1. L. Huber, G. S. Dell, W. H. Dittrich, P. Downing, P. E. Dux, D. Eckstein, M. J. Fenske, A. D. Friederici, A. Frischen & D. January (2007). Harris, IM, 47 Hauser, MD, 654 Hausmann, M., 315 Hoffmann, J., 89. Cognition 104:669-670.
     
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  2. W. H. Dittrich & S. E. G. Lea (1993). Intentionality, Mind and Folk Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
    The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports the view of a "theory theory" in which common sense beliefs are constructed to explain ourselves and others. Focusing the informational processing routes possibly involved we would like to argue that his main thesis (e.g. idea of intentionality as a cognitive construct) lacks support at least for two reasons: (...)
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  3. W. H. Dittrich (1992). Is the Monkeys' World Scientifically Impenetrable? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):152-153.
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