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William Fish [15]William C. Fish [6]W. Fish [3]
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Profile: William Fish (Massey University)
  1. William Fish (2013). High-Level Properties and Visual Experience. Philosophical Studies 162 (1):43-55.
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  2. William Fish (2013). Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion: Reply to My Critics. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 163 (1):57-66.
    This book provides the first full-length treatment of disjunctivism about visual experiences in the service of defending a naive realist theory of veridical visual perception. It includes detailed theories of hallucination and illusion that show how such states can be indistinguishable from veridical experiences without sharing any common character.
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  3. William Fish (2012). 'New Essays on Singular Thought', Edited by Robin Jeshion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):617 - 618.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 90, Issue 3, Page 617-618, September 2012.
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  4. W. Fish (2011). The Subject's Point of View, by Katalin Farkas. Mind 119 (476):1161-1165.
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  5. William Fish & Cynthia Macdonald (2011). McDowell's Alternative Conceptions of the World. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (1):87-94.
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  6. W. Fish (2010). The Metaphysics of Perception: Wilfrid Sellars, Perceptual Consciousness and Critical Realism, by Paul Coates. Mind 119 (473):206-210.
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  7. William Fish (2010). Christopher Norris, Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 27 (1):65-66.
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  8. William Fish (2010). Philosophy of Perception: A Contemporary Introduction. Routledge.
    Introduction: Three key principles -- Sense datum theories -- Adverbial theories -- Belief acquisition theories -- Intentional theories -- Disjunctive theories -- Perception and causation -- Perception and the sciences of the mind -- Perception and other sense modalities.
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  9. William Fish, Disjunctivism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Disjunctivism, as a theory of visual experience, claims that the mental states involved in a “good case” experience of veridical perception and a “bad case” experience of hallucination differ, even in those cases in which the two experiences are indistinguishable for their subject. Consider the veridical perception of a bar stool and an indistinguishable hallucination; both of these experiences might be classed together as experiences (as) of a bar stool or experiences of seeming to see a bar stool. This might (...)
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  10. William Fish (2009). Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Oxford University Press.
    In the first monograph in this exciting area since then, William Fish develops a comprehensive disjunctive theory, incorporating detailed accounts of the three ...
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  11. William Fish (2009). Book Notes: Adams, Frederick and Kenneth Aizawa,The Bounds of Cognition, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008, Pp. Xiii + 197, AU$120.00 / NZ$130.00 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):355-356.
  12. William Fish & Cynthia Macdonald (2009). The Identity Theory of Truth and the Realm of Reference: Where Dodd Goes Wrong. Analysis 69 (2):297-304.
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  13. William Fish (2008). Relationalism and the Problems of Consciousness. Teorema 28:167-80.
    Recent attempts to show that functional processing entails the presence of phenomenal consciousness have failed to deliver the kind of answers to the “problems of consciousness” that anti-materialists insist the functionalist must provide. I will illustrate this by focusing on the claims that there is a special “Hard Problem” of consciousness and an “explanatory gap” between functional and phenomenal facts. I then argue that if we supplement the functionalist stories with a relationalist conception of phenomenal properties, we can begin to (...)
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  14. William C. Fish (2008). Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability, and the Nature of Hallucination. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 144--167.
    In the eyes of some of its critics, disjunctivism fails to support adequately the key claim that a particular hallucination might be indistinguishable from a certain kind of veridical perception despite the two states having nothing other than this in common. Scott Sturgeon, for example, has complained that disjunctivism ‘‘offers no positive story about hallucination at all’’ (2000: 11) and therefore ‘‘simply takes [indistinguishability] for granted’’ (2000: 12). So according to Sturgeon, what the disjunctivist needs to provide is a plausible (...)
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  15. W. Fish (2007). Christopher Norris, Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy. Philosophy in Review 27 (1):65.
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  16. William Fish & Cynthia Macdonald (2007). On McDowell's Identity Conception of Truth. Analysis 67 (293):36-41.
  17. William Fish (2005). Emotions, Moods, and Intentionality. In Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). Rodopi NY.
    Under the general heading of what we might loosely call emotional states, a familiar distinction can be drawn between emotions (strictly so-called) and moods. In order to judge under which of these headings a subject’s emotional episode falls, we advance a question of the form: What is the subject’s emotion of or about? In some cases (for example fear, sadness, and anger) the provision of an answer is straightforward: the subject is afraid of the loose tiger, or sad about England’s (...)
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  18. William C. Fish (2005). Disjunctivism and Non-Disjunctivism: Making Sense of the Debate. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):119-127.
    During the 'What is Realism?' symposium at the 2001 Joint Session, Professor Ayers raised a number of objections to the disjunctive theory of perception. However in his reply, Professor Snowdon protested that Ayers had failed to adequately engage with the disjunctivist's position. This apparent lack of engagement suggests that the terms of this debate are not as clear as they might be. In the light of this, the current paper offers a way in which we might shed light on the (...)
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  19. William C. Fish (2005). Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). Rodopi NY.
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  20. William Fish (2004). Perception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):532 – 535.
    Book Information Perception. Perception Barry Maund , Chesham : Acumen Publishing , 2003 , 240 , £12.95 ( paper ) By Barry Maund. Acumen Publishing. Chesham. Pp. 240. £12.95 (paper:).
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  21. William C. Fish (2004). The Direct/Indirect Distinction in Contemporary Philosophy of Perception. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-13.
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  22. Eros Corazza, William Fish & Jonathan Gorvett (2002). Who is I?(Indexical Reference, Answering Machine Paradox). Philosophical Studies 107 (1):1 - 21.
    Whilst it may seem strange to ask to whom "I" refers, we show that there are occasions when it is not always obvious. In demonstrating this we challenge Kaplan's assumption that the utterer, agent and referent of "I" are always the same person. We begin by presenting what we regard to be the received view about indexical reference popularized by David Kaplan in his influential 1972 "Demonstratives" before going on, in section 2, to discuss Sidelle's answering machine paradox which may (...)
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  23. William C. Fish (2000). Asymmetry in Action. Ratio 13 (2):138-145.
  24. William C. Fish (1999). Problems with Actual-Sequence Incompatibilism. Philosophical Writings 12:47-52.