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Profile: William J. Talbott (University of Washington)
  1. W. J. Talbott (2010). Human Rights and Human Well-Being. Oxford University Press.
    The consequentialist project for human rights -- Exceptions to libertarian natural rights -- The main principle -- What is well-being? What is equity? -- The two deepest mysteries in moral philosophy -- Security rights -- Epistemological foundations for the priority of autonomy rights -- The millian epistemological argument for autonomy rights -- Property rights, contract rights, and other economic rights -- Democratic rights -- Equity rights -- The most reliable judgment standard for weak paternalism -- Liberty rights and privacy rights (...)
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  2. W. J. Talbott (2007). Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights. Philosophical Review 116 (2):294-297.
  3. W. J. Talbott (2005). Which Rights Should Be Universal? Oxford University Press.
    "We hold these truths to be self-evident..." So begins the U.S. Declaration of Independence. What follows those words is a ringing endorsement of universal rights, but it is far from self-evident. Why did the authors claim that it was? William Talbott suggests that they were trapped by a presupposition of Enlightenment philosophy: That there was only one way to rationally justify universal truths, by proving them from self-evident premises. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the authors of (...)
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  4. W. J. Talbott (1997). Does Self-Deception Involve Intentional Biasing? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):127-127.
    I agree with Mele that self-deception is not intentional deception; but I do believe that self-deception involves intentional biasing, primarily for two reasons: (1) There is a Bayesian model of self-deception that explains why the biasing is rational. (2) It is implausible that the observed behavior of self- deceivers could be generated by Mele's “blind” mechanisms.
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  5. W. J. Talbott (1995). Intentional Self-Deception in a Single Coherent Self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):27-74.
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  6. W. J. Talbott (1991). Two Principles of Bayesian Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 62 (2):135-150.
  7. W. J. Talbott (1990). The Reliability of the Cognitive Mechanism: A Mechanist Account of Empirical Justification. Garland.
    First Published in 1990. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
     
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  8. W. J. Talbott (1987). Standard and Non-Standard Newcomb Problems. Synthese 70 (3):415 - 458.
    Examples involving common causes — most prominently, examples involving genetically influenced choices — are analytically equivalent not to standard Newcomb Problems — in which the Predictor genuinely predicts the agent's decision — but to non-standard Newcomb Problems — in which the Predictor guarantees the truth of her predictions by interfering with the agent's decision to make the agent choose as it was predicted she would. When properly qualified, causal and epistemic decision theories diverge only on standard — not on non-standard (...)
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