Definitional and axiomatic theories of truth -- Objects of truth -- Tarski -- Truth and set theory -- Technical preliminaries -- Comparing axiomatic theories of truth -- Disquotation -- Classical compositional truth -- Hierarchies -- Typed and type-free theories of truth -- Reasons against typing -- Axioms and rules -- Axioms for type-free truth -- Classical symmetric truth -- Kripke-Feferman -- Axiomatizing Kripke's theory in partial logic -- Grounded truth -- Alternative evaluation schemata -- Disquotation -- Classical logic -- Deflationism (...) -- Reflection -- Ontological reduction -- Applying theories of truth. (shrink)
We investigate axiomatizations of Kripke's theory of truth based on the Strong Kleene evaluation scheme for treating sentences lacking a truth value. Feferman's axiomatization KF formulated in classical logic is an indirect approach, because it is not sound with respect to Kripke's semantics in the straightforward sense: only the sentences that can be proved to be true in KF are valid in Kripke's partial models. Reinhardt proposed to focus just on the sentences that can be proved to be true in (...) KF and conjectured that the detour through classical logic in KF is dispensable. We refute Reinhardt's Conjecture, and provide a direct axiomatization PKF of Kripke's theory in partial logic. We argue that any natural axiomatization of Kripke's theory in Strong Kleene logic has the same proof-theoretic strength as PKF, namely the strength of the system RA< ωω ramified analysis or a system of Tarskian ramified truth up to ωω. Thus any such axiomatization is much weaker than Feferman's axiomatization KF in classical logic, which is equivalent to the system RA<ε₀ of ramified analysis up to ε₀. (shrink)
If is conceived as an operator, i.e., an expression that gives applied to a formula another formula, the expressive power of the language is severely restricted when compared to a language where is conceived as a predicate, i.e., an expression that yields a formula if it is applied to a term. This consideration favours the predicate approach. The predicate view, however, is threatened mainly by two problems: Some obvious predicate systems are inconsistent, and possible-worlds semantics for predicates of sentences has (...) not been developed very far. By introducing possible-worlds semantics for the language of arithmetic plus the unary predicate , we tackle both problems. Given a frame W,R> consisting of a set W of worlds and a binary relation R on W, we investigate whether we can interpret at every world in such a way that A holds at a world wW if and only if A holds at every world vW such that wRv. The arithmetical vocabulary is interpreted by the standard model at every world. Several paradoxes (like Montague's Theorem, Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem, McGee's Theorem on the -inconsistency of certain truth theories, etc.) show that many frames, e.g., reflexive frames, do not allow for such an interpretation. We present sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of a suitable interpretation of at any world. Sound and complete semi-formal systems, corresponding to the modal systems K and K4, for the class of all possible-worlds models for predicates and all transitive possible-worlds models are presented. We apply our account also to nonstandard models of arithmetic and other languages than the language of arithmetic. (shrink)
The uniform reflection principle for the theory of uniform T-sentences is added to PA. The resulting system is justified on the basis of a disquotationalist theory of truth where the provability predicate is conceived as a special kind of analyticity. The system is equivalent to the system ACA of arithmetical comprehension. If the truth predicate is also allowed to occur in the sentences that are inserted in the T-sentences, yet not in the scope of negation, the system with the reflection (...) schema for these T-sentences assumes the strength of the Kripke-Feferman theory KF, and thus of ramified analysis up to go. (shrink)
I survey some important semantical and axiomatic theories of self-referential truth. Kripke's fixed-point theory, the revision theory of truth and appraoches involving fuzzy logic are the main examples of semantical theories. I look at axiomatic theories devised by Cantini, Feferman, Freidman and Sheard. Finally some applications of the theory of self-referential truth are considered.
The proof-theoretic results on axiomatic theories oftruth obtained by different authors in recent years are surveyed.In particular, the theories of truth are related to subsystems ofsecond-order analysis. On the basis of these results, thesuitability of axiomatic theories of truth for ontologicalreduction is evaluated.
Some axiomatic theories of truth and related subsystems of second-order arithmetic are surveyed and shown to be conservative over their respective base theory. In particular, it is shown by purely finitistically means that the theory PA ÷ "there is a satisfaction class" and the theory FS of  are conservative over PA.
According to the disquotationalist theory of truth, the Tarskian equivalences, conceived as axioms, yield all there is to say about truth. Several authors have claimed that the expression of infinite conjunctions and disjunctions is the only purpose of the disquotationalist truth predicate. The way in which infinite conjunctions can be expressed by an axiomatized truth predicate is explored and it is considered whether the disquotationalist truth predicate is adequate for this purpose.
A theory of the transfinite Tarskian hierarchy of languages is outlined and compared to a notion of partial truth by Kripke. It is shown that the hierarchy can be embedded into Kripkes minimal fixed point model. From this results on the expressive power of both approaches are obtained.
The general notions of object- and metalanguage are discussed and as a special case of this relation an arbitrary first order language with an infinite model is expanded by a predicate symbol T0 which is interpreted as truth predicate for . Then the expanded language is again augmented by a new truth predicate T1 for the whole language plus T0. This process is iterated into the transfinite to obtain the Tarskian hierarchy of languages. It is shown that there are natural (...) points for stopping this process. The sets which become definable in suitable hierarchies are investigated, so that the relevance of the Tarskian hierarchy to some subjects of philosophy of mathematics are clarified. (shrink)