent Neuroscientific Findings in Patients with Disorders of Consciousness. Neuroethics 3 (2):185-196.score: 24.0
    A pressing issue in neuroscience is the high rate of misdiagnosis of disorders of consciousness. As new research on patients with disorders of consciousness has revealed surprising and previously unknown cognitive capacities, the need to develop better and more reliable methods of diagnosing these disorders becomes more urgent. So too the need to expand our ethical and social frameworks for thinking about these patients, to accommodate new concerns that will accompany new revelations. A recent study on trace conditioning and learning (...)
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  45. Robert Hopkins (1997). El Greco's Eyesight: Interpreting Pictures and the Psychology of Vision. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (189):441-458.score: 24.0
    There is a common assumption about pictures, that seeing them produces in us something like the same effects as seeing the things they depict. This assumption lies behind much empirical research into vision, where experiments often expose subjects to pictures of things in order to investigate the processes involved in cognizing those things themselves. Can philosophy provide any justification for this assumption? I examine this issue in the context of Flint Schier's account of pictorial representation. Schier attempts to infer (...)
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  46. W. R. Webster (2003). Revelation and Transparency in Colour Vision Refuted: A Case of Mind/Brain Identity and Another Bridge Over the Explanatory Gap. Synthese 133 (3):419-39.score: 24.0
    Russell (1912) and others have argued that the real nature of colour is transparentto us in colour vision. It's nature is fully revealed to us and no further knowledgeis theoretically possible. This is the doctrine of revelation. Two-dimensionalFourier analyses of coloured checkerboards have shown that apparently simple,monadic, colours can be based on quite different physical mechanisms. Experimentswith the McCollough effect on different types of checkerboards have shown thatidentical colours can have energy at the quite different orientations of Fourierharmonic components (...)
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  47. Richard J. Hall (1996). The Evolution of Color Vision Without Colors. Philosophy of Science Supplement 63 (3):125-33.score: 24.0
    The standard adaptationist explanation of the presence of a sensory mechanism in an organism--that it detects properties useful to the organism--cannot be given for color vision. This is because colors do not exist. After arguing for this latter claim, I consider, but reject, nonadaptationist explanations. I conclude by proposing an explanation of how color vision could have adaptive value even though it does not detect properties in the environment.
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  48. Shadia Kawa & James Giordano (2012). A Brief Historicity of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: Issues and Implications for the Future of Psychiatric Canon and Practice. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7 (1):2-.score: 24.0
    The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association, currently in its fourth edition and considered the reference for the characterization and diagnosis of mental disorders, has undergone various developments since its inception in the mid-twentieth century. With the fifth edition of the DSM presently in field trials for release in 2013, there is renewed discussion and debate over the extent of its relative successes - and shortcomings - at iteratively incorporating scientific evidence on the often ambiguous nature (...)
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  49. Susan Bredlau (2011). Monstrous Faces and a World Transformed: Merleau-Ponty, Dolezal, and the Enactive Approach on Vision Without Inversion of the Retinal Image. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):481-498.score: 24.0
    The world perceived by a person undergoing vision without inversion of the retinal image has traditionally been described as inverted. Drawing on the philosophical work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and the empirical research of Hubert Dolezal, I argue that this description is more reflective of a representationist conception of vision than of actual visual experience. The world initially perceived in vision without inversion of the retinal image is better described as lacking in lived significance rather than inverted; (...) without inversion of the retinal image affects the very content of the perceived world, including, importantly, its expressions and conducts, and not merely the orientation of this content. Moreover, I argue that the enactive approach, rather than a representationist approach, is best able to account for the perception of the world, after prolonged vision without inversion of the retinal image, as both normal and upright, yet still different from the world seen previously. Finally, in their attention to the perception of other people’s facial expressions, I argue that Merleau-Ponty and Dolezal draw out the existential significance of the enactive approach. In encountering another person, the most pressing task is generally not to observe this person’s features but, instead, to engage with this person’s expressions. (shrink)
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  50. Richard Montgomery (1996). The Indeterminacy of Color Vision. Synthese 106 (2):167-203.score: 24.0
    A critical survey of recent work on the ontological status of colors supports the conclusion that, while some accounts of color can plausibly be dismissed, no single account can yet be endorsed. Among the remaining options are certain forms of color realism according which familiar colors are instantiated by objects in our extra-cranial visual environment. Also still an option is color anti-realism, the view that familiar colors are, at best, biologically adaptive fictions, instantiated nowhere.I argue that there is simply no (...)
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