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  1.  226 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese & George Lakoff, The Brain's Concepts: The Role of the Sensory-Motor System in Conceptual Knowledge.
    Concepts are the elementary units of reason and linguistic meaning. They are conventional and relatively stable. As such, they must somehow be the result of neural activity in the brain. The questions are: Where? and How? A common philosophical position is that all concepts—even concepts about action and perception—are symbolic and abstract, and therefore must be implemented outside the brain’s sensory-motor system. We will argue against this position using (1) neuroscientific evidence; (2) results from neural computation; and (3) results about (...)
     
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  2.  184 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese (2005). Embodied Simulation: From Neurons to Phenomenal Experience. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):23-48.
    The same neural structures involved in the unconscious modeling of our acting body in space also contribute to our awareness of the lived body and of the objects that the world contains. Neuroscientific research also shows that there are neural mechanisms mediating between the multi-level personal experience we entertain of our lived body, and the implicit certainties we simultaneously hold about others. Such personal and body-related experiential knowledge enables us to understand the actions performed by others, and to directly decode (...)
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  3.  172 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese (2001). The 'Shared Manifold' Hypothesis: From Mirror Neurons to Empathy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):33-50.
    My initial scope will be limited: starting from a neurobiological standpoint, I will analyse how actions are possibly represented and understood. The main aim of my arguments will be to show that, far from being exclusively dependent upon mentalistic/linguistic abilities, the capacity for understanding others as intentional agents is deeply grounded in the relational nature of action. Action is relational, and the relation holds both between the agent and the object target of the action , as between the agent of (...)
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  4.  143 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese (2007). Before and Below 'Theory of Mind': Embodied Simulation and the Neural Correlates of Social Cognition. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences 362 (1480):659-669.
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  5.  89 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese, Christian Keysers & Giacomo Rizzolatti (2004). A Unifying View of the Basis of Social Cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (9):396-403.
    In this article we provide a unifying neural hypothesis on how individuals understand the actions and emotions of others. Our main claim is that the fundamental mechanism at the basis of the experiential understanding of others' actions is the activation of the mirror neuron system. A similar mechanism, but involving the activation of viscero-motor centers, underlies the experiential understanding of the emotions of others.
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  6.  62 DLs
    Maxim I. Stamenov & Vittorio Gallese (eds.) (2002). Mirror Neurons and the Evolution of Brain and Language. John Benjamins.
    Selected contributions to the symposium on "Mirror neurons and the evolution of brain and language" held on July 5-8, 2000 in Delmenhorst, Germany.
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  7.  55 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese, Pier Francesco Ferrari & Maria Alessandra Umiltà (2001). The Mirror Matching System: A Shared Manifold for Intersubjectivity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):35-36.
    Empathy is the phenomenal experience of mirroring ourselves into others. It can be explained in terms of simulations of actions, sensations, and emotions which constitute a shared manifold for intersubjectivity. Simulation, in turn, can be sustained at the subpersonal level by a series of neural mirror matching systems.
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  8.  53 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese (2000). The Inner Sense of Action: Agency and Motor Representations. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (10):23-40.
    Discusses the possibility of reconciling different articulations of intentionality from a neurobiological perspective. The author analyzes the relationship between agency and representation and how representation is intrinsically related to action control. The author also presents a new account of action, arguing against what is still commonly held as its proper definition, namely the final outcome of a cascade-like process that starts from the analysis of sensory data, incorporates the result of decision processes, and ends up with responses (actions) to externally-or (...)
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  9.  50 DLs
    Thomas Metzinger & Vittorio Gallese (2003). The Emergence of a Shared Action Ontology: Building Blocks for a Theory. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):549-571.
    To have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting our world, possesses an ontology too. It creates primitives and makes existence assumptions. It decomposes target space in a way that exhibits a certain invariance, which in turn is functionally significant. We will investigate which are the functional regularities guiding this decomposition process, by answering to the following questions: What are the explicit and implicit assumptions (...)
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  10.  44 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese & Christian Keysers (2001). Mirror Neurons: A Sensorimotor Representation System. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):983-984.
    Positing the importance of sensorimotor contingencies for perception is by no means denying the presence and importance of representations. Using the evidence of mirror neurons we will show the intrinsic relationship between action control and representation within the logic of forward models.
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  11.  40 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese & Thomas Metzinger (2003). Motor Ontology: The Representational Reality of Goals, Actions and Selves. Philosophical Psychology 16 (3):365 – 388.
    The representational dynamics of the brain is a subsymbolic process, and it has to be conceived as an "agent-free" type of dynamical self-organization. However, in generating a coherent internal world-model, the brain decomposes target space in a certain way. In doing so, it defines an "ontology": to have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting the world, possesses an ontology too. It decomposes target space (...)
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  12.  34 DLs
    Thomas Metzinger & Vittorio Gallese (2003). Of Course They Do. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):574-576.
  13.  28 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese & Corrado Sinigaglia (2011). How the Body in Action Shapes the Self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (7-8):117-143.
    In the present paper we address the issue of the role of the body in shaping our basic self-awareness. It is generally taken for granted that basic bodily self-awareness has primarily to do with proprioception. Here we challenge this assumption by arguing from both a phenomenological and a neurophysiological point of view that our body is primarily given to us as a manifold of action possibilities that cannot be reduced to any form of proprioceptive awareness. By discussing the notion of (...)
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  14.  28 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese & Alvin Goldman (1998). Mirror Neurons and the Simulation Theory of Mind-Reading. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2 (12):493-501.
  15.  27 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese & Corrado Sinigaglia (2011). What is so Special About Embodied Simulation? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (11):512-519.
    Simulation theories of social cognition abound in the literature, but it is often unclear what simulation means and how it works. The discovery of mirror neurons, responding both to action execution and observation, suggested an embodied approach to mental simulation. Over the last years this approach has been hotly debated and alternative accounts have been proposed. We discuss these accounts and argue that they fail to capture the uniqueness of embodied simulation (ES). ES theory provides a unitary account of basic (...)
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  16.  21 DLs
    David Freedberg & Vittorio Gallese (2007). Motion, Emotion and Empathy in Esthetic Experience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (5):197-203.
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  17.  15 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese & Maria Alessandra Umiltá (2006). Cognitive Continuity in Primate Social Cognition. Biological Theory 1 (1):25-30.
  18.  13 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese & Corrado Sinigaglia (2012). Response to de Bruin and Gallagher: Embodied Simulation as Reuse is a Productive Explanation of a Basic Form of Mind-Reading. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (2):99-100.
    de Bruin & Gallagher (2012) suggest that the view of embodied simulation (ES) put forward in our recent article (Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011) lacks explanatory power. We argue that the notion of reuse of mental states represented with a bodily format provides a convincing simulational account of the mirroring mechanism (MM) and its role in mind-reading.
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  19.  13 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese & Corrado Sinigaglia (2010). The Bodily Self as Power for Action. Neuropsychologia.
    The aim of our paper is to show that there is a sense of body that is enactive in nature and that enables to capture the most primitive sense of self. We will argue that the body is primarily given to us as source or power for action, i.e., as the variety of motor potentialities that define the horizon of the world in which we live, by populating it with things at hand to which we can be directed and with (...)
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  20.  12 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese (2009). The Two Sides of Mimesis: Girards Mimetic Theory, Embodied Simulation and Social Identification. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (4):21-44.
    Crucial in Girard's Mimetic Theory is the notion of mimetic desire, viewed as appropriative mimicry, the main source of aggressiveness and violence characterizing our species. The intrinsic value of the objects of our desire is not as relevant as the fact that the very same objects are the targets of others' desire. One could in principle object against such apparently negative and one-sided view of mankind, in general, and of mimesis, in particular. However, such argument would misrepresent Girard's thought. Girard (...)
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  21.  11 DLs
    Cristina Iani, Sandro Rubichi, Luca Ferraro, Roberto Nicoletti & Vittorio Gallese (2013). Observational Learning Without a Model is Influenced by the Observer's Possibility to Act: Evidence From the Simon Task. Cognition 128 (1):26-34.
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  22.  8 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese (2011). Neuroscience and Phenomenology. Phenomenology and Mind 1:34-47.
  23.  7 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese & Corrado Sinigaglia (2014). Understanding Action with the Motor System. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (2):199-200.
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  24.  5 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese (2000). The Acting Subject: Toward the Neural Basis of Social Cognition. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press 325--333.
  25.  5 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese & David Freedberg (2007). Mirror and Canonical Neurons Are Crucial Elements in Esthetic Response. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (10):411.
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  26.  4 DLs
    Fausto Caruana & Vittorio Gallese (2012). Overcoming the Emotion Experience/Expression Dichotomy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (3):145-146.
    We challenge the classic experience/expression dichotomous account of emotions, according to which experiencing and expressing an emotion are two independent processes. By endorsing Dewey's and Mead's accounts of emotions, and capitalizing upon recent empirical findings, we propose that expression is part of the emotional experience. This proposal partly challenges the purely constructivist approach endorsed by the authors of the target article.
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  27.  3 DLs
    Giacomo Rizzolatti, Leonardo Fogassi & Vittorio Gállese (2004). 31 Cortical Mechanisms Subserving Object Grasping, Action Understanding, and Imitation. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences Iii. MIT Press 427.
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  28.  3 DLs
    Alvin Goldman & Vittorio Gallese (2000). Reply to Schulkin. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (7):255-256.
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  29.  3 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese, Christian Keysers & Giacomo Rizzolatti (2004). Amygdala, Insula, and Selectivity for Particular Emotions. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (9):396-403.
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  30.  3 DLs
    Francesca Ferri, Francesca Frassinetti, Francesca Mastrangelo, Anatolia Salone, Filippo Maria Ferro & Vittorio Gallese (2012). Bodily Self and Schizophrenia: The Loss of Implicit Self-Body Knowledge. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (3):1365-1374.
    Schizophrenia spectrum has been associated with a disruption of the basic sense of self, which pertains, among others, the representation of one’s own body. We investigated the impact of either implicit or explicit access to the representation of one’s own body-effectors on bodily self-awareness, in first-episode schizophrenia patients and healthy controls . We contrasted their performance in an implicit self-recognition task and in an explicit self/other discrimination task. Both tasks employed participant’s own and others’ body-effectors. Concerning the implicit task, HCs (...)
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  31.  3 DLs
    Giacomo Rizzolatti & Vittorio Gallese (2003). Mirror Neurons. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group
  32.  0 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese & Michele Guerra (2012). Embodying Movies: Embodied Simulation and Film Studies. Cinema 3:183-210.
    Recent discoveries in neuroscience, among which that of mirror neurons ,have strongly influenced the debate on spatial cognition, action, emotion andempathy, all aspects that in recent years have been deeply reconsidered within film studies. This article focuses on the role embodied simulation theory—triggered by the discovery of MNs—plays in film experience. ES has beenproposed to constitute a basic functional mechanism of humans’ brain.Because of a shared bodily representational format, we map the actions of others onto our own motor representations, as (...)
     
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  33.  0 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese (2007). The "Conscious" Dorsal Stream: Embodied Simulation and its Role in Space and Action Conscious Awareness. Psyche 13.
    The aim of the present article is three-fold. First, it aims to show that perception requires action. This is most evident for some types of visual percept . Second, it aims to show that the distinction of the cortical visual processing into two streams is insufficient and leads to possible misunderstandings on the true nature of perceptual processes. Third, it aims to show that the dorsal stream is not only responsible for the unconscious control of action, but also for the (...)
     
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  34.  0 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese, Laila Craighero, Luciano Fadiga & Leonardo Fogassi (1999). Perception Through Action. Psyche 5.
    The Visual Brain in Action by Milner and Goodale provides a new conceptual account of how the brain processes visual information. Milner and Goodale make two major points: The dorsal stream processes visual information for motor purposes; Action and perception are two completely separate domains, the latter being an exclusive property of the ventral stream. In the first part of this review we will summarize some recent neurophysiological data shedding new light on the "pragmatic" role of the visual information processed (...)
     
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  35.  0 DLs
    Marina Savi & Vittorio Gallese (2009). All’origine dell’interazione con gli altri: Marina Savi intervista Vittorio Gallese. la Società Degli Individui 35:115-126.
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  36.  0 DLs
    Elkhonon Goldberg, Kenneth Podell, J. Proust, Karl H. Pribram, Vittorio Gallese, Marianne Hammerl, Andy P. Field, Frederick Travis, R. Keith Wallace & J. Allan Cheyne (1999). Kai Vogeley, Martin Kurthen, Peter Falkai, and Wolfgang Maier. Essential Functions of the Human. Consciousness and Cognition 8:270.
     
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  37.  0 DLs
    Vittorio Gallese (2010). Le basi neurofisiologiche dell’intersoggettività [Neural Basis of Inter­su­bjectivity]. la Società Degli Individui 37.
    Il saggio offre una ricostruzione sintetica delle più recenti acquisizioni del­le neuroscienze cognitive con l’intento di sollecitare lo sviluppo di un ap­proc­cio multidisciplinare e aperto a uno dei problemi filosofici per ec­cel­lenza: chi siamo? La scoperta della base neurale condivisa – i neuroni spec­chio – che si attiva in ciascuno di noi sia quando siamo attori sia quando sia­mo testimoni di esperienze analoghe, e del fatto che la sua attivazione non è mai identica ma mo­du­lata sulla unicità di ogni essere (...)
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