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Profile: Walter Hopp (Boston University)
  1. Daniel Dahlstrom, Andreas Elpidorou & Walter Hopp (eds.) (forthcoming). Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches. Routledge.
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  2. Walter Hopp (2014). Experiments in Thought. Perspectives on Science 22 (2):242-263.
    Thought experiments in science, philosophy, and everyday life give rise to all of the following: belief, conviction, justification, perplexity, and, sometimes, knowledge. How? More specifically, what sorts of intentional acts must one perform in order to carry out a thought experiment, what sorts of objects are such acts directed toward, and how are those objects made present, or not, in the carrying out of those acts? My view is that a careful and initially metaphysically unbiased phenomenological description will support the (...)
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  3. Walter Hopp (2014). Is Seeing Intentional? A Response to Travis. Methodos 14.
    This is a response to Charles Travis's article "Is Seeing Intentional?" In it, I argue that while seeing differs from other intentional states in a variety of ways, seeing is indeed intentional, at least in the philosophically central sense of "intentional" introduced to us by Brentano and Husserl. Seeing is, quite often at least, the consciousness of something. I spend the majority of the paper discussing Travis's arguments that it is not, and providing reasons for thinking they are inconclusive. That (...)
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  4. Walter Hopp (2013). No Such Look: Problems with the Dual Content Theory. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):813-833.
    It is frequently alleged that a round plate viewed from an oblique angle looks elliptical, and that when one tree is in front of another that is the same intrinsic size, the front one looks larger than the rear one. And yet there is also a clear sense in which the plate viewed from an angle looks round, and a clear sense in which the two trees look to be the same size. According to the Dual Content Theory (DCT), what (...)
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  5. Walter Hopp (2013). Précis of Perception and Knowledge: A Phenomenological Account. [REVIEW] Husserl Studies 29 (1):29-32.
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  6. Walter Hopp (2013). Replies. Husserl Studies 29 (1):65-77.
    I would like to thank Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl and Søren Overgaard for their penetrating and challenging criticisms of my book, Perception and Knowledge (henceforth ‘‘PK’’). What follows are responses to some, though by no means all, of the critical points each raises.
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  7. Walter Hopp (2012). Burt C. Hopkins: The Philosophy of Husserl. [REVIEW] Husserl Studies 28 (3):239-249.
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  8. Walter Hopp (2012). The (Many) Foundations of Knowledge. In Dan Zahavi (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology. Oxford University Press.
     
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  9. Walter Hopp (2011). Perception and Knowledge: A Phenomenological Account. Cambridge University Press.
    Provides an original and provocative account of the nature of perception and its role in the production of knowledge.
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  10. Walter Hopp (2010). How to Think About Nonconceptual Content. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 10 (1):1-24.
    This paper provides a general account of what nonconceptual content is, and some considerations in favor of its existence. After distinguishing between the contents and objects of mental states, as well as the properties of being conceptual and being conceptualized, I argue that what is phenomenologically distinctive about conceptual content is that it is not determined by, and does not determine, the intuitive character of an experience. That is, for virtually any experience E with intuitive character I, there is no (...)
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  11. Walter Hopp (2009). Conceptualism and the Myth of the Given. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):363-385.
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  12. Walter Hopp (2009). Husserl, Dummett, and the Linguistic Turn. Grazer Philosophische Studien 78 (1):17-40.
    Michael Dummett famously holds that the “philosophy of thought” must proceed via the philosophy of language, since that is the only way to preserve the objectivity of thoughts while avoiding commitments to “mythological,” Platonic entities. Central to Dummett’s case is his thesis that all thought contents are linguistically expressible. In this paper, I will (a) argue that making the linguistic turn is neither necessary nor sufficient to avoid the problems of psychologism, (b) discuss Wayne Martin’s argument that not all thought-contents (...)
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  13. Walter Hopp (2009). Phenomenology and Fallibility. Husserl Studies 25 (1):1-14.
    If Husserl is correct, phenomenological inquiry produces knowledge with an extremely high level of epistemic warrant or justification. However, there are several good reasons to think that we are highly fallible at carrying out phenomenological inquiries. It is extremely difficult to engage in phenomenological investigations, and there are very few substantive phenomenological claims that command a widespread consensus. In what follows, I introduce a distinction between method-fallibility and agent-fallibility, and use it to argue that the fact that we are fallible (...)
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  14. Walter Hopp (2009). Reply to Heffernan. Husserl Studies 25 (1):45-49.
  15. Walter Hopp (2008). Husserl on Sensation, Perception, and Interpretation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (2):pp. 219-245.
    Husserl's theory of perception is remarkable in several respects. For one thing, Husserl rigorously distinguishes the parts and properties of the act of consciousness - its content -from the parts and properties of the object perceived. Second, Husserl's repeated insistence that perceptual consciousness places its subject in touch with the perceived object itself, rather than some representation that does duty for it, vindicates the commonsensical and phenomenologically grounded belief that when a thing appears to us, it is precisely that thing, (...)
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  16. Walter Hopp (2008). Husserl, Phenomenology, and Foundationalism. Inquiry 51 (2):194 – 216.
    Husserl is often taken, and not without reason, to endorse the view that phenomenology's task is to provide the “absolute foundation” of human knowledge. In this paper, I will argue that the most natural interpretation of this view, namely that all human knowledge depends for its justification, at least in part, on phenomenological knowledge, is philosophically untenable. I will also present evidence that Husserl himself held no such view, and will argue that Dan Zahavi and John Drummond, though reaching the (...)
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  17. Walter Hopp (2008). Minimalist Truth and Realist Truth. Philosophia Christi 10 (1):87-100.
  18. Walter Hopp (2008). The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 29 (2):175-184.