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Profile: Walter Schaller (Texas Tech University)
  1. Walter E. Schaller (2005). Liberal Neutrality and Liberty of Conscience. Law and Philosophy 24 (2):107 - 138.
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  2. Walter E. Schaller (2004). Is Liberal Neutrality Insufficiently Egalitarian? Neutrality of Justification Versus Strong Egalitarianism. Journal of Philosophy 101 (12):639 - 650.
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  3. Walter E. Schaller (2000). Kant on Right and Moral Rights. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2):321-342.
  4. Walter E. Schaller (2000). Why Preference-Satisfaction Cannot Ground an Egalitarian Theory of Justice. Journal of Social Philosophy 31 (3):294–306.
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  5. Walter E. Schaller (1998). Rawls, the Difference Principle, and Economic Inequality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):368–391.
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  6. Walter E. Schaller (1997). Expensive Preferences and the Priority of Right: A Critique of Welfare-Egalitarianism. Journal of Political Philosophy 5 (3):254–273.
  7. Walter E. Schaller (1995). From the "Groundwork" to the "Metaphysics of Morals:" What Happened to Morality in Kant's Theory of Justice? History of Philosophy Quarterly 12 (3):333 - 345.
  8. Walter E. Schaller (1993). Should Kantians Care About Moral Worth? Dialogue 32 (01):25-.
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  9. Walter E. Schaller (1992). The Relation of Moral Worth to the Good Will in Kant's Ethics. Journal of Philosophical Research 17:351-382.
    I consider three questions concerning the relation of the good will to the moral worth of actions. (1) Does a good will consist simply in acting from the motive of duty? (2) Does acting from the motive of duty presuppose that one has a good will? (3) Does the fact that one has a good wilI entail that all of one’s duty-fulfilling actions have moral worth, even if they are not (directly) motivated by duty? I argue that while only persons (...)
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  10. Walter E. Schaller (1991). Punishment and the Utilitarian Criterion of Right and Wrong. Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):109-125.
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  11. Walter E. Schaller (1990). Are Virtues No More Than Dispositions to Obey Moral Rules? Philosophia 20 (1-2):195-207.
    Virtues are standardly understood as (1) essentially dispositions to perform certain actions and (2) having only instrumental value as motives to fulfill moral duties which can be fulfilled by persons lacking the virtue because the duties mandate only certain act-types. The argument of this article is that the duties of beneficence, gratitude and self-respect cannot be stated in terms of obligatory act-types because they cannot be fulfilled (except in deficient form) by persons lacking the appropriate virtue; they are, rather, duties (...)
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  12. Walter E. Schaller (1987). Kant's Architectonic of Duties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (2):299-314.
  13. Walter E. Schaller (1987). Kant on Virtue and Moral Worth. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):559-573.