Mayo argues that ethical principles are not actually universal but can be universalized in three senses; they are, in fact, essentially controversial and can best be understood in terms of an analysis of the notion of authority. He conculdes with a critique of duty, as opposed to virtue, as a key to morality.--J. T. W.

In this concise volume, the author sets himself several tasks. He attempts to provide a general introduction to Nietzsche for educated readers, or for students in need of a reliable summary. Furthermore, he wishes to rescue Nietzsche from the distortions to which he has been subjected as a result of decades of controversy as well as the use and abuse of him by interested parties. Finally, he desires to depict the way Nietzsche "really was" in both his life and his (...) work. (shrink)

This collection, in the genre of a Festschrift presented in honor of Elizabeth G. Salmon by her colleagues at Fordham University, comprises twelve scholarly essays of uniform excellence, all of them original to this volume. They range rather broadly over the whole history of Western man’s grappling with the question of God—from Plato’s hesitancy to give ultimacy to the Forms to Dewey’s discerning a role for God in the search for human meaning. In between is Avicenna’s understanding of intellect, Descartes’ (...) Cogito, Hegel’s critique of Kant, Marcel’s intuition of being as mystery, the Transcendental Thomists: Rahner’s and Lonergan’s metaphysics of spirit and Maréchal’s argument for God, and Peirce’s neglected argument from Erkenntnislehre as instinct more basic than reasoning. Unification comes from the fact that these are all exercises in the philosophy of God, an activity viewed here as retaining a certain contiguity with theology and religious history. No one school of philosophical thought serves to unify the essays; nearly all are represented, with the exception of any explicit use of Process Thought or of the new natural theology believed to be deriving from Analytical Philosophy, beyond Flew and MacIntyre. (shrink)

One can learn a great deal from this book about both anarchism and Marxism. The author prefers the latter but is fair to the former. He understands anarchism as the left-wing critique of Marxism as well as its bad conscience; he thinks anarchists asked the right questions of Marx and thus forced him to strengthen his thought; and he does not take Marx's victory or superiority as a foregone conclusion.

This volume on Nietzsche is one of a series devoted to "the ways of research" in regard to various authors of note. The editor introduces Nietzsche research by dividing it into four categories: 1) the various and increasing controversies surrounding Nietzsche's thought; 2) the growing acceptance of him as a major philosopher; 3) historical-philological problems; and, 4) the wide-spread acceptance of, and reliance on, the new edition of Nietzsche's works edited by Colli and Montinari.

In the preface to this work, Thayer explains that his purpose is to present "the classic writings of pragmatism" defined as "the original and formative expressions of this philosophy articulated by its most eminent spokesmen." The selections are from Peirce, James, and Dewey as well as brief readings from Mead and C. I. Lewis. Each selection is accompanied by a brief introduction. In addition to these selectional introductions, there is also a two-part general introduction. The first part is a short (...) historical piece by Thayer situating pragmatism in the context of western thought. The second part is a 1931 article by Dewey outlining the development of pragmatism in Peirce and James. These informative introductions should be of value to the philosophical novice who finds himself in many anthologies afloat on the sea of primary sources without the aid of the historical context necessary to fix his position. The individual selections have been carefully chosen and well coordinated. Insofar as they cluster about the central theme of the epistemological nature of pragmatism, they avoid the pitfall of attempting to elucidate the entire philosophy of many thinkers in one volume. The Peirce section includes in addition to the usual articles, "The Fixation of Belief" and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," selections from Peirce's later writings including the 1905 article, "What Pragmatism Is" in which he differentiates his pragmatism from that of James. The section on James incorporates important sections from The Principles of Psychology together with the famous essay "The Will to Believe" and two lectures on the pragmatic concept of meaning and truth from Pragmatism. The Dewey selection provides a judicious collection of his writings from the 1896 article on the "Reflex Arc Concept" advocating the integration of organism and action to the general analysis of intelligent action in his 1938 book, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. Also included is a chapter from The Quest for Certainty describing the application of pragmatic method to the realm of moral value. The contents of this volume are rounded out with a piece by Mead on social consciousness and the social self and an article by C. I. Lewis on the pragmatic conception of the a priori. Thayer has produced an excellent anthology of pragmatic philosophy well suited to any course in classical American philosophy emphasizing an epistemological approach.--W. J. L. (shrink)

This volume is intended for use in an undergraduate philosophy course employing the problems' approach. Chapter I provides a clear presentation of Cartesian rationalism. Following the exposition of Descartes' position, there is a section on the standard criticisms levelled by B. Russell. Aune defends the rationalist position with an outline of the traditional arguments for the validity of intuitive knowledge. Chapter I terminates with a list of "Study Questions" and an annotated bibliography suggesting further readings. Chapter II considers classical English (...) empiricism, taking the thought of Hume as paradigmatic. There is a discussion of a priori and a posteriori knowledge as well as a section on the problems of induction and solipsism. Chapter III outlines the attempts of contemporary empiricists to eschew Hume's skepticism by envisioning the world as a construct of our sensory experiences. To avoid the solipsism still implicit in the latter position, a re-evaluation of Hume's theory of perception is offered. Wittgenstein and Strawson are briefly treated in this section. Chapter IV explains the pragmatist's attempt to reduce to the same untenable position the rationalist and empiricist views of the a priori. Chapter V concentrates on the pragmatic theory of justification and includes a treatment of N. Goodman's "new riddle of induction." Aune's book is a readable account of conflicting theories of knowledge and undergraduates should find it of value.--W. J. L. (shrink)

There are fresh currents running through this volume, subtitled "An Essay on Truth," which dispel some accumulated but unexamined theories: e.g., that St. Paul took literally the three-story picture of the world; that nature can be subsumed under the category of history so that all meaning is historical; that there is a genuine dilemma between absolutism and relativism in morality. The author argues that the clue to reality is "story" for the simple reason that reality itself is story: a dramatic (...) conflict between persons, ambiguous at its core. The real then is grasped as story, rather than in terms of philosophical Weltanschauung, or scientific Weltbild, or history which in furnishing elements to the story distinguishes it from myth. Beyond emotive propositions, verbal propositions, and descriptive propositions lies a fourth kind of statement proper to story. Unfortunate oversimplifications compromise the book’s thesis: e.g. that Logos, Substance, and Life-Process are concepts whose use is metaphorical as is that of causality; that Aquinas taught grace is a supernatural substance; that Aristotle viewed reality as ideal rather than actual; that to conceive of evil as non-being is to deny it reality, to view it as illusory. At work here is a decided antipathy to the narrowings of rational discourse that rules out anything that might undergird the author’s "story" and give it ontological density. (shrink)

Nietzsche scholarship has always been dependent on incomplete editions. Nietzsche wrote much more than he published, and his literary remains were left to posterity in disarray—and in a handwriting few people could decipher. The exploitations perpetrated by his sister added to the tangled situation, as did the rude interruption by World War II of an attempt to publish a definitive edition.