We introduce a precise model for the theory of concepts in philosophy of science. In this model we connect the level of description, the level of reality and the level of set theoretic systems. On the one hand we describe a general frame for the collection of concepts, and on the other hand the „local“ structure of a concept. We specialize this frame to scientific concepts, scientific theories, and to the appertaining structuralist constructions from philosophy of science.
A new approach to analyze scientific methods as patternsof state transitions is proposed and exemplified by the two mostimportant, general methods: induction and deduction. Though only`local' states of science are considered in this paper, includinghypotheses, data, approximation and degree of fit, the approach caneasily be extended to more comprehensive kinds of states. Two `pure'forms of induction are distinguished, enumerative and hypothesisconstruction induction. A combination of these two forms is proposedto yield a more adequate picture of induction. While the pure forms (...) ofinduction are clearly distinct from the deductive pattern, the patternof the combined form of induction is very similar to the latter. Thepresent account of scientific methods not only points out thedifferences between different methods but – in contrast to usualdiscussions of methodology – also clarifies what they have in common. (shrink)
The notions of freedom and equality in a group are precisely defined in terms of individual exertions of influence or power. Freedom is discussed in the version ‘freedom from’ influence rather than in the version ‘freedom to do’ what one wants. It is shown that at the ideal conceptual level complete freedom implies equality. Given the plausibility of the definitions this shows that political ‘folk rhetorics’ in which freedom and equality often are put in opposition are misled and misleading. Quantitative (...) notions of ‘more freedom’ and ‘more equality’ are introduced and shown to be independent of each other. The bearing of these conceptual exercises on the comparison of political systems is discussed. (shrink)
We present a reconstruction of so-called classical, formal or Mendelian genetics using a notation which we believe is more legible than that of earlier accounts, and lends itself easily to computer implementation, for instance in PROLOG. By drawing from, and emending, earlier work of Balzer and Dawe (1986,1997), the present account presents the three most important lines of development of classical genetics: the so-called Mendel's laws, linkage genetics and gene mapping, in the form of a theory-net. This shows that the (...) set theoretic representation format used in the structuralist approach to the philosophy of science also applies to the domain of genetic theories. There construction is intended to lend more clarity to theme thodological, philosophical and didactical discussions of the foundations of genetics, and on the other hand to defend a formally, logically minded view of theories which seems to have become contested through the work of Feyerabend, Kuhn and Kitcher. (shrink)
The net structure of the spatial theory of elections is investigated and described in the format of structuralism. Three new kinds of intertheoretical relations typical for social theory are identified and defined. The historical development of spatial theory as expressed by specializations and other intertheoretic relations is found to be in a sense 'inverse' to that of theories in the natural sciences. The development begins with a 'most special' case.
A comprehensive model for describing various forms of developments in science is defined in precise, set-theoretic terms, and in the spirit of the structuralist approach in the philosophy of science. The model emends previous accounts in centering on single systems in a homogenous way, eliminating notions which essentially refer to sets of systems. This is achieved by eliminating the distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical terms as a primitive, and by introducing the notion of intended links. The force of the model (...) is demonstrated by formally incorporating many of the important, precise meta-theoretic concepts occurring in the literature. (shrink)
Summary The model underlying the hippocratic humoral theory, as well as the corresponding part of hippocratic aetiology is reconstructed in precise, structuralist terms. Stress is laid on the presentation of the model, historical and philological derivations are suppressed. The global net structure of humoral theory in which the different diseases are described as specializations of the basic model is worked out, and the particular metatheoretical features of âtherapeuticalâ theories, as contrasted to âdescriptiveâ theories, are exemplified and stated in general.
The usual completeness theorem for first-order logic is extended in order to allow for a natural incorporation of real analysis. Essentially, this is achieved by building in the set of real numbers into the structures for the language, and by adjusting other semantical notions accordingly. We use many-sorted languages so that the resulting formal systems are general enough for axiomatic treatments of empirical theories without recourse to elements of set theory which are difficult to interprete empirically. Thus we provide a (...) way of applying model theory to empirical theories without tricky detours. Our frame is applied to axiomatizations of three empirical theories: classical mechanics, phenomenological thermodynamics, and exchange economics. (shrink)
In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird ein Begriffsrahmen entwickelt, in dem sich Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede zwischen drei Arten von Kulturprodukten klar aufzeigen lassen: Dichtung, Mythos und Wissenschaft. Die allen drei Phänomenen gemeinsame Struktur erfassen wir in §II und §III mit dem Begriff eines Repräsentationssystems, welcher in Anlehnung an die formale Modelltheorie semiotische Vorstellungen mit einem Denken in Systemen zusammenbringt. Die relevanten Unterschiede werden durch Differenzierung (§IV) jenes Begriffs festgemacht, d.h. die drei Phänomene werden durch jeweils spezielle Arten von Repräsentationssystemen erfaßt (§V). (...) Unser spezielles Augenmerk gilt dabei dem Mythos (§I), der sich in letzter Zeit eines wachsenden Interesses -- oft außerhalb des etablierten Wissenschaftsbetriebs -- erfreut. Es zeigt sich, daß der Mythos eine Mittelstellung zwischen Dichtung und Wissenschaft einnimmt: als "Bindeglied" vermittelt er sowohl zwischen der rein begrifflichen Struktur der Phänomene "Dichtung" und "Wissenschaft" als auch zwischen deren Unterschieden in Methode und Wahrheitsanspruch (die in engem Zusammenhang mit der begrifflichen Struktur stehen). Der hier entwickelte begriffliche Rahmen soll in weiteren Untersuchungen als Grundlage zur Herausarbeitung von Unterschieden in der Methode und im Wahrheitsanspruch dienen, die sich aus unserem Ansatz in natürlicher Weise ergeben. Diese müssen jedoch aus Platzgründen einer weiteren Arbeit vorbehalten bleiben. (shrink)
Zusammenfassung Mit der vorliegenden Arbeit verfolgen wir drei Ziele. Erstens exemplifizieren wir einige wissenschaftstheoretische Fragen und die zugehörigen Antworten (Theoretizität, Problem der theoretischen Terme, empirische Behauptung einer Theorie, Ramsey-Eliminierbarkeit theoretischer Terme) am sehr einfachen Beispiel der klassischen StoÃmechanik. Zweitens läÃt sich an diesem Beispiel besonders klar der Begriff des MeÃmodells darstellen; insbesondere erhalten wir eine vollständige Ãbersicht über alle MeÃmodelle. Und drittens erhalten wir ein schönes Beispiel für den Begriff der Reduktion einer Theorie auf eine andere, denn die StoÃmechanik läÃt (...) sich auf einfache Weise auf eine Spezialisierung der Klassischen Partikelmechanik reduzieren. (shrink)
