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Profile: Wai-hung Wong (California State University, Chico)
  1. Jason Bridges, Mik Kolodyny & Wai-Hung Wong (forthcoming). Barber, Michael. The Intentional Spectrum and Intersubjectivity: Phenomenology the Pittsburgh Neo-Hegelians. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2011. $69.95 Botz-Bornstein, Thorsten, Ed. Inception and Philosophy: Ideas to Die For. Chicago: Open Court, 2011. $19.95 Pb. Bouchard, Larry D. Theater and Integrity: Emptying Selves in Drama, Ethics, and Religion. Evanston: North. [REVIEW] Philosophy Today.
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  2. Wai-Hung Wong & Zanja Yudell (2013). How Fallacious is the Consequence Fallacy? Philosophical Studies 165 (1):221-227.
    Timothy Williamson argues against the tactic of criticizing confidence in a theory by identifying a logical consequence of the theory whose probability is not raised by the evidence. He dubs it “the consequence fallacy”. In this paper, we will show that Williamson’s formulation of the tactic in question is ambiguous. On one reading of Williamson’s formulation, the tactic is indeed a fallacy, but it is not a commonly used tactic; on another reading, it is a commonly used tactic (or at (...)
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  3. Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny & Wai-Hung Wong (eds.) (2012). The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Reflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud. OUP USA.
    Barry Stroud's work has had a profound impact on a very wide array of philosophical topics, including epistemological skepticism, the nature of logical necessity, the interpretation of Hume, the interpretation of Wittgenstein, the possibility of transcendental arguments, and the metaphysical status of color and value. And yet there has heretofore been no book-length treatment of his work. The current collection aims to redress this gap, with 13 essays on Stroud's work by a diverse group of contributors including some of his (...)
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  4. Jason Bridges Niko Kolodny & Wai-Hung Wong (eds.) (2011). The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Reflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud. Oxford University Press.
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  5. Wai-Hung Wong (2011). What the Skeptic Still Can't Learn From How We Use the Word 'Know'. In J. Bridges, N. Kolodny & W. Wong (eds.), The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Reflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud. Oxford University Press.
     ’ The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism has been widely read and discussed by philosophers who are interested in skepticism about our knowledge of the external world.1 Some of his later writings on the topic (such as Stroud (1989) and (1994)) are considered essential reading too. This does not, however, mean that what Stroud says about skepticism2 has as much impact on the discussion of skepticism as it deserves. It seems that his insights into the nature of skepticism have been (...)
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  6. Wai-hung Wong (2009). Internalism About Justification and the Skeptic's Dilemma. Erkenntnis 71 (3):361 - 375.
    I first argue that the skeptic needs an internalist conception of justification for her argument for skepticism. I then argue that the skeptic also needs to show that we do not have perceptual access to the world if her skepticism is to be a real threat to human knowledge of the world. This, I conclude, puts the skeptic in a dilemma, for internalist conceptions of justification presuppose that we have perceptual access to the world.
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  7. Wai-hung Wong (2009). The Cosmic Lottery. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (3):155 - 165.
    One version of the argument for design relies on the assumption that the apparent fine-tuning of the universe for the existence of life requires an explanation. I argue that the assumption is false. Philosophers who argue for the assumption usually appeal to analogies, such as the one in which a person was to draw a particular straw among a very large number of straws in order not to be killed. Philosophers on the other side appeal to analogies like the case (...)
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  8. Wai-hung Wong (2008). Meaningfulness and Identities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (2):123-148.
    Three distinct but related questions can be asked about the meaningfulness of one’s life. The first is ‘What is the meaning of life?,’ which can be called ‘the cosmic question about meaningfulness’; the second is ‘What is a meaningful life?,’ which can be called ‘the general question about meaningfulness’; and the third is ‘What is the meaning of my life?,’ which can be called ‘the personal question about meaningfulness.’ I argue that in order to deal with all three questions we (...)
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  9. Wai-hung Wong (2008). What Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument Really Is. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):536-543.
    Abstract: Williamson argues that when one feels cold, one may not be in a position to know that one feels cold. He thinks this argument can be generalized to show that no mental states are such that when we are in them we are in a position to know that we are in them. I argue that his argument is a sorites argument in disguise because it relies on the implicit premise that warming up is gradual. Williamson claims that his (...)
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  10. Wai-hung Wong (2006). Moore, the Skeptic, and the Philosophical Context. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):271–287.
    I argue that Moore's arguments have anti-skeptical force even though they beg the question against skepticism because they target the skeptic rather than skepticism directly. Moore offers two arguments which are usually conflated by his interpreters, namely, his proof of an external world and a reductio argument. I explain why the anti-skeptical force of the latter has to be derived from that of the former. I consider an objection to Moore that is based on distinguishing between the everyday and the (...)
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  11. Wai-Hung Wong (2005). The Skeptical Paradox and the Indispensability of Knowledge-Beliefs. Synthese 143 (3):273-290.
    Some philosophers understand epistemological skepticism as merely presenting a paradox to be solved, a paradox given rise to by some apparently forceful arguments. I argue that such a view needs to be justified, and that the best way to do so is to show that we cannot help seeing skepticism as obviously false. The obviousness (to us) of the falsity of skepticism is, I suggest, explained by the fact that we cannot live without knowledge-beliefs (a knowledge-belief about the world is (...)
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  12. Wai-hung Wong (2003). Strawson's Anti-Scepticism: A Critical Reconstruction. Ratio 16 (3):290–306.
  13. Wai-hung Wong (2002). The Problem of Insulation. Philosophy 77 (3):349-373.
    Insulation is a noticeable phenomenon in the case of most non-Pyrrhonian sceptics about human knowledge. A sceptic is experiencing insulation when his scepticism does not have any effect on his common sense beliefs, and his common sense beliefs do not have any effect on his scepticism. I try to show why this is a puzzling phenomenon, and how it can be explained. It is puzzling because insulation seems to require blindness to one's own epistemic irresponsibility and irrationality, while the sceptic (...)
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  14. Wai-Hung Wong (1999). Interpretive Charity, Massive Disagreement, and Imagination. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):49-74.
    I argue that it is a main theme of Davidson's theory of interpretation that interpretive charity implies the impossibility of massive disagreement. There is clear textual support for that. I then argue that from the first-person point of view of a full-blooded interpreter, the theme must be accepted; and that is precisely why Davidson accepts it. If massive disagreement between speaker and interpreter seems to us easy to imagine, it is only because the imagination involved is third-personal and not full-blooded.
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  15. Wai-Hung Wong (1993). To Interpret, or to Be Omniscient. Philosophical Papers 22 (3):189-198.
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  16. Wai-Hung Wong (1993). Donald Davidson's Theory of Interpretation. Dissertation, University of Hong Kong
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