A fundamental philosophical question that arises in connection with evolutionary theory is whether the fittest patterns of behavior are always the most rational. Are fitness and rationality fully compatible? When behavioral rationality is characterized formally as in classical decision theory, the question becomes mathematically meaningful and can be explored systematically by investigating whether the optimally fit behavior predicted by evolutionary process models is decision-theoretically coherent. Upon investigation, it appears that in nontrivial evolutionary models the expected behavior is not always in (...) accord with the norms of the standard theory of decision as ordinarily applied. Many classically irrational acts, e.g. betting on the occurrence of one event in the knowledge that the probabilities favor another, can under certain circumstances constitute adaptive behavior.One interesting interpretation of this clash is that the criterion of rationality offered by classical decision theory is simply incorrect (or at least incomplete) as it stands, and that evolutionary theory should be called upon to provide a more generally applicable theory of rationality. Such a program, should it prove feasible, would amount to the logical reduction of the theory of rational choice to evolutionary theory. (shrink)
This paper examines several key aspects of the ethical environment facing the insurance industries of Poland, The Czech Republic and Hungary as they complete the transition from Communist insurance systems built upon state-owned monopolies to viable private domestic insurance markets, and then seek to harmonize their markets with the single insurance market of the European Union. Since many types of ethical problems encountered during the transition are unlikely to diminish significantly as a result of either privatization or regulation of the (...) insurance markets of these countries, measures are identified that should help to improve the ethical environments of these markets. (shrink)
Neutral monist, panpsychist, naturalist, and phenomenological interpretations of James's theory of mind are canvassed. Culling the true tenets from each, I make a case for a reconciling view on the basis of a distinction between mental and proto-mental properties. The resulting interpretation is compared to two forms of panpsychism identified by T Nagel in his essay of that name.
. This paper presents the findings of two surveys conducted in April 2003 of Chartered Life Underwriters (CLUs) and Chartered Financial Consultants (ChFCs) who are members of the Society of Financial Service Professionals. The first survey of 3000 CLUs and ChFCs – the life insurance industry’s most highly regarded professionals – was aimed at identifying the key ethical issues faced by professionals working in the life insurance industry today. A comparison of these findings with those of earlier studies conducted in (...) 1990 and 1995 suggests that while the key ethical issues facing those working in the life insurance business today are essentially the same as those encountered during industry’s highly troubled ethical environment of the early 1990s, these issues are perceived as presenting somewhat less serious problems than in the past. The second survey of 3000 CLUs and ChFCs was aimed at determining the extent to which these professionals perceive the industry created Insurance Marketplace Standards Association (IMSA) as having contributed to any change in the ethical environment that has taken place. The findings suggest that IMSA has played an important role in influencing senior managers to more strongly encourage and support ethical market conduct, a critical step in improving the industry’s ethical environment. (shrink)
Christians who affirm standard science and the biblical doctrine of creation often endorse theistic evolution as the best approach to human origins. But theistic evolution is ambiguous. Some versions are naturalistic (NTE)—God created humans entirely by evolution—and some are supernaturalistic (STE)—God supernaturally augmented evolution. This article claims that NTE is inadequate as an account of human origins because its theological naturalism and emergent physicalist ontology of the soul or person conflict with the Christian doctrine that God created humans for everlasting (...) life. Both the traditional Christian account of the afterlife and its modern Christian alternatives involve God's supernatural action and a separation (dualism) of person and body at death. STE can combine with several philosophical accounts of the body-soul relation to provide an adequate Christian account of original human nature. (shrink)
Thomas Hobbes’s innovative anthropology and novel doctrines of natural right, natural law, and positive law have been taken to inaugurate a tradition that grows into modern United States abortion jurisprudence. In this essay I argue that a careful rereading of Hobbes reveals that the characterization of Hobbes as the philosophical and jurisprudential forefather of abortion rights is false. While Hobbes never directly addressed the question of abortion, I argue that we can reconstruct his position from his philosophical texts. First, I (...) reconstruct the Hobbesian philosophical case against abortion via a rereading of his notions of family, hominization, and natural law. Second, I apply these principles along with Hobbes’s theories of equity and sovereignty to formulate a Hobbesian jurisprudential case against the Roe-Casey order of permissive abortion law. (shrink)
The primary aspects of Clifford Christians's ethical theory may be identified or contextualized in several ways, three of which are employed in this article: 1) a content analysis of his self-reported book, article, and chapter titles; 2) a narrative summary of the themes of his self-selected representative ethical theory essays; and 3) the author's contextualization of Christians' ideas within both intellectual history and communication studies. Although Christians and his work are valued as apex contributions to and leadership within the field (...) of media ethics, three questions are posed to Dr. Christians to which he responded both at the August 2009 AEJMC conference panel in Boston about his intellectual legacy and again in this journal. (shrink)
We set out a variety of material from Nozick’s work after -Anarchy, State, and Utopia- that tends to show that, despite his protestations of fidelity to libertarianism in-Invariances- and interviews before his death, his thought took directions inconsistent with the version of libertarianism in that book, in which only negative rights (or the ‘ethic of respect’ as he called it later) can be coercively enforced by the State. We explore one interpretive possibility, taking a second look at a footnote in (...) ASU that acknowledges a moral permission to violate the ethic of respect under circumstances of ‘catastrophic moral horror.’. (shrink)
We say that a computably enumerable (c.e.) degree b is a Lachlan nonsplitting base (LNB), if there is a computably enumerable degree a such that a > b, and for any c.e. degrees w,v ≤ a, if a ≤ w or; v or; b then either a ≤ w or; b or a ≤ v or; b. In this paper we investigate the relationship between bounding and nonbounding of Lachlan nonsplitting bases and the high /low hierarchy. We prove that there (...) is a non-Low2 c.e. degree which bounds no Lachlan nonsplitting base. (shrink)
This paper addresses central issues in the debate about inclusive language for God by responding to Andrew Dell’Olio, who offered biblical, theological, linguistic, and ethical reasons for a “supplemental” use of feminine language for God. Since he leaves unclear whether “supplemental” means “secondary to” or “fully equal to” the masculine language of the biblical tradition, it is difficult to determine whether he makes his case. While a secondary role for feminine language for God is legitimate, I argue that giving feminine (...) language a status equal to the Bible’s masculine language for God is not warranted by the standard biblical and theological criteria of the Christian tradition. (shrink)
The advent of moral pluralism in the post-modern age leads to a set of issues about how pluralistic societies can function. The questions of biomedical ethics frequently highlight the larger issues of moral pluralism and social cooperation. Reflection on these issues has focused on the decision making roles of the health care professionals, the patient, and the patient's family. One species of actor that has been neglected has been those institutions which are part of the public, secular realm and which (...) have a particular moral heritage. Keywords: approval, compromise, condemnation, integrity, toleration CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)
Lindsay Judson and Vassilis Karasmanis present a selection of philosophical papers by an outstanding international team of scholars, assessing the legacy and continuing relevance of Socrates's thought 2,400 years after his death. The topics of the papers include Socratic method; the notion of definition; Socrates's intellectualist conception of ethics; famous arguments in the Euthyphro and Crito; and aspects of the later portrayal and reception of Socrates as a philosophical and ethical exemplar, by Plato, the Sceptics, and in the early Christian (...) era. Contributors include Lesley Brown, David Charles, John Cooper, Michael Frede, Terence Irwin, Charles Kahn, Vassilis Karasmanis, Carlo Natali, Vasilis Politis, Dory Scaltsas, Gerhard Seel, and C. C. W. Taylor. (shrink)
Machine generated contents note: Acknowledgments Introduction: "Unraveling the Mysteries" Part One. "It All Began on a Warm Summer's Evening in Greece": Aristotelian Insights 1. Aristotle on Sheldon Cooper: Ancient Greek Meets Modern Geek Greg Littmann 2. "You're a Sucky, Sucky Friend": Seeking Aristotelian Friendship in The Big Bang Dean A. Kowalski 3. The Big Bang Theory on the Use and Abuse of Modern Technology Kenneth Wayne Sayles III Part Two. "Is It Wrong to Say I Love Our Killer Robot?": (...) Ethics and Virtue 4. Feeling Good about Feeling Good: Is It Morally Wrong to Laugh at Sheldon? W. Scott Clifton 5...But Is Wil Wheaton Evil? Donna Marie Smith 6. Do We Need a Roommate Agreement?: Pleasure, Selfishness, and Virtue in The Big Bang Gregory L. Bock and Jeffrey L. Bock Part Three. "Perhaps You Mean a Different Thing Than I Do When You Say "Science": Science, Scientism, and Religion 7. Getting Fundamental about Doing Physics in The Big Bang Jonathan Lawhead 8. Sheldon, Leonard, and Leslie: The Three Faces of Quantum Gravity Andrew Zimmerman Jones 9. The One Paradigm to Rule Them All: Scientism and The Big Bang Massimo Pigliucci 10. Cooper Considerations Adam Barkman and Dean A. Kowalski Part Four. "I Need Your Opinion on a Matter of Semiotics": Language and Meaning 11. Wittgenstein and Language Games in The Big Bang Theory Janelle Pötzsch 12. "I'm Afraid You Couldn't Be More Wrong!": Sheldon and Being Right about Being Wrong Adolfas Mackonis 13. The Cooper Conundrum: Good Lord, Who's Tolerating Who? Ruth E. Lowe 14. The Mendacity Bifurcation Don Fallis Part Five. "The Human Experience That has Always Eluded Me": The Human Condition 15. Mothers and Sons of The Big Bang Ashley Barkman 16. Penny, Sheldon, and Personal Growth through Difference Nicholas G. Evans 17. Deconstructing the Women of The Big Bang Theory: So Much More than Girlfriends Mark D. White and Maryanne L. Fisher The Episode Compendium:"Hey, It's a Big Menu--There's Two Pages Just for Desserts" Contributors. "But If We Were Part of the Team... We Could Drink for Free in Any Bar in Any College Town" Index. "Cornucopia...Let's Make that Our Word of the Day" . (shrink)
This article was first published in 1982 in Educational Analysis (4, 75?91) and republished in 1998 (Hirst, P. H., & White, P. (Eds.), Philosophy of education: Major themes in the analytic tradition, Vol. 1, Philosophy and education, Part 1, pp. 61?78. London: Routledge). I was then a lecturer in philosophy of education at Sheffield University teaching the subject to Master?s students on both full- and part-time programmes. My first degree was in philosophy, read under D. W. Hamlyn and David (...) class='Hi'>Cooper and, given their interests, inevitably emphasized the philosophy of language, in particular the work of Wittgenstein in this field. When I subsequently turned my attention to the philosophy of education it seemed obvious to me that there were serious problems with Professor Peters? approach to language, and I had particular difficulties with his approach to criteria, meaning theory and what seemed an odd interpretation of a transcendental argument. This article thus set out to show that the then dominant form of philosophy of education seemed not to take account of developments in the philosophy of language that preceded Professor Peters? early work by at least a decade and which cast serious doubt on the enterprise as it was then understood. As the articles in the 1998 collection indicate, I was not alone in thinking there was something amiss, although at the time I seemed to be ploughing a somewhat lonely furrow. In revisiting this early article some 30 years after it was first published I have found to my surprise that there is little I would now change, although I have been forcibly reminded of the very lively discussions Professor Peters and I had over these issues. The fact that there is little I would now add to, or subtract from, my critique is in itself a telling comment on the enduring and influential legacy of the approach to the philosophy of education that Professor Peters championed so powerfully. (shrink)
John Greene has dismissed the evolutionary ethics of Simpson as a case in which science was “only a tool, a weapon, in defense of positions that were essentially religious and philosophical.”57 This position adopts an amorphous view of science, in which a scientific theory can be construed to support practically any rhetorical position. The relationship between theory and rhetoric, however, is more complex; it is interactive, with the theory and the rhetoric influencing and supporting one another. It is no coincidence (...) that Allee, Emerson, and Simpson all arrived at a biological basis of democracy and a naturalistic ethics during a period when the future of world politics and man's own morality were in question. Allee's commitment to world peace certainly antedated his theory of sociality, just as Simpson's commitment to democracy undoubtedly preceded his evolutionary views.By adopting a particular theory, however, the biologist necessarily imposes constraints on the corresponding rhetoric. Allee and Emerson could not, for example, have stressed the importance of the individual in democracy, given the orientation and framework of their biological research. There were differences among the social philosophies of Allee, Emerson, and Simpson; these differences depended, in part, on the specific evolutionary metaphors to which they subscribed. Allee's ideas with respect to cooperation were distinct from Emerson's, and both men differed strongly from Simpson on the role of the individual in evolution. The Chicago school was united by a conceptual framework that emphasized the population as the unit of selection, and the importance of cooperation in nature. But cooperation could play many roles: as a unifying principle for a theory of sociality, as an integrating mechanism in physiological functionalism, and as a biological source of hope for a society in the grips of a world war. (shrink)
According to the so-called “Folk Theorem” for repeated games, stable cooperative relations can be sustained in a Prisoner’s Dilemma if the game is repeated an indefinite number of times. This result depends on the possibility of applying strategies that are based on reciprocity, i.e., strategies that reward cooperation with subsequent cooperation and punish defectionwith subsequent defection. If future interactions are sufficiently important, i.e., if the discount rate is relatively small, each agent may be motivated to cooperate by fear of retaliation (...) in the future. For finite games, however, where the number of plays is known beforehand, there is a backward induction argument showing that rational agents will not be able to achieve cooperation. On behalf of the Hobbesian “Foole”, who cannot see any advantage in cooperation, Gregory Kavka (1983, 1986) has presented an argument that significantly extends the range of the backward induction argument. He shows that, for the backward induction argument to be effective, it is not necessary that the precise number of future interactions be known. It is sufficient that there is a known definite upper bound on the number of interactions. A similar argument is developed by John W. Carroll (1987). We will here question the assumption of a known upper bound. When the assumption is made precise in the way needed for the argument to go through, its apparent plausibility evaporates. We then offer a reformulation of the argument, based on weaker, and more plausible, assumptions. (shrink)
It is argued that, without a controversial and arguably mistaken assumption, Becker and Cudd's (1990) objections do not undermine the challenge raised by my (1987) model of iterated prisoner's dilemmas for the arguments of Taylor (1976, 1987) and others. Furthermore, it is argued that, even granting this assumption, there is an alternative model that avoids their objections.
It is quite easy to get the impression that the classical American philosophical tradition is a tradition of genteel, loosely pragmatic scholars committed to democracy and liberalism by peaceful, democratic means.1 An intellectual coming-of-age story is often told, highlighting the philosophical insights of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Charles S. Peirce, William James, Josiah Royce, and John Dewey. When time and space permits, some discussion of Jane Addams, W.E.B. Du Bois, or Alain Locke is added.2 What develops is a story of thoughtful, (...) well-intentioned philosophers who engage in cooperative inquiry, dialogic discourse, and moral suasion to augment the agent’s capacity to adapt and adapt to her environment in an .. (shrink)
W&S correctly ask if groups can be like individuals in the harmony and cooperation of their parts, but in their answer, they ignore the importance of the difference between genetically related and unrelated components, and also misconstrue the import of the Hutterites.
On What Makes an Epistemology Naturalistic. Since the publication of W. V. Quine's classic paper "Epistemology Naturalized" there have been many discussion on the virtues and vices of naturalistic epistemology. Within these discussions not much attention has been paid to a basic question: What makes an epistemology naturalistic? I give an answer by providing a logical geography of competing naturalistic positions. Then I defend naturalistic epistemology against the charge of the so-called causal fallacy. Finally I give a critical appraisal of (...) different naturalistic theories of knowledge and introduce cooperative naturalism as the most promising research strategy. (shrink)
Although much has been written about the vigorous debates over science and religion in the Victorian era, little attention has been paid to their continuing importance in early twentieth-century Britain. Reconciling Science and Religion provides a comprehensive survey of the interplay between British science and religion from the late nineteenth century to World War II. Peter J. Bowler argues that unlike the United States, where a strong fundamentalist opposition to evolutionism developed in the 1920s (most famously expressed in the Scopes (...) "monkey trial" of 1925), in Britain there was a concerted effort to reconcile science and religion. Intellectually conservative scientists championed the reconciliation and were supported by liberal theologians in the Free Churches and the Church of England, especially the Anglican "Modernists." Popular writers such as Julian Huxley and George Bernard Shaw sought to create a non-Christian religion similar in some respects to the Modernist position. Younger scientists and secularists—including Rationalists such as H. G. Wells and the Marxists—tended to oppose these efforts, as did conservative Christians, who saw the liberal position as a betrayal of the true spirit of their religion. With the increased social tensions of the 1930s, as the churches moved toward a neo-orthodoxy unfriendly to natural theology and biologists adopted the "Modern Synthesis" of genetics and evolutionary theory, the proposed reconciliation fell apart. Because the tensions between science and religion—and efforts at reconciling the two—are still very much with us today, Bowler's book will be important for everyone interested in these issues. Contents: Illustrations Preface Introduction: A Legacy of Conflict? Confrontation, Cooperation, or Coexistence? Victorian Background Science and Religion in the New Century Part One: The Sciences and Religion 1. The Religion of Scientists Changing Patterns of Belief Scientists and Christianity Scientists and Theism Method and Meaning Science and Values 2. Scientists against Superstition Science and Rationalism Religion without Revelation Marxists and Other Radicals Science, Religion, and the History of Science 3. Physics and Cosmology Ether and Spirit The New Physics The Earth and the Universe 4. Evolution and the New Natural Theology Science and Creation Evolution and Progress The Role of Lamarckism Darwinism Revived 5. Matter, Life, and Mind The Origin of Life Vitalism and Organicism Mind and Body Psychology and Religion Part Two: The Churches and Science 6. The Churches in the New Century The Challenge of the New The Churches’ Response 7. The New Theology in the Free Churches Precursors of the New Theology Campbell and the New Theology Modernism in the Free Churches 8. Anglican Modernism Modernism and the New Natural Theology Charles F. D’Arcy E. W. Barnes W. R. Inge Charles Raven 9. The Reaction against Modernism Evangelicals against Evolution Liberal Catholicism The Menace of the New Psychology Science and Modern Life Theology in the Thirties Roman Catholicism Part Three: The Wider Debate 10. Science and Secularism Against Idealism Popular Rationalism The Social Reformers 11. Religion’s Defenders From Idealism to Spiritualism Creative and Emergent Evolution Evolution and the Human Spirit Progress through Struggle The Christian Response Epilogue Biographical Appendix Bibliography Index. (shrink)
I argue that distinctive regional modes of production entailed divergent configurations of interests and differing degrees of mutual dependence between peasants and landlords. Class-collaborative rebellions correlate highly with a mode of production that makes for cooperative interests and interclass dependence, while class-conflict rebellions correlate highly with a mode of production that makes for antagonistic interests and interclass independence. But class-collaboration was unlikely without a target, which the state provided. Yet the state became the target in subsistence regions where the lack (...) of markets made the raising of tax revenues particularly difficult and where subsistence classes were not dependent on the state for markets and, therefore, had little incentive to cooperate with the state. On the other hand, in regions with a commercial mode of production, raising tax revenues was less burdensome and classes tended to be dependent on the state for markets and, therefore, less likely to engage in antistate collective action.The data appear to support my model's predictions. The model fits best for England where, as predicted, class-collaboration rebellions took place in subsistence regions while class-conflict rebellions occurred in commercial regions. The model does less well for France and Spain. In France, most class-collaboration collective action happened in subsistence regions, though few class-conflict rebellions occurred in commercial regions, while the most intense class-conflict revolt of all took place in Lower Brittany - a mixed region. In Spain, class-antagonistic collective action occurred in commercial regions, especially Castile, while rebellions in other commercial regions displayed both class-cooperative and class-antagonistic aspects. In Spain's subsistence regions, there is little evidence of any collective action between 1500 and 1700. In Andalusia, finally, a mixed region, little collective action took place at all, which fits the model's prediction.In brief, though the mode of production may explain the relation between a form of agrarian rebellion and a particular kind of region, it does not explain variations in the incidence of rebellion either between the three nations or between regions with similar modes of production. These crucial issues will be addressed in a future paper. W. Brustein and M. Levi, “Rulers, Rebels, and Regions 1500–1700,” unpublished paper (University of Utah and University of Washington, 1984). (shrink)
Coalitions are frequently more visible than payoffs. The theory of n-person games seeks primarily to identify stable allocations of valued resources; consequently, it gives inadequate attention to predicting which coalitions form. This paper explores a way of correcting this deficiency of game-theoretic reasoning by extending the theory of two-person cooperative games to predict both coalitions and payoffs in a three-person ‘game of status’ in which each player seeks to maximize the rank of his total score. Martin Shubik, ‘Games of Status’, (...) Behavioral Science 17 (1971), 117–129. To accomplish this, we analyze the negotiations within each potential two-person coalition from the perspective of Nash's procedure for arbitrating two-person bargaining games,R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1958, pp. 121–143. then assume that players expect to achieve the arbitrated outcome selected by this procedure and use these expectations to predict achieved ranks and to identify players' preferences between alternative coalition partners in order to predict the probability that each coalition forms.This work is supported by Research Grant SOC72-05245, awarded to the second author by the National Science Foundation. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., August 29 – September 2, 1974. We thank Peter C. Ordeshook for suggesting that Nash's arbitration model might be applied to this game, and David Deutsch for assisting us in this research. We test these payoff and coalition predictions with data from three laboratory studies, and compare the results with those attained in the same data by von Neumann and Morgenstern's solution of two-person cooperative games,Luce and Raiffa, op.cit., pp. 115–119. Aumann and Maschler's bargaining set solution for cooperative n-person games,R. J. Aumann and Michael Maschler, ‘The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games’, in M. Dresher, L. S. Shapley, and A. W. Tucker (eds.), Advances in Game Theory, Annals Math. Studies, No. 52, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1964, pp. 443–476. and an alternative model of coalition behavior in three-person sequential games of status.For an extension and application of the bargaining set to three-person games of status and a comparison of the bargaining set with our alternative model of coalition behavior in the three laboratory studies reported in this paper, see Richard J. Morrison's Ph.D. thesis, ‘Rational Choice Models of Coalition Formation in the Triad’, Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 1974 (this dissertation is available from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan); and the paper by Laing and Morrison, ‘Sequential Games of Status’, Behavioral Science 19 (1974), 177–197. The coalition model is developed more extensively by Laning and Morrison in “Coalitions and Payoffs in Three-Person Sequential Games: Initial Tests of Two Formal Models”, Journal of Mathematical Sociology 3 (1973), 3–26 (hereinafter cited as ‘Initial Tests of Two Formal Models’). (shrink)
Given the pragmatic tum recently taken by argumentation studies, we owe renewed attention to Henry Johnstone's views on the primacy of process over product. In particular, Johnstone's decidedly non-cooperative model is a refreshing alternative to the current dialogic theories of arguing, one which opens the way for specifically rhetorical lines of inquiry.
Debates concerning the taxation of prostitution have occurred in taxation law and in feminist literature. This article will integrate the case of Polok v. C.E.C.  E.W.H.C, 156;  S.T.C. 361, within the feminist legal canon. The case is discussed in the context of the argument of the European doctrine of fiscal neutrality, which dictates that, regardless of legality as amongst member states, if an activity is levied to V.A.T. in one member state, V.A.T. should be levied on it in (...) all member states. The doctrine of sovereignty accepts the possibility that the integrity of the V.A.T. system may be compromised by the levying of tax on illegal activities, in terms of the cooperation between tax and other aspects of the U.K.’s legal system. European law, feminist law, commodification and the marketplace are all considered within the context of these principles. The article also considers the place of Polok within standard feminist texts on prostitution. Different paradigms of prostitution define different aspects of prostitution as ‘problems’, and the article considers the implications within a feminist reconstruction of Polok of this. The article suggests that the challenge for a feminist analysis of Polok is to remain within the realm of European tax and competition law, and to render the perspective of the employees of the Polok taxpayers part of the substance of the deliberations of the case. (shrink)
The following is a joint report of the Committee on Philosophy in Education of the American Philosophical Association and of the Committee on Cooperation with the American Philosophical Association of the Philosophy of Education Society. The report has been approved by the Executive Committee of the Philosophy of Education Society and by the Board of Officers of the American Philosophical Association (September, 1959). The Committee of the American Philosophical Association was composed of the following: C. W. Hendel, Chairman, H. G. (...) Alexander, R. M. Chisholm, Max Fisch, Lucius Garvin, Douglas Morgan, A. E. Murphy, Charner Perry and R. G. Turnbull. The Committee of the Philosophy of Education Society consisted of Fr. R. J. Henle, S.J., Chairman, and Professors Barton, Clayton, Drake, and Hullfish. The American Philosophical Association subcommittee with primary responsibility for this report was composed of Charner Perry, Chairman, and Douglas Morgan. (shrink)
We consider cooperative games which are modified by subordination to communication networks. Two players i and j will be able to cooperate only if they pay for the cost w ij of their communication link (i,j). Coalitions of players are treated similarly and a new characteristic function form game is developed thus. We also examine incentive for players to cooperate in such situations as well as a related index of a player's communicative strength.
The following article starts by summarising how much modern capitalism is characterised by its religious structure. The world of branding — consumer goods becoming religiously attractive — and religious metaphors that have become necessary to describe contemporary neoliberalism are key examples. A second step consists in describing four typical aspects of religious capitalism in the following of Walter Benjamin's fragment `Capitalism as Religion' from 1921. Against this background I thirdly summarise Hans G. Ulrich's theological ethics concerning the economy. At the (...) centre of Ulrich's ethics we find his emphasis on God's economy that relieves us from all our worries enabling us thereby to become cooperators of God acting and working in an ethical way. A final step discusses Ulrich's rejection of an ethics of striving for God as the summum bonum by showing that desire or will do not necessarily contradict with the priority of God's grace. (shrink)
In conclusion, I shall indicate one consequence of (3.4). The major resultof work on infinitely iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games is that there existcooperative equilibria in such games. I have suggested above that myaccount of finitely, but indefinitely, iterated Prisoner's Dilemma gamesreflects the nature of genuine iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas more accu-rately than accounts involving infinite iterations. If my suggestion iscorrect, then one consequence of (3.4) - of there being only uncooperativeequilibria in finitely, but indefinitely, iterated games - is to call intoquestion (...) the significance of the existence of cooperative equilibria ininfinitely iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games. (shrink)
Imagine both that (1) S1 is deliberating at t about whether or not to x at t' and that (2) although S1’s x-ing at t' would not itself have good consequences, good consequences would ensue if both S1 x's at t' and S2 y's at t", where S1 may or may not be identical to S2 and where t < t' ≤ t". In this paper, I consider how consequentialists should treat S2 and the possibility that S2 will y at (...) t". At one end of the spectrum, consequentialists would hold that, in deciding whether or not to x at t', S1 should always treat S2 as a force of nature over which she has no control and, thus, treat the possibility that S2 will y at t" as she would the possibility that a hurricane will take a certain path. On this view, S1 is to predict whether or not S2 will y and act accordingly. At the other end of the spectrum, consequentialists would hold that S1 should always treat S2 as someone available for mutual cooperation and, thus, treat the possibility that S2 will y at t" as something to be relied upon. On this view, S1 is to rely on S2’s cooperation and so play her part in the best cooperative scheme involving the two of them. A third and intermediate position would be to hold that whether S1 should treat S2 as a force of nature or as someone available for mutual cooperation depends on whether S1 can see to it that S2 will y at t" by, say, having the right set attitudes. I’ll argue for this third position. As we’ll see, an important implication of this view is that consequentialists should be concerned not just with an agent’s voluntary actions but also with their involuntary acquisitions of various mental attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. Indeed, I will argue that consequentialists should hold both that (1) an agent’s most fundamental duty is to have all those attitudes that she has decisive reason to have and only those attitudes that she has sufficient reason to have and that (2) she has a derivative duty to perform an act x if and only if her fulfilling this fundamental duty ensures that she x’s. Thus, I argue (as Donald Regan did before me) that consequentialism should not be exclusively act-orientated – that it should require agents not only to perform certain voluntary actions but also to have certain attitudes. In the process, I develop a new version of consequentialism, which I call attitude-consequentialism. (The latest version of this paper can always be found at: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/14740340/Consequentialism%20and%20Coordination%20Problems.pdf) -/- . (shrink)
The famous philosopher Leibniz (1646-1716) was also active in the (cultural) politics of his time. His interest in forming scientific societies never waned and his efforts led to the founding of the Berlin Academy of Sciences. He also played a part in the founding of the Dresden Academy of Science and the St. Petersburg Academy of Science. Though Leibniz's models for the scientific society were the Royal Society and the Royal Science Academy of France, his pansophistic vision of scientific cooperation (...) sometimes took on utopian dimensions. In this paper, I will present Leibniz's ideas of scientific cooperation as a kind of religious activity and discuss his various schemes for the founding of such scientific societies. (shrink)
Cooperative child care among humans, where individuals other than the biological mother (allomothers) provide care, may increase a mother’s fertility and the survivorship of her children. Although the potential benefits to the mother are clear, the motivations for allomothers to provide care are less clear. Here, we evaluate the kin selection allomothering hypothesis using observations on Hadza hunter-gatherers collected in ten camps over 17 months. Our results indicate that related allomothers spend the largest percentage of time holding children. The higher (...) the degree of relatedness among kin, the more time they spend holding, supporting the hypothesis of nepotism as the strongest motivation for providing allomaternal care. Unrelated helpers of all ages also provide a substantial amount of investment, which may be motivated by learning to mother, reciprocity, or coercion. (shrink)
This paper examines the ideas of Communication and Accountability in relation to professional discourse and the teaching of Professionals. Language does not merely express values, but embodies values, without which it could not function as a medium of communication — Grice''s Cooperative Principle. In practice communication and accountability have become separated, as have ethics and communication in the schools, and this is reflected in assumptions about science and scientific language which characterise professional discourses.The modern professions exist on a continuum between (...) two extremes of collegiate and corporate values, with a trend toward the latter. The place on this continuum determines what stance an organisation takes in its attempts to communicate with its publics. An analysis of the assumptions which underlie the discourses of academic economics and public relations shows how the dissociation of values and communication works in practice. (shrink)
Political choices favoring one''s country or one''s nationality are wrong if they conflict with a principle of universal free acceptability, prohibiting choices that violate every set of rules to which any willing cooperator would want all to conform. Despite its universalism, this principle requires patriotic favoritism in political choices and permits individuals to assert nationalist interests in claims for state aid. But it deprives patriotism and nationalism of any distinctive role in establishing the legitimacy of wars and uprisings. These restrictions (...) are appropriate even if stronger forms of patriotism and nationalism are psychologically indispensable for achieving social goals required for universal free acceptability. (shrink)
G. A. Cohen incisively argued that our judgments of social justice should fit our convictions about how to interact with others in our personal lives. Ironically, the ordinary morality of cooperation invoked in his last book undermines his favored principle of equality, and supports John Rawls' reliance on a relevantly impartial choice promoting appropriate fundamental interests as a basis for distributive standards. His further objections to Rawls' account of distributive justice neglect the role of social relations in establishing the proper (...) scope of that impartiality and the moral force of Rawls' taxonomy of non-ideal societies. In contrast, the powerful evocation of goods of community at the end of Cohen's last book points to a genuine inadequacy. Conscientious fellow-citizens must take account of the impact of their political choices on options for sharing and caring. In finding a proper balance between these goods and competing individualist concerns, the original position is of too little use to sustain Rawls' assessment of his conception of justice as complete. In the face of our strong moral convictions about how to live together, both Cohen's luck egalitarianism and Rawls' barriers between aspirations to community and political choice must give way. (shrink)
This essay treats the Progressives' critique of the Founders' doctrine of natural rights. Natural rights had been attacked before the Progressive erabut the Progressives launched the most thoroughgoing and systematic critique in American history. The leading thinker conducting the critique was America's foremost philosopher John Dewey. His critique had five major points: (1) that America had entered an entirely new age of social and economic organization requiring a different political theory; (2) that all theoretical claims of truth, like natural rights, (...) are relative to the age in which they were born and thrived; (3) that theoretical ideas serve the aims of different classes, with natural rights representing the economic and political interests of the emerging bourgeoisie; (4) that natural rights encouraged a diminished goal for human beings, emphasizing the fulfillment of individual self-interest rather a higher idea of human development and of social cooperation; and (5) that any metaphysical claim in politics is undemocratic by virtue of ascribing a standard of right that is prior to and higher than a decision of a democratic majority. The paper concludes by briefly sketching the influence that this critique had on the heirs of the Progressives, the modern liberals. (shrink)
In recent years, there has been a proliferation of new research on moral thinking informed by evolutionary theory. The new findings have emanated from a wide variety of fields. While there is no shortage of theoretical models that attempt to account for specific research findings, Matthew Keefer's goals in this essay are more general. First, he examines the strength of the evolutionary approach to understanding morality and moral emotions as adaptations to cooperation. Second, he considers the importance of unconscious processing (...) for generating ethical (or unethical) behavior and the complex relation among moral emotions, intuitions, and conscious moral reasoning. Third, he underscores the importance of understanding self-deception and self-serving biases in moral thinking and behavior. Keefer ends the essay with a discussion of some implications of these considerations for professional ethics and moral education. (shrink)
Molecular-scale computing has been explored since 1989 owing to the foreseeable limitation of Moore's law for silicon-based computation devices. With the potential of massive parallelism, low energy consumption and capability of working in vivo, molecular-scale computing promises a new computational paradigm. Inspired by the concepts from the electronic computer, DNA computing has realized basic Boolean functions and has progressed into multi-layered circuits. Recently, RNA nanotechnology has emerged as an alternative approach. Owing to the newly discovered thermodynamic stability of a special (...) RNA motif (Shu et al. 2011 Nat. Nanotechnol. 6, 658–667 (doi:10.1038/nnano.2011.105)), RNA nanoparticles are emerging as another promising medium for nanodevice and nanomedicine as well as molecular-scale computing. Like DNA, RNA sequences can be designed to form desired secondary structures in a straightforward manner, but RNA is structurally more versatile and more thermodynamically stable owing to its non-canonical base-pairing, tertiary interactions and base-stacking property. A 90-nucleotide RNA can exhibit 490 nanostructures, and its loops and tertiary architecture can serve as a mounting dovetail that eliminates the need for external linking dowels. Its enzymatic and fluorogenic activity creates diversity in computational design. Varieties of small RNA can work cooperatively, synergistically or antagonistically to carry out computational logic circuits. The riboswitch and enzymatic ribozyme activities and its special in vivo attributes offer a great potential for in vivo computation. Unique features in transcription, termination, self-assembly, self-processing and acid resistance enable in vivo production of RNA nanoparticles that harbour various regulators for intracellular manipulation. With all these advantages, RNA computation is promising, but it is still in its infancy. Many challenges still exist. Collaborations between RNA nanotechnologists and computer scientists are necessary to advance this nascent technology. (shrink)
Roman Catholicism has long opposed suicide. Although Scripture neither condones nor condemns suicide explicitly, cases in the Bible that are purported to be suicides fall into several different categories, and the Roman Catholic tradition can show why some of these should be considered morally wrong and some should not. While Christian martyrdom is praised, it is not correct to argue that this Christian outlook invites suicide, or that it recommends physician-assisted suicide for altruistic motives. Church Tradition, from its earliest days, (...) has clearly distinguished martyrdom from suicide. The principles of double effect and cooperation, mainstays in Roman Catholic moral theology, enable one to see the moral difference between martyrdom and suicide, and to appreciate why physician-assisted suicide is wrong for both patient and physician. (shrink)
During the 1990s, the Government of Peru began to aggressivelyprivatize agriculture. The government stopped loaning money to farmers' cooperatives and closed the government rice-buying company. The government even rented out most of its researchstations and many senior scientists lost their jobs. As part of this trend, the government eliminated its seed certification agency. Instead, private seed certification committees were set up with USAID funding and technical advise from a US university. The committees were supposed to become self-financing (bycertifying seed grown (...) by small seed producers) and each committee was supposed to encourage the development of a group of small seed-producing firms, clustered around the seedcertification agency. The amazing thing is that many of the seed committees actually accomplished these goals. The agronomists who staffed the committees stood by their jobs,even after US funding ended, even though the committees' income was (at best) modest, and occasionally under the threat of violence from the extreme left. Some seed certificationcommittees failed and others did not. Some of the problems with Peruvian agricultural liberalization can be seen in regard to the seed programs of maize, rice, potatoes, and beans. For example, the government abandoned most research, yet could not resist creating certain distortions in the seed market (e.g.,buying large amounts of seed and distributing them for political ends). (shrink)
In this article the authors seek to conceptualize a dynamic and inclusive understanding of personal identity within multicultural democracies such as South Africa, which will draw on both the liberal and communitarian traditions' respect for the project of self. A preliminary lay out for such a project emerges from a literature survey of recent, primarily South African publications on identity and culture, and it suggests that selfhood depends on: a) virtues, cultivated within cooperative communities which allow for effective freedom; b) (...) a venture into existential uncertainty, which alleviates that fear of loss of identity that is supposedly central to many multicultural conflicts; c) the hermeneutic construction of identity through narratives that allow for a plurality of voices; and d) the creative transcending and re- interpretation of values and traditions. The authors contend that such an under standing of identity goes some way towards addressing the question of the way that diverse personal and group identities are to be accommodated in South Africa's multicultural democracy, and to re thinking the unity which underlies diversity without resorting to liberalism's reduction of personal identity to rational autonomy. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.20(3) 2001: 35-54. (shrink)