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Jonathan Vogel [30]Jonathan Maxwell Vogel [1]
  1. Jonathan Vogel (2000). Reliabilism Leveled. Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602-623.
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  2. Jonathan Vogel (1990). Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation. Journal of Philosophy 87 (11):658-666.
  3. Jonathan Vogel (2008). Epistemic Bootstrapping. Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):518-539.
  4. Jonathan Vogel (1999). The New Relevant Alternatives Theory. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):155-180.
  5. Jonathan Vogel (2007). Subjunctivitis. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):73 - 88.
    Subjunctivitis is the doctrine that what is distinctive about knowledge is essential modal in character, and thus is captured by certain subjunctive conditionals. One principal formulation of subjunctivism invokes a ``sensitivity condition'' (Nozick, De Rose), the other invokes a ``safety condition'' (Sosa). It is shown in detail how defects in the sensitivity condition generate unwanted results, and that the virtues of that condition are merely apparent. The safety condition is untenable also, because it is too easily satisfied. A powerful motivation (...)
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  6. Jonathan Vogel (2004). Skeptical Arguments. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):426–455.
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  7. Jonathan Vogel (2005). The Refutation of Skepticism. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell 72--84.
  8. Jonathan Vogel (1987). Tracking, Closure, and Inductive Knowledge. In Luper-Foy Steven (ed.), The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics. Rowman & Littlefield 197--215.
     
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  9. Jonathan Vogel (2010). Luminosity and Indiscriminability. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):547-572.
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  10. Jonathan Vogel (1990). ``Are There Counterexamples to the Closure Principle?". In Michael David Roth & Glenn Ross (eds.), Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepiticism. Dordrecht: Kluwer 13-29.
     
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  11.  75
    Jonathan Vogel (1993). Dismissing Skeptical Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 70 (3):235 - 250.
  12.  62
    Jonathan Vogel (2010). BonJour on Explanation and Skepticism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):413-421.
    Laurence BonJour, among others, has argued that inference to the best explanation allows us to reject skeptical hypotheses in favor of our common-sense view of the world. BonJour considers several skeptical hypotheses, specifically: our experiences arise by mere chance, uncaused; the simple hypothesis which states merely that our experiences are caused unveridically; and an elaborated hypothesis which explains in detail how our unveridical experiences are brought about. A central issue is whether the coherence of one’s experience makes that experience more (...)
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  13. Jonathan Vogel (2008). Internalist Responses to Skepticism. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press
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  14. Jonathan Vogel (2006). Externalism Resisted. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 131 (3):729 - 742.
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  15. Jonathan Vogel (2004). Review: Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (451):552-555.
  16.  38
    Jonathan Vogel (1992). Sklar on Methodological Conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):125-131.
  17.  87
    Jonathan Vogel (1993). The Problem of Self-Knowledge in Kant's "Refutation of Idealism": Two Recent Views. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):875-887.
  18.  34
    Jonathan Vogel (1997). Skepticism and Foundationalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 22:11-28.
    Michael WiIliams maintains that skepticism about the extemal worId is vitiated by a commitment to foundationalism and epistemological realism. (The latter is, approximately, the view that there is such a thing as knowledge of the extemal world in general, which the skeptic can take as a target). I argue that skepticism is not encumbered in the ways Williams supposes. What matters, first of all, is that we can’t perceive the difference between being in an ordinary environment and being in the (...)
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  19.  82
    Jonathan Vogel (2004). Speaking of Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):501–509.
  20. Jonathan Vogel (1998). Cartesian Skepticism and the Inference to the Best Explanation. In Alcoff Linda (ed.), Epistemology: The Big Questions. Blackwell 352--9.
  21.  1
    Jonathan Vogel (1990). Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation. Journal of Philosophy 87 (11):658-666.
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  22. Jonathan Vogel (2008). Epistemic Bootstrapping. Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):518-539.
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  23. Jonathan Vogel (1999). Causation and Subjectivity. In Robert Stern (ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford: Clarendon Press
  24.  45
    Thomas Tymoczko & Jonathan Vogel (1992). The Exorcist's Nightmare: A Reply to Crispin Wright. Mind 101 (403):543-552.
    Crispin Wright tried to refute classical 'Cartesian' skepticism contending that its core argument is extendible to a reductio ad absurdum (_Mind, 100, 87-116, 1991). We show both that Wright is mistaken and that his mistakes are philosophically illuminating. Wright's 'best version' of skepticism turns on a concept of warranted belief. By his definition, many of our well-founded beliefs about the external world and mathematics would not be warranted. Wright's position worsens if we take 'warranted belief' to be implicitly defined by (...)
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    Jonathan Vogel (1999). The New Relevant Alternatives TheorY. Noûs 33 (s13):155-180.
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  26.  17
    Jonathan Vogel (1995). Evidence and Inquiry. Philosophical Review 104 (4):621-623.
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  27. Jonathan Vogel (2000). Reliabilism Leveled. Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602.
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  28.  10
    Jonathan Vogel (1993). Judgement and Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):233-236.
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  29.  9
    Jonathan Vogel (2006). Review: Externalism Resisted. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 131 (3):729 - 742.
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  30. Jonathan Vogel (2006). Externalism Resisted. Philosophical Studies 131 (3):729-742.
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